[
  {
    "url": "https://lagosmepb.org/wp-content/uploads/Transport-Statistics-ver2020.pdf",
    "text": "LAGOS STATE GOVERNMENT\n \nTRANSPORT \nSTATISTICS \n \n 2020 \nLAGOS BUREAU OF STATISTICS \nMINISTRY OF ECONOMIC PLANNING AND BUDGET \nSECRETARIAT, \nALAUSA, IKEJA, LAGOS \ni \n TABLE OF CONTENTS \nTABLE CONTENTS PAGES \nTable of Contents i \nPREFACE xii \nSummary of Vehicles Statistics: 2006-2019 xiii\nROAD TRANSPORT STATISTICS \nHighlights 1\n1.0 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles and Ownership 5 \n (Including Out of Series and Special Plate Numbers), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.1 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership and 6 \nLicensing Station (Agbowa), Lagos State Year 2019 \n1.2 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles, by type of Vehicles, Ownership 7 \n and Licensing Station (Agege I), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.3 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 8 \nand Licensing Station (Agege II), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.4 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership and 9 \nLicensing Station (Aguda Ijesha), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.5 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 10 \n and Licensing Station (Ajegunle I), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.6 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 11 \n and Licensing Station (Ajegunle II), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.7 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicle, Ownership 12 \n and Licensing Station (Ajegunle III), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.8 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 13 \n and Licensing Station(Akodo), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.9 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 14 \n and Licensing Station (Akowonjo), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.10 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 15 \n and Licensing Station (Alaka I), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.11 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 16 \n and Licensing Station (Alaka II), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.12 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 17 \n and Licensing Station (Alakuko), Lagos State: Year 2018 \n1.13 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 18 \n and Licensing Station (Alausa/Allen), Lagos: State Year 2019 \n1.14 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 19 \n and Licensing Station (Apapa I), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.15 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 20 \nii \n and Licensing Station (Apapa II), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.16 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 21 \n and Licensing Station (Badagry), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.17 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 22 \n and Licensing Station (Bolade), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.18 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 23 \n and Licensing Station (City Hall), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.19 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 24 \n and Licensing Station (Egbe), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.20 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 25 \n and Licensing Station (Ejigbo Glass House II), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.21 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 26 \n and Licensing Station (Epe), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.22 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 27 \n and Licensing Station (Ereko), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.23 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 28 \n and Licensing Station (Glass House), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.24 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 29 \n and Licensing Station (Ifako Ijaiye), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.25 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 30 \n and Licensing Station (Ikeja I), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.26 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 31 \n and Licensing Station (Ikeja II), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.27 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 32 \n and Licensing Station (Ikorodu I), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.28 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 33 \n and Licensing Station (Ikorodu II), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.29 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 34 \n and Licensing Station (Ikoyi), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.30 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 35 \n and Licensing Station (Imota), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.31 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 36 \n and Licensing Station (Jebba), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.32 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 37 \n and Licensing Station (Ketu/Ojota), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.33 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 38 \n and Licensing Station (Mushin), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.34 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 39 \n and Licensing Station (Ogba), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.35 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 40 \n and Licensing Station (Ojo), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.36 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicle, Ownership 41 \niii \n and Licensing Station (Ojodu), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n 1.37 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 42 \n and Licensing Station (Ojokoro), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.38 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicle, Ownership 43 \n and Licensing Station (Oke Awo), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.39 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 44 \n and Licensing Station (Olowogbowo), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.40 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 45 \n and Licensing Station (One stop Centre), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.41 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 46 \n and Licensing Station (Oregun), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.42 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 47 \n and Licensing Station (Orile Iganmu), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.43 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 48 \n and Licensing Station (Oshodi Isolo), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.44 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 49 \n and Licensing Station (Oyingbo), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.45 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 50 \nand Licensing Station (Shogunle), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.46 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 51 \nand Licensing Station (Shomolu), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.47 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 52 \n and Licensing Station (Tinubu), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.48 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 53 \n and Licensing Station (Victoria Island), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.49 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, Ownership 54 \n and Licensing Station (Yaba), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.50 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Ownership 55 \n and Licensing Station (Ajah), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.51 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Ownership 56 \n and Licensing Station (Oto-Awori), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.52 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Ownership 57 \n and Licensing Station (Out of Series), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.53 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Ownership 58 \n and Licensing Station (Special Plate Number), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.54 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Ownership 59 \n and Licensing Station (Standard Out of Series), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n1.55 Newly- Registered Motor Vehicles By Type of Vehicles, Ownership 60 \nAnd Licensing Station ( Out of Series REG), Lagos State: Year 2019 \n 2 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Ownership 61 \n and Licensing Station, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n 3 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles, 62 \niv \n and Licensing Station, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n 4 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Licensing Station and 63 \n Residence of Owners, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n 5 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles Classified by Make and 65 \n Type of Ownership, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n 6 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles Classified by Make/Country 66\n of Origin and Licensing Station, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n7.1 Newly-Registered Private Motor Vehicles Classified by Make/Country 70 \n of Origin and Licensing Station, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n7.2 Newly-Registered Commercial Motor Vehicles by Make/Country of Origin 74 \n and Licensing Station, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n8.1 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles and Year 78 \n of Registration, Lagos State: Year 2004– 2019 \n8.2 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Ownership 79 \n and Year of Registration, Lagos State: Year 2004– 2019 \n9.1 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Ownership, 80 \n and Year of Registration, Lagos State: Year 2011 – 2010 \n9.2 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles and 81 \n Ownership, Lagos State: Year 2012-2013 \n9.3 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles and 82 \n Ownership, Lagos State: Year 2014-2015 \n9.4 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles by Type of Vehicles and 83 \n Ownership, Lagos State: Year 2016 -2017 \n10 Newly-Registered Motorcycles/Tricycles by Make and Ownership 84 \n Including Out of Series and Special Plate Numbers, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n11 Newly-Registered Motorcycles/Tricycles by Licensing Station and Make/ 85 \n Country of Origin, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n12 Newly- Registered Motorcycles/Tricycles by Make and Year of Registration: 87 \n Year 2001-2019 \n13 Estimated Number of Motor Vehicles’ Licenses Renewed by Type of Vehicles 88 \n and Ownership, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n14 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles/Motorcycles/Tricycles and Estimate of Licenses 89\n Renewed, Lagos State: Year 2004-2019\n15 Estimated Number of Motorcycles/Tricycles Licenses Renewed by 90 \n Ownership and Make of Cycles, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n16 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles with Special Plate Numbers Classified 91 \n by Month and Make of Vehicles, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n17 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles with Special Plate Numbers Classified 92 \n by State of Residence of Owners and Make of Vehicles, Lagos State: \n Year 2019 \n18 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles with Out of Series Plate Numbers 93 \n Classified by Month and Make of Vehicles, Lagos State: Year 2019 \nv \n19 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles with Out of Series Plate Numbers 94 \n Classified by State of Residence of Owners and make of Vehicles \n Lagos State: Year 2019 \n20.1 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles with Out of Series Plate Numbers 95 \n by Type of Vehicles and Year of Registration, Lagos State: Year 2008-2019 \n20.2 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles with Special Plate Numbers 95 \n by Type of Vehicles and Year of Registration, Lagos State: Year 2008-2019 \n21.1 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles with Out of Series Plate 96 \n Numbers by Type of Vehicles and Type of Ownership, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n21.2 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles with Special Plate 96 \n Numbers by Type of Vehicles and Type of Ownership, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n22 Newly-Registered Motor Vehicles Classified by Licensing Station and 97 \n Month of Registration, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n23 Newly Registered Motorcycles/Tricycles Classified by Licensing Stations 98 \n and Month of Registration, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n24 Newly Registered Motorcycles/Tricycles by Licensing Station and 99 \n Make/Type o f Motorcycles/Tricycles, Lagos State: Year 2019 \n25 Autoreg Hackney Permits: Year 2011-2019 101 \n26 Number of Drivers Trained in Lagos State Drivers' Institute Centers: 102 \n Year 2015 \n27 Number of Drivers Trained in Lagos State Drivers’ Institute Centers: Year 2016 103 \n28 Number of Drivers Trained in Lagos State Drivers' Institute Centers: Year 2017 104\n29 Number of Drivers Trained in Lagos State Drivers' Institute Centers: Year 2018 105 \n30 Number of Drivers' Trained in Lagos State Drivers' Institute 106 \n Centers: Year 2019 \n31 Summary of Number of Drivers' Trained in Lagos State Drivers' Institute 107 \n Centers: Year 2015-2019 \n32 Statistics of Conductors’ Accreditation and Driving School Application 108 \n Forms as Recorded by Lagos State Drivers Institute: Year 2016 \n33 Statistics of Conductors’ Accreditation and Driving School Application 109 \n Forms as Recorded by Lagos State Drivers Institute: Year 2017 \n34 Statistics of Conductors' Accreditation and Driving School Application 110 \n Form as Recorded by Lagos State Drivers' Institute: Year 2018 \n35 Statistics of Conductors' Accreditation and Driving School Application 111 \nForm as Recorded by Lagos State Drivers' Institute: Year 2019 \n36 Total Revenue Realized Through Fines by Month and Zone: Year 2015 112 \n37 Total Revenue Realized Through Fines by Month and Zone: Year 2016 113 \n38 Total Revenue Realized Through Fines by Month and Zone: Year 2017 114 \n39 Total Revenue Realized Through Demurrage: Year 2017 115 \n40 Total Revenue Realized Through Tow Proceeds: Year 2017 116 \n41 Total Revenue Realized Through Demurrage: Year 2018 117 \n42 Total Revenue Realized Through Tow Proceeds: Year 2018 118 \nvi \n \n43 Total Revenue Realized Through Fines by Month and Zone: Year 2018 119 \n44 Total Revenue Realized Through Demurrage: Year 2019 120 \n45 Total Revenue Realized Through Fines by Month and Zone: Year 2019 121 \n46 Monthly Number of Offenses Committed by Motorist: 2014-2019 122 \n47 Monthly Number of Vehicles Impounded in Lagos State: Year 2014-2018 123 \n48 Monthly Number of Road Accidents Recorded by Traffic Management 124 \nAuthority in Lagos State: Years 2014-2019 \n49 Monthly Number of Persons Injured in Road Accidents in Lagos State: 125 \nYears 2014– 2019 \n50 Monthly Number of Persons Killed in Road Accidents in Lagos State: 125 \nYear 2014– 2019 \n51 Classification of Road Accidents in Lagos State by Category: Year 2011-2019 126 \n52 Number of Recorded Casualties in Road Accidents by Gender in Lagos State: 126 \n Year 2011-2019 \n53 Traffic Related Offenses in Lagos State: Year 2015 – 2019 127 \n54 Production of Plate Numbers Report for Year 2015 in Lagos State 128 \n55 Production of Plate Numbers Report for Year 2016 in Lagos State 129 \n56 Production of Plate Numbers Report for Year 2017 in Lagos State 130 \n57 Production of Plate Numbers Report for Year 2018 in Lagos State 131 \n58 Production of Plate Numbers Report for Year 2019 in Lagos State 132 \n59 Number of BRT Buses by Ownership and Passengers: Year 2015 133 \n60 Number of BRT Buses by Ownership and Passengers: Year 2016 134 \n61 Number of BRT Buses by Ownership and Passengers: Year2017 135\n62 Number of BRT Buses by Ownership and Passengers: Year2018 136 \n63 Number of BRT Buses by Ownership and Passengers: Year2019 137 \n64 Number of BRT Routes and Buses by Passengers: Year 2015 138 \n65 Number of Bus Franchisee Services (BFS) Routes and Buses by 138 \nPassengers: Year 2015 \n66 Number of BRT Routes and Buses by Passengers: Year 2016 139 \n67 Number of Bus Franchisee Services (BFS) Routes and Buses by 139 \n Passengers: Year 2016 \n68 Number of BRT Routes and Buses by Passengers: Year 2017 139 \n69 Number of Bus Franchisee Services (BFS) Routes and Buses by 140 \nPassengers: Year 2018 \n70 Number of BRT Routes and Buses by Passengers: Year 2018 140 \n71 Number of BRT Routes and Buses by Passengers: Year 2019 140 \n72 Monthly Number of Road Accidents recorded by Lagos Metropolitan 141 \n Area Transport Authority: Year 2014-2019 \n73 Monthly Number of Persons injured in Road Accidents recorded by Lagos 141 \n Metropolitan Area Transport Authority: Year 2014-2019 \nvii \n74 Monthly Number of Persons killed in Road Accidents recorded by Lagos 142 \n Metropolitan Area Transport Authority: Year 2014-2019 \n75 Classification of Road Accidents Recorded by Lagos Metropolitan 142 \nArea Transport Authority: Year 2014-2019 \n76 Number of BRT Routes and Buses by Ownership and Status: Year 2018 143 \n77 Number of BRT Routes and Buses by Ownership and Status: Year 2019 144 \n78 Number of Recorded Casualties in Road Accident by Gender in Lagos State: 145 \n Year 2019 \n79 Number of LAGBUS Buses by Ownership and Passengers: Year 2015 146 \n80 Number of LAGBUS Routes and Buses by Passengers: Year 2015 147 \n81 Number of LAGBUS Buses by Ownership and Passengers: Year 2016 148 \n82 Number of LAGBUS Routes and Buses by Passengers: Year 2016 149 \n83 Number of LAGBUS Buses by Ownership and Passengers: Year 2017 150 \n84 Number of LAGBUS Routes and Buses by Passengers: Year 2017 151 \n85 Number of LAGBUS Routes and Buses by Passengers: Year 2018 152 \n86 Number of LAGBUS Routes and Buses by Passengers: Year 2018 153 \n87 Number of LAGBUS Buses by Ownership and Passengers: Year 2019 154 \n88 Number of LAGBUS Routes and Buses by Passengers: Year 2019 155 \n89 Number of LAGBUS by Ownership and Status: Year 2017 156 \n90 Number of LAGBUS by Ownership and Status: Year 2018 156 \n91 Number of LAGBUS by Ownership and Status: Year 2019 157 \n92 Monthly Number of Road Accidents recorded by LAGBUS Assets 158 \n Management in Lagos State: Year 2014- 2019 \n93 Monthly Number of Persons injured in Road Accidents recorded by LAGBUS 158 \n Assets Management in Lagos State: Year 2014-2019 \n94 Monthly Number of Persons killed in Road Accidents recorded by LAGBUS 159 \n Assets Management in Lagos State: Year 2014-2019 \n95 Type of Motor Accidents recorded by LAGBUS Assets 159 \n Management: Year 2009-2018 \n96 Number of casualties in Road Accidents by Gender recorded by 159 \n LAGBUS Assets Management: Year 2014-2019 \n97 Statistics on Renewal by Type of Vehicles: Year 2015 160 \n98 Statistics on Violation of Traffic Offences: Year 2015 160\n99 Statistics on Renewal by Type of Vehicles: Year 2016 161 \n100 Statistics on Violation of Traffic Offences: Year 2016 161 \n101 Statistics on Renewal by Type of Vehicles: Year 2017 162 \n102 Statistics on Violation of Traffic Offences: Year 2017 162 \n103 Statistics on Renewal by Type of Vehicles: Year 2018 163 \n104 Statistics on Renewal by Type of Vehicles: Year 2019 163 \n105 Statistics on Renewal by Type of Vehicles: Year 2019 164 \n106 Monthly Number of Road-worthiness Certificates Issued for Renewal 165 \nby Type of Vehicles in: Year 2019 \nviii \n107 Monthly Number of Road-worthiness Certificates Issued for Renewal 165 \nby Type of Vehicles in: Year 2019 \n108 Monthly Number of Vehicles and Motorcycles Inspected: Year 2015 166 \n109 Monthly Number of Vehicles and Motorcycles Inspected: Year 2016 167 \n110 Monthly Number of Vehicles and Motorcycles Inspected: Year 2017 168 \n111 Monthly Number of Vehicles and Motorcycles Inspected: Year 2018 169 \n112 Monthly Number of Vehicles and Motorcycles Inspected: Year 2019 170 \n113 Number of Vehicles Impounded: Year 2015-2019 171 \n114 Statistics on Vehicle/ Rider's Licenses Processed: Year 2014 172 \n115 Statistics on Vehicle/ Rider's Licenses Processed: Year 2015 173 \n116 Statistics on Vehicle/ Rider's Licenses Processed: Year 2016 174 \n117 Statistics on Vehicle/ Rider's Licenses Processed: Year 2017 175 \n118 Statistics on Vehicle/ Rider's Licenses Processed: Year 2018 176 \n119 Statistics on Vehicle/ Rider's Licenses Processed: Year 2019 177 \n120 Statistics of Motor Parks in Lagos State: Year 2015 178 \n121 Statistics of Motor Parks in Lagos State: Year 2016 181 \n122 Statistics of Motor Parks in Lagos State: Year 2017 184 \n123 Statistics of Motor Parks in Lagos State: Year 2018 187 \n124 Statistics of Motor Parks in Lagos State: Year 2019 189 \n125 Historical Statistics on MOT Certification: Year 2005-2019 192 \n126 Statistics of Motor Parks in Lagos State: Year 2015 193 \n127 Statistics of Mechanic Village and Taxi Parks by Local Government 194 \nAreas: Year 2015–2019 \n128 Statistics of Roads Constructed by Length (km) according to Local Government 195 \n Areas: Year 2015-2019 \n129 Summary of Roads and Bridges Constructed/Rehabilitated 196 \nby Length(km): Year 2010-2019 \n130 Statistics of Roads Rehabilitated/Upgraded by Length (km) according to Local 197 \n Government Areas: Year 2015-2019 \n131 Statistics of Street Lights Installed according to Local Government 198 \nAreas: Year 2015-2019 \n132 Statistics on Length of Bridges completed according to Local Government 199 \n Areas: Year 2017 \n133 Statistics on Length of Bridges Completed According to Local Government 200 \n Areas: Year 2018 \n134 Statistics on Length of Bridges completed according to Local Government 201 \n Areas: Year 2019 \n135 Summary of Roads Maintained/Rehabilitated by Public Works Corporation 202\n According to Local Government Areas: Year 2011-2017 \n136 Statistics of Roads Maintained /Rehabilitated by Length according to 203 \n Local Government Areas: Year 2011– 2018 \nix \nWATER TRANSPORT STATISTICS\n137 Number of Ferries by Ownership and Passengers: Year 2014 204 \n138 Number of Ferries by Ownership and Passengers: Year 2015 204 \n139 Number of Ferries by Ownership and Passengers: Year 2016 205 \n140 Number of Ferries by Ownership and Passengers: Year 2017 206 \n141 Number of Ferries by Ownership and Passengers: Year 2018 207 \n142 Number of Ferries by Ownership and Passengers: Year 2019 208 \n143 Name of Ferry Jetties by Passengers: Year 2015 209 \n144 Name of Ferry Jetties by Passenger: year 2016 210 \n145 Name of Ferry Jetties by Passengers: Year 2017 211 \n146 Name of Ferry Jetties by Passenger: year 2018 212 \n147 Name of Ferry Jetties by Passenger: year 2019 213 \n148 Number of Ferry routes by Passenger: year 2017 214 \n149 Number of Ferry routes by Passenger: year 2018 216 \n150 Number of Ferry routes by Passenger: year 2019 218 \n151 Statistics on Water accident recorded by Lagos State waterways 219 \n Authority: year 2015-2019 \n152 Statistics on person injured in water accident recorded by Lagos 220 \n State waterways Authority: year 2015-2019 \n153 Statistics on person injured in water accident recorded by Lagos 221 \n State waterways Authority: year 2019 \n154 Statistics on person killed in water accident recorded by Lagos 222 \n State waterways Authority: year 2019 \n155 Type of Boat/Ferry Accidents Recorded by Lagos State 223 \n Waterways Authority: Year 2019 \n156 Number of Recorded Casualties by Gender in Boat/Ferry 223 \n Accidents: Year 2019 \n157 List of Ferry Operation by location in Lagos State: Year 2018 224 \n158 List of Ferry Operations by location in Lagos State: Year 2019 230 \n159 Number of Boats by Ownership and Passengers, Lagos State: year 2014 237\n160 Number of Boats by Ownership and Passengers, Lagos State: year 2015 238 \n161 Number of Boats by Ownership and Passengers, Lagos State: year 2016 239 \n162 Number of Boats by Ownership and Passengers, Lagos State: year 2017 240 \n163 Number of Boat/Ferry Routes by passengers, Lagos State 2014 241 \n164 Number of Boat/Ferry Routes by passengers, Lagos State 2015 241 \n165 Number of Boat/Ferry Routes by passengers, Lagos State 2016 242 \n166 Number of Boat/Ferry Routes by passengers, Lagos State 2017 242 \n167 Number of Vessels (Ship Traffic) In Nigeria: Year 2013-2019 243 \n168 Volume Of Cargo Throughput (Million Metric Tons):: Year 2013-2019 243 \n169 Ship Traffic (Gross Registered Tonnage In Million): Year 2013-2019 243 \n170 Number of Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) of Ocean Going Vessels 244 \nx \n In Nigerian Ports: Year 2017 \n171 Number of Gross Registered (GRT) of Service Boats 244 \n In Nigerian Ports: Year 2017 \n172 Volume of Cargo Throughput (Million Metric Tons): by Trade by 244 \nNigeria Ports: Year 2017 \n173 Number of Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) of Ocean Going Vessels 245 \n In Nigeria Ports: Year 2018 \n174 Number of Gross Registered (GRT) of Service Boats 245 \n In Nigeria Ports: Year 2018 \n175 Volume of Cargo Throughput (Million Metric Tons): by Trade by 245 \nNigeria Ports: Year 2018 \n176 Number of Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT) of Ocean Going Vessels 246 \n In Nigeria Ports: Year 2019 \n177 Number of Gross Registered (GRT) of Service Boats 246 \n In Nigeria Ports: Year 2019 \n178 Volume of Cargo Throughput (Million Metric Tons): by Trade by 246 \n Nigeria Ports: Year 2019 \n179 Volume of Cargo Throughput (Million Metric Tons): by Trade by 247 \n Nigeria Ports: Year 2017 \n180 Container Traffic Statistics at Nigeria Ports: 2017 247 \n181 Volume of Cargo Throughput (Million Metric Tons): by Trade by 248 \n Nigeria Ports: Year 2018 \n182 Container Traffic Statistics at Nigeria Ports: 2018 248 \n183 Volume of Cargo Throughput (Million Metric Tons): by Trade by 249 \n Nigeria Ports: Year 2019 \n184 Container Traffic Statistics at Nigeria Ports: 2019 249 \n185 Approved Jetties at Lagos and Tin Can Ports: Year 2018 250\n186 Approved Jetties at Lagos Port Complex and Tin Can 251 \nPorts: Year 2018 \n187: Statistics on Passengers Traffic Across Sea Ports in Nigeria: 252 \nYear 2015 - 2019 \nAIR TRANSPORT STATISTICS\n188 Statistics on Passenger Traffic at Muritala Muhammed Airport, Lagos: 253 \n Year 2014 \n189 Statistics on Passenger Traffic at Muritala Muhammed Airport, Lagos: 254 \n Year 2015 \n190 Statistics on Passenger Traffic at Muritala Muhammed Airport, Lagos: 255 \n Year 2016 \n191 Statistics on Passenger Traffic at Muritala Muhammed Airport, Lagos: 256 \n Year 2017 \nxi \n192 Statistics on Passenger Traffic at Muritala Muhammed Airport, Lagos: 257 \n Year 2018 \n193 Statistics on Passenger Traffic at Muritala Muhammed Airport, Lagos: 258 \n Year 2019 \n194 Statistics on Aircraft Movement at Muritala Muhammed Airport, Lagos: 259 \n Year 2014 \n195 Statistics on Aircraft Movement at Muritala Muhammed Airport, Lagos: 260 \nYear: 2015 \n196 Statistics on Aircraft Movement at Muritala Muhammed Airport, Lagos: 261 \n Year 2016 \n197 Statistics on Aircraft Movement at Muritala Muhammed Airport, Lagos: 262 \n Year 2017 \n198 Statistics on Aircraft Movement at Muritala Muhammed Airport, Lagos: 263 \n Year 2018 \n199 Statistics on Aircraft Movement at Muritala Muhammed Airport, Lagos: 264 \n Year 2019 \n200 Statistics on Cargo and Mail Movement at Muritala Muhammed 265 \nInternational Airport, Lagos: Year 2014 \n201 Statistics on Cargo and Mail Movement at Muritala Muhammed 266 \nInternational Airport, Lagos: Year 2015 \n203 Statistics on Cargo and Mail Movement at Muritala Muhammed 267 \nInternational Airport, Lagos: Year 2016 \n204 Statistics on Cargo and Mail Movement at Muritala Muhammed 268 \nInternational Airport, Lagos: Year 2017 \n205 Statistics on Cargo and Mail Movement at Muritala Muhammed 269 \nInternational Airport, Lagos: Year 2018 \n205 Statistics on Cargo and Mail Movement at Muritala Muhammed 270 \nInternational Airport, Lagos: Year 2019 \n206 Summary of Passenger Traffic at Muritala Muhammed Airport, 271 \nLagos: Year 2012-2018 \n207 Summary of Aircraft Movement at Muritala Muhammed Airport 271 \n Lagos: year 2012-2018 \n208 Summary of Cargo and Mail Movement at Muritala Muhammed 271 \n International Airport, Lagos: Year 2012-2018 \n RAIL TRANSPORT STATISTICS\n209 Railway Passengers and Freight Traffic: Year 2014 272 \n210 Railway Passengers and Freights Traffic: Year 2015 272 \n211 Railway Passengers and Freight Traffic: Year 2016 273 \n212 Railway Passengers and Freights Traffic: Year 2017 273 \nxii \n213 Railway Passengers and Freight Traffic: Year 2018 274 \n214 Railway Passengers and Freight Traffic: Year 2019 275 \n215 Railway Passengers and Freights Traffic for Lagos District: Year 2013-2019 276 \n216 Railway Passengers Traffic: Year 2013-2019 277 \n217 Railway Freights Traffic: Year 2013-2019 277 \n218 Rail Track Routes by Distance in Lagos State 278 \n219 Rail Park and Ride Facilities for Railway Commuters by Location 279 \nand Capacity in Lagos State \n220 Railway Stations by Location in Lagos State 279 \n221 Types of Rail Accidents in Lagos State: Year 2015 - 2019 280 \n222 Quarterly Number of Rail Accidents in Lagos State: Year 2014 - 2019 281 \n223 Type of Rail Accidents in Lagos State: Year 2014 -2019 281 \n224 Quarterly Number of Persons Injured In Rail Accidents in Lagos 282 \n State: Year 2019 \n225 Monthly Number of Persons Killed in Rail Accidents in Lagos State: 283 \n Year 2014 - 2017 \n226 Quarterly Number of Persons Killed in Rail Accidents in Lagos State: 283 \n Year 2014 - 2019 \nPREFACE \nThis publication makes an attempt to meet the demand of individuals and \norganizationson Transport Statistical data. This edition features data on four (4) \nmain components of Transportation across the State and Federal Transport \nrelated Agencies with Lagos State specific data comprising Road Transport \nStatistics, Water Transport Statistics, Air Transport Statistics and Rail Transport \nStatistics. \nThe Publication would be useful by researchers, academia,students, planners, \npolicy makers and all those who are interested in Transport Statistics. The scope \nof the subsequent edition of this Annual Publication will continue to be expanded \nto cover both State and Federal related Transport Agencies that were not \ncaptured in this edition. \nWe wish to express our profound gratitude to all State and Federal Transport \nrelated Agencies that had responded positively to our data request that featured \nin this year edition of Transport Statistics Publication. We also hope that statistical \ndata users would find the publication useful. \n Constructive criticisms and suggestions for improvement are however welcome. \nLagos Bureau of Statistics \nMinistry of Economic Planning and Budget \nThe Secretariat, \nAlausa-Ikeja, Lagos. \nEmail Address: lbs@lagosstate.gov.ng \nxii \nSUMMARY OF MOTOR VEHICLE/CYCLES STATISTICS (INCLUDING OUT OF SERIES AND SPECIAL \nPLATE NUMBERS): YEAR 2006 - 2019 \nYEAR\nNEW REGISTRATION RENEWAL \nGRAND \nTOTAL \nMOTOR \nVEHICLES \nMOTOR \nCYCLES TOTAL \nMOTOR \nVEHICLES \nMOTOR \nCYCLES TOTAL \n2006 141,265 11,846 153,111 205,927 6,461 212,388 365,499\n2007 187,442 18,906 206,348 438,649 12,356 451,005 657,353\n2008 239,922 42,754 282,676 497,657 14,810 512,467 795,143\n2009 210,798 80,414 291,212 577,638 16,762 594,400 885,612\n2010 240,963 84,666 325,629 695,641 20,481 716122 1,041,751\n2011 259,473 73,411 332,884 758,958 22,587 781,545 1,114,429\n2012 293,864 27,713 321,577 723,595 3,636 727,231 1,048,808 \n2013 307,399 11,858 319,257 778,463 3,814 782,277 1,101,534 \n2014 285,657 3,471 289,128 682,343 6,263 688,606 977,734 \n2015 304,935 10,214 315,149 529,022 15,744 544,766 859,915 \n2016 257,590 15,967 273,557 616,234 18,339 634,573 908,130 \n2017 206,876 13,517 220,393 512,224 15,244 527,468 747,861 \n2018 238,226 25,050 263,276 408229 12149 420378 683,654\n2019 154,056 38,330 192,386 497,633 14,809 512,442 704,828\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \n xiii \n1\n \nMOTOR VEHICLE REGISTRATION STATISTICS, \nLAGOS STATE 2019 \nHIGHLIGHTS \n1.1.0 NEWLY-REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES: Y2019 \n1.1.1 The total number of motor vehicles newly registered in Lagos State in the \nyear 2019 Stood at 154,056 compared with 238,226 vehicles recorded in \n2018. This indicate a decrease of 84,170 (35.33%) over the 2018 figure. \n1.1.2 Motor vehicles registered for private use in year 2019 numbered 127,058 \nrepresenting 82.5% of the total vehicle registered as against 196,077 in \n2018. There is a decrease of 69,019 (35.20%) over the 2018 figure. Out of \nthe total motor vehicles registered for private use 126,436 were \nsaloon/Jeep wagons representing 99.51% of total vehicle registered for \nprivate. \n1.1.3 The number of vehicles registered for commercial use decreased from \n25,788 in 2018 to 17,526 in the year 2019 representing a decrease of \n8,262 (47.14%). Minibuses and Omnibuses accounted for 4,855 (27.70%) \nand 6,741 (38.46%) respectively of the vehicles registered for commercial \nuse in year 2019. However, saloon/station wagons including taxi cabs \naccounted for 1,307 representing 7.45% of the commercial motor vehicles \nregistered in 2019. \n1.1.4 The number of vehicles registered by corporate organizations (companies) \nin year 2019 was 8,774 which indicated a decrease of 6,489 ( 42.51%) \nover the 15,263 vehicles recorded in 2018 while 5,617 representing \n64.02% of the total vehicles registered by companies in year 2019 were \nmade up of saloon/ wagons. Registration figure for Government’s vehicles \nrecorded downward trend as a total of 234 vehicles were registered in year \n2019 as against 489 vehicles registered in 2018. This represents a \n2\ndecrease of 255 (52.15%) over 2018 figure. Similarly, the number of \nvehicles registered by mission/schools in year 2019 was 464 which shows \na decrease of 141 (23.30%) over the corresponding figure of 605 recorded \nin year 2018. \n1.1.5 Saloon/Station wagon vehicles registered in year 2019 was 133,935 \nrepresenting 86.94% of the total vehicles registered in the year. There was \na decrease of 75,099 (35.93%) in year 2019 compared with year 2018 \nfigure which was 209,034. Minibuses constituted 5,837 (3.79%) of the year \n2019 total number of registered vehicles. Van/Pick up accounted for 2,823 \n(1.83%) of the total number registered in year 2019 with an increase of 629 \n(28.67%) compared with total number of 2,194 registered in 2018. \nOmnibus vehicles accounted for 8,072 (5.24%) of the total figure for the \nyear 2019 compared with corresponding figure of 3890 (1.63%) in year \n2018. Lorry/Truck vehicles accounted for 3,185 (2.07%) of the total \nvehicles registered in year 2019 and it shows a decrease of 1691 \n(34.68%) over 4,876 figure recorded in year 2018. \n1.1.6 Glass House Licensing Station recorded the highest number of newly \nregistered Vehicles with a figure of 7,266 representing 4.72% of the total \nregistration figure in year 2019. However, Ojodu Licensing Station came \nnext with a registration figure of 4,944 (3.21%) while Ketu Ojota Licensing \nStation followed with a total figure of 4,581 representing 2.97% of the \nregistration figure in 2019. Out of series Licensing Station recorded the \nlowest Motor Vehicles registration with 200 registered vehicles \nrepresenting (0.012) % of the total figure in year 2019 followed by Fancy \n(Special) Licensing Station and Bolade Licensing Stations with 510 (0.33%) \nand 1,834 (1.19%) respectively. \n2.1.0 NEWLY REGISTERED MOTOR CYCLES: Y2019 \n2.1.1 A total number of 38,330 motorcycles were registered in the State in year \n 2019 as against 25,050 and 13,517 registered in year 2018 and 2017 \n respectively. \n3\n2.1.2 Jebba Licensing Station recorded the highest number of motorcycles \nRegistration with a total figure of 4,736 (12.36%) in year 2019 while Jebba, \nOgba and Ikorodu II followed with 2,830 (7.38%), 2,091 (5.46%) and 2003 \n(5.23%) number of registered vehicles respectively in year 2019. \nHowever, Fancy Licensing Station recorded the lowest Motor Cycles \nRegistration with 18 registered motorcycle representing 0.05% of the total \nFigure in year 2019 followed by Out Series, Standard, Apapa I Licensing \nStations with 20 (0.052%), 150 (0.39%) and 155 (0.40%) respectively of the \ntotal motorcycles registered in 2019. \n3.1.0 RENEWAL OF MOTOR VEHICLES LICENSES: Y2019 \n3.1.1 The estimated figure of motor vehicles licenses renewed in the State for the \n Year 2019 was 497,633. This indicates an upward trend compared with \n the Corresponding figure of 408,229 in year 2018. There was an increase of \n 89,404 representing 21.90% as against 2018 figure. \n3.1.2 Motor vehicles licenses renewed for private use in year 2019 numbered \n409,587 (83.31%) while 53,867 (10.82%) and 31,885 (6.41%) of the total \n were renewed for Commercial and Corporation use respectively. A total of \n 409,111 representing 99.88% of the vehicles renewed for private \n use in year 2019 were Saloon/Station wagons while 3,300 of the \n same brand of vehicles had their licenses renewed for commercial use. \n Minibuses and Omnibuses, accounted for 307 (0.08%) and 69 \n (0.02%) respectively for private use. Renewal of licenses figure \n For Government vehicles and Mission/Schools were 1021 (0.21%) and \n1273 (0.26%) respectively of the total vehicles licenses renewed in year \n2019. \n3.1.3 Saloon/Station wagon vehicles renewed in year 2019 was 436,653 which \n Constitutes about 87.75% of the total vehicles renewed in the year. While \n4\n Minibuses and Omnibuses recorded 34,846 (7.00%) and 8,126 (1.63%) \n respectively of the total vehicle renewed during this year. \n Vans/Pick-up recorded 4583 (0.92%) whereas Lorry/Truck accounted for \n 10,185 (2.05%) of the total vehicles renewed in year 2019. \n4.1.0 RENEWAL OF MOTOR CYCLE LICENSES: Y2019\n4.1.1 An estimated number of 14,809 motorcycle licenses were renewed in the \nState in 2019 as against a corresponding number of 12,149 recorded in year \n2018. This indicates an increase of 2,660 motorcycles/ tricycles representing \n21.89% over year 2018.TVS, Bajaj, and others motorcycles recorded \n5,195(35.08%), 5,344 (36.09%) and 2481 (16.75%) respectively of the Motor \nCycles/tricycles licenses renewed during the year. A total number of 820 \n(5.54%) and 13,763 (92.94%) licenses of Motorcycles were renewed for \nprivate and commercial use respectively in year 2019. Motorcycles/ tricycles \nlicenses renewed by companies (corporate organizations) in year 2019 stood \nat 226 (1.53%). \n \n\nTABLE 1.0: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES AND OWNERSHIP \n(INCLUDING OUT OF SERIES AND SPECIAL PLATE NUMBERS), LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 1,307 126,436 205 370 5,617 133,935\nVan, Pick-up 2,195 124 - 14 490 2,823\nLorry/Truck 17 2,317 15 836 3,185\nMinibus 4,855 282 7 26 667 5,837\nOmnibus 6,741 211 5 39 1,076 8,072\nTanker 30 - - - 21 51\nTractor 29 - - - 18 47\nTrailer 13 - - - 36 49\nTipper 26 - - - 12 38\nMini-Truck 13 - - - 1 14\nJEEP\n - 5 - - - 5 \nTotal 17,526 127,058 234 464 8,774 154,056 \nTYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA)\n5\nTABLE 1.1: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND LICENSING \nSTATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nAGBOWA LICENSING STATION.\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 2243 _ 5 6 36 2,290\nVan, Pick-up 13 46 _ _ 6 65\nLorry/Truck _ 24 _ 1 2 27\nMinibus 11 135 _ _ 5 151\nOmnibus 14 140 _ _ 5 159\nTanker _ _ _ _ _ -\nTractor _ _ _ _ _ -\nTrailer _ _ _ _ _ -\nTipper _ _ _ _ _ -\nMini-Truck 0 1 0 0 0 1\nJeep 1 0 0 0 0 1\nTotal 346 2,282 5 7 54 2,694 \nTOTAL\nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor VehicleAdministration Agency(MVAA)\n6\nTABLE 1.2: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS \nSTATE: YEAR 2019\nAGEGE I LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 1993 2 10 12 127 2,144\nVan, Pick-up 23 44 _ 2 6 75\nLorry/Truck _ 58 _ 7 15 80\nMinibus 18 20 _ _ 5 43\nOmnibus 14 38 _ 1 48 101\nTanker _ _ _ _ _ -\nTractor _ _ _ _ _ -\nTrailer _ _ _ _ _ -\nTipper _ _ _ _ _ -\nMini-Truck _ _ _ _ _ -\nJeep 1 _ _ _ _ 1\nTotal 162 2,049 10 22 201 2,444\nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n7\nTABLE 1.3: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE:YEAR 2019\nAGEGE II LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\n Saloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 2 1,971 47 2 34 2,056\n Van, Pick-up 4 49 - - 20 73\n Lorry/Truck - 60 4 - 32 96\n Minibus 5 29 - - 5 39\n Omnibus - 49 - - 31 80\n Tanker _ _ _ _ _ -\n Tractor _ _ _ _ _ -\n Trailer _ _ _ _ _ -\n Tipper _ _ _ _ _ -\nMini-Truck _ _ _ _ _ -\nJeep _ _ _ _ _ -\n Total 1,980 189 51 2 122 2,344\nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n8\nTABLE 1.4: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\n \nAGUDA IJESHA LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 2259 _ _ 2 31 2292\nVan, Pick-up _ 4 _ _ _ 4\nLorry/Truck _ 7 _ _ _ 7\nMinibus _ 22 _ _ _ 22\nOmnibus _ 300 _ _ _ 300\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nJeep - - - - - -\nTotal 333 2,259 - 2 31 2,625 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n9\nTABLE 1.5: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nAJEGUNLE I LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep _ 2,208 _ 43 2 2,253\nVan, Pick-up 35 2 _ _ 19 56\nLorry/Truck _ 44 _ _ 12 56\nMinibus 56 13 _ _ 5 74\nOmnibus 58 9 _ _ 1 68\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nTotal 193 2,232 - 2 80 2,507 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n10\nTABLE 1.6: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nAJEGUNLE II LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/jeep 1 2,019 1 2 66 2,089\nVan, Pick-up 43 9 _ _ 6 58\nLorry/Truck _ 24 _ _ 2 26\nMinibus 79 18 _ _ 31 128\nOmnibus 96 15 _ 3 26 140\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor _ 1 _ _ _ 1\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper _ - - - _ -\nJeep 1 _ _ _ _ 1\nTotal 244 2,061 1 5 131 2,443 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n11\nTABLE 1.7: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nAJEGUNLE III LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep \n 168 2,026 4 12 53 2,263\n Van, Pick-up 20 42 _ 1 2 65\n Lorry/Truck _ 25 _ _ 4 29\n Minibus 30 76 _ 2 4 112\n Omnibus 35 84 _ 7 5 131\n Tanker _ _ _ _ _ -\n Tractor _ _ _ _ _ -\n Trailer _ _ _ _ _ -\n Tipper _ _ _ _ _ -\n Total 278 2,228 4 22 68 2,600 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n12\nTABLE 1.8: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nAKODO LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\n Saloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 5 1,914 13 5 87 2,024\n Van, Pick-up 6 23 _ _ _ 29\n Lorry/Truck 33 - _ _ _ 33\n Minibus 16 93 _ _ _ 109\n Omnibus 24 50 _ _ _ 74\n Tanker - - - - - -\n Tractor - - - - - -\n Trailer - - - - - -\n Tipper - - - - - -\n Total 84 2,080 13 5 87 2,269 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n13\nTABLE 1.9: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nAKOWONJO LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep _ _ 2 2,083 19 2,104\nVan, Pick-up _ 3 _ _ 4 7\nLorry/Truck _ 39 _ _ 23 62\nMinibus _ 125 _ _ 4 129\nOmnibus _ 116 _ _ 33 149\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor _ 1 _ _ _ 1\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper _ - - - -\nTotal 284 2,083 - 2 83 2,452 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n14\nTABLE 1.10: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, TYPE AND LICENSING \nSTATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nALAKA I LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/jeep 2441 _ 3 16 236 2696\nVan, Pick-up _ 61 _ _ 5 66\nLorry/Truck _ 14 _ _ 1 15\nMinibus _ 84 _ _ 2 86\nOmnibus _ 168 _ _ 7 175\nTanker - - _ _ - -\nTractor _ 2 _ _ _ 2\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper _ - - - - -\nTotal 329 2,441 3 16 251 3,040 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n15\nTABLE 1.11: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nALAKA II LICENSING STATION\n Private Commercial Government \n Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation \nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep \n _ _ 12 1,960 93 2,065\n Van, Pick-up 1 68 _ _ 6 75\n Lorry/Truck - 37 _ _ - 37\n Minibus 8 94 _ _ 19 121\n Omnibus 14 119 _ 2 10 145\n Tanker - - - - - -\n Tractor - 1 - - -\n Trailer - - - - - -\n Tipper - - - - _ -\n Total 1,983 319 - 14 128 2,444 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP\n TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n16\nTABLE 1.12: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nALAKUKO LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nS+A3:G9aloon/\nStation \nwagon/Jeep\n _ 1,994 _ _ 54 2,048\nVan, Pick-up _ 58 _ _ 4 62\nLorry/Truck _ 21 _ _ 11 32\nMinibus 71 16 _ _ 2 89\nOmnibus 101 8 _ _ 4 113\nTanker - - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nMini-Truck - - - -\nTotal 251 2,018 - - 75 2,344 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n17\nTABLE 1.13: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nALLEN LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\n Saloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 401 1,977 5 10 107 2,500\n Van, Pick-up 20 3 - 3 - 26\n Lorry/Truck 51 - - - - 51\n Minibus 47 2 - - - 49\n Omnibus 126 2 - - - 128\n Tanker _ - - _ - -\n Tractor _ _ _ _ _ -\n Trailer _ _ _ _ _ -\n Tipper _ _ _ _ _ -\nMini-Truck _ _ _ _ _ -\n Total 645 1,984 5 13 107 2,754 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n18\nTABLE 1.14: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nAPAPA I LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 2054 2 5 21 169 2,251\nVan, Pick-up 1 _ _ _ 4 5\nLorry/Truck _ _ _ _ 146 146\nMinibus 16 1 _ _ 7 24\nOmnibus 1 _ _ 6 22 29\nTanker _ - - - _ -\nTractor - - - - _ -\nTrailer _ - - - _ -\nTipper _ - - - _ -\nJeep 1 _ - - _ 1\nTotal 3 2,073 5 27 348 2,456 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n19\nTABLE 1.15: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nAPAPA II LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 16 2,043 - 99 2,158\nVan, Pick-up - 15 - 12 27\nLorry/Truck - 66 - 43 109\nMinibus - 127 2 10 139\nOmnibus - 50 - 11 61\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nMini-Truck - - - - - -\nTotal 2,043 274 - 2 175 2,494 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n20\nTABLE 1.16: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nBADAGRY LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep _ _ 5 2,471 35 2,511\nVan, Pick-up - 10 _ _ 4 14\nLorry/Truck - 89 _ _ 20 109\nMinibus - 139 _ _ 7 146\nOmnibus - 110 _ _ 4 114\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nTotal 348 2,471 - 5 70 2,894 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n21\nTABLE 1.17: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nBOLADE LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep - 1,576 3 2 20 1,601\nVan, Pick-up - 26 - - - 26\nLorry/Truck - 4 - - - 4\nMinibus - 30 - - - 30\nOmnibus - 173 - - - 173\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - _\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nTotal 1,576 233 3 2 20 1,834 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n22\nTABLE 1.18: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nCITY HALL LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 8 1,975 _ 209 5 2,197\nVan, Pick-up 27 - _ _ 8 35\nLorry/Truck 26 - _ _ 4 30\nMinibus 88 - _ _ _ 88\nOmnibus 92 - _ _ 1 93\nTanker 1 - _ _ _ -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nTotal 242 1,975 - 5 222 2,444 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n23\nTABLE 1.19: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nEGBE LICENSING STATION.\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep _ 2 3,002 4 69 3,077\nVan, Pick-up _ 6 _ _ _ 6\nLorry/Truck _ 67 _ _ 2 69\nMinibus _ 330 _ _ 2 332\nOmnibus _ _ _ _ _ -\nTanker - - - - - - \nTractor - - - - - - \nTrailer - - - - - - \nTipper - - - - - - \nTotal 403 3,002 2 4 73 3,484 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n24\nTABLE 1.20: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nEJIGBO G/HOUSE II LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 160 2,319 1 7 15 2,502\nVan, Pick-up 2 2 _ 3 2 9\nLorry/Truck _ 8 _ 1 23 32\nMinibus 24 1 _ 2 5 32\nOmnibus _ 65 _ 3 11 79\nTanker - - - -\nTractor _ - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nTotal 259 2,322 1 16 56 2,654 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n25\nTABLE 1.21: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nEPE LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep _ _ 1 2,071 17 2,089\nVan, Pick-up _ 58 _ _ _ 58\nLorry/Truck _ 7 _ _ _ 7\nMinibus _ 62 _ _ _ 62\nOmnibus _ 235 _ _ _ 235\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nTotal 362 2,071 - 1 17 2,451 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n26\nTABLE 1.22: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\n EREKO LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/jeep _ _ 6 2,095 58 2,159\nVan, Pick-up 47 - _ - 3 50\nLorry/Truck 13 - _ - 2 15\nMinibus 98 - _ - 14 112\nOmnibus 83 - _ 1 19 103\nTanker 1 - _ - - 1\nTractor 3 - _ - - 3\nTrailer 1 - _ - - 1\nTipper - - - - - -\nMini-Truck - - - - - -\nTotal 246 2,095 - 7 96 2,444 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n27\nTABLE 1.23: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nGLASS HOUSE LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/jeep 130 5,767 12 11 250 6,170\nVan, Pick-up 67 - - 3 5 75\nLorry/Truck 80 - - - 41 121\nMinibus 381 - 3 7 64 455\nOmnibus 373 - 1 - 69 -\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor 1 - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nJeep - 1 - - - 1\nTotal 1,032 5,768 16 21 429 7,266 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n28\nTABLE 1.24: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nIFAKO IJAIYELICENSING STATION\n Private Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation \n Saloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 39 2,209 - - 117 2,365\n Van, Pick-up 25 - - - 6 31\n Lorry/Truck 17 - - - 7 24\n Minibus 76 - - - 24 100\n Omnibus 57 - - - 16 73\n Tanker _ - - - _ -\n Tractor - - - - _ 1\n Trailer _ - - - _ -\n Tipper _ - - - - -\nMini-Truck _ _ _ _ 1 1\n Total 2,209 214 - - 171 2,594 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP\n TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n29\nTABLE 1.25: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nIKEJA I LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep - 2,730 25 17 107 2,879\nVan, Pick-up 88 - - - 4 92\nLorry/Truck 31 - - - 26 57\nMinibus 54 - - - 11 65\nOmnibus 121 - - - 60 181\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nMini-Truck - - - - - -\nTotal 294 2,730 25 17 208 3,274 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: *- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n30\nTABLE 1.26: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nIKEJA II LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep \n 2 2,615 14 14 148 2,793\n Van, Pick-up 74 - - - 8 82\n Lorry/Truck 46 - 7 - 33 86\n Minibus 66 - - - 14 80\n Omnibus 119 - 1 - 40 160\n Tanker _ - - - - -\n Tractor - - - - - -\n Trailer _ - - - _ -\n Tipper 1 - - - - 1\nMini-Truck _ - - - - -\n Total 308 2,615 22 14 243 3,202 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: *- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n31\nTABLE 1.27: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nIKORODU I LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\n Saloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep - 2,266 1 12 60 2,339\n Van, Pick-up 67 - - - 6 73\n Lorry/Truck 17 - - - 3 20\n Minibus 111 - - 2 15 128\n Omnibus 119 - - - 10 129\n Tanker - - - - - -\n Tractor 2 - - - - 2\n Trailer _ - - - - -\n Tipper 3 - - - - 3\nMini-Truck _ - - - - -\n Total 319 2,266 1 14 94 2,694 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: *- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n32\nTABLE 1.28: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nIKORODU II LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep - 2,305 - 135 9 2,449\nVan, Pick-up 41 - - - 6 47\nLorry/Truck 34 - - - 11 45\nMinibus 218 - - 53 3 274\nOmnibus 175 - - - 38 213\nTanker 4 - - - 1 5\nTractor 2 - - - 1 3\nTrailer 2 - - - - 2\nTipper 6 - - - - 6\nMini-Truck - - - - - -\nTotal 482 2,305 - 12 245 3,044 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n33\nTABLE 1.29: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nIKOYI LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep - 2,094 2 3 143 2,242\nVan, Pick-up _ 32 _ _ 5 37\nLorry/Truck _ 18 _ _ 2 20\nMinibus _ 122 _ _ 28 150\nOmnibus _ 95 _ _ 20 115\nTanker _ 7 _ _ - 7\nTractor _ _ _ _ _ -\nTrailer _ 1 _ _ _ 1\nTipper _ 2 _ _ _ 2\nMini-Truck _ _ _ _ _ -\nTotal 277 2,094 2 3 198 2,574 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n34\nTABLE 1.30: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nIMOTA LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 3 2,085 - 2 34 2,124\nVan, Pick-up 4 - - - - 4\nLorry/Truck 69 - - - 23 92\nMinibus 138 - 1 - 12 151\nOmnibus 59 - - - 12 71\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper 2 - - - - 2\nTotal 275 2,085 1 2 81 2,444 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n35\nTABLE 1.31: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP AND \nLICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2020\nJEBBA LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 6 3,558 - 5 32 3,601\nVan, Pick-up 23 - - 1 3 27\nLorry/Truck 189 - - - 53 242\nMinibus 196 - 1 - 43 240\nOmnibus 225 - - 1 27 253\nTanker _ - - - _ -\nTractor 2 - - - - 2\nTrailer - - - - - -\nMini-Truck 9 - - - - 9\nTotal 650 3,558 1 7 158 4,374 \nSaloon/Station \nwagon\n3558 6 0 5 32 3601\nVan, Pick-up and \nKitcar 0 23 0 1 3 27\nLorry/Truck 0 189 0 0 53 242\nMinibus 0 196 1 0 43 240\nOmnibus 0 225 0 1 27 253\nTractor 0 2 0 0 0 2\nMini-Truck 0 9 0 0 0 9\n3558 650 1 7 158 4374\nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP\nTotal\nTYPE OF \nVEHICLES\nJEBBA TYPE OF \nVEHICLES\nTOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n36\nTABLE 1.32: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nKETU/OJOTA LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 96 3,724 - 7 24 3,851\nVan, Pick-up 10 - - - 2 12\nLorry/Truck 143 - - 1 22 166\nMinibus 295 - 2 7 32 336\nOmnibus 191 - 1 3 15 210\nTanker - - - - - _\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper 4 - - - - 4\nMini-Truck - 2 - - - 2\nTotal 741 3,724 3 18 95 4,581 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n37\nTABLE 1.33: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nMUSHIN LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 24 2,137 1 8 279 2,449\nVan, Pick-up 24 - - - 16 40\nLorry/Truck 55 - - - 21 76\nMinibus 74 - - - 19 93\nOmnibus 36 - - 2 53 91\nTanker 7 - - - 11 18\nTractor 3 - - - 1 4\nTrailer 1 - - - 18 -\nTipper 1 - - - 3 4\nMini-Truck - - - - - -\nTotal 225 2,137 1 10 421 2,794 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n38\nTABLE 1.34: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nOGBA LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\n Saloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 7 2,514 3 20 303 2,847\n Van, Pick-up - - - - 7 7\n Lorry/Truck - - - - 10 10\n Minibus 11 - - - 26 37\n Omnibus 6 - - - 77 83\n Tanker - - - - - -\n Tractor - - - - - -\n Trailer - - - - - -\n Tipper - - - - - -\n Total 24 2,514 3 20 423 2,984 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n39\nTABLE 1.35: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP \nAND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nOJO LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 121 2,118 8 9 58 2,314\nVan, Pick-up 53 - - - 5 58\nLorry/Truck 53 - 3 - 14 70\nMinibus 16 - - 1 9 26\nOmnibus 53 - - 6 17 76\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nMini-Truck - - - - - -\nTotal 2,118 296 11 16 103 2,544 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n40\nTABLE 1.36: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP \nAND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nOJODU LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 14 4,008 2 13 224 4,261\nVan, Pick-up 153 - - - 31 184\nLorry/Truck 164 - - - 37 201\nMinibus 74 1 - - 16 91\nOmnibus 173 - 1 _ 33 207\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nMini-Truck - - - - - -\nTotal 578 4,009 3 13 341 4,944 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n41\nTABLE 1.37: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nOJOKORO LICENSING STATION.\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep - 2,382 - 3 56 2,441\nVan, Pick-up 46 - - - 6 52\nLorry/Truck 28 - - 1 2 31\nMinibus 118 2 - - 3 123\nOmnibus 128 - - - 5 133\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nMini-Truck 1 - - - 1\nTotal 321 2,384 - 4 72 2,781 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n42\nTABLE 1.38: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nOKO AWO LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 1 1,971 - 4 117 2,093\nVan, Pick-up 58 - - - 4 62\nLorry/Truck 25 - - - 2 27\nMinibus 115 - - - 11 126\nOmnibus 119 - - - 9 128\nTanker 1 - - - - 1\nTractor 3 - - - - 3\nTrailer _ _ - - - \nTipper 3 - - - 1 4\nMini-Truck _ _ - - - -\nTotal 325 1,971 - 4 144 2,444 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION AGENCY (MVAA)\n43\nTABLE 1.39: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, TYPE OF \nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nOLOWOGBOWO LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep - 2,244 3 1 44 2,292\nVan, Pick-up 46 - - - - 46\nLorry/Truck 12 - - - - 12\nMinibus 47 - - - - 47\nOmnibus 228 - - - - 228\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - - \nTrailer - - - - - - \nTipper - - - - - - \nTotal 333 2,244 3 1 44 2,625 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: *- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n44\nTABLE 1.40: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nONE STOP CENTRE LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep - 2,772 2 10 262 3,046\nVan, Pick-up 77 - - 1 23 101\nLorry/Truck 67 - - - 7 74\nMinibus 63 - - - 2 65\nOmnibus 155 - - 2 12 169\nTanker - - - - - _\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nTotal 362 2,772 2 13 306 3,455 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n45\nTABLE 1.41: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nOREGUN LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 3 2,069 - - 217 2,289\nVan, Pick-up - 44 - - 22 66\nLorry/Truck - 36 - - 14 50\nMinibus - 66 - - 47 113\nOmnibus - 68 - - 53 121\nTanker - - - - 1 1\nTractor - 1 - - 1 2\nTrailer - - - - 1 1\nTipper - - - - 1 1\nTotal 218 2,069 - - 357 2,644 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n46\nTABLE 1.42: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nORILE IGANMU LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\n Saloon/Station \nwagon \n 78 2,031 - - 255 2,364\n Van, Pick-up 20 - - - 22 42\n Lorry/Truck 45 - - - 11 56\n Minibus 50 - - - 24 74\n Omnibus 99 - - - 59 158\n Tanker 5 - - - 7 12\n Tractor 1 - - - 3 4\n Trailer - - - - 17 17\n Tipper 1 - - - 5 6\n Total 299 2,031 - - 403 2,733 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n47\nTABLE 1.43: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nOSHODI ISOLO LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep _ _ 1 2,074 93 2,168\nVan, Pick-up _ 53 _ _ 5 58\nLorry/Truck _ 23 3 _ 9 35\nMinibus 90 1 - - 6 97\nOmnibus - 1 94 - 8 103\nTanker - 1 - - - 1\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - 3 - - - 3\nTipper - - - - - -\nTotal 264 2,075 4 1 121 2,465 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n48\nTABLE 1.44: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nOYINGBO LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep - 2,447 - 25 17 2,489\nVan, Pick-up 59 - - - 4 63\nLorry/Truck 125 - - - 11 136\nMinibus 84 - - - 5 89\nOmnibus 99 - - 2 16 117\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nTotal 367 2,447 - 27 53 2,894 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n49\nTABLE 1.45: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nSHOGUNLE LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\n Saloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 14 2,935 21 16 160 3,146\n Van, Pick-up 44 - - - 18 62\n Lorry/Truck 42 - - - 19 61\n Minibus 81 - - - 14 95\n Omnibus 49 - - - 26 75\n Tanker 2 - - - - 2\n Tractor 2 - - - 12 14\n Trailer 2 - - - - -\n Tipper - - - - - -\n Total 236 2,935 21 16 249 3,457 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n50\nTABLE 1.46: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, OWNERSHIP \nAND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nSHOMOLU LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 1 1,971 - 244 20 2,236\nVan, Pick-up _ 43 - - 99 142\nLorry/Truck 50 - - - 54 104\nMinibus 91 - - - 18 109\nOmnibus 6 - - - 46 52\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - 1 1\nMini-Truck - - - -\nTotal 191 1,971 - 20 462 2,644 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n51\nTABLE 1.47: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \n OWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nTINUBU LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep - 1,955 - 160 6 2,121\nVan, Pick-up 47 - - - - 47\nLorry/Truck 21 - - 2 - 23\nMinibus 86 - - 25 - 111\nOmnibus 122 - - 8 - 130\nTanker - - - 1 - 1\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - - \nTipper - - - 1 - 1\nMini-Truck - - - - - - \nTotal 276 1,955 - 6 197 2,434 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP\nTYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n52\nTABLE 1.48: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \n OWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nVICTORIA ISLAND LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep - 2,286 - 65 2 2,353\nVan, Pick-up 26 - - - 26 52\nLorry/Truck 42 - - - 6 48\nMinibus 68 - - - 8 76\nOmnibus 88 - - - 7 95\nTanker - - - - - - \nTractor - - - - - - \nTrailer - - - - - - \nTipper - - - - - - \nTotal 224 2,286 - 112 2 2,624 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP\nTYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n53\nTABLE 1.49: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \n OWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nYABA LICENSING STATION\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep - 2,085 - - 6 2,091\nVan, Pick-up 1 - - - - 1\nLorry/Truck 5 - - - - 5\nMinibus 68 - - - - 68\nOmnibus 239 - - - - 239\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - \nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nTotal 313 2,085 - - 6 2,404 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP\nTYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n54\nTABLE 1.50: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \n OWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\n AJAH\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 2105 _ _ 3 45 2,153\nVan, Pick-up _ 42 _ _ 6 48\nLorry/Truck _ 26 _ _ 9 35\nMinibus _ 74 _ _ 1 75\nOmnibus _ 88 _ _ 45 133\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nTotal 230 2,105 - 3 106 2,444 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n55\nTABLE 1.51: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \n OWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\n OTO-AWORI\nOTO - AWORI\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep - 2,580 - - 31 2,611\nVan, Pick-up - - - - - -\nLorry/Truck 10 - - - - 10\nMinibus 112 - - - - 112\nOmnibus 311 - - - - 311\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nTotal 433 2,580 - - 31 3,044 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP\nTYPE OF VEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n56\nTABLE 1.52: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES,\nOWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\n\nOUT OF SERIES\nLe\n\nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP\nTOTAL\n\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n\n57\n\nTABLE 1.53: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \n OWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\n FANCY\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 447 - - 5 49 501\nVan, Pick-up - - - - - -\nLorry/Truck - - - - - -\nMinibus - - - - - -\nOmnibus - - - - - -\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - - \nTipper - - - - - - \nTotal - 447 - 5 49 501 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n58\nTABLE 1.54: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \n OWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\n STANDARD OUT OF SERIES\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep - 2,431 12 2 27 2,472\nVan, Pick-up 100 1 - - 22 123\nLorry/Truck 62 - - 4 20 86\nMinibus 115 1 - - 5 121\nOmnibus 218 - - - 14 232\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor _ - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nTotal 495 2,433 12 6 88 3,034 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP TYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nNote: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA).\n59\nTABLE 1.55: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES, \n OWNERSHIP AND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\n OUT OF SERIES REG\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 3 2,653 - 152 8 2,816\nVan, Pick-up 186 - - 18 - 204\nLorry/Truck 126 - - 27 - 153\nMinibus 251 - - 5 - 256\nOmnibus 320 - - 41 - 361\nTanker 1 - - - - 1\nTractor 7 - - - - 7\nTrailer 3 - - - - 3\nTipper - - - - - -\nTotal 897 2,653 - 8 243 3,801 \nNots*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Admistration Agency\n60\nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP\nTYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\nTABLE 2: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF OWNERSHIP \nAND LICENSING STATION: LAGOS STATE, YEAR 2019\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nAGBOWA 2,282 346 5 7 54 2,694 \nAGEGE I 2,049 162 10 22 201 2,444 \nAGEGE II 1,980 189 51 2 122 2,344 \nAGUDA IJESHA 2,259 333 - 2 31 2,625 \nAJEGUNLE I 2,232 193 - 2 80 2,507 \nAJEGUNLE II 2,062 244 1 5 131 2,443 \nAJEGUNLE III 2,228 278 4 22 68 2,600 \nAKODO 2,080 84 13 5 87 2,269 \nAKOWONJO 2,083 284 - 2 83 2,452 \nALAKA I 2,441 329 3 16 251 3,040 \nALAKA II 1,983 319 - 14 128 2,444 \nALAKUKO 2,018 251 - - 75 2,344 \nALLEN 1,984 645 5 13 107 2,754 \nAPAPA I 2,073 3 5 27 348 2,456 \nAPAPA II 2,043 274 - 2 175 2,494 \nBADAGRY 2,471 348 - 5 70 2,894 \nBOLADE 1,576 233 3 2 20 1,834 \nCITY HALL 1,975 242 - 5 222 2,444 \n EGBE 3,002 403 2 4 73 3,484 \nEJIGBO G/H II 2,322 259 1 16 56 2,654 \nEPE 2,071 362 - 1 17 2,451 \nEREKO 2,095 246 - 7 96 2,444 \nGLASS HOUSE 5,768 1,032 16 21 429 7,266 \nIFAKO IJAIYE 2,209 214 - - 171 2,594 \nIKEJA I 2,730 294 25 17 208 3,274 \nIKEJA II 2,615 308 22 14 243 3,202 \nIKORODU I 2,266 319 1 14 94 2,694 \nIKORODU II 2,305 482 - 12 245 3,044 \nIKOYI 2,094 277 2 3 198 2,574 \nIMOTA 2,085 275 1 2 81 2,444 \nJEBBA 3,558 650 1 7 158 4,374 \nKETU OJOTA 3,724 741 3 18 95 4,581 \nMUSHIN 2,137 225 1 10 421 2,794 \nOGBA 2,514 24 3 20 423 2,984 \nOJO 2,118 296 11 16 103 2,544 \nOJODU 4,009 578 3 13 341 4,944 \nOJOKORO 2,384 321 - 4 72 2,781 \nOKO AWO 1,971 325 - 4 144 2,444 \nOLOWOGBOWO 2,244 333 3 1 44 2,625 \nONE STOP 2,772 362 2 13 306 3,455 \nOREGUN 2,069 218 - - 357 2,644 \nORILE IGANMU 2,031 299 - - 403 2,733 \nOSHODI 2,075 264 4 1 121 2,465 \nOYINGBO 2,447 367 - 27 53 2,894 \nSHOGUNLE 2,935 236 21 16 249 3,457 \nSHOMOLU 1,971 191 - 20 462 2,644 \nTINUBU 1,955 276 - 6 197 2,434 \nVICTORIA ISLAND 2,286 224 - 2 112 2,624 \nYABA 2,085 313 - - 6 2,404 \nOTO AWORI 2,580 433 - - 31 3,044 \nAJAH 2,105 230 - 3 106 2,444 \nFANCY 447 - - 5 49 501 \nOUT OF SERIES 174 - - - 26 200 \nOUT OF SERIES (STANDARD) 495 2,433 12 6 88 3,034 \n OUT OF SERIES(RE REG) 897 2,653 - 8 243 3,801 \nTOTAL 127,058 17,526 234 464 8,774 154,056 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP\nLICENSING\nSTATIONS\nTOTAL\n Note: * - Corporation refers to private sector companies \nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \n61\nTABLE 3: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES \nAND LICENSING STATION: LAGOS STATE, 2019\nSaloon/ Station \nwagon/Jeep\nVan, Pick\u0002up Lorry/ \nTruck Minibus Omnibus Tanker Tractor Trailer Tipper Mini-Truck Jeep\nAGBOWA 2290 65 27 151 159 _ _ _ _ 1 1 2694\nAGEGE I 2144 75 80 43 101 _ _ _ _ _ 1 2444\nAGEGE II 2056 73 96 39 80 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2344\nAGUDA IJESHA 2292 4 7 22 300 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2625\nAJEGUNLE I 2253 56 56 74 68 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2507\nAJEGUNLE II 2089 58 26 128 140 _ 1 _ _ _ 1 2443\nAJEGUNLE III 2263 65 29 112 131 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2600\nAKODO 2024 29 33 109 74 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2269\nAKOWONJO 2104 7 62 129 149 _ 1 _ _ _ _ 2452\nALAKA I 2696 66 15 86 175 _ 2 _ _ _ _ 3040\nALAKA II 2065 75 37 121 145 _ 1 _ _ _ _ 2444\nALAKUKO 2048 62 32 89 113 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2344\nALLEN 2500 26 51 49 128 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2754\nAPAPA I 2251 5 146 24 29 _ _ _ _ _ 1 2456\nAPAPA II 2158 27 109 139 61 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2494\nBADAGRY 2511 14 109 146 114 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2894\nBOLADE 1601 26 4 30 173 _ _ _ _ _ _ 1834\nCITY HALL 2197 35 30 88 93 1 _ _ _ _ _ 2444\n EGBE 3077 0 6 69 332 _ _ _ _ _ _ 3484\nEJIGBO G/H II 2502 9 32 32 79 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2654\nEPE 2089 58 7 62 235 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2451\nEREKO 2159 50 15 112 103 1 _ 3 1 _ _ 2444\nGLASS HOUSE 6170 75 121 455 443 _ 1 _ _ _ 1 7266\nIFAKO IJAIYE 2365 31 24 100 73 _ _ _ _ 1 _ 2594\nIKEJA I 2879 92 57 65 181 _ _ _ _ _ _ 3274\nIKEJA II 2793 82 86 80 160 _ _ _ 1 _ _ 3202\nIKORODU I 2339 73 20 128 129 _ 2 _ 3 _ _ 2694\nIKORODU II 2449 47 45 274 213 5 3 2 6 _ _ 3044\nIKOYI 2242 37 20 150 115 7 _ 1 2 _ _ 2574\nIMOTA 2124 4 92 151 71 _ _ _ 2 _ _ 2444\nJEBBA 3601 27 242 240 253 _ 2 _ _ 9 _ 4374\nKETU OJOTA 3851 12 166 336 210 _ _ _ 4 2 _ 4581\nMUSHIN 2449 40 76 93 91 18 4 19 4 _ _ 2794\nOGBA 2847 7 10 37 83 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2984\nOJO 2314 58 70 26 76 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2544\nOJODU 4261 184 201 91 207 _ _ _ _ _ _ 4944\nOJOKORO 2441 52 31 123 133 _ _ _ _ 1 _ 2781\nOKO AWO 2093 62 27 126 128 1 3 _ 4 _ _ 2444\nOLOWOGBOWO 2292 46 12 47 228 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2625\nONE STOP 3046 101 74 65 169 _ _ _ _ _ _ 3455\nOREGUN 2289 66 50 113 121 1 2 1 1 _ _ 2644\nORILE IGANMU 2364 42 56 74 158 12 4 17 6 _ _ 2733\nOSHODI 2168 58 35 97 103 1 _ 3 _ _ _ 2465\nOYINGBO 2489 63 136 89 117 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2894\nSHOGUNLE 3146 62 61 95 75 2 14 _ 2 _ _ 3457\nSHOMOLU 2236 142 104 109 52 0 _ _ 1 _ _ 2644\nTINUBU 2121 47 23 111 130 1 _ _ 1 _ _ 2434\nVICTORIA ISLAND 2353 52 48 76 95 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2624\nYABA 2091 1 5 68 239 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2404\nOTO AWORI 2611 0 10 112 311 _ _ _ _ _ _ 3044\nAJAH 2153 48 35 75 133 _ _ _ _ _ _ 2444\nFANCY 501 0 0 0 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ 501\nOUT OF SERIES 200 0 0 0 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ 200\nOUT OF SERIES (STANDARD) 2472 123 86 121 232 _ _ _ _ _ _ 3034\nOUT OF SERIES (REG-) 2816 204 153 256 361 1 7 3 _ _ _ 3801\nTOTAL 133935 2823 3185 5837 8072 51 47 49 38 14 5 154056\nNote*- Coporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency(MVAA)\nTYPE OF VEHICLES LICENSING\nSTATIONS Total\n62\nTABLE 4: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY LICENSING STATION \nAND RESIDENCE OF OWNERS, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019 AGBOWA AGEGE I AGEGE II AGUDA IJESHA AJEGUNLE I AJEGUNLE II AJEGUNLE III AKODO AKOWONJO ALAKA I ALAKA II ALAKUKO ALLEN APAPA APAPA II BADAGRY BOLADE CITY HALL EGBE EJIGBO G/H II EPE EREKO GLASS HOUSE IFAKO IJAIYE IKEJA I IKEJA II IKORODU I\nAbia 11 14 17 26 26 27 67 12 18 23 30 26 26 24 31 19 16 13 27 29 23 12 105 5 35 35 18\nAdamawa 0 0 1 3 1 1 2 0 2 0 2 2 1 1 3 1 1 0 6 5 1 0 7 0 1 0 0\nAkwa Ibom 16 6 11 11 13 17 25 24 10 15 11 22 5 12 16 22 5 12 14 13 13 15 59 3 10 17 24\nAnambra 19 15 21 27 27 28 55 14 17 22 27 43 7 18 87 24 23 25 20 37 41 14 133 3 43 48 17\nBauchi 6 0 0 6 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 4 0 5 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 4\nBalyesa 2 2 3 9 5 6 6 1 2 3 0 5 3 0 3 6 1 0 3 6 1 1 8 1 5 1 2\nBenue 2 5 4 6 5 3 0 3 3 4 13 2 3 6 3 6 2 1 1 3 2 0 17 2 2 2 1\nBorno 0 1 0 0 2 1 2 0 0 2 3 2 0 3 3 2 0 0 1 3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0\nCross River 2 3 4 12 4 12 8 7 5 5 8 7 7 1 11 2 3 13 6 15 12 9 16 7 8 4 2\nDelta 39 21 37 77 29 52 60 36 29 56 55 53 33 28 77 32 49 46 67 48 91 85 181 19 85 149 54\nEbonyi 5 1 5 5 3 6 2 1 4 2 5 5 0 0 7 6 5 2 3 5 4 2 9 0 1 4 2\nEdo 15 39 26 41 16 30 49 34 22 28 27 27 31 33 43 21 21 55 42 31 33 28 101 38 44 30 18\nEkiti 38 13 10 39 67 6 8 10 16 13 9 9 3 5 6 21 31 5 35 7 23 24 41 17 26 16 6\nEnugu 11 10 12 23 8 21 57 7 19 12 24 24 9 30 54 22 24 13 18 33 25 16 77 11 23 22 15\nGombe 0 1 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 7 0 0 7 0 1 2 0\nImo 7 16 17 25 13 29 45 12 20 14 36 43 14 35 63 28 12 28 34 47 32 19 68 5 56 41 21\nJigawa 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0\nKaduna 1 5 2 3 7 5 11 3 4 3 3 4 2 28 5 4 4 2 1 6 3 2 14 2 4 5 5\nKano 1 5 4 2 8 1 2 1 4 3 6 4 2 4 3 1 0 10 4 0 1 0 3 2 12 6 3\nKatsina 0 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 5 0 2 3 2\nKebbi 4 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 10 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 8 0 0 1 1\nKogi 2 3 3 3 1 3 0 2 1 8 3 2 0 3 2 4 1 2 9 7 6 5 9 0 2 3 5\nKwara 6 22 19 11 38 17 17 7 11 11 12 15 5 7 5 22 7 12 46 17 23 9 68 8 44 27 7\nLagos 2216 1476 1547 1820 1622 1790 1857 1291 1593 2040 1798 1655 1981 1877 1792 1890 1352 1982 2623 1895 1657 1918 4908 2075 2006 2022 2142\nNassarawa 0 0 0 0 1 4 3 0 1 1 3 3 1 0 2 2 0 4 0 0 1 1 5 1 2 1 0\nNiger 0 2 3 4 3 3 4 1 2 1 2 3 0 6 1 6 1 1 2 0 1 0 11 0 6 6 2\nOgun 133 401 314 185 145 168 93 286 233 184 136 145 266 97 54 270 116 78 216 107 190 112 577 218 411 355 137\nOndo 15 29 28 37 35 15 18 25 29 28 20 13 16 22 13 59 11 15 26 101 35 21 78 23 34 31 30\nOsun 19 54 41 26 56 27 23 117 51 70 17 30 21 14 8 50 26 12 47 41 40 22 130 26 71 66 13\nOyo 83 220 137 143 322 89 70 283 256 373 82 99 242 81 21 287 84 44 128 88 100 75 369 98 234 200 94\nPlateau 1 6 0 3 4 3 2 0 5 2 2 2 1 4 7 3 1 1 2 3 1 2 9 1 5 4 3\nRivers 17 39 43 53 32 48 81 53 46 62 60 53 26 58 135 50 24 47 56 58 66 29 164 6 59 67 43\nSokoto 1 1 0 3 2 1 3 1 0 2 2 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 4 0 1 1 2 0 2 2 0\nTaraba 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 0 2 3 0 0 4 2 3 0 4 3 0 2 0\nYobe 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0\nZamfara 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0\nF.C.T.Abuja 21 31 29 12 8 23 27 38 37 46 42 42 46 50 33 26 6 20 30 40 16 17 68 19 39 29 23\nTotal 2694 2444 2344 2625 2507 2443 2600 2269 2452 3040 2444 2344 2754 2456 2494 2894 1834 2444 3484 2654 2451 2444 7266 2594 3274 3202 2694\nSTATE OF RESIDENCE OF OWNERS\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \n63\nAND RESIDENCE OF OWNERS, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nAbia\nAdamawa\nAkwa Ibom\nAnambra\nBauchi\nBalyesa\nBenue\nBorno\nCross River\nDelta\nEbonyi\nEdo\nEkiti\nEnugu\nGombe\nImo\nJigawa\nKaduna\nKano\nKatsina\nKebbi\nKogi\nKwara\nLagos\nNassarawa\nNiger\nOgun\nOndo\nOsun\nOyo\nPlateau\nRivers\nSokoto\nTaraba\nYobe\nZamfara\nF.C.T.Abuja\nTotalSTATE OF RESIDENCE \nOF OWNERS IKORODU II IKOYI IMOTA JEBBA KETU OJOTA MUSHIN OGBA OJO OJODU OJOKORO OKO AWO OLOWOGBO WO ONE STOP CENTRE OREGUN ORILE IGANMU OSHODI ISOLO OYINGBO SHOGUNLE SHOMOLU TINUBU VICTORIA ISLAND YABA OTO AWORI AJAH FANCY OUT OF SERIES OUT OF SERIES (STANDARD) OUT OF SERIES RE- REG TOTAL\n11 13 19 30 40 41 12 66 31 17 17 18 37 3 58 17 44 19 11 15 25 23 27 20 1 0 6 22 1358\n0 0 2 3 2 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 7 0 13 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 2 4 0 0 0 1 85\n19 7 14 30 33 15 6 22 16 9 17 8 19 10 11 8 22 27 6 12 12 12 10 17 3 0 7 23 816\n17 13 9 56 59 21 9 50 28 15 21 21 34 22 28 15 30 17 13 21 32 26 41 28 7 0 8 49 1545\n0 4 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 62\n3 0 2 8 6 2 0 7 1 4 0 3 3 1 0 3 3 0 3 1 6 2 6 1 0 0 2 6 158\n2 1 1 9 11 1 0 2 7 17 0 4 6 2 0 4 4 3 2 0 6 8 6 7 0 0 3 8 215\n1 1 1 5 7 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 5 0 0 0 2 1 2 0 12 2 2 4 0 0 0 2 77\n2 4 5 40 12 4 9 5 11 10 1 3 32 5 4 3 6 3 10 15 12 12 13 7 0 0 0 5 426\n41 47 33 73 96 66 34 54 60 64 53 63 50 25 101 20 42 115 43 135 26 43 72 35 14 2 33 39 3067\n1 3 3 7 12 0 0 3 2 6 1 2 13 3 0 3 2 5 4 2 5 2 10 8 0 0 1 2 194\n26 18 15 47 55 38 31 30 59 25 25 26 45 48 27 37 15 49 24 37 23 27 41 24 11 4 12 42 1784\n26 17 22 18 26 13 14 6 15 10 64 9 8 39 30 5 20 23 10 26 31 22 27 39 2 1 5 28 1060\n17 3 9 38 41 23 10 47 20 18 9 12 24 8 9 17 26 15 14 15 30 18 19 14 0 0 2 24 1102\n0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 41\n23 14 11 32 62 41 8 36 19 21 18 19 29 21 29 11 29 25 27 20 29 17 26 21 13 0 6 38 1425\n0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 20\n3 2 5 21 16 8 2 7 4 8 2 3 10 5 6 5 6 4 10 8 12 3 5 8 0 2 58 4 365\n2 2 4 6 7 6 0 3 5 3 3 0 8 11 17 3 5 3 0 3 7 0 4 4 0 0 3 7 208\n0 2 4 2 2 3 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 3 2 2 4 2 1 5 3 2 2 0 0 0 1 77\n0 4 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 7 2 0 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 66\n4 3 2 9 9 7 3 0 3 2 1 1 4 3 5 0 4 10 2 2 6 2 6 1 1 0 2 4 185\n14 17 20 21 43 21 20 13 29 11 15 6 29 41 15 13 15 14 27 8 15 22 18 40 3 2 9 26 1020\n2371 2093 1496 2402 2687 2072 2140 1766 2919 1937 1886 2139 2535 1813 2036 1769 2157 2200 2089 1766 1698 1814 2220 1846 345 161 2527 2718 108427\n1 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 1 3 0 2 1 6 2 3 0 0 1 3 1 2 1 0 0 1 2 78\n2 3 1 2 5 3 1 5 4 2 1 0 8 10 9 3 4 4 1 1 1 3 4 2 1 1 1 5 158\n207 141 296 495 468 163 265 141 706 236 110 126 244 196 158 234 177 363 136 119 155 156 190 130 46 9 167 271 11732\n21 19 41 70 51 58 48 18 55 27 28 29 44 46 13 23 33 71 37 34 25 34 45 29 2 1 13 55 1777\n30 20 75 114 157 16 52 26 227 33 19 15 25 134 12 36 27 84 18 38 48 26 37 21 2 1 26 64 2501\n135 69 295 675 483 79 261 91 543 207 86 62 128 113 55 153 145 275 90 71 280 74 135 82 28 4 76 230 9227\n1 2 4 5 8 7 4 4 3 6 4 1 3 9 0 3 2 6 1 4 3 0 0 2 0 0 2 6 167\n38 31 30 80 117 53 32 99 95 54 39 34 63 45 68 36 41 71 24 44 74 28 50 28 15 3 19 67 2853\n1 0 1 3 4 1 1 3 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 1 1 8 4 0 3 1 3 3 0 2 1 2 83\n0 0 0 3 4 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 2 54\n2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17\n0 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 17\n23 14 19 63 53 32 22 31 78 33 14 14 32 30 18 26 23 37 32 26 30 16 15 15 7 6 43 39 1609\n3044 2574 2444 4374 4581 2794 2984 2544 4944 2781 2444 2625 3455 2644 2733 2465 2894 3457 2644 2434 2624 2404 3044 2444 501 200 3034 3801 154056\nNUMBER OF MOTOR VEHICLES REGISTERED BY LICENSING STATION\nTABLE 5: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES CLASSIFIED BY MAKE\nAND TYPE OF OWNERSHIP, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/School *Corporation\nUNITED KINGDOM\nBedford 26 23 6 55\nSub-Total 26 23 - - 6 55\nJAPAN\nDatsun 34 74 - - 14 122\nHonda 10,806 161 5 14 375 11,361\nToyota 83,537 4,077 170 270 3,861 91,915\nMazda 2,306 546 - 4 83 2,939\nSuzuki (VEH) 748 2,575 11 15 343 3,692\nDaihatsu 87 180 - - 38 305\nIsuzu 140 146 - 5 36 327\nNissan 6,126 769 7 18 403 7,323\nMitsubishi 1,611 489 - 12 518 2,630\nGalant 20 - - - 1 21\nLancer 16 - - - - 16\nSubaru 84 20 - - 7 111\nSub-Total 105,515 9,037 193 338 5,679 120,762\nAUSTRIA\nSteyr - 44 - 13 57\nMACK 14 538 5 206 763\nSub-Total 14 582 5 - 219 820\nKOREA\nDaewoo 33 - - - 1 34\nKia 1,172 58 - 8 346 1,584\nHyundai 2,014 137 9 16 363 2,539\nSub-Total 3,219 195 9 24 710 4,157\n GERMANY\nM. Benz 5,423 880 8 6 304 6,621\nB.M.W. 721 13 - 3 26 763\nAudi 453 - - 1 6 460\nV/W Bora 449 96 - - 21 566\nOPEL 453 55 - 1 5 514\nMAN 7 288 - - 87 382\nSkoda 38 - - - - 38\nSub-Total 7,544 1,332 8 11 449 9,344\nSWEDEN\nVolvo 843 235 2 63 1,143\nScania 5 213 - 31 249\nSub-Total 848 448 - 2 94 1,392\nNIGERIA\nPgt204/205/206 161 5 - - 1 167\nPgt304/305/306 146 - - - 10 156\nPgt404/405/406 157 - - - 4 161\nPgt504/505/506 40 1 - - - 41\nPgt604/605/606/607 49 31 2 - 17 99\nOther Pgts 327 86 2 3 10 428\nJ5/J9 8 1 - - 2 11\nV/W Santana 115 67 - - 19 201\nPassat 406 24 - - 9 439\nGolf 837 24 - 1 46 908\nJetta 59 - - - 1 60\nKombi Bus 9 3 - - - 12\nOther V/W 1,484 1,567 - 17 135 3,203\nSub-Total 3,798 1,809 4 21 254 5,886\nOTHERS\nOthers 2,338 1,857 21 666 4,882\nSub-Total 2,338 1,857 - 21 666 4,882\nCHINA\nQuingqi - 7 - - 7\nJimbei 1 4 - 36 41\nFoton 49 113 7 15 184\nSub-Total 50 124 7 51 232\nUSA\nChevrolet 335 97 - - 33 465\nChrysler 223 1 - - 1 225\nFord 2,900 1,034 5 34 315 4,288\nHummer 18 - - - 1 19\nSub-Total 3,476 1,132 5 34 350 4,997\nFRANCE\nRenault 142 80 7 229\nSub-Total 142 80 - 7 229\nITALY\nFiat 82 397 102 581\nSub-Total 82 397 - 102 581\nNetherlands\nDAF 6 392 10 6 133 547\nSub-Total 6 392 10 6 133 547\nINDIA\nTATA 118 54 172\nSub-Total - 118 54 172\nTOTAL 127,058 17,526 234 464 8,774 154,056\nNUMBER OF MOTOR VEHICLE REGISTERED BY TYPE OF OWNERSHIP MAKE OF VEHICLES TOTAL\n65\n*Corporation refers to private sector company\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \nTABLE 6: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES CLASSIFIED BY MAKE/COUNTRY OF ORIGIN \nAND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019 AGBOWA AGEGE I AGEGE II AGUDA IJESHA AJEGUNLE I AJEGUNLE II AJEGUNLE III AKODO AKOWONJO ALAKA I ALAKA II ALAKUKO ALLEN APAPA I APAPA II BADAGRY BOLADE CITY HALL EGBE EJIGBO G/H IIEPE EREKO GLASS HOUSE IFAKO IJAIYE IKEJA I IKEJA II IKORODU I\nUNITED KINGDOM\nBedford 4 3 1 6 1 2 3 9 1 2 7 \nSub-Total - - 3 4 1 - - - - - - - 6 - - - - 1 2 - 3 9 1 2 - - 7 \nJAPAN\nDatsun - 10 - 3 - 4 1 - 1 3 1 2 - 2 - 2 3 3 4 2 1 8 5 - - - 2 \nHonda 206 195 193 215 204 74 220 135 190 193 137 427 147 211 179 218 162 160 298 180 168 218 724 223 249 217 210 \nToyota 1,391 1,688 1,446 1,657 1,277 1,793 1,520 1,496 1,359 1,987 1,633 1,334 1,420 1,506 1,500 1,503 1,176 1,619 2,205 1,787 1,533 1,543 4,413 1,678 2,068 2,022 1,688 \nMazda 45 50 47 42 55 21 41 43 84 57 46 28 43 19 23 100 39 18 61 21 46 29 105 26 69 53 57 \nSuzuki (VEH) 37 103 33 29 31 70 70 50 99 57 66 58 75 24 45 65 25 46 49 32 61 52 292 48 47 67 64 \nDaihatsu 4 4 9 10 1 3 7 5 3 9 1 - - 2 4 3 3 3 9 4 8 10 14 3 2 19 6 \nIsuzu 2 - 1 7 2 3 27 15 3 10 5 1 4 4 - 9 5 - 5 2 4 2 11 3 3 3 6 \nNissan 144 94 117 84 201 72 72 98 184 130 74 80 111 85 67 255 74 64 137 81 105 73 260 109 168 145 104 \nMitsubishi 73 50 20 41 58 24 21 29 50 43 22 14 44 24 20 61 14 58 27 37 33 52 104 27 33 58 41 \nGalant 1 - 1 1 - - - - - 2 1 1 - - - - 3 - - - 2 - - - - - - \nLancer - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - - - - - - 2 2 - - 2 - - - - - - \nSubaru - 1 4 6 - 2 - - - 2 - 1 2 5 - 2 7 1 11 - 8 1 1 1 - - 2 \nSub-Total 1,903 2,195 1,871 2,095 1,829 2,066 1,979 1,872 1,973 2,494 1,986 1,946 1,846 1,882 1,838 2,218 1,513 1,974 2,806 2,146 1,971 1,988 5,929 2,118 2,639 2,584 2,180 \nAUSTRIA\nSteyr - - - - - - - - 12 _ - 1 - - - 5 - - - - - 1 17 - - 3 - \nMACK 15 11 15 1 6 16 15 18 7 _ 8 11 1 47 52 26 3 5 1 12 4 4 31 9 12 29 8 \nSub-Total 15 11 15 1 6 16 15 18 19 - 12 8 1 47 52 31 3 5 1 12 4 5 48 9 12 32 8 \n KOREA\nDaewoo 1 - - 1 - 1 4 - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - \nKia 22 16 21 25 43 16 24 21 41 18 11 11 19 14 13 61 12 28 28 21 22 21 51 29 19 23 23 \nHyundai 40 39 51 48 28 17 71 31 25 39 30 28 47 32 45 39 29 63 64 43 34 40 126 3 49 75 35 \nSub-Total 63 55 72 74 71 34 99 52 66 57 41 39 66 47 58 100 41 91 92 64 56 61 178 32 68 98 58 \nGERMANY\nM. Benz 110 113 105 89 92 64 83 100 83 115 84 105 130 111 142 114 70 99 143 105 103 116 221 107 145 153 106 \nB.M.W. 10 5 7 13 14 5 15 9 10 8 7 11 8 14 16 20 7 5 22 20 10 7 26 18 12 7 7 \nAudi 13 5 6 6 7 2 4 4 9 11 2 5 4 3 9 14 2 26 11 15 4 6 16 8 12 10 7 \nV/W Bora 4 2 4 9 6 12 28 5 6 26 25 13 17 1 - - 5 4 20 33 6 6 8 41 - 21 - \nOPEL 3 8 3 9 18 5 6 2 18 4 4 2 2 4 10 23 7 6 21 8 16 4 7 8 6 13 8 \nMAN 3 6 9 10 4 10 3 5 3 6 4 3 1 8 25 9 - 2 2 2 - 8 9 16 4 3 5 \nSkoda - - - - - - - 7 1 - - - 1 - 2 2 - - - - - - - - - - - \nSub-Total 143 139 134 136 141 98 139 132 130 170 126 139 163 141 204 182 91 142 219 183 139 147 287 198 179 207 133 \nSWEDEN\nVolvo 15 24 19 14 11 7 16 7 23 20 16 12 17 18 27 15 15 13 30 17 24 21 46 19 25 26 19 \nScania 13 1 2 6 5 2 1 2 4 3 9 6 2 1 3 1 - 3 5 2 3 6 14 3 2 2 4 \nSub-Total 28 25 21 20 16 9 17 9 27 23 25 18 19 19 30 16 15 16 35 19 27 27 60 22 27 28 23 \nNUMBER OF MOTOR VEHICLES REGISTERED BY LICENSING STATION COUNTRY OF ORIGIN/MAK\nE OF VEHICLES\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \n66\nAGBOWA AGEGE I AGEGE II AGUDA IJESHA AJEGUNLE I AJEGUNLE II AJEGUNLE III AKODO AKOWONJO ALAKA I ALAKA II ALAKUKO ALLEN APAPA I APAPA II BADAGRY BOLADE CITY HALL EGBE EJIGBO G/H IIEPE EREKO GLASS HOUSE IFAKO IJAIYE IKEJA I IKEJA II IKORODU I\nNUMBER OF MOTOR VEHICLES REGISTERED BY LICENSING STATION COUNTRY OF \nORIGIN/MAK\nE OF VEHICLES\nNIGERIA\nPgt204/205/206 1 8 1 3 2 - 5 - 1 3 2 2 - 5 - 6 - 2 2 6 3 1 15 2 6 7 3\nPgt304/305/306 - 3 4 3 2 3 - - 18 3 - 2 - 3 8 2 - 1 3 1 3 - 6 - 3 2 1\nPgt404/405/406 - 2 1 2 4 3 - - 6 2 7 1 - 7 2 8 1 1 3 5 - 3 6 - 4 2 - \nPgt504/505/506 - - - 1 2 - - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - - - 7 - 1 1 4 2 - - \nPgt604/605/606 - - 1 1 - - - - 4 - - - - 2 2 5 - 1 1 - - - 24 1 - - 2\nOther Pgts 4 7 5 8 5 4 16 15 4 10 3 5 11 12 1 6 3 8 8 5 7 5 7 9 17 4 5\nJ5/J9 - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - \nV/W Santana - 2 1 1 - - 16 - 2 3 - - 11 - - - - 1 - 23 - 3 4 - 1 3 - \nPassat 8 12 4 12 22 4 - - 6 4 9 9 - 2 - 25 3 8 13 1 8 5 31 - 14 7 10\nGolf 14 19 10 23 28 11 3 - 33 29 21 11 - 8 3 61 10 4 32 - 14 8 39 2 18 4 8\nJetta 2 1 1 1 3 3 - - 1 1 3 1 - 5 - 4 - - 3 - 1 3 1 - - - 3\nKombi Bus - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - \nOther V/W 46 49 45 34 122 31 23 59 37 54 45 34 38 52 128 62 24 34 67 22 47 40 151 45 71 47 72\nSub-Total 103 75 74 88 190 59 63 74 113 110 92 63 62 98 144 179 41 60 132 70 83 69 287 63 136 76 104\nOthers \nOthers 71 67 54 65 110 93 170 42 15 94 75 47 469 96 64 39 56 62 69 72 63 48 207 55 56 45 73\nSub Total 71 67 54 65 110 170 93 42 15 94 75 47 469 96 64 39 56 62 69 72 63 48 207 55 56 45 73\nCHINA\nQuingqi 1 - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - \nJimbei - 1 - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - \nFoton 8 8 1 4 17 3 10 1 1 1 2 5 2 1 1 4 1\nSub-Total - - - 9 9 1 4 17 - 3 - 10 - - 1 3 1 2 6 2 1 - 2 - - 4 1\nUSA\nChevrolet 5 9 1 15 13 2 3 5 3 6 8 3 4 11 7 11 12 9 12 3 8 6 21 13 9 4 3\nChrysler 4 7 6 6 10 3 3 1 5 3 6 1 2 4 1 5 2 - 4 6 5 4 11 1 4 4 3\nFord 88 69 58 86 70 46 87 46 75 66 53 45 72 85 71 71 54 77 86 63 79 64 179 69 117 89 79\nHummer - 2 - 2 - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 1 - 1 - 1 - - - - - - \nSub-Total 97 87 107 67 93 51 93 52 83 76 67 49 78 100 79 88 69 86 103 72 93 74 211 83 130 97 85\nFRANCE\nRenault 8 1 4 3 7 2 2 3 2 1 3 7 3 1 7 7 3 5 7 3 1 6\nSub-Total 8 1 - 4 3 - 7 - 2 2 3 2 1 - 3 7 3 1 7 7 3 5 7 - 3 1 6\nITALY\nFiat 6 10 17 13 16 3 5 18 1 5 12 41 2 15 14 1 2 7 5 4 6 22 4 13 7 2\nSub-Total 10 6 17 13 16 3 5 - 18 1 5 12 41 2 15 14 1 2 7 5 4 6 22 4 13 7 2\nNETHERLANDS\nDAF 9 24 16 2 22 13 9 1 6 9 12 5 2 24 1 7 1 2 1 5 17 8 11 23 12\nSub-Total 24 9 16 2 22 13 9 1 6 9 12 5 2 24 1 7 - 1 - 2 1 5 17 8 11 23 12\nINDIA\nTATA 3 7 1 6 5 10 1 5 3 10 2\nSub-Total - 3 - 7 - - - - - 1 - 6 - - 5 10 - 1 5 - 3 - 10 - - - 2\nGRAND TOTAL 2,694 2,444 2,344 2,625 2,507 2,443 2,600 2,269 2,452 3,040 2,444 2,344 2,754 2,456 2,494 2,894 1,834 2,444 3,484 2,654 2,451 2,444 7,266 2,594 3,274 3,202 2,694\nUNITED KINGDOM\nBedford\nSub-Total\nJAPAN\nDatsun\nHonda\nToyota\nMazda\nSuzuki (VEH)\nDaihatsu\nIsuzu\nNissan\nMitsubishi\nGalant\nLancer\nSubaru\nSub-Total\nAUSTRIA\nSteyr\nMACK\nSub-Total\n KOREA\nDaewoo\nKia\nHyundai\nSub-Total\nGERMANY\nM. Benz\nB.M.W.\nAudi\nV/W Bora\nOPEL\nMAN\nSkoda\nSub-Total\nSWEDEN\nVolvo\nScania\nSub-Total\nCOUNTRY OF \nORIGIN/MAK\nE OF VEHICLESIKORODU II IKOYI IMOTA JEBBA KETU OJOTA MUSHIN OGBA OJO OJODU OJOKORO OKO AWO OLOWOGBO WOONE STOP OREGUN ORILE IGANMU OSHODI OYINGBO SHOGUNLE SHOMOLU TINUBU VICTORIA ISLAND YABA OTO AWORI AJAH FANCY OUT OF SERIES OUT OF SERIES (STANDARD\n)OUT OF SERIES (RE- REG)\n 1 1 1 1 3 3 2 1 2 1 55 \n 1 1 - 1 - - - - - - - 1 3 3 2 - 1 - - - - 2 1 - - - - 55\n 4 6 - - - 2 4 - - 7 5 2 10 - 1 1 - - - 2 - 3 5 1 - - 5 7 122\n 210 205 298 373 389 208 195 110 142 127 211 200 198 182 124 111 239 194 183 202 196 217 175 197 16 11 75 420 11,361\n 1,873 1,599 1,258 2,137 2,383 1,788 1,886 1,365 2,843 1,505 1,501 1,605 2,165 1,713 1,729 971 1,470 2,258 1,516 1,430 1,308 1,461 1,831 1,289 277 112 2,129 2,271 91,915\n 52 25 64 150 149 42 29 45 130 126 39 40 68 33 25 58 73 130 21 34 104 35 54 46 4 - 59 36 2,939\n 79 71 72 153 203 63 75 45 121 91 59 59 47 85 83 75 48 59 28 29 66 20 68 36 7 - 111 144 3,692\n- 5 - 9 12 3 3 10 13 9 1 - 3 2 6 8 15 4 8 2 13 4 9 6 - - 5 9 305\n 5 2 2 10 10 11 6 - 3 12 1 6 8 2 9 4 7 4 9 2 7 11 22 17 - - - 20 327\n 93 86 210 360 372 117 121 148 338 329 59 113 149 53 117 114 269 137 65 87 163 96 125 244 11 4 71 84 7,323\n 63 51 43 118 93 26 33 32 67 94 32 39 85 138 39 40 49 36 85 39 75 53 42 93 1 - 35 51 2,630\n- - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - 3 4 - - - - - 21\n- - - - - - - - 4 - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 2 1 - - - - - 16\n 4 2 2 4 1 5 1 - 1 - - 6 4 - 4 2 1 1 - 2 - 3 5 - - 1 3 2 111\n 2,383 2,052 1,949 3,314 3,612 2,265 2,353 1,755 3,662 2,300 1,908 2,070 2,740 2,208 2,137 1,384 2,171 2,823 1,915 1,829 1,932 1,908 2,341 1,929 316 128 3,044 120,762\n 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - - 1 13 57\n 15 6 11 31 26 31 3 23 22 10 15 16 10 20 11 30 12 20 7 9 - 1 5 19 43 763\n 16 6 11 31 26 31 23 3 22 11 15 - 16 10 20 11 30 12 20 8 9 1 1 5 - - 20 56 820\n 1 - - 2 2 - - 5 1 4 1 - 1 - - - 1 - 4 - 1 - 1 - 1 - - - 34\n 52 21 39 53 51 12 16 34 55 17 48 23 23 18 9 46 30 40 171 52 22 16 36 25 - 2 14 6 1,584\n 37 51 23 46 74 102 54 109 95 37 44 46 65 25 109 71 33 43 42 48 39 29 53 33 4 7 24 25 2,539\n 90 72 62 101 127 114 148 70 151 58 93 69 89 118 43 117 64 83 217 100 62 45 90 58 5 9 38 31 4,157\n 130 115 72 195 163 78 122 162 326 100 113 123 168 83 90 214 178 132 93 163 161 88 145 110 90 37 57 105 6,621\n 6 14 24 24 22 11 15 20 37 7 4 11 19 10 4 34 24 16 17 20 40 9 14 14 20 1 2 11 763\n 6 11 10 16 20 5 2 11 20 5 2 8 20 3 11 13 9 8 13 8 6 10 7 6 3 2 1 3 460\n 1 2 11 1 - 1 22 29 33 7 3 31 27 1 3 20 5 - 9 5 11 15 20 4 1 - - 2 566\n 11 6 7 37 28 9 13 5 7 5 3 19 11 6 12 28 12 5 2 - 12 8 28 8 - - 5 2 514\n 9 9 9 18 15 11 - 1 6 4 7 - 4 10 15 9 20 6 1 4 6 2 2 - - - 11 43 382\n- - - - 2 1 - - 14 - - - 2 - - 4 - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - 38\n 163 157 133 291 250 116 174 228 443 128 132 192 251 113 135 322 248 168 135 200 236 132 216 142 114 40 77 166 9,344\n 25 16 19 41 55 15 20 21 50 23 21 32 13 13 2 48 35 21 31 21 18 24 27 6 1 16 13 1,143\n 3 8 7 8 6 5 - 1 5 6 5 8 1 4 7 1 8 4 8 8 3 3 2 - - 7 26 249\n 28 24 26 49 61 20 20 22 55 29 26 40 14 17 9 49 43 25 39 29 21 27 29 6 - 1 23 39 1,392 TOTAL\nCOUNTRY OF \nORIGIN/MAK\nE OF VEHICLES\nNIGERIA\nPgt204/205/206\nPgt304/305/306\nPgt404/405/406\nPgt504/505/506\nPgt604/605/606\nOther Pgts\nJ5/J9\nV/W Santana\nPassat\nGolf\nJetta\nKombi Bus\nOther V/W\nSub-Total\nOthers \nOthers \nSub Total\nCHINA\nQuingqi\nJimbei\nFoton\nSub-Total\nUSA\nChevrolet\nChrysler\nFord\nHummer\nSub-Total\nFRANCE\nRenault\nSub-Total\nITALY\nFiat\nSub-Total\nNETHERLANDS\nDAF\nSub-Total\nINDIA\nTATA\nSub-Total\nGRAND TOTAL IKORODU II IKOYI IMOTA JEBBA KETU OJOTA MUSHIN OGBA OJO OJODU OJOKORO OKO AWO OLOWOGBO WOONE STOP OREGUN ORILE IGANMU OSHODI OYINGBO SHOGUNLE SHOMOLU TINUBU VICTORIA ISLAND YABA OTO AWORI AJAH FANCY OUT OF SERIES OUT OF SERIES (STANDARD\n)OUT OF SERIES (RE- REG) TOTAL\n - 1 3 6 4 2 2 7 1 - 2 - 5 - 1 9 - 11 2 2 2 13 5 1 - - 2 167\n 2 4 6 3 6 - 1 2 3 3 2 5 3 - - 5 1 8 2 11 7 - 1 1 - - 9 156\n 2 - 6 18 11 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 - 1 7 3 2 4 5 6 3 5 1 - 1 3 161\n - 2 3 - 2 - - - 1 1 2 - 2 - - 3 1 1 - 2 - - - - - - - 41\n 1 1 3 6 24 - - - - 1 2 - 1 - - 13 2 - - 1 - - - - - - - 99\n 5 3 - 4 10 5 7 13 31 2 8 1 22 4 6 24 14 5 7 2 14 14 12 12 - 3 6 428\n - - - - - 1 4 - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 2 2 - - - - 11\n - - - 1 - 29 18 10 - - 3 - 9 4 32 4 1 - - 5 - 5 3 3 - 3 - 201\n 7 5 9 25 30 1 - 7 3 7 7 9 15 - - 21 19 4 - 7 9 8 12 9 - 3 5 439\n 11 18 38 71 73 1 - 7 13 17 10 23 24 - 2 67 19 2 - 8 18 17 25 8 - 8 15 908\n 3 - - 2 2 - - - 1 - 3 1 4 - - 4 - - - 1 2 - - - - - - 60\n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 - - - - - - 1 - - - - 12\n 91 30 56 122 99 37 20 32 129 44 61 16 44 44 45 73 85 80 81 52 87 48 73 60 105 1 109 3,203\n 122 64 124 258 261 77 54 80 184 76 101 131 57 55 84 238 145 113 96 96 145 110 139 95 - 123 1 149 5,886\n 98 88 30 68 70 78 222 145 148 68 72 69 53 72 149 108 62 102 101 94 46 81 76 69 57 127 6 146 4,882\n 98 88 30 68 70 78 222 145 148 68 72 69 53 149 72 108 62 102 101 94 46 81 76 69 57 6 146 4,882\n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 2 - - - 7\n - - 37 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 41\n 6 21 3 6 2 13 4 6 5 6 4 1 2 6 - 1 8 5 1 2 12 184\n - 6 21 40 - - 6 2 13 4 6 5 6 - - 4 1 2 6 1 1 9 8 - 1 - 12 232\n 4 2 2 17 9 3 7 - 13 9 2 13 17 9 1 42 18 4 4 6 13 12 17 11 5 1 10 8 465\n 4 6 4 16 7 - 6 7 6 5 2 8 1 - - 10 5 - 5 4 5 4 5 1 1 - - 2 225\n 96 65 57 134 113 55 60 112 158 69 66 83 99 88 51 146 79 103 79 50 117 49 90 74 2 14 72 63 4,288\n - - - 1 1 - 2 - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - 1 1 1 - - 1 19\n 104 73 63 168 130 58 119 75 177 83 104 70 117 97 52 199 102 107 88 61 135 113 65 87 15 9 74 4,997\n 10 6 2 9 12 5 4 11 1 9 4 5 3 3 11 2 4 10 2 2 4 9 4 9 2 229\n 10 6 2 12 9 5 11 4 1 9 4 5 3 - 3 11 2 4 10 2 2 4 9 - 4 - 2 229\n 6 9 16 26 6 8 4 57 6 3 4 20 4 6 6 15 8 5 5 18 13 11 18 20 36 581\n 6 9 16 26 6 8 - 4 57 6 3 20 4 4 6 6 15 8 5 5 18 13 11 18 - - 36 581\n 18 9 7 17 25 15 3 7 28 6 8 3 12 19 11 16 4 9 10 5 14 1 1 16 41 547\n 18 9 7 17 25 15 3 7 28 6 8 12 3 19 11 16 4 9 10 5 14 - 1 - 1 - 16 41 547\n 5 7 1 1 7 3 3 6 6 10 6 1 2 4 3 7 9 29 4 5 172\n 5 7 - 1 1 7 - - 3 3 6 - 6 - 10 - 6 1 2 4 3 7 29 9 - - 5 172\n 3,044 2,574 2,444 4,374 4,581 2,794 2,984 2,544 4,944 2,781 2,444 2,625 3,455 2,644 2,733 2,465 2,894 3,457 2,644 2,434 2,624 2,404 3,044 2,444 501 200 3,801 154,056\n \nTABLE 7.1: NEWLY- REGISTERED PRIVATE MOTOR VEHICLES CLASSIFIED BY MAKE/COUNTRY OF ORIGIN \nAND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019 AGBOWA AGEGE I AGEGE II AGUDA IJESHA AJEGUNLE I AJEGUNLE II AJEGUNLE III AKODO AKOWONJO ALAKA I ALAKA II ALAKUKO ALAUSA/ ALLEN APAPA I APAPA II BADAGRY BOLADE CITY HALL EGBE EJIGBO G/H II EPE EREKO GLASS HOUSE IFAKO IJAIYE IKEJA I\nU K\nBedford 4 3 3 2 3 1 \nSub-Total 3 - 4 - - - - - - - - 3 - - - - - 2 - 3 - 1 - - \nJAPAN\nDatsun - 4 - - - - - - - 2 - - - 2 - - 2 1 - - - 5 - - - \nHonda 206 195 192 213 204 74 220 135 190 193 132 427 146 211 179 218 159 159 298 180 160 217 708 223 248 \nToyota 1,319 1,618 1,376 1,530 1,256 1,739 1,445 1,394 1,223 1,921 1,567 1,258 1,331 1,429 1,455 1,445 1,094 1,501 2,050 1,651 1,408 1,493 4,157 1,644 1,903 \nMazda 34 42 31 33 44 12 27 32 72 47 31 24 33 17 22 86 32 12 54 19 34 22 63 20 49 \nSuzuki (VEH) 9 9 2 11 12 1 4 - 8 6 6 1 44 6 1 4 4 4 4 1 4 5 18 3 1 \nDaihatsu 1 - 1 7 1 - 2 - - - - - - 2 - 2 1 - 6 - 1 - 5 - 1 \nIsuzu 2 - 1 7 2 - - - 1 5 - - - - - 5 1 - 3 - 2 - 4 - 2 \nNissan 129 74 105 66 201 48 64 87 176 114 66 75 92 76 56 241 55 58 122 72 94 62 222 98 135 \nMitsubishi 41 32 11 34 50 11 11 18 39 31 6 10 33 20 19 42 11 52 19 28 27 41 69 13 29 \nGalant 1 - 1 1 - - - - - 2 1 1 - - - - 3 - - - 2 - - - - \nLancer - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - - - - - - 2 2 - - 2 - - - - \nSubaru - 1 4 3 - 2 - - - 2 - 1 2 5 - 2 5 1 7 - 5 1 1 1 - \nSub-Total 1,742 1,975 1,724 1,905 1,770 1,887 1,773 1,667 1,709 2,324 1,809 1,797 1,681 1,768 1,732 2,045 1,369 1,790 2,563 1,951 1,739 1,846 5,247 2,002 2,368 \nAUSTRIA\nSteyr -\nMack\nSub-Total\n KOREA\nDaewoo 1 - - 1 - 1 4 - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - - \nKia 22 11 21 23 41 16 23 21 41 18 9 10 16 14 12 61 10 28 27 18 19 20 47 29 17 \nHyundai 32 36 46 45 28 14 62 30 25 36 27 28 44 32 43 39 29 62 58 40 32 40 126 2 49 \nSub-Total 55 47 67 69 69 31 89 51 66 54 36 38 60 47 55 100 39 90 85 58 51 60 174 31 66 \n GERMANY\nM. Benz 90 88 80 81 91 52 66 82 73 103 69 86 105 94 117 95 61 78 135 77 98 94 187 93 119 \nB.M.W. 10 5 7 11 14 4 15 9 10 7 7 11 8 14 16 20 7 5 22 18 10 7 25 18 12 \nAudi 13 5 6 6 7 2 4 4 9 11 2 5 4 3 9 14 2 26 11 15 4 6 16 8 12 \nV/W Bora 4 2 4 8 - 7 7 - 6 25 13 8 4 - - - 5 3 16 - 6 6 4 7 - \nOPEL 3 7 3 7 18 4 5 2 18 4 3 1 2 4 10 23 7 6 13 6 14 4 7 8 6 \nMAN - - - - - - - 7 1 - - - 1 - 2 2 - - - - - - - - - \nSkoda\nSub-Total 120 107 100 113 130 69 97 104 117 150 94 111 124 115 154 154 82 118 197 116 132 117 239 134 149 \nSWEDEN\nVolvo 11 15 12 12 8 4 9 7 20 16 10 10 15 18 22 12 11 8 28 16 19 17 40 16 20 \nScania\nSub-Total 11 15 12 12 8 4 9 7 20 16 10 10 15 18 22 12 11 8 28 16 19 17 40 16 20 \nNIGERIA\nPgt204/205/206 7 1 1 3 2 - 5 - 1 3 2 2 - 5 - 6 - 2 2 6 3 1 15 2 6 \nPgt304/305/306 3 - 4 3 2 3 - - 18 3 2 - - 3 8 2 - 1 3 1 3 - 6 - 3 \nNUMBER OF MOTOR VEHICLES REGISTERED BY LICENSING STATION COUNTRY OF ORIGIN/MAKE OF VEHICLES\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \n70\nAGBOWA AGEGE I AGEGE II AGUDA IJESHA AJEGUNLE I AJEGUNLE II AJEGUNLE III AKODO AKOWONJO ALAKA I ALAKA II ALAKUKO ALAUSA/ ALLEN APAPA I APAPA II BADAGRY BOLADE CITY HALL EGBE EJIGBO G/H II EPE EREKO GLASS HOUSE IFAKO IJAIYE IKEJA I\nNUMBER OF MOTOR VEHICLES REGISTERED BY LICENSING STATION COUNTRY OF ORIGIN/MAKE OF VEHICLES\nPgt404/405/406 - 2 1 2 4 3 - - 6 2 7 1 - 7 2 8 1 1 3 5 - 3 6 - 4\nPgt504/505/506 - - 1 - - 2 - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - - - 7 - 1 1 4 2\nPg604/605/606 - - 1 1 - - - - 4 - - - - 2 2 5 - 1 1 - - - 1 - -\nOther Pgts 3 7 5 4 5 2 6 5 3 8 3 4 5 7 - 6 3 1 6 1 5 4 5 9 17\nJ5/J9 - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nV/W Santana - 2 1 1 - - 2 - 2 3 - - 11 - - - - - - 23 - 3 3 - 1\nPassat 7 12 4 12 22 4 - - 6 3 9 9 - 1 - 20 3 7 13 - 8 3 25 - 14\nGolf 14 19 10 23 28 11 3 - 33 29 21 11 - 8 3 46 10 4 32 - 14 8 23 2 18\nJetta 2 1 1 1 3 3 - - 1 1 3 1 - 5 - 4 - - 3 - 1 3 1 - -\nKombi Bus - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nOther V/W 13 21 29 7 46 4 19 28 29 5 1 3 33 29 52 23 7 13 18 4 12 7 58 36 55\nSub-Total 40 74 58 57 114 30 35 33 104 58 48 31 49 69 120 67 24 30 81 47 46 33 144 53 120\nOTHERS\nOthers 28 41 36 37 54 26 107 34 10 42 26 324 9 45 48 22 21 43 33 43 37 28 84 26 46\nSub-Total 28 41 36 37 54 26 107 34 10 42 26 324 9 45 48 22 21 43 33 43 37 28 84 26 46\nChina\nQuingqi\nJimbei\nFoton 2 2 2 2 2\nSub-Total - - - - 2 - 2 - 2 - - - - - - - - - 2 - 2 - - - -\nUSA\nChevrolet 3 8 1 10 8 1 - 5 2 5 2 2 4 10 7 4 7 7 10 3 5 3 10 10 8\nChrysler 4 7 6 6 9 3 3 1 5 3 6 1 2 4 1 5 2 - 4 6 5 4 11 1 4\nFord 56 54 38 72 40 35 69 42 69 42 26 25 58 59 49 40 43 62 70 44 49 47 129 46 94\nHummer - 2 2 - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 1 - 1 - 1 - - - -\nSub-Total 63 71 47 88 57 39 72 48 76 51 34 28 64 73 57 50 53 69 85 53 60 54 150 57 106\nFRANCE\nRenault 3 1 3 3 5 2 1 1 1 1 3 6 2 3 7 2 3 4 3\nSub-Total 3 1 - 3 - 3 5 - 2 1 1 1 - 1 3 6 - 2 3 7 2 3 - 4 3\nITALY\nFiat 1 2 1 1 2 1 38 1 3 2 1 3 1 3 1 1\nSub-Total - 1 2 1 - 1 2 - - - - 1 38 1 3 - 2 - 1 - 3 1 3 1 1\nNETHERLANDS\nDAF\nSub-Total\nINDIA\nTata 1\nSub-Total - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nGRAND TOTAL 2,278 2,116 2,049 2,292 2,206 2,086 2,191 1,946 2,104 2,696 2,059 2,025 2,359 2,136 2,141 2,511 1,601 2,151 3,077 2,296 2,089 2,159 6,086 2,320 2,879\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \nU K\nBedford\nSub-Total\nJAPAN\nDatsun\nHonda\nToyota\nMazda\nSuzuki (VEH)\nDaihatsu\nIsuzu\nNissan\nMitsubishi\nGalant\nLancer\nSubaru\nSub-Total\nAUSTRIA\nSteyr\nMack\nSub-Total\n KOREA\nDaewoo\nKia\nHyundai\nSub-Total\n GERMANY\nM. Benz\nB.M.W.\nAudi\nV/W Bora\nOPEL\nMAN\nSkoda\nSub-Total\nSWEDEN\nVolvo\nScania\nSub-Total\nNIGERIA\nPgt204/205/206\nPgt304/305/306\nCOUNTRY OF ORIGIN/MAKE OF VEHICLES IKEJA II IKORODU I IKORODU II IKOYI IMOTA JEBBA KETU OJOTA MUSHIN OGBA OJO OJODU OJOKORO OKO AWO OLOWOGBOW\nOONE STOP OREGUN ORILE IGANMU OSHODI ISOLO OYINGBO SHOGUNLE SHOMOLU TINUBU VICTORIA ISLAND YABA OTO-AWORI AJAH FANCY OUT OF SERIES OUT OF SERIES (STANDARD) OUT OF SERIES RE- REG\n 1 3 2 1 23\n - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 3 - - - - - - - 2 - 1 - - - 23\n - - 2 2 - - - - - - - - 3 1 4 - - - - - - - - - 2 1 - - - - 31\n 217 209 206 204 278 372 389 207 190 110 140 127 207 195 198 181 121 110 238 194 183 196 195 213 175 197 16 11 75 420 11,261\n 1,960 1,629 1,740 1,547 1,179 1,951 2,236 1,745 1,788 1,311 2,622 1,441 1,434 1,498 1,947 1,681 1,679 926 1,406 2,185 1,465 1,356 1,287 1,365 1,723 1,229 277 112 1,993 2,037 86,956\n 28 47 38 21 50 115 110 39 21 36 86 115 34 32 47 22 19 51 59 123 19 18 76 29 30 41 4 - 39 20 2,261\n 3 5 4 8 5 11 17 5 5 5 5 16 6 16 17 22 3 6 10 3 - 11 8 7 7 4 7 - 1 1 386\n - 3 - - - 1 - - 1 4 - - 5 - - - - - - 3 - - 1 4 6 - - - - - 58\n 2 - 1 2 1 5 4 5 - - 3 12 - 4 1 - - 2 - - - 1 2 4 15 5 - - - 3 107\n 98 95 80 67 205 334 324 92 87 103 279 312 52 99 130 43 89 100 217 114 56 80 153 83 111 202 11 4 47 50 6,305\n 30 32 50 43 41 83 72 16 21 17 56 79 27 33 49 86 32 27 31 29 11 27 41 41 31 40 1 - 21 22 1,786\n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - 3 4 - - - - - 21\n - - - - - - - - - - 4 - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 2 1 - - - - - 16\n - 1 4 2 2 4 1 4 1 - 1 - - 5 4 - 3 2 1 1 - 2 - 3 5 - - 1 1 - 91\n 2,341 2,021 2,122 1,896 1,761 2,876 3,153 2,113 2,114 1,586 3,196 2,107 1,763 1,883 2,400 2,035 1,946 1,224 1,962 2,652 1,734 1,691 1,763 1,754 2,110 1,719 316 2,177 128 2,553 109,279\n - - 1 - - 2 2 - - 5 1 4 1 - 1 - - - 1 - 4 - - 1 1 - 1 - - - 34\n 22 23 51 18 39 51 49 10 16 33 52 15 43 21 23 18 9 46 30 39 145 50 20 16 36 25 - 2 11 4 1,491\n 70 32 34 47 22 44 72 102 51 101 91 35 44 42 59 24 109 70 30 41 42 48 39 26 51 33 4 7 12 14 2,401\n 92 55 86 65 61 97 123 112 67 139 144 54 88 63 83 42 118 116 61 191 80 98 60 42 88 58 5 23 9 3,926 18 \n 107 90 93 100 66 163 141 64 100 114 247 75 92 113 152 62 75 189 116 112 73 149 157 79 125 103 90 37 26 38 5,462\n 7 7 5 14 24 23 22 11 15 20 37 7 3 11 19 10 4 34 23 16 17 20 40 7 14 14 20 1 2 8 747\n 10 7 6 11 10 16 20 5 2 11 20 5 2 8 20 3 11 13 9 8 13 8 6 10 7 6 3 2 1 3 460\n 15 - 1 1 11 1 - - 21 8 32 7 3 31 22 - - 20 3 - 9 4 6 13 14 4 1 - - 2 364\n 11 7 9 6 7 36 28 9 12 5 7 4 2 14 11 6 12 28 11 3 2 - 12 3 13 8 - - 3 2 456\n - - - - - - 2 1 - - 14 - - - 2 - - 4 - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - 38\n -\n 150 111 114 132 118 239 213 90 150 158 357 102 98 177 226 81 102 288 162 140 114 181 221 112 173 135 114 33 7,527 53 \n 24 16 13 11 19 33 34 11 10 17 27 15 18 27 9 9 1 45 17 14 19 6 16 20 21 4 1 4 4 841\n -\n 24 16 13 11 19 33 34 11 10 17 27 15 18 27 9 9 1 45 17 14 19 6 16 20 21 - 4 1 4 4 841\n 7 - 3 1 3 6 4 2 2 7 1 - 2 - 5 - 1 9 - 7 2 2 2 13 5 1 - - 2 162\n 2 1 2 4 6 3 6 - 1 2 3 3 2 5 3 - - 5 1 8 2 11 - 7 1 1 - - 9 156 TOTAL\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \nCOUNTRY OF ORIGIN/MAKE OF VEHICLES\nPgt404/405/406\nPgt504/505/506\nPg604/605/606\nOther Pgts\nJ5/J9\nV/W Santana\nPassat\nGolf\nJetta\nKombi Bus\nOther V/W\nSub-Total\nOTHERS\nOthers\nSub-Total\nChina\nQuingqi\nJimbei\nFoton\nSub-Total\nUSA\nChevrolet\nChrysler\nFord\nHummer\nSub-Total\nFRANCE\nRenault\nSub-Total\nITALY\nFiat\nSub-Total\nNETHERLANDS\nDAF\nSub-Total\nINDIA\nTata\nSub-Total\nGRAND TOTAL IKEJA II IKORODU I IKORODU II IKOYI IMOTA JEBBA KETU OJOTA MUSHIN OGBA OJO OJODU OJOKORO OKO AWO OLOWOGBOW\nOONE STOP OREGUN ORILE IGANMU OSHODI ISOLO OYINGBO SHOGUNLE SHOMOLU TINUBU VICTORIA ISLAND YABA OTO-AWORI AJAH FANCY OUT OF SERIES OUT OF SERIES (STANDARD) OUT OF SERIES RE- REG TOTAL\n - 2 2 - 6 18 11 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 - 7 3 2 4 5 6 3 5 1 - 1 3 161\n - - - 1 3 - 2 - - - 1 1 2 - 2 - - 3 1 1 - 2 - - - - - - - 40\n - 2 1 1 2 6 2 - - - - 1 2 - 1 - - 13 2 - - 1 - - - - - - - 52\n 4 4 4 1 - 2 8 2 7 5 9 1 4 - 18 3 3 22 9 5 2 2 14 10 6 9 - 2 - 280\n - - - - - - - 1 4 - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 2 1 - - - - 10\n - 3 - - - 1 - - 1 2 - - 3 - 5 - - 4 - - - 4 - 5 3 - - 3 - 86\n 7 7 7 5 9 25 30 1 - 7 3 7 6 9 15 - - 18 19 4 - 6 9 8 12 8 - 3 5 412\n 4 8 11 18 38 70 69 1 - 7 13 17 10 23 24 2 - 67 18 2 - 8 18 17 25 8 - 8 15 871\n - 3 3 - - 2 2 - - - 1 - 3 1 4 - - 4 - - - 1 - 2 - - - - - 60\n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 - - - - - - - - - - - 7\n 42 20 11 14 24 60 57 19 14 31 57 11 11 3 13 27 32 43 52 52 31 10 61 1 22 43 1 14 2 1,330\n 71 48 41 45 193 91 191 27 31 63 90 42 46 43 92 33 36 203 105 81 41 52 119 59 80 71 - 31 1 3,627 36 \n 32 23 21 36 17 32 34 29 137 117 88 28 26 18 33 24 46 85 43 60 54 45 40 34 42 58 57 6 13 13 2,541\n 32 23 21 36 17 32 34 29 137 117 88 28 26 18 33 24 46 85 43 60 54 45 40 34 42 58 57 13 6 2,541 13 \n -\n -\n 4 2 4 4 1 6 4 4 4 43\n - 4 - - - - - - - 2 4 - 4 1 - 6 - 4 - - - 4 - - 4 - - - - 43\n 4 3 3 1 2 14 8 2 7 - 12 6 1 5 13 9 - 42 16 4 2 4 11 8 13 7 5 1 2 3 343\n 4 3 4 6 4 15 7 - 6 7 6 5 2 8 1 - - 10 5 - 5 4 5 4 5 1 1 - - 2 223\n 69 54 40 44 30 93 80 31 35 98 103 36 44 65 75 53 24 127 65 83 48 38 82 43 70 62 2 14 20 22 3,008\n - - - - - 1 1 - 2 - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - 1 1 1 - - 1 19\n 77 60 47 51 123 36 96 33 50 105 121 47 47 78 89 62 24 180 86 87 55 47 98 55 89 71 15 9 22 3,593 28 \n 5 4 5 2 5 7 1 9 1 3 2 1 3 10 2 3 10 1 2 2 5 1 1 139\n - 5 4 5 2 5 7 - 1 9 1 3 2 1 - 3 - 10 2 10 3 1 2 2 5 - 1 - 1 139\n 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 6 1 1 7 2 1 92\n - 1 1 - 1 2 - - 2 3 1 - 1 - - 6 - - 1 - - - 1 7 2 - 1 - - 92\n -\n -\n 1\n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1\n 2,792 2,339 2,449 2,242 2,105 3,600 3,851 2,418 2,559 2,199 4,029 2,399 2,092 2,292 2,950 2,286 2,273 2,155 2,439 3,117 2,222 2,121 2,320 2,091 2,611 2,118 501 2,304 2,705 131,632\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \nTABLE 7.2: NEWLY- REGISTERED COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLES CLASSIFIED BY MAKE/COUNTRY OF ORIGIN \nAND LICENSING STATION, LAGOS STATE: 2019 AGBOWA AGEGE I AGEGE II AGUDA IJESHA AJEGUNLE I AJEGUNLE II AJEGUNLE III AKODO AKOWONJO ALAKA I ALAKA II ALAKUKO ALAUSA ALLEN APAPA I APAPA II BADAGRY BOLADE CITY HALL EGBE EJIGBO G/H II EPE EREKO GLASS HOUSE IFAKO IJAIYE IKEJA I IKEJA II\nBedford 1 1 1 1 9 2 \n Sub-Total - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 - 1 - 9 - 2 - - \nJAPAN\nDatsun - 6 - 3 - 4 1 - 1 1 1 2 - - - 2 1 2 4 2 1 3 5 - - - \nHonda - - 1 2 - - - - - - 5 - 1 - - - 3 1 - - 8 1 16 - 1 - \nToyota 59 65 70 127 21 52 73 44 136 66 60 61 83 44 45 58 82 118 155 76 125 50 230 34 165 62 \nMazda 11 8 16 9 11 9 14 11 12 10 15 4 10 2 1 14 7 6 7 2 12 7 42 6 20 25 \nSuzuki (VEH) 28 94 31 18 19 69 66 50 91 51 60 57 31 19 44 61 21 42 45 64 57 47 282 45 46 64 \nDaihatsu 3 4 8 3 - 3 5 5 3 9 1 - - - 4 1 2 3 3 4 7 10 9 3 1 16 \nIsuzu - - - - - 3 27 15 2 5 5 1 4 4 - 4 4 - 2 2 2 2 7 3 1 1 \nNissan 15 20 12 18 - 24 8 11 8 16 8 5 19 9 11 14 19 6 15 9 11 11 38 11 33 47 \nMitsubishi 32 18 9 7 8 13 10 11 11 12 16 4 11 4 1 19 3 6 8 9 6 11 35 14 4 28 \nSubaru - - - 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - 4 - 3 - - - - - \n Sub-Total 148 215 147 190 59 177 204 147 264 170 171 134 159 82 106 173 144 184 243 168 232 142 664 116 271 243 \nAUSTRIA\nSteyr - - - - - - - - 12 1 - - - - 5 - - - - - 1 17 - - 3 \nMack 17 11 15 1 6 16 15 26 7 12 13 4 61 52 26 3 5 1 20 4 4 37 9 12 29 \n Sub-Total 17 11 15 1 6 16 15 26 19 - 13 13 4 61 52 31 3 5 1 20 4 5 54 9 12 32 \n KOREA\nDaewoo\nKia - 5 - 2 2 - 1 - - - 2 1 3 - 1 - 2 - 1 3 3 1 4 - 2 1 \nHyundai 8 3 5 3 - 3 9 1 - 3 3 - 3 - 2 - - 1 6 3 2 - - 1 - 5 \n Sub-Total 8 8 5 5 2 3 10 1 - 3 5 1 6 - 3 - 2 1 7 6 5 1 4 1 2 6 \n GERMANY\nM. Benz 20 25 25 8 1 12 17 25 10 12 16 21 25 18 25 19 9 21 8 28 5 22 34 14 26 46 \nB.M.W. _ - - 2 - 1 - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - 2 - - 1 - - - \nV/W Bora _ - - 1 6 5 21 5 - 1 12 5 13 1 - - - 1 4 33 - - 13 34 - 6 \nOPEL - 1 - 2 - 1 1 - - - 1 1 - - - - - - 8 2 2 - - - - 2 \nMAN 4 6 9 10 4 10 3 17 3 6 4 8 1 13 25 9 - 2 2 5 - 8 10 16 4 3 \n Sub-Total 24 32 34 23 11 29 42 47 13 20 33 35 39 32 50 28 9 24 22 70 7 30 58 64 30 57 \nSWEDEN\nVolvo 9 4 7 2 3 3 7 0 3 4 6 2 2 0 5 3 4 5 2 1 5 4 6 3 5 2\nScania 1 13 2 6 5 2 1 2 4 3 9 7 2 3 3 1 0 3 5 5 3 6 14 3 2 2\n Sub-Total 17 10 9 8 8 5 8 2 7 7 15 9 4 3 8 4 4 8 7 6 8 10 20 6 7 4 \nNIGERIA\nPgt204/205/206 _ 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0 0 0 0\nPgt504/505/506 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0 0 0 0\nPgt604/605/606/607 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 23 1 0 0\nOther Pgts 1 _ _ 4 _ 2 10 10 1 2 0 1 6 5 1 _ _ 7 2 4 2 1 2 _ 0 0\nJ5/J9 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 0 0\nV/W Santana 0 _ _ _ _ _ 14 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0\nPassat 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 _ _ _ 1 _ 5 0 1 0 1 0 2 6 0 0 0\nGolf 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0\nKombi bus 0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2 _ _ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0\nOther V/W 33 28 16 27 76 27 4 31 8 49 44 31 5 23 76 39 17 21 49 18 35 33 93 9 16 5\n Sub-Total 35 29 16 31 76 29 28 41 9 52 44 32 13 29 77 59 17 30 51 23 37 36 143 10 16 5\nCOUNTRY OF ORIGIN/MAKE OF VEHICLES\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \n74\nAGBOWA AGEGE I AGEGE II AGUDA IJESHA AJEGUNLE I AJEGUNLE II AJEGUNLE III AKODO AKOWONJO ALAKA I ALAKA II ALAKUKO ALAUSA ALLEN APAPA I APAPA II BADAGRY BOLADE CITY HALL EGBE EJIGBO G/H II EPE EREKO GLASS HOUSE IFAKO IJAIYE IKEJA I IKEJA II COUNTRY OF ORIGIN/MAKE OF VEHICLES\nOTHERS\nOthers 26 18 43 28 56 67 63 19 5 52 49 38 146 52 16 17 35 19 36 33 26 20 123 29 10 13 \n Sub-Total 26 18 43 28 56 67 63 19 5 52 49 38 146 52 16 17 35 19 36 33 26 20 123 29 10 13 \nChina\nQuingqi _ _ _ 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - 1 - 1 \nJimbei _ _ _ - 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - 2 - - - - \nFoton _ _ _ 6 8 1 2 15 _ 3 _ 12 _ _ 1 1 1 5 1 1 \n Sub-Total - - - 7 9 1 2 15 _ 3 _ 12 _ _ 1 3 1 - 6 - 1 - 2 - - - \n USA \nChevrolet 1 - 2 5 5 1 3 - 1 1 6 1 - 1 - 7 5 2 2 - 3 3 11 3 1 - \nChrysler - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - \nFord 15 20 32 14 30 11 18 14 6 24 31 20 14 26 22 31 11 15 16 20 30 17 50 23 23 20 \n Sub-Total 16 20 34 19 36 12 21 14 7 25 37 21 14 27 22 38 16 17 18 20 33 20 61 26 24 20 \n FRANCE \nRenault 5 _ _ 1 _ _ 2 _ _ 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 1 2 3 1 \n Sub-Total - - 5 1 - - 2 - - 1 2 1 - - - 1 1 1 4 - 1 2 3 - - 1 \n ITALY \nFiat 8 15 15 12 15 3 3 _ 18 1 4 12 5 3 12 12 1 1 7 5 4 5 19 3 12 6\n Sub-Total 8 15 15 12 15 3 3 - 18 1 4 12 5 3 12 12 1 1 7 5 4 5 19 3 12 6 \n NETHERLANDS \n DAF 12 28 16 2 22 15 11 11 6 9 12 5 4 31 1 7 1 6 1 5 19 8 11 23\n Sub-Total 12 28 16 2 22 15 11 11 6 9 12 5 4 31 1 7 - 1 - 6 1 5 19 8 11 23 \n INDIA \n Tata 3 6 1 6 5 10 1 5 3 10\n Sub-Total 3 - - 6 - - - - - 1 - 6 - - 5 10 - 1 5 - 3 - 10 - - - \nGRAND TOTAL 416 328 295 333 301 357 409 323 348 344 385 319 395 320 353 383 233 293 407 358 362 285 1,180 274 395 410 \n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \nBedford\n Sub-Total \nJAPAN\nDatsun\nHonda\nToyota\nMazda\nSuzuki (VEH)\nDaihatsu\nIsuzu\nNissan\nMitsubishi\nSubaru\n Sub-Total \nAUSTRIA\nSteyr\nMack\n Sub-Total \n KOREA\nDaewoo\nKia\nHyundai\n Sub-Total \n GERMANY\nM. Benz\nB.M.W.\nV/W Bora\nOPEL\nMAN\n Sub-Total \nSWEDEN\nVolvo\nScania\n Sub-Total \nNIGERIA\nPgt204/205/206\nPgt504/505/506\nPgt604/605/606/607\nOther Pgts\nJ5/J9\nV/W Santana\nPassat\nGolf\nKombi bus\nOther V/W\n Sub-Total \nCOUNTRY OF ORIGIN/MAKE OF VEHICLESIKORODU I IKORODU II IKOYI IMOTA JEBBA KETU OJOTA MUSHIN OGBA OJO OJODU OJOKORO OKO AWO OLOWOGBOW\nOONE STOP CENTRE OREGUN ORILE IGANMU OSHODI OYINGBO SHOGUNLE SHOMOLU TINUBU VICTORIA ISLAND YABA OTO-AWORI AJAH FANCY OUT OF SERIES OUT OF SERIES (STANDARD) OUT OF SERIES RE- REG TOTAL\n 1 7 1 1 3 2 1 31\n 1 7 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - 3 - 2 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - 31\n - 4 4 - - - 4 2 - - 2 7 1 6 - 1 - 1 - - - 2 3 3 - 7 5 91\n 4 1 1 20 - 1 5 1 - - 2 5 4 - 1 3 1 1 - - 1 6 4 - - - - 100\n 133 59 52 185 79 147 88 43 48 188 67 61 107 218 32 50 37 44 73 51 74 21 96 108 54 215 129 4,620\n 14 10 4 14 39 35 8 3 9 44 5 11 8 21 11 6 14 7 2 7 16 28 24 6 5 17 20 679\n 75 59 63 142 67 186 70 58 40 116 53 75 43 30 63 80 38 69 56 28 18 58 13 61 32 143 110 3,348\n - 6 - 5 12 8 2 3 6 13 1 4 - 3 2 6 15 8 8 1 2 12 - 6 3 9 5 247\n 5 5 - 1 6 5 6 6 - - - 2 1 7 2 9 7 2 4 9 1 5 7 7 12 - 17 220\n 13 9 19 26 5 48 25 34 45 59 7 17 14 19 10 28 52 14 23 7 9 10 13 14 42 34 24 1,018\n 13 9 8 35 2 21 10 12 15 10 5 15 6 36 52 13 7 18 74 7 12 34 12 11 53 29 14 843\n - 1 - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 2 2 20\n 261 159 156 188 459 437 152 229 163 432 145 190 187 340 173 191 182 159 171 181 138 169 154 231 204 - - 309 473 11,186\n - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - 13 1 57\n 15 8 6 11 26 31 31 5 24 35 15 10 10 16 20 46 11 12 20 9 7 - 11 1 50 20 856\n 16 8 6 11 26 31 31 5 24 35 15 11 - 16 10 20 46 11 12 20 9 8 1 1 11 63 21 913\n -\n -\n - 3 1 - 2 2 2 - 1 3 5 2 2 - - - - - 26 1 2 2 - - - - - 2 3 93\n 3 3 4 1 2 2 - 8 3 4 - 2 4 6 1 - 3 1 2 - - - 2 3 - - - 11 12 138\n 4 3 7 1 4 4 2 3 9 7 5 4 6 6 1 - 3 1 3 26 2 2 3 2 - - - 13 15 231\n 37 16 15 32 6 22 14 22 48 79 21 25 10 16 21 15 62 25 20 20 14 4 9 20 7 - - 67 31 1,170\n - - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 - - - - 2 - - - - 3 16\n - - - 1 - - 1 1 21 - 1 - - 5 1 - 3 - 2 - 5 1 2 6 - - - - - 211\n 2 1 - - - 1 - - 1 - 1 1 5 - - - - 2 1 - - - 15 5 - - - - 2 58\n 9 5 9 18 9 15 11 - 1 19 7 4 - 4 10 15 28 9 1 6 4 6 2 2 - - - 49 12 437\n 49 22 25 15 37 52 26 24 70 99 30 30 15 25 32 33 94 34 28 21 19 15 20 43 7 - - 119 45 1,892\n3 12 5 0 8 21 4 10 4 23 8 3 5 4 4 1 3 19 7 12 15 2 4 6 2 - - 12 9 303\n4 3 8 7 8 6 5 1 2 5 6 5 8 1 4 7 1 10 4 8 8 3 3 2 0 - - 7 26 259\n 15 7 13 16 7 27 9 11 6 28 14 8 13 5 8 8 4 29 11 20 23 5 7 8 2 - - 19 35 562\n0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 _ _ 0 0 5\n0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 _ _ 0 0 1\n0 0 0 1 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 _ _ 0 0 47\n1 1 2 0 2 2 3 0 8 22 1 4 1 4 1 3 2 5 0 5 0 0 4 6 3 _ _ 1 6 148\n0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 _ _ 0 0 1\n0 0 0 0 0 0 29 17 8 0 0 0 0 4 4 32 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 _ _ 0 0 115\n3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 _ _ 0 0 27\n0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 _ _ 0 0 37\n0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 _ _ 0 0 5\n52 80 16 32 62 42 18 6 1 72 33 50 13 31 17 13 30 33 28 50 42 26 47 51 17 _ _ 91 107 1,873\n56 81 19 33 65 70 50 23 17 94 34 55 14 39 22 48 35 40 32 55 44 26 51 59 24 _ _ 92 113 2,259\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \nCOUNTRY OF ORIGIN/MAKE OF VEHICLES\nOTHERS\nOthers\n Sub-Total \nChina\nQuingqi\nJimbei\nFoton\n Sub-Total \n USA \nChevrolet\nChrysler\nFord\n Sub-Total \n FRANCE \nRenault\n Sub-Total \n ITALY \nFiat\n Sub-Total \n NETHERLANDS \n DAF \n Sub-Total \n INDIA \n Tata \n Sub-Total \nGRAND TOTAL IKORODU I IKORODU II IKOYI IMOTA JEBBA KETU OJOTA MUSHIN OGBA OJO OJODU OJOKORO OKO AWO OLOWOGBOW\nOONE STOP CENTRE OREGUN ORILE IGANMU OSHODI OYINGBO SHOGUNLE SHOMOLU TINUBU VICTORIA ISLAND YABA OTO-AWORI AJAH FANCY OUT OF SERIES OUT OF SERIES (STANDARD) OUT OF SERIES RE- REG TOTAL\n 77 50 52 13 36 36 49 85 28 60 46 40 51 20 48 103 19 23 42 47 49 6 47 34 11 133 114 2,358\n 77 50 52 13 36 36 49 85 28 60 46 40 51 20 48 103 19 23 42 47 49 6 47 34 11 - - 114 133 2,358\n - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 2 1 - - - - - 7\n - - - 37 - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 41\n 1 6 21 3 6 9 4 6 2 1 2 - 4 1 5 1 - - 12 2 143\n 1 - 6 21 40 - - 6 - 9 - 6 4 - - - - 1 2 2 1 1 5 8 1 - - 2 12 191\n - 1 1 - 1 3 1 - - 1 1 3 8 4 - - 1 - 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 5 8 122\n - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2\n 56 25 21 27 33 41 24 25 15 55 22 33 18 24 35 27 14 19 20 31 12 35 20 6 12 41 52 1,296\n 57 25 22 27 34 45 25 25 15 56 23 36 26 28 35 28 16 19 20 33 14 37 10 24 16 46 60 1,420\n 6 1 1 5 4 4 4 2 2 6 4 3 1 1 1 4 2 3 2 8 90\n 6 1 1 - 5 4 4 4 2 - 2 6 4 - 3 - - 1 - 1 - 1 4 2 3 - - 2 8 90\n2 5 8 16 24 6 6 2 3 56 8 3 4 14 4 6 7 14 8 5 5 17 6 9 17 24 40 520\n 5 2 8 16 24 6 6 2 3 56 3 8 4 14 4 6 7 14 8 5 5 17 6 9 17 - - 24 40 520\n12 18 9 7 18 25 15 8 8 36 6 8 3 12 19 11 16 4 9 10 5 14 1 1 17 42 600\n 18 12 9 7 18 25 15 8 8 36 8 6 3 12 19 11 16 4 9 10 5 14 - 1 1 - - 17 42 600\n2 5 7 1 1 7 3 3 6 6 10 6 1 2 4 3 7 9 29 4 5 171\n 2 5 7 - 1 1 7 - - 3 3 6 6 - - 10 - 6 1 2 4 3 7 9 29 - - 4 5 171 \n 595 355 332 339 774 730 376 425 345 915 382 352 333 505 358 460 310 455 340 422 313 304 313 433 326 - - 730 1,096 22,424\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \nTABLE 8.1: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES AND YEAR OF REGISTRATION :YEAR 2004 - 2019\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 70,496 57,826 118,099 156,858 202,042 166,207 188,515 218,528 253,404 264,286 236,873 252,497 216,360 178,626 209,034 133,935\nVan, Pick-up 1,460 1,146 3,616 6,149 7,084 6,995 7,203 6,155 5,817 6,318 6,107 8,753 5,691 3,373 2,194 2,823\nLorry/Truck 1,780 1,723 4,175 6,357 9,987 13,296 11,690 12,478 13,578 12,504 10,329 10,003 7,881 6,700 4,876 3,185\nMinibus 6,988 6,292 14,290 17,124 19,244 22,351 30,232 20,420 19,424 21,807 28,859 31,950 24,824 16,853 16,681 5,837\nOmnibus 202 162 485 116 392 434 1,541 611 583 642 1,277 1,047 2,320 981 3,890 8,072\nTanker 6 16 30 61 94 83 40 62 110 205 179 71 34 45 309 51\nTractor 25 17 50 73 77 81 97 88 52 183 119 50 40 60 80 47\nTrailer 70 49 216 172 157 322 782 36 32 29 445 26 7 1 346 49\nTipper 86 110 304 532 845 1,029 863 1,095 864 1,008 885 538 433 237 502 38\nJeep 5\nMini-T\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 314 14\nTotal 67,376 81,078 141,265 187,442 239,922 210,798 240,963 259,473 293,864 306,982 285,073 304,935 257,590 206,876 238,226 154,056\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\nTYPE OF \nVEHICLES\n2004\n2005\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency\n78\nTABLE 8.2: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF OWNERSHIP \nAND YEAR OF REGISTRATION, LAGOS STATE :YEAR 2004 - 2019\nPRIVATE 53,322 67,246 109,436 138,592 181,632 153,781 186,429 196,987 237,697 245,332 225,361 242,456 204,726 172,161 196,077 127,058 \nCOMMERCIAL 5,879 5,766 17,446 19,484 28,425 32,490 32,978 43,641 40,758 45,668 43,198 43,965 37,199 23,761 25,788 17,526 \nGOVERNMENT 216 268 571 1,061 651 1,170 892 445 618 478 274 231 420 114 489 234 \nMISSION/SCHOOL 258 235 332 1,097 843 890 875 747 910 899 739 402 681 466 609 464 \n*CORPORATION 7,701 7,563 13,480 27,208 28,371 22,467 19,789 17,653 13,881 14,605 15,501 17,881 14,564 10,374 15,263 8,774 \nTOTAL 81,078 67,376 141,265 187,442 239,922 210,798 240,963 259,473 293,864 306,982 285,073 304,935 257,590 206,876 238,226 154,056 \n2018\n2019\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\nTYPE OF \nOWNERSHIP\n20 4\n20 5\n20 6\n20 7\n20 8\n20 9\n2010\n2011\n*Corporation refers to private sector companies\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency\n79\nTABLE 9.1: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES AND \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP , LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2010 - 2011\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nschool *Corporation TOTAL Private Commercial Government Mission/ school. *Corporation TOTAL\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 7,357 169,659 657 371 10,471 188,515 16,036 189,680 402 582 11,828 218,528\nVan, Pick-up 3,025 1,986 115 30 2,047 7,203 3,797 1,350 13 16 979 6,155\nLorry/Truck 7,606 411 3 15 3,655 11,690 8,811 351 2 3 3,311 12,478\nMinibus 12,966 13,892 103 340 2,931 30,232 13,703 5,345 27 139 1,206 20,420\nOmnibus 764 423 8 119 227 1,541 316 182 - 6 107 611\nTanker 19 1 1 - 19 40 48 7 - - 7 62\nTractor 38 1 5 - 53 97 23 1 - 1 63 88\nTrailer 593 38 - - 151 782 - 31 - 5 36\nTipper 610 18 - - 235 863 876 71 1 - 147 1,095\nTotal 32,978 186,429 892 875 19,789 240,963 196,987 43,641 445 747 17,653 259,473 \nNUMBER OF NEWLY REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF OWNERSHIP\nTYPE OF 2010 2011\nVEHICLES\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency\n80\nTABLE 9.2: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES AND \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP , LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2012 - 2013\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nschool. *Corporation TOTAL Private Commercial Government Mission/ school. *Corporation TOTAL\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 13,373 228,384 500 675 10,472 253,404 15,591 237,276 329 679 10,411 264,286\nVan, Pick-up 3,345 1,599 44 16 813 5,817 3,561 1,364 64 17 1,312 6,318\nLorry/Truck 11,594 259 8 1,717 13,578 10,642 240 8 30 1,584 12,504\nMinibus 11,280 7,193 70 176 705 19,424 14,182 6,373 66 152 1,034 21,807\nOmnibus 217 259 4 33 70 583 469 79 1 21 72 642\nTanker 101 1 - - 8 110 - 163 - - 42 205\nTractor 51 - - - 1 52 - 148 - - 35 183\nTrailer 30 1 - - 1 32 - 28 - - 1 29\nTipper 767 1 - 2 94 864 - 884 10 - 114 1,008\nTotal 27,385 9,313 118 235 3,409 293,864 245,332 45,668 478 899 14,605 306,982 \nNUMBER OF NEWLY REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF OWNERSHIP\n2012 2013 TYPE OF \nVEHICLES\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies\nSOURCE:Motor Vehicle Administration Agency\n81\nTABLE 9.3: NEWLY REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES AND BY\nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2014 - 2015\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nschool. *Corporation TOTAL Private Commercial Government Mission/ school. *Corporation TOTAL\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 3,610 224,027 149 487 9,183 237,456 1,806 241,302 204 269 8,916 252,497\nVan, Pick-up 4,223 456 64 20 1,344 6,107 6,739 244 20 5 1,745 8,753\nLorry/Truck 8,314 65 5 4 1,942 10,330 7,281 24 7 2,691 10,003\nMinibus 24,663 1,352 56 225 2,563 28,859 26,734 864 7 120 4,225 31,950\nOmnibus 1,041 2 4 230 1,277 908 22 1 116 1,047\nTanker 1 160 18 179 26 45 71\nTractor 63 56 119 28 22 50\nTrailer 77 368 445 9 17 26\nTipper 121 764 885 125 413 538\nTOTAL 43,199 225,902 274 741 15,541 285,657 242,456 43,965 231 402 17,881 304,935 \nNUMBER OF NEWLY REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF OWNERSHIP\n2014 2015 TYPE OF \nVEHICLES\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies \nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency\n82\nTABLE 9.4: NEWLY REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF VEHICLES AND \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2016 - 2017\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nschool. *Corporation TOTAL Private Commercial Government Mission/ school. *Corporation TOTAL\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 1,768 204,579 414 557 9,042 - 216,360 \nVan, Pick-up 4,304 56 4 17 1,310 - 5,691 \nLorry/Truck 6,405 7 1 7 1,461 - 7,881 \nMinibus 22,423 84 1 96 2,220 - 24,824 \nOmnibus 1,857 - - 4 459 - 2,320 \nTanker 30 - - - 4 - 34 \nTractor 37 - - - 3 - 40 \nTrailer 6 - - - 1 - 7 \nTipper 369 - - - 64 - 433 \nTotal 37,199 204,726 420 681 14,564 257,590 - - - - - - \nNUMBER OF NEWLY REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES BY TYPE OF OWNERSHIP\n2016 2017 TYPE OF \nVEHICLES\nNote:*- Corporation refers to private sector companies \nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency\n83\nTABLE 10: NEWLY - REGISTERED MOTOR CYCLES BY MAKE AND \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP INCLUDING OUT OF SERIES AND SPECIAL PLATE NUMBERS, \nLAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/School *Corporation TOTAL\nSUZUKI 205 14 - - - 219\nHONDA 482 21 - - 9 512\nKAWAZAKI 31 - - - - 31\nYAMAHA 45 2 - - - 47\nVESPA 11 - - - - 11\nBAJAJ 11,278 1,728 - - 2 13,008\nPEUGEOT - - - -\nOTHERS 5,858 441 - - 52 6,351\nKEKE NAPEP 196 24 - - - 220\nSKYGO 195 10 - - - 205\nQUINGO 379 10 - - - 389\nJINCHENG 293 34 - - - 327\nNANFANG 276 - - - - 276\nKEKE MARWA 623 104 - - - 727\nNIPPON 433 - - - - 433\nSINOIKI 749 53 - - 11 813\nJINKE 247 5 - 5 257\nLIFAN - - - -\nTVS 13,212 952 - - 340 14,504\nLONCIN - - - - - -\nSIMBA - - - - - -\nLARUTI - - - - - -\nTOTAL 34,513 3,398 - - 419 38,330 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP\nMAKE OF CYCLES\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \n84\nTABLE 11: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR CYCLES BY LICENSING \nSTATION AND MAKE/COUNTRY OF ORIGIN , LAGOS STATE : YEAR 2018 AGBOWA AGEGE 1 AGEGE 2 AGUDA IJESHA AJEGUNLE AJEGUNLE II AJEGUNLE III AKODO AKOWONJO ALAKA I ALAKA II ALAKUKO ALLEN APAPA I APAPA II BADAGRY BOLADE CITY HALL EGBE EJIGBO G/H II EPE EREKO GLASS HOUSE IJU IFAKO IKEJA I IKEJA II\nJAPAN\nSUZUKI 21 - - 16 2 - 12 - - 1 1 - - - 16 - - 7 5 - 2 - 1 - \nKAWAZAKI - - 1 2 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 6 - 1 - - - \nYAMAHA - - - 2 3 - - - - 2 9 1 1 - - - - 4 2 - - - 3 - \nKEKE NAPEP - - - - 50 - 2 - - - 19 - - 16 3 - - 1 6 8 3 9 4 4 \nSKYGO 5 1 - 1 1 - 5 - - - - - 66 - - - - 7 5 1 1 1 - - \nQUINGO 12 1 - 11 1 72 6 - - 1 - - - - 3 - - 3 2 13 52 - - - \nJINCHENG - - 3 1 1 - - - 29 1 6 - - - - - - 2 3 - 32 - - - \nNANFANG 15 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - 1 - - - \nNIPPON - 24 3 16 1 - 65 - 40 - - - - - - - - 2 2 20 1 - - - \nSINOIKI 2 4 - 35 1 2 3 - - 3 14 10 36 7 20 - 35 15 19 24 3 1 - - \nJINKE - - 1 - 2 4 5 2 3 - - - - - - 3 2 1 2 61 - - - - \nSub-Total 63 6 24 77 75 76 98 2 51 29 49 11 103 23 42 3 37 49 53 130 93 - 11 - 4 8 \nITALY\nVESPA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 1 - 1 - - - - - \nBAJAJ 149 231 130 45 198 26 151 37 44 40 89 58 250 60 374 137 40 158 502 320 724 606 60 104 772 126 \nSub-Total 231 149 130 45 198 26 151 37 44 40 89 58 250 60 374 137 40 160 503 321 724 60 606 104 772 126 \nFRANCE\n HONDA 7 2 2 2 1 2 7 12 1 24 8 24 3 1 3\nPEUGEOT\nSub-Total - - 7 2 2 - 2 - 1 2 7 - - - 1 12 - 8 24 24 - 3 1 - - 3 \nOTHERS \nOTHERS 80 91 114 45 46 45 43 54 99 31 75 75 154 42 8 84 20 106 173 131 316 232 100 72 123 171 \nSub-Total 80 91 114 45 46 45 43 54 99 31 75 75 154 42 8 84 20 106 173 131 316 232 100 72 123 171 \nINDIA\nKEKE MARWA 29 35 26 - 2 3 11 4 2 6 8 37 24 2 6 - - 4 9 23 35 47 11 4 8 12 \nTVS 232 164 76 91 72 21 235 593 77 103 202 89 315 62 85 114 103 83 225 367 255 1,066 59 280 158 266 \nSIMBA\nSub-Total 261 199 117 76 75 23 246 597 79 109 210 126 339 64 91 114 103 87 234 390 290 1,113 70 166 284 278 \nCHINA\nLIFAN\nLONCIN\nLARUTI\nSub-Total - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - \nGRAND TOTAL\n 560 527 385 245 396 170 540 690 275 210 430 270 846 155 550 350 200 410 987 996 1,426 1,963 230 460 1,065 ###\nCOUNTRY OF ORIGIN/MAKE\nOF CYCLES\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \nTABLE 11: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR CYCLES BY LICENSING \nSTATION AND MAKE/COUNTRY OF ORIGIN , LAGOS STATE : YEAR 2018 IKORODU I IKORODU II IKOYI IMOTA JEBBA KETU OJOTA MUSHIN OGBA OJO OJODU OKO AWO OLOWOGBOW\nOONE STOP CENTRE OREGUN ORILE IGANMU OSHODI OYINGBO SHOMOLU SHOGUNLE TINUBU VICTORIA ISLAND YABA AJAH MUSHIN OTO-AWORI FANCY OUT OF SERIES STANDARD NPTOTAL\n - 7 - - 11 31 - - - - 3 - - - 8 25 - - - - 14 17 5 2 - 12 219\n - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - 4 4 1 - - 31\n - - - - 4 - 1 - - - 2 - - - - 6 - - - - - 4 2 1 - - 47\n 5 2 7 31 16 3 21 3 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 4 - - 220\n - - - - 2 - 19 - - - 3 5 50 - - - - - - - 5 4 14 9 - - 205\n - - - 16 90 9 - - - - - - - - 12 81 - - - - - 2 - 2 - - 389\n - - - - 14 - 17 13 - - 1 - - - 69 14 - 100 - - 2 7 1 7 - 4 327\n - - - 51 24 - - - - - 1 - - - - 180 - - - - - 1 - 1 - - 276\n - - - 41 55 - 33 50 1 33 1 - - - 25 17 - - - - - 1 - 2 - - 433\n - - 3 38 89 19 33 - 1 50 3 - - 3 72 217 2 6 2 1 5 3 27 5 - - 813\n - - - 119 13 - - - - - 1 - - - 22 8 - - - - 4 3 - 1 - - 257\n 5 9 10 318 296 62 - 66 124 4 83 17 5 50 3 208 548 2 106 2 1 31 34 44 56 - 12 4 3,217 \n - - - - 1 - - - - - - 2 - - - - 1 - - - - - 2 - 1 - - - 11\n 993 151 96 1,877 620 299 111 466 100 250 142 57 74 106 346 218 205 110 341 74 107 164 174 329 88 10 65 4 13,008\n 151 993 96 1,878 620 299 111 466 100 250 142 59 74 106 346 218 206 110 341 74 107 174 166 89 329 10 4 65 13,019 \n 183 24 14 1 60 3 15 3 18 15 4 7 12 33 6 10 5 512 \n - \n 183 - - 24 14 1 - - 60 - - 3 - - 3 15 18 - 15 4 7 12 33 6 10 5 512 \n - \n 233 59 188 360 734 154 72 313 39 38 152 47 19 37 81 231 420 32 39 56 67 117 118 68 125 3 16 3 6,351 \n 233 59 188 360 734 154 72 313 39 38 152 47 19 37 81 231 420 32 39 56 67 117 118 68 125 3 16 3 6,351\n 24 16 15 4 127 44 19 13 - 11 8 14 5 12 8 13 - - - - - - - 34 - 12 - - 727\n 565 135 201 1,665 1,526 408 108 1,233 177 297 270 165 97 245 289 55 303 103 150 153 208 147 136 146 263 5 60 1 14,504\n -\n 589 151 216 1,530 1,792 452 127 1,246 177 308 278 179 102 257 297 68 303 103 150 153 208 136 181 146 275 5 60 1 15,231\n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\n 2,003 370 510 4,736 #### 968 310 2,091 500 600 655 305 200 450 730 740 #### 247 640 300 390 455 470 430 795 20 18 150 38,330\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \nTABLE 12: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTORCYCLES/TRICYCYCLES BY MAKE AND YEAR OF REGISTRATION: YEAR 2001-2019\nJAPAN\nSUZUKI 14,579 6,856 6,953 1,300 567 1,997 3,588 6,123 7,015 6,615 5,391 1,066 1,417 251 164 50 38 219 141 \nKAWAZAKI 122 129 39 6 38 63 41 84 127 80 48 79 46 46 109 11 13 31 43 \nYAMAHA 9,023 4,302 5,355 1,195 423 415 339 1,540 1,360 1,180 2,960 439 168 85 530 152 134 47 124 \nKEKE NAPEP - - 159 23 163 121 75 306 456 248 125 149 104 22 11 227 581 220 419 \nSKYGO - - 478 58 42 76 61 282 497 332 526 219 155 100 337 23 9 205 115 \nQUINGO - - 1,168 332 128 111 121 206 274 192 375 24 66 - 23 3 3 389 303 \nJINCHENG - - 7,259 3,548 2,542 3,322 5,462 9,392 7,868 4,569 4,105 796 307 81 271 15 13 327 295 \nNANFANG - - 1,179 464 305 151 114 205 402 149 102 109 11 - 76 32 - 276 39 \nNIPPON - - - - 185 105 35 233 291 62 67 4 7 - 92 - 3 433 94 \nSINOIKI - - - - 555 993 949 1,061 908 236 925 189 98 131 251 263 170 813 726 \nJINKE - - - - 5 9 - 4 24 38 11 2 - - - - 257 8 \nSub-Total 23,724 11,287 22,590 6,926 4,953 7,363 10,785 19,436 19,222 13,701 14,635 3,076 2,379 716 1,864 776 964 3,217 2,307 \nITALY\nVESPA 353 177 281 29 9 2 7 103 180 166 19 6 2 1 - 11 11 \nBAJAJ 32 7 34 42 19 458 4,171 14,969 45,873 60,626 42,497 16,835 4,634 726 2,739 4,832 3,085 13,008 9,040 \nSub-Total 385 184 315 71 28 460 4,178 15,072 46,053 60,792 42,516 16,841 4,636 726 2,739 4,833 3,085 13,019 9,051 \nFRANCE\n HONDA 1,048 771 1,431 726 854 1,347 1,414 2,429 3,520 3,588 5,104 3,279 885 246 246 69 119 512 223 \nPEUGEOT - 10 17 - - - 10 21 13 66 1,142 425 208 - 45 11 14 _ 29\nSub-Total 1,048 781 1,448 726 854 1,347 1,424 2,450 3,533 3,654 6,246 3,704 1,093 246 291 80 133 512 252 \nOTHERS \nOTHERS 8,295 888 7,412 3,825 2,133 2,643 2,326 4,467 5,387 4,423 4,020 2,195 1,169 1,109 1,209 2,141 918 6,351 4,197 \nSub-Total 8,295 888 7,412 3,825 2,133 2,643 2,326 4,467 5,387 4,423 4,020 2,195 1,169 1,109 1,209 2,141 918 6,351 4,197 \nINDIA\nKEKE MARWA - - 11 1 54 33 193 697 1,390 547 691 120 107 75 46 26 162 727 319 \nTVS - - - - - - - 366 3,896 1,027 4,766 1,463 2,125 307 3,790 8,101 8,245 14,504 8,787 \nSIMBA - - - - - - - 136 376 228 284 206 93 9 152 4 5 1\nSub-Total - - 11 1 54 33 193 1,199 5,662 1,802 5,741 1,789 2,325 391 3,988 8,131 8,412 15,231 9,107 \nCHINA\nLIFAN - - - - - - - 40 226 111 141 59 183 283 83 6 5 136\nLONCIN - - - - - - - 90 230 161 93 49 73 - 40 - -\nLARUTI - - - - - - - - 101 22 19 - - - - -\nSub-Total - - - - - - - 130 557 294 253 106 256 283 123 6 5 - 136 \nGRAND TOTAL 33,452 13,140 31,776 11,549 8,022 11,846 18,906 42,754 80,414 84,666 73,411 27,711 11,858 3,471 10,214 15,967 25,050 13,517 \n 38,330\n2018\n2019\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2006\n2007\n2008\n2009\n2010\n2011\nCOUNTRY OF\nORIGIN/MAKE\nOF CYCLES\n2001\n2002\n2003\n2004\n2005\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \n87\nTABLE 13: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF MOTOR VEHICLES' LICENSES RENEWED BY \nTYPE OF VEHICLES AND OWNERSHIP, LAGOS STATE : YEAR 2019\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nSchool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep\n409,111 3,300 1,021 1,264 21,957\n 436,653\nVan, Pick-up \n100 3,808\n - - \n675\n 4,583\nLorry/Truck\n7,739\n - - \n2,446\n 10,185\nMinibus\n307 29,084\n -\n9 5,446\n 34,846\nOmnibus\n69 7,332\n - - \n725\n 8,126\nTanker -\n526\n - - \n119\n 645\nTractor -\n148\n - - \n20\n 168\nTrailer -\n591\n - - \n132\n 723\nTipper -\n850\n - - \n198\n 1,048\nMini-Truck -\n489\n - - \n167\n 656\nTotal 53,867 409,587 1,021 1,273 31,885 497,633 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP\nTYPE OF \nVEHICLES TOTAL\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administrtion Agency\n88\nTABLE 14: NEWLY REGISTERED MOTORVEHICLES/MOTORCYCLES AND ESTIMATE \nOF LICENSES RENEWED , LAGOS STATE : YEAR 2004- 2018\nNEW REGISTRATION RENEWAL TOTAL NEW REGISTRATION RENEWAL TOTAL\n2004 67,376 158,694 226,070 2,519 11,549 14,068\n2005 81,078 181,456 262,534 4,539 8,022 12,561\n2006 141,265 205,927 347,192 6,461 11,846 18,307\n2007 187,442 438,649 626,091 12,356 18,906 31,262\n2008 239,922 497,657 737,579 14,810 42,754 57,564\n2009 210,798 577,638 788,436 16,762 80,414 97,176\n2010 240,963 695,641 936,604 20,481 84,666 105,147\n2011 259,473 758,958 1,018,431 73,411\n -\n 73,411\n2012 293,864 723,595 1,017,459 3,636 27,713 31,349\n2013 307,399 778,463 1,085,862 11,858 3,814 15,672 \n2014 285,657 682,343 968,000 6,263 3,471 9,734\n2015 304,935 529,022 833,957 15,744 10,214 25,958\n2016 257,590 616,234 873,824 18,339 15,967 34,306\n2017 206,876 512,224 719,100 15,244 13,517 28,761\n2018 238,226 408,229 646,455 12,149 25,050 37,199\n2019 154,056 497,633 651,689 14,809 38,330 53,139\nMOTOR VEHICLES MOTORCYCLES\nYEAR\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency\n89\nTABLE 15: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF MOTORCYCLES/TRICYCLES LICENCES RENEWED BY TYPE OF OWNERSHIP AND \nMAKE OF CYCLES, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/School *Corporation TOTAL\nSUZUKI 2 81 - - - 83\nHONDA 18 114 - - - 132\nKAWAZAKI 6 19 - - 2\n 27\nYAMAHA 35 38 - - - 73\nVESPA 7 - - - 7\nBAJAJ 313 5,017 - - 14 5,344\nPEUGEOT 1 16 - - - 17\nOTHERS 210 2,154 - - 117 2,481\nKEKE NAPEP 17 231 - - - 248\nSKYGO 7 61 - - - 68\nQUINGO 5 172 - - 2\n 179\nJINCHENG 25 150 - - - 175\nNANFANG - 23 - - - 23\nKEKE MARWA 1 186 - - - 187\nNIPPON - 55 - - - 55\nSINOIKI 9 416 - - 4\n 429\nJINKE - 5\n - - - 5\nLIFAN - 80 - - - 80\nTVS 171 4,937 - - 87 5,195\nLONCIN - - - - - -\nSIMBA - 1\n - - - 1\nLARUTI - - - - - -\nTOTAL 13,763 820 - 226 14,809 \nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP\nMAKE OF CYCLES\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency\n90\nTABLE 16: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES WITH FANCY PLATE NUMBERS \nCLASSIFIED BY MONTH AND MAKE OF VEHICLES, LAGOS STATE : YEAR 2019\nBedford - - - - - - - - - - - - - \nDatsun - - - - - - - - - - - - - \nHonda - - 2 2 3 1 3 3 2 - - - 16\nToyota 20 20 24 15 26 23 34 19 29 27 24 16 277\nMazda - - - - - 2 - 1 1 - - - 4\nSuzuki (VEH) 1 1 - - 2 - - 2 1 - - - 7\nDaihatsu - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nIsuzu - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nNissan 1 - 1 - - - - - 1 1 4 3 11\nMitsubishi - 1 - - - - - - - - - - 1\nDaewoo 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 1\nLancer - - - - - - - - - - - -\nSubaru - - - - - - - - - - - -\nM. Benz 8 9 10 1 7 6 4 9 3 11 12 10 90\nB.M.W. 1 3 - - 2 2 2 1 3 2 3 1 20\nAudi - - - - 1 - - 1 1 - - - 3\nVolvo - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nPgt505 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nPgt504 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nPgt204/205/206 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nPgt304/305/306 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nPgt604/605/606/607 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nPassat - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nOther Pgts - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nJ5/J9 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nV/W Santana - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nKombi Bus - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nV/W Bora - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1\nOther V/W - - - - - -\nHyundai 1 - - - 1 - 1 - 1 - - - 4\nOPEL - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nGolf - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nDAF - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nMAN - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nSteyr - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nDaewoo - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nFiat - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nOthers 10 9 5 2 3 2 4 1 3 8 5 5 57\nKia - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nskoda - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nFoton - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nMACK - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nChevrolet 1 - - - - 2 - 1 1 - - - 5\nChrysler - - 1 - - - - - - - - - 1\nFord - - - - - - - - - 2 - - 2\nHummer - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1\nTOTAL 43 44 43 20 45 38 48 38 47 52 48 35 501\nSEPT OCT NOV DEC TOTAL\nMONTH\nJUNE JULY AUG\nMAKE OF \nVEHICLES JAN FEB MARCH APRIL MAY\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency\n91\nTABLE 17: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES WITH FANCY PLATE NUMBERS \nCLASSIFIED BY STATE OF RESIDENCE OF OWNERS AND MAKE OF VEHICLES, LAGOS STATE : YEAR 2019 Others\nAbia - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1\nAdamawa - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nAkwa Ibom - 2 - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 3\nAnambra - 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 7\nBauchi - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nBalyesa - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nBenue - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nBorno - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nCross River - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nDelta 7 4 2 - - - - - - - - - - - 1 14\nEbonyi - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nEdo 7 - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - 2 11\nEkiti 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2\nEnugu - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nGombe - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nImo - 2 - - - 5 6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13\nJigawa - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nKaduna - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nKano - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nKatsina - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nKebbi - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nKogi 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1\nKwara 2 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3\nLagos 9 188 2 6 - 5 1 69 13 2 - - 1 1 4 1 40 1 2 345\nNassarawa - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nNiger - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1\nOgun 38 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 - - - - - 46\nOndo 1 - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2\nOsun 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2\nOyo 4 17 1 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 1 3 - - - - 1 28\nPlateau - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nRivers 4 - 4 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 - - 1 - - 15\nSokoto - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nTaraba - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nYobe - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZamfara - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nF.C.T.Abuja 3 2 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7\nTOTAL 274 19 4 7 11 84 26 3 - - 1 1 4 - 1 1 - 57 1 1 5 501 STATE OF RESIDENCE OF OWNERS HONDA TOYOTA MAZDA Suzuki (VEH) Isuzu NISSAN MITSUBISHI M. Benz B.M.W AUDI VOLVO V/W SANDNA Daewoo Pgt604/605/606 Other Pgt V/W Bora Hyundai Foton Golf Man Ford Opel KIA Hummer Chevrolet Renault Chrysler\nTOTAL\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency\n \n92\nTABLE 18: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES WITH OUT OF SERIES PLATE NUMBERS CLASSIFIED BY MONTH \nAND MAKE OF VEHICLES, LAGOS STATE : YEAR 2019\nBedford\nHonda 1 3 - 1 1 - 1 - - 3 1 - 11\nToyota 6 10 6 17 12 11 13 3 9 9 8 8 112\nMazda - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nSuzuki (VEH) - - - - - - - - - - - -\nIsuzu - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nNissan - - 1 - - 1 - - 1 - - 1 4\nMitsubishi - - - - - - - - - - - -\nGalant - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nLancer - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nM. Benz 1 6 1 5 4 3 1 5 3 5 2 1 37\nB.M.W. - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1\nAudi - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - 2\nVolvo - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1\nPgt404/405/406 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nSubaru - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1\nOther pgts - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nPassat - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nGolf - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nOther V/W - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1\nHyundai - - 1 1 - 2 1 - - - - 2 7\nChevrolet - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1\nFord - - 6 1 1 - - - - 6 - - 14\nOthers - 1 - 2 - - - 2 - - 1 - 6\nKia 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - - 2\nChevrolet - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nChrysler - - - - - - - - - - - - \nHummer - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nTOTAL 20 15 9 29 20 19 16 10 14 18 18 12 200 \nSEPT OCT NOV DEC TOTAL\nMONTH\nJUNE JULY AUG\nMAKE OF \nVEHICLES\nJAN. FEB. MARCH APRIL MAY\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \n93\nTABLE 19: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES WITH OUT OF SERIES PLATE NUMBERS CLASSIFIED\n BY STATE OF RESIDENCE OF OWNERS AND MAKE OF VEHICLES: LAGOS STATE, YEAR 2019 BEDFORD JETTA STEYR Chrysler Hummer\nAbia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nAdamawa - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nAkwa Ibom - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nAnambra - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nBauchi - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nBalyesa - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nBenue - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nBorno - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nCross River - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nDelta - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - 2\nEbonyi - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nEdo - - 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4\nEkiti - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1\nEnugu - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nGombe - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nImo - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nJigawa - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nKaduna - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 2\nKano - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nKatsina - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nKebbi - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nKogi - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nKwara - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2\nLagos 5 90 - - - 4 - - - 1 33 1 2 1 1 5 14 2 2 161\nNassarawa - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nNiger - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1\nOgun - 4 4 - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9\nOndo - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1\nOsun - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1\nOyo - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 4\nPlateau - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nRivers - - 2 - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3\nSokoto - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 2\nTaraba - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1\nYobe - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZamfara - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nF.C.T.Abuja - 1 4 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6\nTotal - 11 112 - - - 4 - - - 1 37 1 2 1 - - - - - - - - - 1 7 - - - - - 1 14 - 6 2 - - - 200 FORD FIAT OTHERS KIA SKODA TOTAL HYUNDAI OPEL RENAULT DAF MAN Chevrolet V/W SANTANA PASSAT GOLF KOMBI BUS V/W BORA OTHER V/W B.M.W AUDI VOLVO PEUGEOT404/ 405/406 Peugeot204/205/206 OTHER PGT NISSAN MITSUBISHI GALANT LANCER SUBARU M. BENZ STATE OF RESIDENCE OF OWNERS HONDA TOYOTA MAZDA SUZUKI (VEH) ISUZU\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \n94\nTABLE 20.1: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES WITH OUT OF SERIES PLATE NUMBERS BY TYPE OF VEHICLES AND \nYEAR OF REGISTRATION:YEAR 2008 -2019\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 625 491 619 336 195 121 139 155 406 107 \n 200 457 \nVan, Pick-up \n 8 1 5 2\n - - - - - 1 26 \nLorry/Truck - - - - - - 1 - - 93 \nMinibus\n 2 2 8 1\n - - - - - 276 \nOmnibus - - - - - - - - - - - \nTanker - - - - - - - - - - - \nTractor - - - - - - - - - 1 \nTrailer - - - - - - - - - - - \nTipper - - - - - - - - - - - \nTotal 628 501 632 339 195 121 140 155 406 108 853 200 \nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 368 393 364 245 489 296 444 337 123 378 407 468\nVan, Pick-up 1 3 7 1 5 - - - - 6 - 23\nLorry/Truck - 4 - - 1 - - - - - 90\nMinibus 2 3 6 4 13 - - - - - 271\nOmnibus - 2 - - - - - - - - -\nTanker - - - - - - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - - - - - - -\nTotal 405 371 377 250 508 296 444 337 123 384 407 852 \n2019\n2019\n2016\n2016\n2017\n2017\n2018\n2018\nY2013\n2013\nY2014\n2014\n2015\n2015\nY2010\n2010\nY2011\n2011\nY2012\n2012\n TABLE 20.2: NEWLY -REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES WITH OUT OF SERIES NUMBERS BY\n TYPE OF VEHICLES AND YEAR OF REGISTRATION: YEAR 2008- 2019\nTYPE OF VEHICLES\nTYPE OF VEHICLES\nY20 8\n20 8\nY20 9\n20 9\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency\n95\nTABLE 21.1: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES WITH OUT OF SERIES PLATE NUMBERS BY TYPE OF VEHICLES \nAND TYPE OF OWNERSHIP, LAGOS STATE : YEAR 2019\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nschool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 9 449 - - 10 468\nVan, Pick-up - 8 - - 15 23\nLorry/Truck - 72 - - 18 90\nMinibus - 232 - - 39 271\nOmnibus - - - - - - \nTanker - - - - - - \nTractor - 1 - - - - \nTrailer - - - - - - \nTipper - - - - - - \nTotal 322 449 - 82 - 853 \nTABLE21.2: NEWLY -REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES WITH SPECIAL PLATE NUMBERS BY\n TYPE OF VEHICLES AND TYPE OF OWNERSHIP, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2018\nPrivate Commercial Government Mission/ \nschool. *Corporation\nSaloon/Station \nwagon/Jeep 371 - - - 36 407\nVan, Pick-up - - - - -\n-\nLorry/Truck - - - - - -\nMinibus - - - - -\n-\nOmnibus - - - - - -\nTanker - - - - - -\nTractor - - - - - -\nTrailer - - - - - -\nTipper - - - - - -\nTotal 371 - -\n- 36 407\nMOTOR VEHICLES WITH OUT OF SERIES PLATE NUMBER \nREGISTERED ANNUALLY\nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP\nMOTOR VEHICLES WITH SPECIAL PLATE NUMBER REGISTERED \nANNUALLY\nTYPE OF OWNERSHIP\nTYPE OF \nVEHICLES\nTYPE OF \nVEHICLES\nTOTAL\nTOTAL\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency\n96\nTABLE 22: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES CLASSIFIED BY LICENSING STATIONS AND \nMONTH OF REGISTRATION, YEAR 2019\nJAN. FEB. MAR. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT. OCT. NOV. DEC.\nAGBOWA 44 380 305 245 175 145 300 250 200 250 200 200 2,694\nAGEGE I 44 390 195 245 175 145 200 200 200 250 200 200 2,444\nAGEGE II 44 280 305 245 175 145 200 200 190 210 180 170 2,344\nAGUDA IJESHA 45 280 365 305 215 165 200 200 200 250 200 200 2,625\nAJEGUNLE I 44 340 258 295 175 145 300 330 200 195 95 130 2,507\nAJEGUNLE II 44 280 305 245 175 145 200 199 200 250 200 200 2,443\nAJEGUNLE III 44 280 305 245 175 145 205 201 250 350 200 200 2,600\nAKODO 44 280 305 245 225 170 200 250 175 145 100 130 2,269\nAKOWONJO 52 295 265 270 175 145 200 180 220 245 205 200 2,452\nALAKA I 44 380 355 395 225 245 200 200 200 343 253 200 3,040\nALAKA II 44 330 305 245 175 145 200 190 210 250 150 200 2,444\nALAKUKO 44 280 305 230 190 145 200 190 160 190 190 220 2,344\nALLEN 44 340 325 335 235 225 200 200 200 250 200 200 2,754\nAPAPA I 44 280 305 245 187 145 200 200 200 250 200 200 2,456\nAPAPA II 44 280 305 245 175 145 200 200 200 300 200 200 2,494\nBADAGRY 44 280 305 245 175 145 300 400 270 330 200 200 2,894\nBOLADE 84 300 220 285 180 155 210 100 100 100 50 50 1,834\nCITY HALL 44 280 280 221 224 145 200 165 185 300 195 205 2,444\nEGBE 44 430 515 305 265 315 250 290 220 350 250 250 3,484\nEJIGBO GH II 44 280 305 365 215 145 200 200 200 250 200 250 2,654\nEPE 44 280 305 252 175 145 200 200 200 250 200 200 2,451\nEREKO 44 280 280 270 175 145 200 200 196 247 207 200 2,444\nGLASS HOUSE 203 674 720 832 615 844 672 732 543 568 453 410 7,266\nIFAKO IJAIYE 44 280 305 245 175 195 200 200 200 250 300 200 2,594\nIKEJA I 181 380 458 305 225 295 200 220 200 350 250 210 3,274\nIKEJA II 114 280 355 330 175 148 300 200 350 500 250 200 3,202\nIKORODU I 44 280 305 245 175 145 300 290 260 250 200 200 2,694\nIKORODU II 44 530 605 245 175 195 200 200 200 250 200 200 3,044\nIKOYI 44 280 335 335 215 165 200 200 200 220 180 200 2,574\nIMOTA 44 280 305 245 175 145 200 250 200 240 160 200 2,444\nJEBBA 44 280 360 360 215 165 550 1,050 500 400 200 250 4,374\nKETU OJOTA 45 280 365 315 265 280 600 620 501 500 400 410 4,581\nMUSHIN 44 280 305 245 175 145 250 350 300 300 200 200 2,794\nOGBA 44 280 305 350 225 175 205 200 300 500 200 200 2,984\nOJO 44 280 305 245 225 145 200 200 200 300 200 200 2,544\nOJODU 126 800 395 570 692 245 330 360 421 463 310 232 4,944\nOJOKORO 69 280 323 255 210 195 300 350 279 220 150 150 2,781\nOKO AWO 44 280 305 245 175 145 200 200 200 250 200 200 2,444\nOLOWOGBOWO 44 280 305 245 176 165 200 240 270 250 200 250 2,625\nONE STOP 45 280 280 255 200 145 400 380 370 450 300 350 3,455\nOREGUN 44 280 340 280 225 275 200 250 150 200 200 200 2,644\nORILE IGANMU 68 300 345 305 220 195 200 200 200 250 200 250 2,733\nOSHODI 44 286 270 265 200 150 250 190 210 250 150 200 2,465\nOYINGBO 44 280 305 245 175 145 200 200 300 500 250 250 2,894\nSHOMOLU 150 380 410 345 297 416 239 220 200 333 248 219 3,457\nSHOGUNLE 174 280 280 255 190 145 200 220 200 250 200 250 2,644\nTINUBU 44 280 305 245 175 145 200 190 200 250 200 200 2,434\nVICTORIA ISLAND 44 280 335 335 215 165 200 200 200 250 200 200 2,624\nYABA 44 290 305 245 175 145 200 200 200 250 150 200 2,404\nOTO-AWORI 44 280 280 270 175 145 250 380 320 400 300 200 3,044\nAJAH 44 180 350 300 175 145 200 200 200 250 200 200 2,444\nFANCY 43 44 43 20 45 38 48 38 47 52 48 35 501\nOUT OF SERIES 20 15 9 29 20 19 16 10 14 18 18 12 200\nSTANDARD(OUT OF SERIES) 690 - 853 351 275 420 245 200 - - - - 3,034\nOUT OF SERIES REG - - - 1,651 1,500 650 - - - - - - 3,801\nTOTAL 16,994 3,091 17,784 16,986 12,811 10,730 12,920 13,685 12,311 15,069 10,792 10,883 154,056 \nMONTH\nLICENSING OFFICE TOTAL\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency\n97\nTABLE 23: NEWLY-REGISTERED MOTOR CYCLES CLASSIFIED BY LICENSING STATIONS AND \nMONTH OF REGISTRATION, LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nJAN. FEB. MAR. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT. *OCT. *NOV. *DEC.\nAGBOWA 5 41 1 20 50 40 110 40 20 100 60 40 527\nAGEGE I - - 100 - 100 20 60 30 60 60 60 70 560\nAGEGE II - 10 50 - 100 20 60 40 20 20 35 30 385\nAGUDA IJESHA - - 15 - 30 - 60 - - 40 60 40 245\nAJEGUNLE I - - 20 50 156 10 60 20 30 30 20 - 396\nAJEGUNLE II - 20 - - 30 - 60 20 - - - 40 170\nAJEGUNLE III - 40 100 50 80 50 60 60 80 - 20 - 540\nAKODO - 500 20 - 30 20 60 20 - 20 - 20 690\nAKOWONJO - 25 30 - 30 20 40 20 - 20 50 40 275\nALAKA I - 20 - - 50 - 60 20 20 20 - 20 210\nALAKA II - 30 50 30 50 50 60 40 20 30 40 30 430\nALAKUKO - 30 50 - 30 - 60 40 20 20 20 - 270\nALLEN - 1 35 - 80 500 90 20 20 60 20 20 846\nAPAPA I - 10 15 - 30 20 40 20 20 - - - 155\nAPAPA II - 150 100 - 60 20 60 20 80 40 - 20 550\nBADAGRY - - 50 - 100 - 60 20 40 - 20 60 350\nBOLADE - 10 20 - 130 - 40 - - - - - 200\nCITY HALL - 10 - - 18 5 67 20 60 120 25 85 410\n EGBE - 40 100 300 100 50 60 37 60 60 80 100 987\nEJIGBO GH II 150 106 100 100 100 20 90 50 60 100 80 40 996\nEPE - 66 750 - 100 20 60 40 80 120 80 110 1,426\nEREKO 25 10 75 20 - - 60 40 - - - - 230\nGLASS HOUSE 101 22 51 131 83 69 83 100 140 520 430 233 1,963\nIJU IFAKO 50 - 50 150 50 20 60 20 - 20 20 20 460\nIKEJA I - 21 15 - 50 20 40 20 20 540 259 80 1,065\nIKEJA II 50 10 15 30 60 20 60 60 80 100 61 40 586\nIKORODU I - 50 - - 60 20 35 45 60 50 30 20 370\nIKORODU II - 650 750 - 180 20 60 63 60 80 60 80 2,003\nIKOYI - 10 30 - 130 - 60 60 40 40 80 60 510\nIMOTA - 20 - 20 100 420 1,260 1,050 1,100 166 80 520 4,736\nJEBBA 50 20 15 - 50 20 500 1,750 200 20 105 100 2,830\nKETU OJOTA - 27 100 - 155 165 160 121 50 80 75 35 968\nOGBA - - - 20 130 10 70 20 20 - 20 20 310\nOJO - 30 50 - 125 20 60 141 780 700 80 105 2,091\nOJODU - 30 - 20 - - 80 20 60 130 80 80 500\nOJOKORO - - - - 140 30 60 70 85 75 70 70 600\nOKO AWO 35 15 50 - 100 50 60 60 40 35 50 160 655\nOLOWOGBOWO 20 - 15 - 50 - 60 30 30 20 80 - 305\nONE STOP CENTRE - 10 20 - 24 26 60 20 30 10 - - 200\nOREGUN - - - 50 80 20 120 40 20 80 20 20 450\nORILE IGANMU - 10 - 30 200 100 160 40 20 50 - 120 730\nOSHODI - 10 100 - 80 50 60 80 80 100 80 100 740\nOYINGBO 300 50 100 150 200 70 95 50 240 100 80 60 1,495\nSHOGUNLE - 17 20 - 30 - 80 40 20 20 10 10 247\nSHOMOLU 100 - - 20 - 20 80 110 100 120 90 - 640\nTINUBU - 20 30 - 30 - 60 40 40 - 40 40 300\nVICTORIA ISLAND - 10 30 - 130 - 60 20 60 40 - 40 390\nYABA - 40 50 - 50 50 60 20 - 200 - - 470\nAJAH - 10 35 - 130 20 60 20 20 80 40 40 455\nMUSHIN - 20 20 - - 20 60 20 60 80 80 70 430\nOTO AWORI 65 - 20 100 150 - 60 60 80 80 80 100 795\nFANCY - - - 3 1 - 1 5 3 1 2 2 18\nOUT OF SERIES - - - - - - 20 - - - - - 20\nSTANDARD NP - - - - - - - - - 25 25 100 150\nTOTAL 967 2,205 3,247 1,294 4,022 2,125 5,121 4,812 4,228 4,422 2,797 3,090 38,330 \nMONTH LICENSING STATION TOTAL\n SOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency \n 98\nTABLE 24: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR CYCLES/ TRICYCLES BY LICENSING \nSTATION AND MAKE/TYPE OF CYCLES , LAGOS STATE : YEAR 2019 AGBOWA AGEGE 1 AGEGE 2 AGUDA IJESHA AJEGUNLE AJEGUNLE IIAJEGUNLE III AKODO AKOWONJO ALAKA I ALAKA II ALAKUKO ALLEN APAPA I APAPA II BADAGRY BOLADE CITY HALL EGBE EJIGBO G/H IIEPE EREKO GLASS HOUSE IJU IFAKO IKEJA I IKEJA II\nSUZUKI 21 - - 16 2 - 12 - 1 - 1 - - - 16 - - 7 5 2 - - - - - 1 \nHONDA 7 - - 2 2 - 2 - 2 1 7 - - - 1 12 - 8 24 24 3 - 1 - - 3 \nKAWAZAKI 1 - - 4 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 6 - 1 - - - - - \nYAMAHA - - - 3 2 - - - 2 - 9 1 1 - - - - 4 2 - - - - - - 3 \nVESPA - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 1 1 - - - - - - \nBAJAJ 3 18 12 45 176 12 102 6 41 31 77 9 145 32 287 62 36 8 306 296 508 - 30 41 11 22 \nOTHERS 23 22 14 45 40 41 21 7 93 19 63 6 47 5 34 16 - 3 140 95 202 75 15 6 7 14 \nKEKE NAPEP - - - - 50 - - - - - 17 - - 16 3 - - 1 6 8 3 - 9 - 4 4 \nSKYGO 1 1 - 1 1 - - - - - - - 66 - - - - - 5 1 - - 1 - - - \nQUINGO 11 1 - 1 11 72 6 - 1 - - - - - 3 - - - 2 13 51 - - - - - \nJINCHENG 2 - - 1 1 - - - 1 29 6 - - - - - - - 3 - 32 - - - - - \nNANFANG 14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - - - - - - \nKEKE MARWA - - - - 2 - - - 2 5 4 - 7 1 1 - - - - 13 - - - - - - \nNIPPON 2 - 24 16 1 - 65 - 40 - - - - - - - - - 2 20 - - - - - - \nSINOKI - 4 - 35 1 2 2 - 3 - 14 10 34 7 20 - 20 - 19 24 - - 1 - - - \nJINKE - - - - 4 2 5 2 3 - - - - - - 3 2 - 2 61 - - - - - - \nTVS 12 - 9 76 52 21 125 12 68 85 177 9 183 45 67 67 12 - 203 281 8 - 39 15 8 18 \n 97 46 59 245 347 150 340 27 257 170 375 35 483 106 432 160 70 39 727 840 808 75 96 62 30 65 \nBAJAJ 157 213 118 22 14 55 31 3 9 12 49 107 28 87 75 19 181 196 24 222 60 576 63 761 104 \nOTHERS 57 69 100 6 4 22 47 6 12 12 69 107 3 8 68 20 103 33 36 114 25 217 66 116 157 \nKEKE NAPEP - - - - - 2 - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - \nKEKE MARWA 29 35 26 1 2 11 4 - 1 4 37 17 1 5 - - 4 9 10 35 11 47 4 8 12 \nTVS 220 164 82 20 - 110 581 9 18 25 80 132 17 18 47 91 83 22 86 247 59 1,027 265 150 248 \n 463 481 326 - 49 20 200 663 18 40 55 235 363 49 118 190 130 371 260 156 618 155 1,867 398 1,035 521 \nTotal\nTotal\nTYPE OF CYCLES/MAKE OF CYCLES\nMotorcycles\nTRICYCLE\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency\n99\nTABLE 24: NEWLY- REGISTERED MOTOR CYCLES/ TRICYCLES BY LICENSING \nSTATION AND MAKE/TYPE OF CYCLES , LAGOS STATE : YEAR 2019 IKORODU I IKORODU II IKOYI IMOTA JEBBA KETU OJOTA MUSHIN OGBA OJO OJODU OKO AWO OLOWOGB OWO ONE STOP CENTRE OREGUN ORILE IGANMU OSHODI OYINGBO SHOMOLU SHOGUNLE TINUBU VICTORIA ISLAND YABA AJAH MUSHIN OTO-AWORI FANCY OUT OF SERIES STANDARD NPTOTAL\n 7 - - 11 - 31 - - - - - - 3 - - 8 25 - - - - 14 17 5 - 2 12 - 219\n - 183 - 14 24 - 1 - 60 - - - 3 - 3 15 18 - 4 15 12 7 33 6 10 - - 5 512\n - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - 4 4 - 1 - - 31\n - - - 4 - - - - - 1 - - 2 - - - - 6 - - - - 4 2 - 1 - - 47\n - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - 1 - - - - 2 - 1 - - - 11\n 20 573 12 31 128 110 6 49 83 17 12 20 14 2 52 126 135 227 9 54 144 15 35 60 231 7 4 65 4,557\n 15 7 8 15 122 11 - 4 37 4 55 18 8 8 27 226 417 7 28 15 110 11 35 82 60 2 3 8 2,396\n 2 5 7 16 31 - 3 3 21 - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 4 - - 216\n - - - 2 - - - - 19 - - 3 5 50 - - - - - - - 4 5 9 14 - - - 188\n - - - 90 16 - 9 - - - - - - - - 12 81 - - - - - 2 - 2 - - - 384\n - - - 14 - - - 13 17 - - - 1 - - 69 14 - 100 - - 7 2 1 - 7 - 4 324\n - - - 24 51 - - - - - - - 1 - - - 180 - - - - - 1 - 1 - - - 274\n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 35\n - - - 55 41 - - 50 33 1 33 - 1 - - 25 17 - - - - - 1 - 2 - - - 429\n - - 1 89 38 19 - - 33 1 50 - 3 - 3 72 217 2 6 2 1 3 5 5 27 - - - 773\n - - - 13 119 - - - - - - - 1 - - 22 - 8 - - - 3 4 - 1 - - - 255\n 10 14 22 41 278 17 - 14 116 13 - 8 22 2 66 5 106 32 77 69 127 7 38 52 113 3 1 44 2,889\n 782 54 50 420 201 848 133 6 420 38 150 68 49 62 151 580 1,225 442 50 155 41 424 150 272 470 12 20 126 13,540 \n 131 420 86 1,846 492 189 105 417 17 233 130 37 60 104 294 92 70 101 114 20 92 129 30 28 98 3 - 8,524\n 44 226 180 719 238 143 72 309 2 34 97 29 11 29 54 5 3 25 11 41 56 33 7 36 65 1 8 3,955\n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4\n 16 24 15 127 4 44 19 13 - 11 8 14 5 12 8 13 - - - - - - 34 - 12 - - 692\n 125 551 179 1,624 1,248 391 108 1,219 61 284 270 157 75 243 223 50 197 71 73 84 201 109 9 94 150 2 16 11,615\n 1,221 316 4,316 460 1,982 304 767 1,958 562 80 505 237 151 388 579 160 197 270 198 145 349 46 305 158 325 6 24,790 24 \nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency\nTABLE 25: AUTOREG HACKNEY PERMIT: YEAR 2011 - 2019\nJAN. FEB. MAR. APR. MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT. OCT. NOV. DEC.\n2011 14,958 16,282 17,757 11,824 16,233 16,899 15,756 18,035 17,031 12,636 11,896 183,121 13,814 \n2012 12,744 17,224 13,569 12,801 13,333 12,455 19,095 17,684 20,668 11,485 12,902 174,252 10,292 \n2013 14,988 15,267 13,311 13,425 13,610 11,869 15,764 15,102 15,356 12,525 11,333 162,436 9,886 \n2014 13,849 13,866 12,243 11,750 11,286 11,594 12,394 13,494 14,537 10,390 9,600 144,722 9,719 \n2015 9,533 9,186 9,361 9,680 8,642 10,240 12,566 13,720 12,930 11,588 10,480 126,679 8,753 \n2016 10,664 12,329 12,220 10,936 9,933 11,934 11,860 16,002 11,341 10,095 10,013 135,115 7,788 \n2017 10,802 11,501 12,549 8,367 8,128 6,944 8,033 9,567 8,157 8,094 8,276 105,585 5,167 \n2018 8,587 8,105 8,489 6,614 6,745 6,364 7,054 6,599 6,075 8,170 7,845 85,886 5,239 \n2019 8,899 7,019 8,267 7,437 8,386 6,955 8,917 17,849 8,401 9,183 8,296 106,348 6,739 \nMONTH\nYEAR TOTAL\nSOURCE: Motor Vehicle Administration Agency .\nS/N MONTH MANDATORY \nCOURSE\nREHABILITATION \nCOURSE\nSTRUCTURE \nCOURSE TOTAL %\n1 JANUARY 2,426 44 2 2,472 4.45\n2 FEBRUARY 2,646 32 - 2,678 4.82\n3 MARCH 5,091 6 - 5,097 9.18\n4 APRIL 3,678 68 - 3,746 6.75\n5 MAY 4,779 152 - 4,931 8.88\n6 JUNE 4,625 172 - 4,797 8.64\n7 JULY 6,264 109 - 6,373 11.48\n8 AUGUST 9,953 214 - 10,167 18.31\n9 SEPTEMBER 4,765 93 - 4,858 8.75\n10 OCTOBER 3,931 43 - 3,974 7.16\n11 NOVEMBER 3,808 94 - 3,902 7.03\n12 DECEMBER 2,425 92 - 2,517 4.53\n TOTAL 54,391 1,119 2 55,512 100.00\n102\nTABLE 26 : NUMBER OF DRIVERS TRAINED IN LAGOS STATE DRIVERS' INSTITUTE \nCENTRES: Y2015\nSOURCE: Lagos State Drivers' Institute\nS/N MONTH MANDATORY \nCOURSE\nREHABILITATION \nCOURSE\nSTRUCTURE \nCOURSE\nTOTAL %\n1 JANUARY 6,602 113 1 6,716 7.40\n2 FEBRUARY 8,506 155 - 8,661 9.54\n3 MARCH 8,458 106 - 8,564 9.44\n4 APRIL 7,990 127 3 8,120 8.95\n5 MAY 7,263 272 - 7,535 8.30\n6 JUNE 7,773 440 - 8,213 9.05\n7 JULY 8,083 164 - 8,247 9.09\n8 AUGUST 9,554 58 - 9,612 10.59\n9 SEPTEMBER 6,688 84 - 6,772 7.46\n10 OCTOBER 7,516 89 2 7,607 8.38\n11 NOVEMBER 6,547 110 - 6,657 7.33\n12 DECEMBER 4,049 10 - 4,059 4.47\n TOTAL 89,029 1,728 6 90,763 100.00\n103\nTABLE 27 : NUMBER OF DRIVERS TRAINED IN LAGOS STATE DRIVERS' INSTITUTE \nCENTRES: Y2016\nSOURCE: Lagos State Drivers' Institute\nS/N MONTH MANDATORY \nCOURSE\nREHABILITATION \nCOURSE\nSTRUCTURE \nCOURSE\nTOTAL %\n1 JANUARY 6,778 29 3 6,810 17.46\n2 FEBRUARY 6,820 33 13 6,866 17.60\n3 MARCH 8,100 34 1 8,135 20.86\n4 APRIL 5,322 25 0 5,347 13.71\n5 MAY 3,377 11 14 3,402 8.72\n6 JUNE 1,419 98 0 1,517 3.89\n7 JULY 1,013 127 0 1,140 2.92\n8 AUGUST 1,647 86 0 1,733 4.44\n9 SEPTEMBER 1,148 46 0 1,194 3.06\n10 OCTOBER 1,040 125 0 1,165 2.99\n11 NOVEMBER 846 202 2 1,050 2.69\n12 DECEMBER 518 107 17 642 1.65\n TOTAL 38,028 923 50 39,001 100.00\n104\nTABLE 28 : NUMBER OF DRIVERS TRAINED IN LAGOS STATE DRIVERS' INSTITUTE \nCENTRES: Y2017\nSOURCE: Lagos State Drivers' Institute\nS/N MONTH MANDATORY \nCOURSE\nREHABILITATION \nCOURSE\nSTRUCTURE \nCOURSE\nTOTAL %\n1 JANUARY 979 198 - 1,177 6.94\n2 FEBRUARY 959 174 3 1,136 6.80\n3 MARCH 1,592 213 1 1,806 11.29\n4 APRIL 1,725 196 - 1,921 12.24\n5 MAY 1,212 223 - 1,435 8.60\n6 JUNE 1,108 164 - 1,272 7.86\n7 JULY 1,108 228 6 1,342 7.86\n8 AUGUST 832 229 - 1,061 5.90\n9 SEPTEMBER 1,153 155 - 1,308 8.18\n10 OCTOBER 1,128 87 - 1,215 8.00\n11 NOVEMBER 1,112 93 - 1,205 7.89\n12 DECEMBER 1,189 44 - 1,233 8.43\n TOTAL 14,097 2,004 10 16,111 100.00\n105\nTABLE 29: NUMBER OF DRIVERS TRAINED IN LAGOS STATE DRIVERS' INSTITUTE \nCENTRES: Y2018\nSOURCE: Lagos State Drivers' Institute\nS/N MONTH MANDATORY \nCOURSE\nREHABILITATION \nCOURSE\nSTRUCTURE \nCOURSE TOTAL %\n1 JANUARY 4,813 45 17 4,875 12.24\n2 FEBRUARY 1,801 7 - 1,808 4.54\n3 MARCH 2,630 6 - 2,636 6.62\n4 APRIL 3,062 18 - 3,080 7.73\n5 MAY 2,072 107 - 2,179 5.47\n6 JUNE 4,859 46 18 4,923 12.36\n7 JULY 6,352 29 11 6,392 16.05\n8 AUGUST 3,262 18 8 3,288 8.26\n9 SEPTEMBER 2,943 21 1 2,965 7.45\n10 OCTOBER 2,521 27 - 2,548 6.40\n11 NOVEMBER 3,289 17 - 3,306 8.30\n12 DECEMBER 1,799 21 1 1,821 4.57\n TOTAL 39,403 362 56 39,821\n106\nSOURCE: Lagos State Drivers' Institute\nTABLE 30: NUMBER OF DRIVERS TRAINED IN LAGOS STATE DRIVERS' INSTITUTE \nCENTRES: Y2019\n2015 2016 2017 2018 2019\nMANDATORY \nCOURSE 54,391 89,029 38,028 14,097 39,403 234,948\nREHABILITATIO\nN COURSE 1,119 1,728 923 2,004 362 6,136\nSTRUCTURE \nCOURSE 2 6 50 10 56 124\nTOTAL 55,512 90,763 39,001 16,111 39,821 241,208\n107\nTABLE 31: SUMMARY OF NUMBER OF DRIVERS TRAINED IN \nLAGOS STATE DRIVERS' INSSTITUTE CENTRES: YEAR 2015- 2019\nSOURCE: Lagos State Drivers' Institute\nCOURSE TOTAL\nS/N MONTH NO. OF CONDUCTORS \nACCREDITTED\nNO. OF DRIVING SCHOOL \nAPPLICATION FORMS \nISSUED\n1 JANUARY - -\n2 FEBRUARY - -\n3 MARCH - -\n4 APRIL - -\n5 MAY - -\n6 JUNE - -\n7 JULY - 8\n8 AUGUST - 49\n9 SEPTEMBER 141 22\n10 OCTOBER 58 18\n11 NOVEMBER - 13\n12 DECEMBER 12 24\n TOTAL 211 134\n108\nTABLE 32: STATISTICS OF CONDUCTORS' ACCREDITATION AND DRIVING \nSCHOOL APPLICATION FORM AS RECORDED BY LAGOS STATE DRIVERS' \nINSTITUTE: YEAR 2016\nSOURCE: Lagos State Drivers' Institute\nS/N MONTH NO. OF CONDUCTORS \nACCREDITTED\nNO. OF DRIVING SCHOOL \nAPPLICATION FORMS \nISSUED\n1 JANUARY 131 6\n2 FEBRUARY 168 13\n3 MARCH 185 2\n4 APRIL 108 4\n5 MAY 31 1\n6 JUNE 26 1\n7 JULY 9 1\n8 AUGUST 37 4\n9 SEPTEMBER 13 1\n10 OCTOBER 11 1\n11 NOVEMBER 6 5\n12 DECEMBER 10\n TOTAL 735 39\n109\nTABLE 33: STATISTICS OF CONDUCTORS' ACCREDITATION AND DRIVING \nSCHOOL APPLICATION FORM AS RECORDED BY LAGOS STATE DRIVERS' \nINSTITUTE: YEAR 2017\nSOURCE: Lagos State Drivers' Institute\nS/N MONTH NO. OF CONDUCTORS \nACCREDITTED\nNO. OF DRIVING SCHOOL \nAPPLICATION FORMS \nISSUED\n1 JANUARY 12 9\n2 FEBRUARY 8 13\n3 MARCH 6 2\n4 APRIL 5 3\n5 MAY 5 1\n6 JUNE - -\n7 JULY 4 -\n8 AUGUST 4 -\n9 SEPTEMBER - -\n10 OCTOBER - -\n11 NOVEMBER - -\n12 DECEMBER - -\n TOTAL 44 28\n110\nTABLE 34: STATISTICS OF CONDUCTORS' ACCREDITATION AND DRIVING \nSCHOOL APPLICATION FORM AS RECORDED BY LAGOS STATE DRIVERS' \nINSTITUTE: YEAR 2018\nSOURCE: Lagos State Drivers' Institute\nS/N MONTH NO. OF CONDUCTORS \nACCREDITTED\nNO. OF DRIVING SCHOOL \nAPPLICATION FORMS \nISSUED\n1 JANUARY 11 -\n2 FEBRUARY 4 1\n3 MARCH 5 -\n4 APRIL 5 -\n5 MAY - -\n6 JUNE 1 3\n7 JULY 11 2\n8 AUGUST 9 2\n9 SEPTEMBER 4 -\n10 OCTOBER 42 -\n11 NOVEMBER 620 128\n12 DECEMBER 23 8\n TOTAL 735 144\n111\nTABLE 35: STATISTICS OF CONDUCTORS' ACCREDITATION AND DRIVING \nSCHOOL APPLICATION FORM AS RECORDED BY LAGOS STATE DRIVERS' \nINSTITUTE: YEAR 2019\nSOURCE: Lagos State Drivers' Institute\nMONTH/ZO NES JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC TOTAL\n ZONE 1 105,000 125,000 20,000 180,000 340,000 655,000 585,000 910,000 270,000 85,000 545,000 1,365,000 5,185,000\n ZONE 2 - 40,000 25,000 140,000 390,000 340,000 505,000 220,000 - 190,000 330,000 325,000 2,505,000\n ZONE 3 70,000 65,000 110,000 410,000 305,000 700,000 545,000 965,000 330,000 200,000 240,000 455,000 4,395,000\n ZONE 4 260,000 170,000 730,000 750,000 410,000 975,000 745,000 1,120,000 110,000 60,000 270,000 220,000 5,820,000\n ZONE 5 - - 20,000 480,000 810,000 710,000 480,000 165,000 150,000 230,000 320,000 420,000 3,785,000\n ZONE 6 70,000 20,000 - 370,000 540,000 1,145,000 1,295,000 1,030,000 340,000 20,000 200,000 380,000 5,410,000\n ZONE 7 60,000 45,000 50,000 305,000 670,000 867,000 690,000 405,000 340,000 85,000 590,000 660,000 4,767,000\n ZONE 8 105,000 120,000 145,000 165,000 600,000 425,000 335,000 1,045,000 270,000 - 480,000 360,000 4,050,000\n ZONE 9 140,000 100,000 20,000 165,000 540,000 550,000 480,000 700,000 145,000 80,000 490,000 495,000 3,905,000\nZONE 10 285,000 390,000 400,000 695,000 2,205,000 2,445,000 2,365,000 1,830,000 470,000 530,000 595,000 400,000 12,610,000\nZONE 11 220,000 60,000 335,000 95,000 690,000 1,395,000 790,000 1,235,000 80,000 180,000 955,000 505,000 6,540,000\nZONE 12 60,000 30,000 - 452,000 1,020,000 1,590,000 1,885,000 2,350,000 340,000 25,000 585,000 725,000 9,062,000\nZONE 13 - - 20,000 25,000 395,000 370,000 795,000 600,000 - - 275,000 200,000 2,680,000\nZONE 14 230,000 580,000 280,000 160,000 1,525,000 1,370,000 1,110,000 1,805,000 375,000 100,000 220,000 545,000 8,300,000\nZONE 15 - - - 210,000 465,000 905,000 685,000 770,000 145,000 340,000 300,000 180,000 4,000,000\nZONE 16 - 25,000 60,000 240,000 590,000 740,000 730,000 600,000 200,000 200,000 105,000 185,000 3,675,000\nZONE 17 - 20,000 40,000 240,000 1,505,000 1,175,000 905,000 260,000 150,000 150,000 490,000 585,000 5,520,000\nZONE 18 25,000 215,000 45,000 210,000 345,000 759,000 460,000 1,120,000 200,000 220,000 475,000 790,000 4,864,000\nZONE 19 30,000 65,000 20,000 350,000 1,120,000 820,000 1,085,000 850,000 440,000 460,000 440,000 480,000 6,160,000\nZONE 20 385,000 340,000 170,000 335,000 1,005,000 705,000 970,000 1,025,000 240,000 90,000 120,000 665,000 6,050,000\nZONE 21 210,000 305,000 225,000 230,000 850,000 1,420,000 605,000 1,460,000 275,000 60,000 850,000 475,000 6,965,000\nZONE 22 - 40,000 50,000 145,000 120,000 190,000 - 290,000 70,000 - 105,000 90,000 1,100,000\nZONE 23 80,000 60,000 40,000 25,000 120,000 280,000 180,000 655,000 160,000 50,000 330,000 295,000 2,275,000\nZONE 24 - - 40,000 60,000 60,000 40,000 60,000 - - 20,000 - - 280,000\nZONE 25 - - - - 495,000 375,000 435,000 720,000 120,000 80,000 455,000 580,000 3,260,000\nZONE 26 40,000 60,000 80,000 230,000 920,000 1,050,000 1,090,000 910,000 240,000 80,000 310,000 430,000 5,440,000\nZONE 27 90,000 45,000 - 270,000 495,000 1,960,000 1,275,000 980,000 215,000 45,000 525,000 510,000 6,410,000\nZONE 28 - 40,000 95,000 115,000 365,000 640,000 160,000 370,000 50,000 70,000 150,000 110,000 2,165,000\nZONE 29 60,000 25,000 20,000 220,000 570,000 440,000 510,000 775,000 185,000 120,000 260,000 525,000 3,710,000\nZONE 30 - - - 105,000 20,000 400,000 120,000 160,000 25,000 80,000 60,000 100,000 1,070,000\nZONE 31 130,000 30,000 110,000 195,000 670,000 870,000 970,000 705,000 - 200,000 445,000 430,000 4,755,000\nZONE 32 690,000 1,145,000 490,000 1,185,000 2,670,000 2,960,000 3,115,000 3,055,000 655,000 850,000 2,250,000 1,620,000 20,685,000\nZONE 33 105,000 100,000 80,000 90,000 495,000 275,000 145,000 220,000 20,000 40,000 180,000 60,000 1,810,000\nZONE 34 240,000 615,000 70,000 725,000 1,885,000 2,000,000 2,290,000 2,120,000 1,215,000 - 300,000 420,000 11,880,000\nZONE 35 - - - 25,000 160,000 140,000 125,000 290,000 120,000 60,000 460,000 280,000 1,660,000\nZONE 36 - - - - 120,000 250,000 135,000 415,000 - 220,000 190,000 160,000 1,490,000\nZONE 37 - - - - 120,000 175,000 90,000 95,000 75,000 25,000 170,000 40,000 790,000\nZONE 38 - - - - - 340,000 530,000 765,000 340,000 140,000 310,000 385,000 2,810,000\nZONE 39 - - - - - 315,000 380,000 690,000 160,000 320,000 325,000 280,000 2,470,000\nZONE 40 - - - - - 225,000 480,000 765,000 60,000 120,000 170,000 400,000 2,220,000\nHQ OPS 190,000 190,000 505,000 465,000 2,025,000 890,000 1,320,000 1,210,000 225,000 420,000 760,000 654,500 8,854,500\nRESCUE 425,000 460,000 355,000 680,000 1,495,000 2,085,000 2,470,000 1,185,000 50,000 150,000 230,000 480,000 10,065,000\nBRT. ANT 480,000 20,000 1,005,000 1,690,000 4,147,000 3,700,000 3,630,000 2,440,000 1,810,000 1,610,000 3,000,000 3,505,000 27,037,000\n ZERO TOL \nLEKKI - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nIDUMOTA - - - - - - - - - - - - -\n IYANA - - - - - 100,000 20,000 140,000 115,000 220,000 110,000 45,000 750,000\n OSHODI - - - - - - - - - - - - -\n CARWASH - - - - - - 60,000 160,000 - - - 60,000 280,000\nBRT IKRD - - - - 250,000 90,000 235,000 480,000 140,000 40,000 290,000 20,000 1,545,000\n TOTAL 5,755,000 4,785,000 5,490,000 12,302,000 33,607,000 39,851,000 37,870,000 40,060,000 10,920,000 8,265,000 20,380,000 21,774,500 241,059,500\n112\nTABLE 36: TOTAL REVENUE REALISED THROUGH FINES BY MONTH AND ZONE: YEAR 2015\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\n MONTH/ ZONES JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC TOTAL\n ZONE 1 1,215,000 820,000 1,005,000 840,000 1,285,000 2,155,000 1,530,000 1,230,000 830,000 810,000 1,610,000 880,000 14,210,000\n ZONE 2 470,000 190,000 240,000 365,000 1,190,000 1,245,000 885,000 960,000 390,000 400,000 850,000 540,000 7,725,000\n ZONE 3 765,000 480,000 310,000 700,000 820,000 1,540,000 1,315,000 1,300,000 1,135,000 840,000 1,750,000 865,000 11,820,000\n ZONE 4 680,000 595,000 805,000 660,000 1,290,000 1,985,000 1,555,000 1,760,000 870,000 640,000 1,550,000 580,000 12,970,000\n ZONE 5 2,020,000 395,000 1,580,000 840,000 1,020,000 1,843,000 1,460,000 1,270,000 870,000 1,345,000 1,690,000 1,840,000 16,173,000\n ZONE 6 890,000 660,000 535,000 515,000 1,280,000 1,722,000 1,300,000 1,670,000 360,000 920,000 1,200,000 930,000 11,982,000\n ZONE 7 965,000 490,000 1,300,000 1,140,000 1,790,000 1,885,000 1,690,000 1,670,000 360,000 920,000 1,200,000 930,000 14,340,000\n ZONE 8 1,180,000 300,000 635,000 330,000 1,000,000 1,740,000 1,715,000 2,020,000 1,422,500 1,500,000 1,540,000 1,700,000 15,082,500\n ZONE 9 845,000 410,000 470,000 490,000 1,470,000 1,260,000 1,230,000 1,050,000 340,000 550,000 1,080,000 280,000 9,475,000\nZONE 10 1,847,500 595,000 1,265,000 1,960,000 2,292,500 2,185,000 1,350,000 1,840,000 1,635,000 1,620,000 2,370,000 1,470,000 20,430,000\nZONE 11 1,495,000 535,000 1,005,000 1,145,000 870,000 1,950,000 910,000 1,430,000 760,000 600,000 1,010,000 1,100,000 12,810,000\nZONE 12 3,560,000 1,477,500 3,040,000 1,350,000 1,795,000 3,035,000 2,355,000 2,060,000 1,140,000 1,260,000 1,350,000 2,880,000 25,302,500\nZONE 13 1,120,000 220,000 1,345,000 1,175,000 600,000 1,125,000 1,000,000 1,210,000 580,000 830,000 1,090,000 900,000 11,195,000\nZONE 14 1,620,000 980,000 980,000 1,040,000 1,270,000 1,725,000 1,555,000 1,980,000 1,070,000 1,230,000 2,760,000 1,270,000 17,480,000\nZONE 15 1,270,000 460,000 900,000 590,000 1,015,000 1,205,000 1,080,000 10,000,000 1,020,000 850,000 1,560,000 790,000 20,740,000\nZONE 16 560,000 320,000 665,000 270,000 650,000 1,315,000 1,380,000 1,130,000 520,000 810,000 1,130,000 340,000 9,090,000\nZONE 17 760,000 485,000 910,000 840,000 1,075,000 1,640,000 1,650,000 1,785,000 1,415,000 1,415,000 1,990,000 1,220,000 15,185,000\nZONE 18 675,000 650,000 470,000 575,000 915,000 1,285,000 850,000 1,025,000 460,000 430,000 1,010,000 840,000 9,185,000\nZONE 19 870,000 575,000 755,000 705,000 985,000 1,240,000 1,175,000 1,180,000 585,000 855,000 1,100,000 1,010,000 11,035,000\nZONE 20 1,350,000 450,000 2,070,000 2,025,000 1,605,000 2,490,000 2,015,000 2,590,000 1,470,000 2,140,000 2,520,000 1,920,000 22,645,000\nZONE 21 1,740,000 725,000 1,305,000 1,310,000 1,520,000 1,750,000 1,795,000 2,160,000 1,620,000 1,650,000 1,980,000 1,550,000 19,105,000\nZONE 22 740,000 370,000 465,000 375,000 680,000 1,000,000 840,000 695,000 600,000 130,000 1,400,000 745,000 8,040,000\nZONE 23 1,145,000 560,000 1,095,000 520,000 1,015,000 1,100,000 835,000 1,060,000 640,000 900,000 1,590,000 760,000 11,220,000\nZONE 24 - 20,000 40,000 295,000 340,000 455,000 600,000 515,000 355,000 410,000 650,000 260,000 3,940,000\nZONE 25 730,000 400,000 785,000 520,000 1,075,000 1,545,000 1,020,000 1,517,500 700,000 920,000 1,300,000 1,040,000 11,552,500\nZONE 26 1,075,000 480,000 780,000 470,000 1,490,000 1,770,000 1,465,000 1,745,000 400,000 500,000 1,130,000 895,000 12,200,000\nZONE 27 1,165,000 415,000 1,460,000 1,460,000 1,270,000 1,420,000 1,470,000 1,600,000 1,190,000 1,050,000 1,800,000 1,200,000 15,500,000\nZONE 28 415,000 170,000 375,000 180,000 435,000 665,000 615,000 710,000 260,000 310,000 690,000 690,000 5,515,000\nZONE 29 1,040,000 585,000 630,000 495,000 1,435,000 1,715,000 1,450,000 1,810,000 640,000 630,000 1,370,000 540,000 12,340,000\nZONE 30 800,000 350,000 575,000 420,000 1,280,000 2,230,000 2,210,000 1,410,000 1,240,000 1,135,000 2,160,000 1,080,000 14,890,000\nZONE 31 1,125,000 300,000 770,000 815,000 1,075,000 1,180,000 960,000 870,000 570,000 480,000 1,200,000 1,290,000 10,635,000\nZONE 32 2,245,000 1,165,000 2,260,000 1,790,000 2,495,000 2,910,000 2,110,000 2,825,000 935,000 1,425,000 1,615,000 1,905,000 23,680,000\nZONE 33 840,000 170,000 300,000 220,000 785,000 1,010,000 975,000 930,000 940,000 880,000 1,030,000 1,390,000 9,470,000\nZONE 34 980,000 440,000 1,125,000 1,230,000 2,020,000 2,045,000 1,660,000 1,610,000 1,050,000 680,000 1,720,000 1,890,000 16,450,000\nZONE 35 360,000 140,000 210,000 220,000 765,000 1,230,000 950,000 1,090,000 340,000 250,000 990,000 240,000 6,785,000\nZONE 36 315,000 225,000 460,000 150,000 370,000 945,000 890,000 750,000 370,000 310,000 890,000 330,000 6,005,000\nZONE 37 420,000 360,000 195,000 70,000 790,000 1,005,000 605,000 810,000 510,000 420,000 920,000 520,000 6,625,000\nZONE 38 970,000 310,000 700,000 710,000 945,000 1,090,000 620,000 870,000 500,000 420,000 1,220,000 560,000 8,915,000\nZONE 39 905,000 470,000 820,000 650,000 695,000 1,130,000 770,000 1,170,000 600,000 660,000 1,200,000 490,000 9,560,000\nZONE 40 715,000 450,000 700,000 540,000 655,000 745,000 790,000 1,070,000 620,000 520,000 880,000 390,000 8,075,000\nHQ OPS 2,265,000 1,765,000 1,745,000 1,125,000 1,550,000 1,830,000 1,464,000 2,875,000 825,000 1,900,000 2,570,000 1,685,000 21,599,000\nRESCUE 370,000 515,000 675,000 150,000 1,410,000 1,990,000 1,670,000 1,770,000 1,250,000 1,520,000 1,960,000 1,325,000 14,605,000\nBRT. ANT 3,645,000 2,360,000 2,137,500 1,535,000 1,810,000 3,075,000 3,270,000 2,460,000 1,960,000 2,160,000 2,080,000 3,120,000 29,612,500\n SQUAD 6 290,000 130,000 315,000 215,000 660,000 980,000 730,000 860,000 290,000 440,000 160,000 620,000 5,690,000\nSQUAD 9 - - - 1,090,000 585,000 1,005,000 695,000 790,000 640,000 310,000 850,000 585,000 6,550,000\n TOTAL 48,452,500 23,962,500 40,207,500 34,110,000 51,367,500 70,390,000 58,459,000 73,132,500 36,277,500 39,975,000 63,715,000 47,385,000 587,434,000 \n113\nTABLE 37: TOTAL REVENUE REALISED THROUGH FINES BY MONTH AND ZONE: YEAR 2016\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\n MONTH/ ZONES JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC TOTAL\n ZONE 1 390,000.00 570,000.00 250,000.00 310,000.00 180,000.00 490,000.00 310,000.00 890,000.00 520,000.00 690,000.00 1,020,000.00 480,000.00 6,100,000.00\n ZONE 2 60,000.00 120,000.00 130,000.00 0.00 40,000.00 40,000.00 0.00 400,000.00 330,000.00 290,000.00 370,000.00 80,000.00 1,860,000.00\n ZONE 3 140,000.00 60,000.00 40,000.00 20,000.00 - 110,000.00 60,000.00 500,000.00 320,000.00 300,000.00 450,000.00 220,000.00 2,220,000.00\n ZONE 4 220,000.00 100,000.00 20,000.00 0.00 110,000.00 110,000.00 50,000.00 280,000.00 780,000.00 640,000.00 820,000.00 290,000.00 3,420,000.00\n ZONE 5 450,000.00 220,000.00 80,000.00 140,000.00 740,000.00 540,000.00 560,000.00 1,090,000.00 970,000.00 1,130,000.00 2,410,000.00 990,000.00 9,320,000.00\n ZONE 6 330,000.00 140,000.00 100,000.00 60,000.00 100,000.00 200,000.00 140,000.00 390,000.00 260,000.00 450,000.00 440,000.00 400,000.00 3,010,000.00\n ZONE 7 560,000.00 200,000.00 80,000.00 0.00 220,000.00 415,000.00 330,000.00 970,000.00 720,000.00 740,000.00 560,000.00 340,000.00 5,135,000.00\n ZONE 8 500,000.00 300,000.00 220,000.00 40,000.00 350,000.00 320,000.00 240,000.00 620,000.00 560,000.00 490,000.00 780,000.00 690,000.00 5,110,000.00\n ZONE 9 40,000.00 40,000.00 40,000.00 120,000.00 100,000.00 110,000.00 160,000.00 560,000.00 310,000.00 230,000.00 440,000.00 410,000.00 2,560,000.00\nZONE 10 580,000.00 360,000.00 220,000.00 140,000.00 480,000.00 380,000.00 165,000.00 740,000.00 300,000.00 500,000.00 440,000.00 260,000.00 4,565,000.00\nZONE 11 340,000.00 190,000.00 110,000.00 140,000.00 310,000.00 520,000.00 190,000.00 610,000.00 640,000.00 780,000.00 270,000.00 290,000.00 4,390,000.00\nZONE 12 250,000.00 380,000.00 280,000.00 460,000.00 90,000.00 590,000.00 770,000.00 1,280,000.00 1,400,000.00 840,000.00 685,000.00 620,000.00 7,645,000.00\nZONE 13 40,000.00 - 50,000.00 - - - - 100,000.00 140,000.00 180,000.00 120,000.00 80,000.00 710,000.00\nZONE 14 950,000.00 430,000.00 100,000.00 100,000.00 100,000.00 60,000.00 - 380,000.00 320,000.00 400,000.00 300,000.00 180,000.00 3,320,000.00\nZONE 15 60,000.00 150,000.00 - 20,000.00 20,000.00 40,000.00 40,000.00 380,000.00 250,000.00 120,000.00 80,000.00 160,000.00 1,320,000.00\nZONE 16 100,000.00 80,000.00 140,000.00 20,000.00 40,000.00 - 20,000.00 300,000.00 230,000.00 430,000.00 290,000.00 100,000.00 1,750,000.00\nZONE 17 670,000.00 520,000.00 260,000.00 180,000.00 500,000.00 300,000.00 20,000.00 540,000.00 460,000.00 750,000.00 600,000.00 570,000.00 5,370,000.00\nZONE 18 40,000.00 240,000.00 440,000.00 160,000.00 110,000.00 290,000.00 270,000.00 860,000.00 650,000.00 650,000.00 1,265,000.00 690,000.00 5,665,000.00\nZONE 19 250,000.00 120,000.00 120,000.00 60,000.00 100,000.00 160,000.00 100,000.00 860,000.00 200,000.00 390,000.00 500,000.00 420,000.00 3,280,000.00\nZONE 20 925,000.00 510,000.00 220,000.00 80,000.00 160,000.00 350,000.00 270,000.00 1,130,000.00 680,000.00 910,000.00 680,000.00 500,000.00 6,415,000.00\nZONE 21 210,000.00 180,000.00 190,000.00 60,000.00 80,000.00 150,000.00 140,000.00 390,000.00 450,000.00 360,000.00 780,000.00 450,000.00 3,440,000.00\nZONE 22 20,000.00 90,000.00 - 100,000.00 140,000.00 80,000.00 170,000.00 330,000.00 300,000.00 310,000.00 370,000.00 300,000.00 2,210,000.00\nZONE 23 390,000.00 360,000.00 40,000.00 100,000.00 20,000.00 40,000.00 20,000.00 300,000.00 180,000.00 220,000.00 180,000.00 140,000.00 1,990,000.00\nZONE 24 120,000.00 120,000.00 20,000.00 - 80,000.00 - 80,000.00 180,000.00 200,000.00 220,000.00 230,000.00 70,000.00 1,320,000.00\nZONE 25 350,000.00 110,000.00 230,000.00 20,000.00 200,000.00 100,000.00 80,000.00 320,000.00 290,000.00 460,000.00 410,000.00 280,000.00 2,850,000.00\nZONE 26 590,000.00 580,000.00 620,000.00 160,000.00 525,000.00 670,000.00 600,000.00 1,150,000.00 1,280,000.00 1,330,000.00 1,890,000.00 2,025,000.00 11,420,000.00\nZONE 27 560,000.00 380,000.00 680,000.00 410,000.00 1,720,000.00 990,000.00 340,000.00 680,000.00 560,000.00 620,000.00 580,000.00 440,000.00 7,960,000.00\nZONE 28 100,000.00 - 20,000.00 - 40,000.00 - 20,000.00 200,000.00 120,000.00 80,000.00 100,000.00 40,000.00 720,000.00\nZONE 29 270,000.00 220,000.00 100,000.00 70,000.00 100,000.00 80,000.00 140,000.00 480,000.00 280,000.00 440,000.00 370,000.00 460,000.00 2,010,000.00\nZONE 30 350,000.00 120,000.00 70,000.00 20,000.00 80,000.00 40,000.00 120,000.00 270,000.00 220,000.00 470,000.00 320,000.00 270,000.00 2,350,000.00\nZONE 31 120,000.00 210,000.00 70,000.00 60,000.00 130,000.00 100,000.00 60,000.00 260,000.00 160,000.00 200,000.00 380,000.00 120,000.00 1,870,000.00\nZONE 32 380,000.00 270,000.00 140,000.00 130,000.00 200,000.00 480,000.00 520,000.00 1,105,000.00 1,275,000.00 870,000.00 780,000.00 920,000.00 7,070,000.00\nZONE 33 260,000.00 180,000.00 110,000.00 60,000.00 100,000.00 70,000.00 - 460,000.00 320,000.00 510,000.00 860,000.00 1,360,000.00 4,290,000.00\nZONE 34 360,000.00 300,000.00 120,000.00 120,000.00 25,000.00 100,000.00 140,000.00 820,000.00 550,000.00 740,000.00 790,000.00 560,000.00 4,625,000.00\nZONE 35 20,000.00 20,000.00 - 45,000.00 20,000.00 - 60,000.00 220,000.00 140,000.00 160,000.00 240,000.00 250,000.00 1,175,000.00\nZONE 36 90,000.00 40,000.00 - - - - - - - 60,000.00 20,000.00 - 210,000.00\nZONE 37 220,000.00 40,000.00 - - - 20,000.00 - 150,000.00 200,000.00 160,000.00 370,000.00 180,000.00 1,340,000.00\nZONE 38 100,000.00 100,000.00 120,000.00 80,000.00 - 40,000.00 20,000.00 220,000.00 220,000.00 280,000.00 430,000.00 80,000.00 1,690,000.00\nZONE 39 100,000.00 150,000.00 100,000.00 100,000.00 180,000.00 60,000.00 60,000.00 520,000.00 240,000.00 200,000.00 490,000.00 130,000.00 2,330,000.00\nZONE 40 40,000.00 80,000.00 40,000.00 60,000.00 60,000.00 90,000.00 60,000.00 410,000.00 340,000.00 140,000.00 330,000.00 240,000.00 1,890,000.00\nZONE 41 - - - - - - - 240,000.00 120,000.00 180,000.00 140,000.00 120,000.00 800,000.00\nHQ OPS 210,000.00 165,000.00 520,000.00 425,000.00 700,000.00 470,000.00 420000.00 1,740,000.00 1,210,000.00 1,450,000.00 1,930,000.00 590,000.00 9,830,000.00\nRESCUE 420,000.00 375,000.00 540,000.00 0.00 740,000.00 1,580,000.00 1,060,000.00 790,000.00 910,000.00 1,620,000.00 1,370,000.00 1,350,000.00 10,755,000.00\nBRT. ANT 1,645,000.00 1,110,000.00 1,120,000.00 720,000.00 2,700,000.00 8,490,000.00 6,085,000.00 5,135,000.00 3,790,000.00 5,000,000.00 3,240,000.00 1,960,000.00 40,995,000.00\n SQUAD 6 20,000.00 100,000.00 20,000.00 40,000.00 20,000.00 - - - - - - - 200,000.00\nSQUAD 9 50,000.00 110,000.00 - - - - - - - - - - 160,000.00\n TOTAL 13,890,000.00 10,140,000.00 7,770,000.00 4,830,000.00 11,610,000.00 18,675,000.00 13,890,000.00 29,250,000.00 23,395,000.00 26,990,000.00 29,120,000.00 20,105,000.00 209,665,000.00\n114\nTABLE 38: TOTAL REVENUE REALISED THROUGH FINES BY MONTH AND ZONE: YEAR 2017\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\n MONTH/ ZONES JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC TOTAL\n ZONE 1 35,000.00 36,000.00 36,000.00 90,000.00 20,000.00 29,000.00 1,000.00 4,000.00 13,000.00 7,000.00 - 17,000.00 288,000.00\n ZONE 2 - 2,000.00 16,000.00 - 30,000.00 6,000.00 - 2,000.00 42,000.00 12,000.00 26,000.00 2,000.00 138,000.00\n ZONE 3 48,000.00 47,000.00 3,000.00 - 5,000.00 - 45,000.00 19,500.00 63,000.00 31,000.00 104,000.00 20,000.00 385,500.00\n ZONE 4 10,000.00 20,000.00 7,500.00 - 30,000.00 2,000.00 - - 43,000.00 5,000.00 21,000.00 3,000.00 141,500.00\n ZONE 5 26,800.00 55,000.00 4,000.00 5,000.00 41,000.00 23,000.00 60,500.00 78,000.00 91,500.00 16,000.00 110,000.00 56,000.00 566,800.00\n ZONE 6 33,000.00 10,000.00 5,500.00 - 30,000.00 0.00 2,500.00 8,500.00 6,000.00 27,000.00 16,000.00 7,000.00 145,500.00\n ZONE 7 35,000.00 65,000.00 55,700.00 - 1,000.00 86,000.00 22,000.00 17,000.00 74,000.00 63,000.00 13,500.00 31,000.00 463,200.00\n ZONE 8 - 27,000.00 55,000.00 - 45,000.00 12,000.00 74,000.00 20,000.00 6,000.00 54,000.00 54,000.00 25,000.00 372,000.00\n ZONE 9 - 8,000.00 10,000.00 - - 3,000.00 - 4,000.00 10,000.00 18,000.00 2,000.00 26,000.00 81,000.00\nZONE 10 4,500.00 26,000.00 25,000.00 14,900.00 9,000.00 51,000.00 20,000.00 23,500.00 36,000.00 30,500.00 4,500.00 40,500.00 285,400.00\nZONE 11 96,000.00 32,000.00 55,000.00 4,000.00 - 5,000.00 - 14,000.00 20,000.00 20,000.00 - 17,000.00 263,000.00\nZONE 12 33,500.00 14,000.00 6,500.00 42,700.00 34,000.00 21,000.00 15,000.00 51,000.00 50,500.00 49,000.00 76,500.00 70,000.00 463,700.00\nZONE 13 - - - - - - - 4,500.00 5,000.00 - - - 9,500.00\nZONE 14 23,000.00 32,000.00 10,000.00 - - - - - - - - - 65,000.00\nZONE 15 77,500.00 13,000.00 - - 12,000.00 50,000.00 - 2,000.00 1,000.00 0.00 0.00 4,000.00 159,500.00\nZONE 16 - 10,000.00 9,000.00 - 85,000.00 - - 10,000.00 8,000.00 9,000.00 4,000.00 - 135,000.00\nZONE 17 79,000.00 23,000.00 41,000.00 17,700.00 24,000.00 3,000.00 - 74,000.00 2,000.00 47,000.00 6,000.00 27,000.00 343,700.00\nZONE 18 - 22,000.00 26,000.00 36,000.00 18,000.00 - - 22,000.00 27,000.00 5,000.00 11,000.00 - 167,000.00\nZONE 19 47,000.00 26,000.00 45,000.00 13,000.00 - 45,000.00 2,000.00 30,000.00 2,000.00 8,000.00 8,000.00 72,000.00 298,000.00\nZONE 20 103,000.00 173,000.00 15,700.00 10,000.00 - - 104,000.00 58,000.00 32,000.00 28,000.00 73,000.00 37,000.00 633,700.00\nZONE 21 - 42,500.00 56,000.00 25,600.00 20,000.00 3,000.00 - 10,000.00 30,000.00 16,000.00 19,000.00 6,000.00 228,100.00\nZONE 22 - - - - 5,000.00 - 20,000.00 - - - - - 25,000.00\nZONE 23 50,000.00 8,000.00 20,000.00 - - - - - - 10,000.00 - - 88,000.00\nZONE 24 17,000.00 31,000.00 1,000.00 - 5,000.00 - 42,000.00 7,000.00 2,000.00 7,000.00 4,000.00 2,000.00 118,000.00\nZONE 25 20,000.00 33,000.00 13,000.00 - 11,000.00 8,000.00 10,000.00 - 4,000.00 10,000.00 0.00 2,000.00 111,000.00\nZONE 26 16,500.00 79,000.00 35,500.00 12,000.00 55,500.00 41,500.00 19,500.00 22,000.00 73,000.00 24,500.00 28,500.00 36,500.00 444,000.00\nZONE 27 - 14,000.00 21,000.00 7,000.00 26,000.00 39,000.00 0.00 6,000.00 27,000.00 0.00 5,000.00 16,000.00 161,000.00\nZONE 28 - 11,000.00 40,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 51,000.00\nZONE 29 18,000.00 27,000.00 16,000.00 28,000.00 52,000.00 3,000.00 16,000.00 56,000.00 2,000.00 15,500.00 10,000.00 14,500.00 258,000.00\nZONE 30 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 31 - 15,000.00 40,000.00 15,000.00 - - - 30,000.00 - - 20,000.00 12,000.00 132,000.00\nZONE 32 - 50,000.00 20,000.00 8,000.00 20,000.00 17,000.00 52,000.00 20,000.00 71,000.00 64,000.00 61,500.00 10,000.00 393,500.00\nZONE 33 45,000.00 9,500.00 35,000.00 8,000.00 - 4,000.00 0.00 5,000.00 8,000.00 25,000.00 5,000.00 11,000.00 155,500.00\nZONE 34 41,500.00 46,000.00 32,000.00 23,500.00 1,000.00 59,000.00 69,000.00 100,500.00 104,500.00 52,000.00 67,000.00 28,500.00 624,500.00\nZONE 35 - - - 15,000.00 - - 1,000.00 5,000.00 5,000.00 67,000.00 5,000.00 47,500.00 145,500.00\nZONE 36 - - - - - - - - - - - 5,000.00 5,000.00\nZONE 37 - - - - 2,000.00 55,000.00 - 16,500.00 2,500.00 8,000.00 66,000.00 4,000.00 154,000.00\nZONE 38 4,000.00 36,000.00 7,500.00 - - 3,000.00 2,000.00 2,000.00 - - 5,000.00 - 59,500.00\nZONE 39 - 30,000.00 4,500.00 1,000.00 30,000.00 2,000.00 - 15,000.00 6,000.00 - 6,000.00 20,000.00 114,500.00\nZONE 40 - - 22,000.00 20,000.00 40,000.00 - 1,000.00 4,000.00 7,000.00 60,000.00 25,000.00 5,000.00 184,000.00\nZONE 41 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nHQ OPS - 95,000.00 4,000.00 35,000.00 - 11,000.00 6,000.00 23,000.00 50,000.00 27,000.00 26,000.00 15,000.00 292,000.00\nRESCUE 50,000.00 15,000.00 20,000.00 - - - 44,000.00 190,000.00 39,000.00 50,000.00 27,000.00 33,000.00 468,000.00\nBRT. ANT 22,000.00 66,000.00 20,000.00 - 14,000.00 109,000.00 82,000.00 35,000.00 15,000.00 10,000.00 5,500.00 7,000.00 385,500.00\n SQUAD 6 - - 8,000.00 4,000.00 - - - - - - - - 12,000.00\nSQUAD 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\n TOTAL 1,194,300.00 1,108,500.00 783,900.00 439,400.00 663,500.00 637,500.00 710,500.00 984,500.00 977,500.00 875,500.00 915,000.00 724,500.00 10,014,600.00 \n115\nTABLE 39: TOTAL REVENUE REALISED THROUGH DEMMURAGE: YEAR 2017\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\n MONTH/ ZONES JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC TOTAL\n ZONE 1 10,000.00 20,000.00 10,000.00 50,000.00 - - 10,000.00 - 60,000.00 20,000.00 10,000.00 10,000.00 200000.00\n ZONE 2 - - - - - - - - 10,000.00 - - - 10,000.00\n ZONE 3 10,000.00 30,000.00 - - - 10,000.00 - - 10,000.00 - - - 60,000.00\n ZONE 4 50,000.00 160,000.00 - - 50,000.00 50,000.00 50,000.00 50,000.00 200,000.00 - 50,000.00 20,000.00 680,000.00\n ZONE 5 - - - - - - 10,000.00 10,000.00 - - 10,000.00 - 30,000.00\n ZONE 6 - 10,000.00 10,000.00 - 10,000.00 - - - - - - - 30,000.00\n ZONE 7 - - 20,000.00 - - 20,000.00 - - 50,000.00 - - - 90,000.00\n ZONE 8 - 10,000.00 10,000.00 - - 10,000.00 10,000.00 100,000.00 - - - - 140,000.00\n ZONE 9 - - - - 10,000.00 10,000.00 - - - 10,000.00 - - 30,000.00\nZONE 10 10,000.00 50,000.00 10,000.00 - 60,000.00 30,000.00 - - - 30,000.00 30,000.00 2,000.00 222,000.00\nZONE 11 50,000.00 100,000.00 20,000.00 - - - 50,000.00 20,000.00 120,000.00 - - - 360,000.00\nZONE 12 - - - - - - - 20,000.00 20,000.00 50,000.00 70,000.00 110,000.00 270,000.00\nZONE 13 - - - - - - - - - - - 10,000.00 10,000.00\nZONE 14 - - - - - 10,000.00 - - - - - - 10,000.00\nZONE 15 10,000.00 20,000.00 - - - - - - - - - - 30,000.00\nZONE 16 - 10,000.00 - - 10,000.00 - - - - - - - 20,000.00\nZONE 17 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 18 - - 10,000.00 10,000.00 10,000.00 60,000.00 - - 40,000.00 40,000.00 40,000.00 - 210,000.00\nZONE 19 - - 10,000.00 110,000.00 - - - - - - - - 120,000.00\nZONE 20 30,000.00 132,000.00 10,000.00 10,000.00 - 10,000.00 - - - - - - 192,000.00\nZONE 21 - - - - - - - 20,000.00 10,000.00 - 30,000.00 110,000.00 170,000.00\nZONE 22 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 23 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 24 - - - - - 10,000.00 20,000.00 - - - - - 30,000.00\nZONE 25 - - - - 10,000.00 60,000.00 - - - - - - 70,000.00\nZONE 26 - - - - 50,000.00 90,000.00 - 80,000.00 60,000.00 - - - 280,000.00\nZONE 27 - - - - 20,000.00 30,000.00 - - - - - - 50,000.00\nZONE 28 - 10,000.00 50,000.00 - - - - - - - - - 60,000.00\nZONE 29 10,000.00 10,000.00 - 10,000.00 - - 10,000.00 - - - - - 40,000.00\nZONE 30 10,000.00 80,000.00 - - - - - - - - 10,000.00 0.00 100,000.00\nZONE 31 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 32 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 33 10,000.00 20,000.00 - - 10,000.00 50,000.00 - 100,000.00 - - - - 190,000.00\nZONE 34 10,000.00 20,000.00 - - - - - - 10,000.00 - - 50,000.00 90,000.00\nZONE 35 - - - - - - - - - 10,000.00 - - 10,000.00\nZONE 36 10,000.00 60,000.00 - - - - - - - - - - 70,000.00\nZONE 37 - - - - - - 50,000.00 50,000.00 - - - - 100,000.00\nZONE 38 - - - - - - - - - - 20,000.00 - 20,000.00\nZONE 39 - - - - - - - - - - 10,000.00 - 10,000.00\nZONE 40 - - 10,000.00 10,000.00 - - - - - 10,000.00 - - 30,000.00\nZONE 41 - - - - - - - - - 10,000.00 - - 10,000.00\nHQ OPS - 50,000.00 - - - 130,000.00 100,000.00 210,000.00 90,000.00 200,000.00 70,000.00 20,000.00 870,000.00\nRESCUE 110,000.00 335,000.00 10,000.00 - - - 330,000.00 640,000.00 520,000.00 1,130,000.00 390,000.00 990,000.00 4,455,000.00\nBRT. ANT - - - 30,000.00 40,000.00 - 10,000.00 10,000.00 - - 10,000.00 - 100,000.00\n SQUAD 6 - - - - - - - - - - - 10,000.00 10,000.00\nSQUAD 9 - - - - - - - - - - - 10,000.00 10,000.00\n TOTAL 400,000.00 1,577,000.00 130,000.00 100,000.00 180,000.00 470,000.00 580,000.00 1,270,000.00 1,210,000.00 1,510,000.00 750,000.00 1,312,000.00 9,489,000.00 \n116\nTABLE 40: TOTAL REVENUE REALISED THROUGH TOW PROCEEDS: YEAR 2017\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\n MONTH/ ZONES JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC TOTAL\n ZONE 1 8,000.00 5,000.00 6,000.00 11,000.00 4,500.00 51,000.00 11,000.00 5,000.00 17,000.00 9,000.00 10,000.00 2,000.00 139,500.00\n ZONE 2 20,000.00 3,000.00 15,000.00 6,000.00 14,000.00 4,000.00 10,000.00 28,000.00 55,500.00 21,000.00 39,000.00 8,000.00 223,500.00\n ZONE 3 21,000.00 70,000.00 55,000.00 169,000.00 172,000.00 82,000.00 31,500.00 10,000.00 46,400.00 88,000.00 35,000.00 45,000.00 824,900.00\n ZONE 4 10,000.00 4,000.00 22,000.00 - 35,000.00 - 5,000.00 2,000.00 - - - 10,000.00 88,000.00\n ZONE 5 45,000.00 45,000.00 26,000.00 21,000.00 101,000.00 58,000.00 20,000.00 8,000.00 7,000.00 26,000.00 17,000.00 3,000.00 377,000.00\n ZONE 6 22,500.00 - 24,000.00 10,000.00 4,000.00 - - 2,000.00 21,500.00 13,500.00 4,500.00 1,000.00 103,000.00\n ZONE 7 17,000.00 8,000.00 28,000.00 82,000.00 23,000.00 42,500.00 56,500.00 35,000.00 51,000.00 54,000.00 38,000.00 46,500.00 481,500.00\n ZONE 8 62,500.00 85,000.00 68,000.00 28,000.00 57,000.00 51,000.00 67,000.00 95,000.00 86,000.00 22,000.00 21,000.00 49,000.00 691,500.00\n ZONE 9 74,000.00 5,000.00 21,000.00 20,000.00 34,000.00 40,000.00 15,000.00 5,000.00 15,000.00 4,000.00 14,000.00 17,000.00 264,000.00\nZONE 10 26,000.00 10,000.00 48,500.00 37,500.00 70,500.00 14,000.00 72,500.00 187,500.00 149,000.00 59,600.00 57,200.00 46,500.00 778,800.00\nZONE 11 - 9,000.00 38,000.00 15,000.00 25,000.00 10,000.00 3,000.00 10,000.00 7,000.00 4,000.00 2,000.00 - 123,000.00\nZONE 12 120,000.00 186,000.00 280,500.00 41,500.00 101,000.00 15,500.00 32,000.00 29,000.00 95,000.00 12,000.00 51,500.00 - 964,000.00\nZONE 13 - - - 23,000.00 - - 5,000.00 - 6,000.00 - - 3,000.00 37,000.00\nZONE 14 68,000.00 5,000.00 - 10,000.00 5,000.00 15,000.00 13,000.00 - - - - - 116,000.00\nZONE 15 5,000.00 14,000.00 11,000.00 26,000.00 23,000.00 20,000.00 11,000.00 16,000.00 28,000.00 15,000.00 10,000.00 13,000.00 192,000.00\nZONE 16 5,000.00 24,000.00 122,000.00 11,000.00 8,000.00 32,000.00 - 7,000.00 44,500.00 15,000.00 54,000.00 6,000.00 328,500.00\nZONE 17 10,000.00 28,000.00 21,000.00 6,000.00 18,000.00 4,000.00 6,000.00 3,000.00 9,000.00 22,000.00 40,000.00 5,000.00 172,000.00\nZONE 18 30,000.00 17,000.00 10,000.00 34,000.00 51,000.00 10,000.00 38,000.00 9,000.00 15,000.00 3,000.00 5,000.00 - 222,000.00\nZONE 19 9,000.00 32,000.00 32,000.00 26,000.00 16,000.00 15,000.00 5,000.00 79,000.00 2,000.00 - 18,000.00 3,000.00 237,000.00\nZONE 20 16,000.00 20,000.00 64,000.00 49,000.00 75,000.00 20,000.00 61,000.00 111,000.00 89,000.00 65,000.00 22,000.00 69,000.00 661,000.00\nZONE 21 15,000.00 27,000.00 5,000.00 6,000.00 45,000.00 16,000.00 7,000.00 15,000.00 5,000.00 30,000.00 15,000.00 7,000.00 193,000.00\nZONE 22 - - - 20,000.00 - - - - - - - - 20,000.00\nZONE 23 - - 20,000.00 10,000.00 2,000.00 15,000.00 - 12,000.00 - - - - 59,000.00\nZONE 24 34,000.00 14,000.00 39,000.00 5,000.00 8,000.00 - 5,000.00 5,000.00 14,000.00 15,000.00 11,000.00 43,600.00 193,600.00\nZONE 25 8,000.00 2,500.00 18,000.00 - - 12,000.00 4,000.00 - 6,000.00 2,000.00 14,300.00 - 66,800.00\nZONE 26 207,000.00 171,500.00 168,500.00 55,500.00 129,000.00 84,000.00 108,500.00 151,500.00 139,500.00 107,000.00 57,000.00 57,500.00 1,436,500.00\nZONE 27 - 3,000.00 74,000.00 80,000.00 7,000.00 5,000.00 2,000.00 40,000.00 - 8,000.00 4,000.00 9,000.00 232,000.00\nZONE 28 - - - 80,000.00 - - - - - - - 80,000.00\nZONE 29 14,000.00 9,000.00 18,000.00 17,000.00 6,000.00 9,000.00 18,000.00 3,000.00 1,000.00 13,000.00 3,000.00 4,000.00 115,000.00\nZONE 30 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 31 4,000.00 6,000.00 40,000.00 18,000.00 15,000.00 38,000.00 41,000.00 17,000.00 14,000.00 18,000.00 36,000.00 - 247,000.00\nZONE 32 81,000.00 37,000.00 29,000.00 20,000.00 53,000.00 8,000.00 - 17,000.00 - - 10,000.00 - 255,000.00\nZONE 33 64,000.00 30,000.00 51,000.00 63,000.00 92,000.00 20,000.00 7,000.00 - 29,000.00 4,000.00 - 19,000.00 379,000.00\nZONE 34 46,500.00 30,000.00 59,000.00 70,000.00 26,000.00 91,000.00 62,500.00 25,000.00 38,000.00 29,500.00 66,700.00 12,500.00 556,700.00\nZONE 35 17,000.00 - 6,000.00 3,000.00 4,000.00 11,500.00 15,000.00 2,000.00 11,000.00 2,000.00 4,000.00 11,000.00 86,500.00\nZONE 36 - - 20,000.00 8,000.00 - - 2,000.00 - 10,000.00 - - 1,000.00 41,000.00\nZONE 37 3,000.00 2,000.00 5,500.00 21,000.00 - - 4,000.00 9,000.00 - - 7,000.00 4,000.00 55,500.00\nZONE 38 - 7,000.00 11,000.00 14,500.00 13,000.00 - 8,000.00 9,000.00 9,500.00 - 62,000.00 10,000.00 144,000.00\nZONE 39 - 5,000.00 33,000.00 15,000.00 3,000.00 5,000.00 2,000.00 12,000.00 4,000.00 - 23,800.00 2,000.00 104,800.00\nZONE 40 2,000.00 7,000.00 47,000.00 54,000.00 12,000.00 15,000.00 3,000.00 58,500.00 5,000.00 30,000.00 24,000.00 3,000.00 260,500.00\nZONE 41 3,000.00 8,000.00 10,000.00 - - - 3,000.00 21,000.00 4,000.00 - 18,000.00 5,000.00 72,000.00\nHQ OPS 16,000.00 9,000.00 35,000.00 16,000.00 30,000.00 24,000.00 100,000.00 39,000.00 26,000.00 64,000.00 61,000.00 - 420,000.00\nRESCUE 18,000.00 78,000.00 24,000.00 28,000.00 46,000.00 30,000.00 37,000.00 20,000.00 7,000.00 40,000.00 10,000.00 30,800.00 368,800.00\nBRT. ANT 101,000.00 69,000.00 22,000.00 61,000.00 107,000.00 56,000.00 39,500.00 84,000.00 8,000.00 10,000.00 62,000.00 7,000.00 626,500.00\n TOTAL 1,106,000.00 1,176,500.00 1,601,500.00 1,274,500.00 1,495,000.00 923,500.00 920,000.00 1,183,500.00 1,058,900.00 821,600.00 927,000.00 549,400.00 13,037,400.00\n117\nTABLE: 41 TOTAL REVENUE REALISED THROUGH DEMMURAGE: YEAR 2018\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\n MONTH/ ZONES JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC TOTAL\n ZONE 1 10,000.00 20,000.00 - 20,000.00 - - - - - - 10,000.00 - 60,000.00\n ZONE 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\n ZONE 3 - - - - - - - - - - 10000.00 - 10,000.00\n ZONE 4 50,000.00 50,000.00 30,000.00 10,000.00 - - - 50,000.00 - - - - 190,000.00\n ZONE 5 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\n ZONE 6 50,000.00 60,000.00 10,000.00 60,000.00 110,000.00 50,000.00 - - 20000.00 - - 10000.00 370,000.00\n ZONE 7 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\n ZONE 8 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\n ZONE 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 10 - 20,000.00 2,000.00 - - - 20,000.00 - - - - - 42,000.00\nZONE 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 12 - 110,000.00 - 100,000.00 150,000.00 110,000.00 240,000.00 - - 100,000.00 - - 810,000.00\nZONE 13 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 14 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 15 - - - - 10,000.00 10,000.00 10,000.00 - - - - - 30,000.00\nZONE 16 - 20,000.00 - - - - - - - - - - 20,000.00\nZONE 17 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 18 - - 20,000.00 - - - - 10000.00 10,000.00 - - - 40,000.00\nZONE 19 20,000.00 10,000.00 - - 20,000.00 - - - - - - - 50,000.00\nZONE 20 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 21 10,000.00 50,000.00 20,000.00 - - - 10,000.00 - 10,000.00 - 50,000.00 - 150,000.00\nZONE 22 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 23 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 24 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 25 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 26 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 27 - - - - 10,000.00 - - - - 10000.00 - 20000.00 40,000.00\nZONE 28 - - - - 50,000.00 - - - - - - - 50,000.00\nZONE 29 10,000.00 20,000.00 10,000.00 10,000.00 - - - - - - - - 50,000.00\nZONE 30 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 31 10,000.00 - 10,000.00 - - 50,000.00 - - - - - - 70,000.00\nZONE 32 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 33 - - - 10,000.00 - - - - - - - - 10,000.00\nZONE 34 - 120,000.00 - 5,000.00 - - - - - - - - 125,000.00\nZONE 35 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 36 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 37 - - - - - - - - - 50000.00 - - 50,000.00\nZONE 38 - 20,000.00 - - - 10,000.00 - - - - - - 30,000.00\nZONE 39 - - - - - - - 10000.00 - - - - 10,000.00\nZONE 40 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nZONE 41 - - - - - - - - - - - - -\nHQ OPS 30,000.00 70,000.00 120,000.00 110,000.00 \n - 30,000.00 20,000.00 130,000.00 - - - - 510,000.00\nRESCUE 690,000.00 960,000.00 720,000.00 380,000.00 430,000.00 320,000.00 370,000.00 440,000.00 330,000.00 200,000.00 150,000.00 160,000.00 5,150,000.00\nBRT. ANT - 10,000.00 - - - - - - 20,000.00 - 10,000.00 - 40,000.00\n TOTAL 1,040,000.00 1,270,000.00 1,052,000.00 715,000.00 780,000.00 560,000.00 680,000.00 660,000.00 370,000.00 360,000.00 230,000.00 190,000.00 7,907,000.00 \n118\n TABLE 42: TOTAL REVENUE REALISED THROUGH TOW PROCEEDS: YEAR 2018\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\n MONTH/ ZONES JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC TOTAL\n ZONE 1 870,000.00 1,020,000.00 1,070,000.00 1,260,000.00 1,190,000.00 760,000.00 595,000.00 880,000.00 920,000.00 570,000.00 780,000.00 700,000.00 10,615,000.00\n ZONE 2 350,000.00 240,000.00 600,000.00 740,000.00 895,000.00 381,000.00 970,000.00 800,000.00 870,000.00 320,000.00 840,000.00 260,000.00 7,266,000.00\n ZONE 3 300,000.00 420,000.00 360,000.00 640,000.00 710,000.00 350,000.00 417,000.00 405,000.00 650,000.00 590,000.00 730,000.00 1,260,000.00 6,832,000.00\n ZONE 4 460,000.00 380,000.00 750,000.00 520,000.00 365,000.00 135,000.00 235,000.00 170,000.00 220,000.00 135,000.00 135,000.00 195,000.00 3,700,000.00\n ZONE 5 1,870,000.00 1,380,000.00 670,000.00 1,400,000.00 1,430,000.00 785,000.00 1,365,000.00 1,565,000.00 810,000.00 1,340,000.00 1,950,000.00 765,000.00 15,330,000.00\n ZONE 6 400,000.00 760,000.00 760,000.00 700,000.00 310,000.00 100,000.00 265,000.00 290,000.00 240,000.00 330,000.00 380,000.00 305,000.00 4,840,000.00\n ZONE 7 320,000.00 520,000.00 650,000.00 760,000.00 620,000.00 705,000.00 575,000.00 622,500.00 505,000.00 505,000.00 770,000.00 545,000.00 7,097,500.00\n ZONE 8 800,000.00 540,000.00 710,000.00 740,000.00 710,000.00 430,000.00 680,000.00 565,000.00 610,000.00 570,000.00 690,000.00 380,000.00 7,425,000.00\n ZONE 9 370,000.00 390,000.00 710,000.00 580,000.00 630,000.00 390,000.00 460,000.00 330,000.00 335,000.00 310,000.00 575,000.00 310,000.00 5,390,000.00\nZONE 10 370,000.00 220,000.00 1,100,000.00 1,180,000.00 1,330,000.00 585,000.00 855,000.00 1,160,000.00 1,170,000.00 895,000.00 900,000.00 520,000.00 10,285,000.00\nZONE 11 340,000.00 560,000.00 1,110,000.00 840,000.00 840,000.00 460,000.00 360,000.00 230,000.00 270,000.00 290,000.00 240,000.00 460,000.00 6,000,000.00\nZONE 12 1,020,000.00 900,000.00 1,625,000.00 1,330,000.00 955,000.00 1,000,000.00 1,492,000.00 2,340,000.00 1,242,500.00 1,620,000.00 805,000.00 470,000.00 14,799,500.00\nZONE 13 150,000.00 180,000.00 170,000.00 580,000.00 150,000.00 30,000.00 60,000.00 80,000.00 150,000.00 430,000.00 870,000.00 80,000.00 2,930,000.00\nZONE 14 370,000.00 560,000.00 440,000.00 520,000.00 540,000.00 230,000.00 390,000.00 260,000.00 210,000.00 240,000.00 400,000.00 60,000.00 4,220,000.00\nZONE 15 260,000.00 280,000.00 960,000.00 1,100,000.00 1,010,000.00 560,000.00 1,655,000.00 2,500,000.00 1,860,000.00 2,257,000.00 2,920,000.00 2,690,000.00 18,052,000.00\nZONE 16 390,000.00 410,000.00 520,000.00 490,000.00 240,000.00 145,000.00 270,000.00 510,000.00 240,000.00 80,000.00 330,000.00 80,000.00 3,705,000.00\nZONE 17 380,000.00 420,000.00 550,000.00 420,000.00 400,000.00 275,000.00 420,000.00 420,000.00 370,000.00 420,000.00 610,000.00 790,000.00 5,475,000.00\nZONE 18 1,200,000.00 1,450,000.00 1,620,000.00 1,600,000.00 1,475,000.00 640,000.00 815,000.00 920,000.00 1,160,000.00 730,000.00 1,050,000.00 590,000.00 13,250,000.00\nZONE 19 380,000.00 530,000.00 830,000.00 920,000.00 840,000.00 195,000.00 300,000.00 465,000.00 610,000.00 260,000.00 615,000.00 215,000.00 6,160,000.00\nZONE 20 540,000.00 850,000.00 820,000.00 890,000.00 760,000.00 275,000.00 595,000.00 835,000.00 465,000.00 725,000.00 588,000.00 870,000.00 8,213,000.00\nZONE 21 630,000.00 720,000.00 940,000.00 700,000.00 580,000.00 350,000.00 670,000.00 660,000.00 610,000.00 630,000.00 1,160,000.00 710,000.00 8,360,000.00\nZONE 22 330,000.00 380,000.00 300,000.00 1,040,000.00 310,000.00 70,000.00 100,000.00 120,000.00 120,000.00 430,000.00 950,000.00 340,000.00 4,490,000.00\nZONE 23 160,000.00 220,000.00 330,000.00 420,000.00 220,000.00 250,000.00 180,000.00 220,000.00 80,000.00 40,000.00 320,000.00 60,000.00 2,500,000.00\nZONE 24 100,000.00 130,000.00 410,000.00 100,000.00 120,000.00 140,000.00 160,000.00 140,000.00 40,000.00 40,000.00 140,000.00 200,000.00 1,720,000.00\nZONE 25 510,000.00 510,000.00 560,000.00 260,000.00 450,000.00 495,000.00 560,000.00 320,000.00 550,000.00 370,000.00 420,000.00 330,000.00 5,335,000.00\nZONE 26 2,590,000.00 3,440,000.00 2,990,000.00 2,260,000.00 3,890,000.00 960,000.00 1,715,000.00 2,285,000.00 1,792,000.00 1,725,000.00 1,500,000.00 810,000.00 25,957,000.00\nZONE 27 460,000.00 620,000.00 660,000.00 760,000.00 440,000.00 290,000.00 305,000.00 260,000.00 390,000.00 435,000.00 740,000.00 320,000.00 5,680,000.00\nZONE 28 60,000.00 200,000.00 180,000.00 2,780,000.00 440,000.00 0.00 80,000.00 80,000.00 60,000.00 330,000.00 1,330,000.00 0.00 5,540,000.00\nZONE 29 450,000.00 460,000.00 460,000.00 490,000.00 465,000.00 210,000.00 380,000.00 200,000.00 280,000.00 480,000.00 520,000.00 380,000.00 4,775,000.00\nZONE 30 290,000.00 470,000.00 440,000.00 590,000.00 500,000.00 150,000.00 390,000.00 200,000.00 240,000.00 400,000.00 445,000.00 400,000.00 4,515,000.00\nZONE 31 565,000.00 620,000.00 510,000.00 585,000.00 500,000.00 335,000.00 365,000.00 295,000.00 370,000.00 395,000.00 635,000.00 100,000.00 5,275,000.00\nZONE 32 870,000.00 1,325,000.00 1,285,000.00 760,000.00 1,750,000.00 705,000.00 450,000.00 705,000.00 490,000.00 160,000.00 360,000.00 230,000.00 9,090,000.00\nZONE 33 1,850,000.00 1,570,000.00 1,460,000.00 2,240,000.00 1,975,000.00 330,000.00 580,000.00 400,000.00 408,500.00 290,000.00 520,000.00 490,000.00 12,113,500.00\nZONE 34 360,000.00 830,000.00 1,180,000.00 990,000.00 705,000.00 510,000.00 900,000.00 1,075,000.00 1,270,000.00 2,140,000.00 880,000.00 770,000.00 11,610,000.00\nZONE 35 140,000.00 180,000.00 240,000.00 190,000.00 160,000.00 130,000.00 390,000.00 300,000.00 280,000.00 60,000.00 160,000.00 80,000.00 2,310,000.00\nZONE 36 20,000.00 60,000.00 100,000.00 1,140,000.00 50,000.00 0.00 140,000.00 180,000.00 100,000.00 450,000.00 810,000.00 60,000.00 3,110,000.00\nZONE 37 280,000.00 320,000.00 380,000.00 380,000.00 290,000.00 80,000.00 200,000.00 165,000.00 210,000.00 180,000.00 170,000.00 180,000.00 2,835,000.00\nZONE 38 300,000.00 420,000.00 300,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 200,000.00 400,000.00 440,000.00 450,000.00 360,000.00 310,000.00 265,000.00 4,445,000.00\nZONE 39 470,000.00 440,000.00 390,000.00 530,000.00 600,000.00 190,000.00 600,000.00 665,000.00 1,247,000.00 550,000.00 290,000.00 155,000.00 6,127,000.00\nZONE 40 350,000.00 380,000.00 770,000.00 730,000.00 590,000.00 440,000.00 335,000.00 680,000.00 580,000.00 500,000.00 690,000.00 370,000.00 6,415,000.00\nZONE 41 120,000.00 440,000.00 340,000.00 340,000.00 180,000.00 20,000.00 370,000.00 280,000.00 180,000.00 160,000.00 280,000.00 300,000.00 3,010,000.00\nHQ OPS 1,360,000.00 690,000.00 1,720,000.00 2,195,000.00 2,660,000.00 960,000.00 1345000.00 1,245,000.00 845,000.00 1,170,000.00 1,410,000.00 1,080,000.00 16,680,000.00\nRESCUE 2,010,000.00 1,460,000.00 1,350,000.00 800,000.00 950,000.00 610,000.00 760,000.00 1,070,000.00 740,000.00 370,000.00 300,000.00 360,000.00 10,780,000.00\nBRT. ANT 3,710,000.00 4,745,000.00 6,370,000.00 7,770,000.00 5,715,000.00 3,765,000.00 4,110,000.00 3,690,000.00 2,715,000.00 2,833,500.00 2,200,000.00 1,485,000.00 49,108,500.00\n TOTAL 29,125,000.00 32,640,000.00 39,690,000.00 45,760,000.00 39,440,000.00 19,621,000.00 28,259,000.00 31,022,500.00 26,955,000.00 27,115,500.00 32,718,000.00 21,020,000.00 373,366,000.00\n119\nTABLE 43: TOTAL REVENUE REALISED THROUGH FINES BY MONTH AND ZONE: YEAR 2018\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\n MONTH/ ZONES JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC TOTAL\n ZONE 1 5,000.00 21,000.00 52,400.00 0.00 8,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6,000.00 2,000.00 10,000.00 9,000.00 113,400.00\n ZONE 2 27,000.00 5,000.00 30,000.00 2,000.00 2,000.00 15,000.00 14,000.00 38,000.00 16,000.00 14,000.00 7,000.00 6,000.00 176,000.00\n ZONE 3 26,000.00 71,500.00 21,500.00 36,500.00 140,000.00 99,000.00 101,000.00 19,000.00 58,000.00 42,500.00 47,000.00 27,000.00 689,000.00\n ZONE 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 102,000.00 1,000.00 19,000.00 3,000.00 9,000.00 11,000.00 12,000.00 14,000.00 5,000.00 176,000.00\n ZONE 5 7,000.00 23,000.00 6,000.00 27,000.00 194,000.00 51,000.00 26,000.00 234,000.00 22,000.00 8,000.00 55,000.00 29,000.00 682,000.00\n ZONE 6 3,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10,000.00 10,000.00 3,000.00 11,000.00 7,000.00 0.00 44,000.00\n ZONE 7 9,000.00 39,000.00 14,000.00 19,000.00 77,000.00 7,500.00 24,000.00 16,000.00 30,500.00 41,000.00 16,000.00 33,000.00 326,000.00\n ZONE 8 14,000.00 20,000.00 18,000.00 11,500.00 88,500.00 30,000.00 46,000.00 9,000.00 0.00 10,000.00 18,000.00 19,500.00 284,500.00\n ZONE 9 3,000.00 82,000.00 0.00 1,000.00 10,000.00 9,000.00 10,000.00 16,000.00 2,000.00 8,000.00 40,000.00 7,000.00 188,000.00\nZONE 10 7,500.00 16,000.00 51,500.00 66,500.00 59,500.00 45,000.00 90,500.00 48,000.00 70,500.00 64,500.00 28,500.00 15,000.00 563,000.00\nZONE 11 5,000.00 6,000.00 0.00 0.00 3,000.00 0.00 0.00 4,000.00 3,500.00 3,000.00 0.00 22,000.00 46,500.00\nZONE 12 19,500.00 71,000.00 11,500.00 10,000.00 62,000.00 33,500.00 83,000.00 26,000.00 156,000.00 54,000.00 26,000.00 10,500.00 563,000.00\nZONE 13 0.00 0.00 194,000.00 2,000.00 19,000.00 0.00 0.00 7,000.00 22,000.00 27,000.00 5,000.00 7,000.00 283,000.00\nZONE 14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5,000.00 0.00 4,000.00 7,000.00 8,000.00 2,000.00 10,000.00 36,000.00\nZONE 15 34,000.00 8,000.00 0.00 12,000.00 8,000.00 26,000.00 9,000.00 2,000.00 5,000.00 29,000.00 12,000.00 40,500.00 185,500.00\nZONE 16 8,000.00 14,000.00 0.00 10,500.00 6,000.00 4,000.00 5,000.00 13,000.00 22,000.00 25,000.00 14,500.00 7,000.00 129,000.00\nZONE 17 5,000.00 18,000.00 0.00 3,000.00 18,000.00 18,000.00 4,000.00 9,000.00 18,000.00 12,000.00 9,000.00 3,000.00 117,000.00\nZONE 18 26,000.00 24,000.00 0.00 25,000.00 18,600.00 67,600.00 24,000.00 11,000.00 34,000.00 14,000.00 10,000.00 8,000.00 262,200.00\nZONE 19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2,000.00 43,000.00 4,000.00 7,000.00 36,000.00 22,000.00 6,000.00 120,000.00\nZONE 20 5,000.00 35,000.00 13,000.00 5,000.00 13,000.00 12,000.00 21,000.00 31,000.00 0.00 2,000.00 52,000.00 18,000.00 207,000.00\nZONE 21 4,000.00 21,000.00 20,000.00 4,000.00 10,000.00 8,000.00 21,000.00 11,000.00 0.00 0.00 3,000.00 0.00 102,000.00\nZONE 22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7,000.00\nZONE 23 0.00 2,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2,000.00 10,000.00 0.00 2,000.00 0.00 8,000.00 3,000.00 27,000.00\nZONE 24 1,000.00 3,000.00 0.00 37,000.00 79,000.00 3,000.00 18,000.00 48,000.00 12,000.00 3,000.00 17,000.00 6,000.00 227,000.00\nZONE 25 6,000.00 5,000.00 3,000.00 12,000.00 9,000.00 4,000.00 17,000.00 12,000.00 25,000.00 8,000.00 34,000.00 25,000.00 160,000.00\nZONE 26 39,500.00 54,500.00 18,500.00 27,000.00 69,500.00 232,000.00 217,500.00 104,500.00 177,500.00 173,000.00 266,000.00 78,000.00 1,457,500.00\nZONE 27 24,000.00 0.00 2,000.00 7,000.00 30,000.00 42,000.00 5,000.00 5,000.00 14,000.00 12,000.00 2,000.00 11,500.00 154,500.00\nZONE 28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\nZONE 29 2,000.00 2,000.00 0.00 5,000.00 32,000.00 7,000.00 6,000.00 30,500.00 15,000.00 27,000.00 42,500.00 14,000.00 183,000.00\nZONE 30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00\nZONE 31 6,000.00 0.00 7,000.00 11,000.00 2,000.00 7,000.00 11,000.00 20,000.00 47,000.00 20,000.00 18,000.00 8,000.00 157,000.00\nZONE 32 0.00 0.00 9,000.00 0.00 13,000.00 3,000.00 19,500.00 24,000.00 47,500.00 26,000.00 25,500.00 65,000.00 232,500.00\nZONE 33 1,000.00 34,000.00 7,000.00 12,000.00 65,000.00 10,000.00 23,000.00 6,000.00 23,000.00 41,000.00 7,500.00 92,000.00 321,500.00\nZONE 34 29,900.00 17,500.00 64,000.00 21,500.00 38,500.00 28,000.00 96,500.00 36,000.00 124,500.00 37,000.00 23,000.00 35,500.00 551,900.00\nZONE 35 12,600.00 2,000.00 2,000.00 1,000.00 12,000.00 7,000.00 4,000.00 2,000.00 6,000.00 6,000.00 0.00 4,000.00 58,600.00\nZONE 36 4,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 13,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3,500.00 20,500.00\nZONE 37 0.00 0.00 0.00 5,000.00 1,000.00 7,000.00 30,000.00 3,000.00 0.00 1,000.00 0.00 24,000.00 71,000.00\nZONE 38 0.00 0.00 0.00 2,000.00 21,000.00 0.00 3,000.00 4,000.00 9,000.00 78,000.00 2,000.00 2,000.00 121,000.00\nZONE 39 5,000.00 0.00 0.00 24,400.00 37,000.00 2,000.00 0.00 7,000.00 4,000.00 25,000.00 27,000.00 2,000.00 133,400.00\nZONE 40 30,000.00 127,200.00 2,000.00 18,500.00 115,000.00 29,000.00 21,000.00 34,000.00 2,000.00 4,000.00 41,500.00 6,000.00 430,200.00\nZONE 41 4,000.00 5,000.00 0.00 12,000.00 10,500.00 16,000.00 4,000.00 8,500.00 42,000.00 2,000.00 5,000.00 5,000.00 114,000.00\nZONE 42 0.00 0.00 0.00 20,000.00 35,000.00 10,000.00 19,000.00 72,500.00 16,000.00 12,000.00 11,000.00 11,000.00 206,500.00\nZONE 43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 19,000.00 4,000.00 0.00 23,000.00\nHQ OPS 2,000.00 25,000.00 0.00 15,000.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50,000.00 7,000.00 42,000.00 0.00 145,000.00 286,000.00\nRESCUE 15,000.00 10,000.00 0.00 0.00 5,000.00 0.00 0.00 80,000.00 9,000.00 25,000.00 0.00 0.00 144,000.00\nBRT 1 18,000.00 5,000.00 11,000.00 7,000.00 22,000.00 58,000.00 126,000.00 88,000.00 7,000.00 74,000.00 5,000.00 13,000.00 434,000.00\nBRT 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3,000.00 3,000.00 3,000.00 47,000.00 56,000.00\nENF 0.00 0.00 60,000.00 0.00 0.00 565,000.00 4,006,000.00 503,000.00 265,000.00 173,000.00 30,000.00 170,000.00 5,772,000.00\n TOTAL 408,000.00 766,700.00 617,400.00 574,400.00 1,347,100.00 1,483,600.00 5,178,000.00 1,659,000.00 1,351,000.00 1,234,000.00 970,000.00 1,053,000.00 16,642,200.00\n120\nTABLE: 44 TOTAL REVENUE REALISED THROUGH DEMMURAGE: YEAR 2019\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\n MONTH/ ZONES JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC TOTAL\n ZONE 1 950,000.00 915,000.00 1,150,000.00 1,120,000.00 970,000.00 870,000.00 920,000.00 760,000.00 1,770,000.00 1,260,000.00 1,280,000.00 680,000.00 12,645,000.00\n ZONE 2 580,000.00 200,000.00 450,000.00 670,000.00 660,000.00 1,040,000.00 1,535,000.00 1,070,000.00 1,260,000.00 990,000.00 980,000.00 560,000.00 9,995,000.00\n ZONE 3 930,000.00 710,000.00 1,220,000.00 1,525,000.00 1,280,000.00 1,810,000.00 2,540,000.00 2,600,000.00 2,800,000.00 3,430,000.00 1,940,000.00 1,590,000.00 22,375,000.00\n ZONE 4 525,000.00 270,000.00 350,000.00 720,000.00 630,000.00 420,000.00 1,100,000.00 1,100,000.00 1,155,000.00 1,255,000.00 1,050,000.00 1,030,000.00 9,605,000.00\n ZONE 5 780,000.00 1,040,000.00 900,000.00 2,880,000.00 2,090,000.00 1,470,000.00 1,120,000.00 1,220,000.00 1,210,000.00 1,240,000.00 1,210,000.00 1,060,000.00 16,220,000.00\n ZONE 6 380,000.00 450,000.00 330,000.00 660,000.00 360,000.00 650,000.00 650,000.00 440,000.00 840,000.00 940,000.00 590,000.00 530,000.00 6,820,000.00\n ZONE 7 445,000.00 620,000.00 785,000.00 807,500.00 1,007,000.00 745,000.00 1,210,000.00 720,000.00 760,000.00 780,000.00 500,000.00 620,000.00 8,999,500.00\n ZONE 8 610,000.00 480,000.00 670,000.00 725,000.00 735,000.00 520,000.00 810,000.00 870,000.00 920,000.00 880,000.00 880,000.00 570,000.00 8,670,000.00\n ZONE 9 455,000.00 660,000.00 515,000.00 790,000.00 910,000.00 740,000.00 780,000.00 860,000.00 1,510,000.00 1,140,000.00 970,000.00 810,000.00 10,140,000.00\nZONE 10 535,000.00 540,000.00 920,000.00 985,000.00 1,115,000.00 670,000.00 1,295,000.00 1,020,000.00 1,250,000.00 1,210,000.00 600,000.00 620,000.00 10,760,000.00\nZONE 11 470,000.00 350,000.00 190,000.00 360,000.00 795,000.00 475,000.00 1,280,000.00 710,000.00 1,500,000.00 1,070,000.00 580,000.00 780,000.00 8,560,000.00\nZONE 12 340,000.00 1,250,000.00 760,000.00 660,000.00 1,470,000.00 1,480,000.00 3,030,000.00 2,115,000.00 4,680,000.00 2,930,000.00 2,530,000.00 3,125,000.00 24,370,000.00\nZONE 13 180,000.00 140,000.00 370,000.00 990,000.00 930,000.00 100,000.00 360,000.00 430,000.00 1,170,000.00 770,000.00 950,000.00 1,270,000.00 7,660,000.00\nZONE 14 240,000.00 100,000.00 280,000.00 1,140,000.00 960,000.00 810,000.00 790,000.00 585,000.00 1,050,000.00 560,000.00 670,000.00 380,000.00 7,565,000.00\nZONE 15 2,270,000.00 1,695,000.00 1,110,000.00 1,960,000.00 2,910,000.00 2,155,000.00 3,270,000.00 1,905,000.00 2,550,000.00 2,740,000.00 1,990,000.00 1,940,000.00 26,495,000.00\nZONE 16 130,000.00 110,000.00 130,000.00 380,000.00 280,000.00 220,000.00 460,000.00 340,000.00 550,000.00 900,000.00 710,000.00 510,000.00 4,720,000.00\nZONE 17 330,000.00 260,000.00 460,000.00 400,000.00 470,000.00 380,000.00 460,000.00 710,000.00 715,000.00 795,000.00 540,000.00 480,000.00 6,000,000.00\nZONE 18 1,490,000.00 1,230,000.00 1,100,000.00 1,190,000.00 1,360,000.00 985,000.00 1,430,000.00 1,110,000.00 1,530,000.00 1,490,000.00 1,110,000.00 730,000.00 14,755,000.00\nZONE 19 360,000.00 270,000.00 200,000.00 260,000.00 650,000.00 650,000.00 935,000.00 620,000.00 920,000.00 890,000.00 680,000.00 410,000.00 6,845,000.00\nZONE 20 475,000.00 505,000.00 625,000.00 450,000.00 740,000.00 365,000.00 680,000.00 715,000.00 975,000.00 1,130,000.00 800,000.00 640,000.00 8,100,000.00\nZONE 21 620,000.00 1,215,000.00 960,000.00 490,000.00 805,000.00 760,000.00 1,310,000.00 890,000.00 735,000.00 960,000.00 760,000.00 570,000.00 10,075,000.00\nZONE 22 180,000.00 290,000.00 360,000.00 1,005,000.00 1,490,000.00 400,000.00 895,000.00 500,000.00 710,000.00 720,000.00 530,000.00 840,000.00 7,920,000.00\nZONE 23 270,000.00 200,000.00 280,000.00 600,000.00 522,000.00 510,000.00 480,000.00 380,000.00 880,000.00 370,000.00 630,000.00 340,000.00 5,462,000.00\nZONE 24 190,000.00 80,000.00 80,000.00 240,000.00 360,000.00 180,000.00 430,000.00 470,000.00 700,000.00 400,000.00 260,000.00 330,000.00 3,720,000.00\nZONE 25 570,000.00 430,000.00 650,000.00 570,000.00 615,000.00 720,000.00 1,425,000.00 1,480,000.00 1,460,000.00 1,400,000.00 1,010,000.00 980,000.00 11,310,000.00\nZONE 26 1,640,000.00 1,345,000.00 1,630,000.00 2,120,000.00 1,970,000.00 3,335,000.00 3,370,000.00 2,525,000.00 2,580,000.00 2,290,000.00 2,330,000.00 1,600,000.00 26,735,000.00\nZONE 27 300,000.00 180,000.00 320,000.00 375,000.00 905,000.00 770,000.00 1,470,000.00 750,000.00 985,000.00 970,000.00 710,000.00 650,000.00 8,385,000.00\nZONE 28 280,000.00 40,000.00 90,000.00 400,000.00 490,000.00 560,000.00 650,000.00 310,000.00 450,000.00 800,000.00 550,000.00 680,000.00 5,300,000.00\nZONE 29 520,000.00 460,000.00 440,000.00 765,000.00 635,000.00 770,000.00 670,000.00 470,000.00 870,000.00 820,000.00 820,000.00 720,000.00 7,960,000.00\nZONE 30 670,000.00 630,000.00 620,000.00 1,005,000.00 1,285,000.00 1,300,000.00 1,560,000.00 1,040,000.00 1,270,000.00 1,200,000.00 860,000.00 780,000.00 12,220,000.00\nZONE 31 310,000.00 240,000.00 95,000.00 260,000.00 355,000.00 290,000.00 550,000.00 270,000.00 460,000.00 300,000.00 260,000.00 260,000.00 3,650,000.00\nZONE 32 340,000.00 230,000.00 407,500.00 265,000.00 370,000.00 280,000.00 1,485,000.00 1,185,000.00 1,425,000.00 845,000.00 450,000.00 790,000.00 8,072,500.00\nZONE 33 340,000.00 440,000.00 640,000.00 1,065,000.00 1,075,000.00 670,000.00 410,000.00 620,000.00 840,000.00 720,000.00 690,000.00 460,000.00 7,970,000.00\nZONE 34 680,000.00 765,000.00 790,000.00 890,000.00 1,260,000.00 730,000.00 2,030,000.00 1,780,000.00 5,270,000.00 3,040,000.00 1,920,000.00 2,980,000.00 22,135,000.00\nZONE 35 180,000.00 60,000.00 80,000.00 180,000.00 420,000.00 380,000.00 420,000.00 330,000.00 460,000.00 380,000.00 400,000.00 260,000.00 3,550,000.00\nZONE 36 100,000.00 100,000.00 80,000.00 170,000.00 650,000.00 20,000.00 110,000.00 340,000.00 460,000.00 550,000.00 380,000.00 370,000.00 3,330,000.00\nZONE 37 160,000.00 120,000.00 270,000.00 1,190,000.00 675,000.00 1,192,000.00 2,910,000.00 970,000.00 1,180,000.00 1,055,000.00 670,000.00 460,000.00 10,852,000.00\nZONE 38 520,000.00 400,000.00 400,000.00 600,000.00 450,000.00 450,000.00 710,000.00 610,000.00 980,000.00 1,060,000.00 1,040,000.00 790,000.00 8,010,000.00\nZONE 39 910,000.00 350,000.00 530,000.00 700,000.00 990,000.00 550,000.00 500,000.00 690,000.00 950,000.00 920,000.00 850,000.00 420,000.00 8,360,000.00\nZONE 40 500,000.00 820,000.00 690,000.00 920,000.00 1,180,000.00 1,225,000.00 1,240,000.00 1,290,000.00 1,340,000.00 1,480,000.00 1,140,000.00 780,000.00 12,605,000.00\nZONE 41 200,000.00 80,000.00 40,000.00 440,000.00 350,000.00 160,000.00 290,000.00 690,000.00 670,000.00 500,000.00 475,000.00 400,000.00 4,295,000.00\nZONE 42 0.00 0.00 20,000.00 570,000.00 580,000.00 490,000.00 570,000.00 620,000.00 620,000.00 560,000.00 580,000.00 460,000.00 5,070,000.00\nZONE 43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40,000.00 150,000.00 40,000.00 20,000.00 250,000.00\nHQ OPS 680,000.00 445,000.00 1,070,000.00 1,105,000.00 990,000.00 80,000.00 525000.00 190,000.00 440,000.00 600,000.00 1,610,000.00 3,020,000.00 10,755,000.00\nRESCUE 870,000.00 250,000.00 520,000.00 310,000.00 390,000.00 460,000.00 1,280,000.00 1,520,000.00 1,490,000.00 1,150,000.00 1,440,000.00 1,570,000.00 11,250,000.00\nBRT1 2,038,000.00 945,000.00 2,045,000.00 2,115,000.00 3,094,500.00 2,255,000.00 5,215,000.00 2,865,000.00 2,140,000.00 2,085,000.00 1,780,000.00 1,470,000.00 28,047,500.00\nBRT 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 735,000.00 2,105,000.00 1,530,000.00 2,560,000.00 1,630,000.00 8,560,000.00\nENF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3,957,500.00 12,160,000.00 3,900,000.00 4,080,000.00 2,105,000.00 995,000.00 2,130,000.00 29,327,500.00\n TOTAL 25,543,000.00 21,910,000.00 25,622,500.00 37,022,500.00 42,228,500.00 39,049,500.00 67,320,000.00 47,320,000.00 64,705,000.00 55,360,000.00 46,300,000.00 44,095,000.00 516,476,000.00\n121\nTABLE 45: TOTAL REVENUE REALISED THROUGH FINES BY MONTH AND ZONE: YEAR 2019\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\n2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019\nJANUARY 2,224 231 1,319 625 1,247 1,285 6,931\nFEBRUARY 2,081 203 2,262 242 1,298 923 7,009\nMARCH 2,065 191 1,555 272 1,458 1,247 6,788\nAPRIL 1,876 790 1,623 267 1,694 1,535 7,785\nMAY 1,969 1,610 2,328 507 1,391 1,706 9,511\nJUNE 1,910 1,651 3,364 679 846 1,625 10,075\nJULY 1,589 1,500 2,307 532 1,306 2,466 9,700\nAUGUST 1,292 1,837 2,789 1,271 1,301 1,875 10,365\nSEPTEMBER 1,452 468 1,438 1,028 1,150 2,649 8,185\nOCTOBER 963 1,179 1,697 1,075 1,214 2,272 8,400\nNOVEMBER 487 1,024 1,856 1,289 1,347 1,961 7,964\nDECEMBER 334 828 1,620 708 869 1,598 5,957\nTOTAL 18,242 11,512 24,158 8,495 15,121 21,142 98,670\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\n122\nTABLE 46: MONTHLY NUMBER OF OFFENCES COMMITTED BY \nMOTORISTS: YEAR 2014 - 2019\nMONTH TOTAL\n2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TOTAL\nJANUARY 1,941 230 1,350 509 1,053 5,083\nFEBRUARY 1,887 194 2,123 344 1,044 5,592\nMARCH 1,964 163 1,553 257 1,316 5,253\nAPRIL 1,632 733 1,546 243 1,367 5,521\nMAY 1,680 1,298 2,249 471 1,126 6,824\nJUNE 1,597 1,404 3,181 582 704 7,468\nJULY 1,443 1,236 2,067 430 1,109 6,285\nAUGUST 1,161 1,602 2,601 1,154 1,211 7,729\nSEPTEMBER 1,265 439 1,352 875 1,027 4,958\nOCTOBER 905 1,405 1,642 938 1,045 5,935\nNOVEMBER 459 1,066 2,836 1,008 1,156 6,525\nDECEMBER 322 888 1,532 608 811 4,161\nTOTAL 16,256 10,658 24,032 7,419 12,969 71,334\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\n123\nTABLE 47: MONTHLY NUMBER OF VEHICLES IMPOUNDED IN \nLAGOS STATE: YEAR 2014 - 2018\nMONTH\nMONTH 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 TOTAL\nJAN 142 76 108 64 230 650 1270\nFEB 137 59 80 58 591 465 1390\nMAR 145 191 77 146 603 564 1726\nAPR 123 21 63 224 428 401 1260\nMAY 74 36 36 289 669 462 1566\nJUN 100 40 64 293 662 784 1943\nJUL 99 56 36 225 587 451 1454\nAUG 98 42 51 217 771 264 1443\nSEP 98 43 64 173 714 516 1608\nOCT 69 40 49 274 331 367 1130\nNOV 71 45 54 236 513 327 1246\nDEC 66 53 23 173 549 320 1184\nTOTAL 1,222 702 705 705 6,648 5,571 15,553\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\n124\nTABLE 48: MONTHLY NUMBER OF ROAD ACCIDENTS RECORDED \nBY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY IN LAGOS STATE: YEAR \n2014- 2019\nMONTH 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 TOTAL\nJAN 100 43 71 30 88 591 923\nFEB 109 67 28 35 496 418 1153\nMAR 128 16 76 40 477 611 1348\nAPR 46 9 32 133 314 480 1014\nMAY 43 26 34 168 511 469 1251\nJUN 46 32 60 169 527 932 1766\nJUL 23 40 13 108 437 533 1154\nAUG 76 24 82 116 645 356 1299\nSEP 86 6 74 55 518 457 1196\nOCT 62 4 41 104 250 431 892\nNOV 60 18 50 131 563 395 1217\nDEC 26 43 16 79 506 361 1031\nTOTAL 805 328 577 1,168 5,332 6,034 14,244\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\nMONTH 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 TOTAL\nJAN 26 8 7 2 7 20 70\nFEB 23 20 7 1 9 8 68\nMAR 17 5 12 6 25 10 75\nAPR 9 5 3 14 11 8 50\nMAY 2 2 2 7 16 10 39\nJUN 7 1 17 5 20 23 73\nJUL 5 7 12 9 23 10 66\nAUG 10 2 12 6 32 31 93\nSEP 9 9 2 - 9 23 52\nOCT 5 6 2 13 7 4 37\nNOV 6 2 9 4 8 3 32\nDEC 9 1 - 7 18 8 43\nTOTAL 128 68 85 74 185 158 698\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\n125\nTABLE 49: MONTHLY NUMBER OF PERSONS INJURED IN ROAD \nACCIDENTS IN LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2014 - 2019\nTABLE 50: MONTHLY NUMBER OF PERSONS KILLED IN ROAD \nACCIDENTS IN LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2014 - 2019\nFATAL SERIOUSMINOR TOTAL\n2011 47 143 263 453\n2012 116 240 505 861\n2013 92 255 763 1,110\n2014 92 240 890 1,222\n2015 45 117 382 544\n2016 40 194 471 705\n2017 57 486 1,824 2,367\n2018 982 2,865 2,801 6,648\n2019 119 3,336 2,117 5,572\nTOTAL 1,590 7,876 10,016 19,482\nMALE FEMALETOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL\n2011 47 22 69 279 164 443 512\n2012 113 58 171 455 253 708 879\n2013 95 40 135 482 304 786 921\n2014 108 20 128 542 263 805 933\n2015 50 18 68 226 101 327 395\n2016 51 34 85 347 230 577 662\n2017 55 26 81 730 445 1,175 1,256\n2018 164 28 192 3,704 1,627 5,331 5,523\n2019 137 21 158 4,469 1,565 6,034 6,192\nTOTAL 820 267 1,087 11,234 4,952 16,186 17,273\n126\nYEAR\nYEAR GRAND \nTOTAL\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\nTABLE 51: CLASSIFICATION OF ROAD \nACCIDENTS IN LAGOS STATE BY \nCATEGORY: YEAR 2011- 2019\nCATEGORY OF ACCIDENT\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\nTABLE 52: NUMBER OF RECORDED CASUALTIES IN ROAD \nACCIDENTS BY GENDER IN LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2011-2019\nCASUALTY\nDEAD INJURED\n2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019\n1 BRT Lane Violation 798 517 - - 1,133 20,000 20,000 - - 20,000 15,960,000 10,340,000 - - 22,660,000\n2 Traffic Light Violation 75 297 - - 432 20,000 20,000 - - 20,000 1,500,000 5,940,000 - - 8,640,000\n3\nDriving in the \nDirection Prohibited \nby the Road Traffic \nLaw/Neglect of Traffic \nDirections\n460 338 - - 68\n4\nParking or Stopping to \nPick Passengers by a \nCommercial Vehicle \non the Highway 1,546 3,243 1,318 1,290 1,282 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 30,920,000 64,860,000 26,360,000 25,800,000 25,640,000\n5\nWillful Obstruction on \nHighway 1,161 1,326 1,037 2,376 2,876 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 58,050,000 66,300,000 51,850,000 118,800,000 143,800,000\n6\nDriving without a \nStrapped Seat Belt for \nboth Driver and front \nSeat Passenger 848 2,276 775 1,819 2,702 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 16,960,000 45,520,000 15,500,000 36,380,000 54,040,000\n7\nParking on Yellow \nLine on any Public \nHighway/Illegal \nParking 2,278 6,134 1,155 2,561 4,910 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 45,560,000 122,680,000 23,100,000 51,220,000 98,200,000\n8\nNot Painting a \nCommercial Vehicle in \nApproved Colours 391 566 181 551 529 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 19,550,000 28,300,000 9,050,000 27,550,000 26,450,000\n127\nSOURCE: Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)\nTABLE 53: TRAFFIC RELATED OFFENCES IN LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2015 - 2019\nUNIT (NUMBER) AVERAGE FINE PER VEHICLE (N) TOTAL REVENUE (N)\nForfeiture of Vehicle to the State\nS/N TYPES OF OFFENCE\nMONTH STD PLATE M.CYCLE\nLWA/FANCY \n(OKADA)\nFANCY \n(VEHICLE)\nREPL.S\nTD\nREPL. \nM.CYCLE\nOFFICIAL \nSTD\nOFFICIAL \nM.CYCLE\nOUT OF \nSERIES ARTICULATED SECURITY DEALER TOTAL\nJAN - 1 31,200 87 79 - - - 24 - - 11 31,402\nFEB - 1 36,400 74 102 - - - 23 - - 10 36,610\nMAR 1,000 46,600 62 109 - - - 21 - - 20 47,812\nAPR - 2 20,800 39 91 - - - 29 - - 15 20,976\nMAY - 3 31,200 69 79 - - - 17 - - 13 31,381\nJUN 1,000 5,000 2 80 120 - - - 27 - - 13 6,242\nJUL 7,000 9,000 5 67 125 - - - 8 - - 10 16,215\nAUG - 1 36,400 48 88 1 - - 18 - - 23 36,579\nSEP - 5 20,800 67 109 1 - - 20 - - 10 21,012\nOCT 2,000 30,800 1 57 117 - - 18 - - 14 33,007\nNOV 1,000 25,800 1 55 84 2 - - 10 - - 22 26,974\nDEC 1,000 25,800 4 73 84 2 - - 25 - - 20 27,008\nTOTAL 13,000 319,800 26 778 1,187 6 - - 240 - - 335,218 181 \nNote: STD - Standard\n REPL - Replacement\n M.CYCLE - Motorcycle\n128\nTABLE 54: PRODUCTION OF PLATE NUMBERS REPORT FOR YEAR 2015 IN LAGOS STATE\nSOURCE: Lagos State Number Plate Production Authority\nMONTH STD PLATE M.CYCLE\nLWA/FANCY \n(OKADA)\nFANCY \n(VEHICLE)\nREPL.S\nTD\nREPL. \nM.CYCLE\nOFFICIAL \nSTD\nOFFICIAL \nM.CYCLE\nOUT OF \nSERIES ARTICULATED SECURITY DEALER TOTAL\nJAN 41 1 77 1 12 10 142\nFEB 68 46,800 126 1 23 19 47,037\nMAR 2 20,800 46 94 1 16 26 20,985\nAPR 2 41,600 63 105 1 20 18 41,809\nMAY 1 10,400 28 84 1 3,500 8 6 14,028\nJUN 1 41,600 70 153 26 25 41,875\nJUL 3 26,000 45 112 4 14 26,178\nAUG 4 15,600 73 125 10 15 15,827\nSEP 2 10,400 32 65 1 4 14 10,518\nOCT 55 46,800 80 16 24 46,975\nNOV 3 15,600 55 83 16 26 15,783\nDEC 1 36,400 93 63 1 18 32 36,608\nTOTAL 20 312,000 669 1,167 7 3,500 173 0 0 229\nNote: STD - Standard\n REPL - Replacement\n M.CYCLE - Motorcycle\n129\nSOURCE: Lagos State Number Plate Production Authority\nTABLE 55: PRODUCTION OF PLATE NUMBERS REPORT FOR YEAR 2016 IN LAGOS STATE\nMONTH STD PLATE M.CYCLE\nLWA/FANCY \n(OKADA)\nFANCY \n(VEHICLE)\nREPL.S\nTD\nREPL. \nM.CYCLE\nOFFICIAL \nSTD\nOFFICIAL \nM.CYCLE\nOUT OF \nSERIES ARTICULATED SECURITY DEALER TOTAL\nJAN 5 20,800 86 79 14 9 20,993\nFEB 2,000 20,400 2 47 59 1 5 26 22,540\nMAR 35 3 46 12 21 117\nAPR 2 26,000 50 45 14 28 26,139\nMAY 1 10,400 43 27 1 14 14 10,500\nJUN 1,000 31,000 3 55 40 6 17 35 32,156\nJUL 2,000 12,000 1 39 66 3 8 35 14,152\nAUG 3 1,000 49 66 14 40 1,172\nSEP 6 34,000 54 33 14 28 34,135\nOCT 1,000 25,800 2 61 74 2 14 57 27,010\nNOV 1,000 20,600 4 81 73 2 23 55 21,838\nDEC 1 20,800 65 25 7 36 20,934\nTOTAL 8,000 221,800 33 665 633 15 156 0 0 384\nNote: STD - Standard\n REPL - Replacement\n M.CYCLE - Motorcycle\n130\nTABLE 56: PRODUCTION OF PLATE NUMBERS REPORT FOR YEAR 2017 IN LAGOS STATE\nSOURCE: Lagos State Number Plate Production Authority\nMONTH STD PLATE M.CYCLE\nLWA/FANCY \n(OKADA)\nFANCY \n(VEHICLE)\nREPL.S\nTD\nREPL. \nM.CYCLE\nOFFICIAL \nSTD\nOFFICIAL \nM.CYCLE\nOUT OF \nSERIES ARTICULATED SECURITY DEALER TOTAL\nJAN 2,000 15,200 3 76 43 13 28 17,363\nFEB 1,000 25,800 1 35 37 6 50 26,929\nMAR 4,000 40,800 1 39 42 11 65 44,958\nAPR 2,000 5,000 4 65 41 10 39 7,159\nMAY 2,000 25,400 6 58 49 11 71 27,595\nJUN 1,000 15,400 1 21 9 9 48 16,488\nJUL 4,000 25,200 39 21 10 66 29,336\nAUG 3,000 30,600 4 26 22 12 59 33,723\nSEP 1,000 11,200 2 33 43 1 7 18 12,304\nOCT 2,000 35,000 1 54 31 16 9 47 37,158\nNOV 3,000 30,600 1 61 42 9 35 33,748\nDEC 2 15,600 80 15 20 89 15,806\nTOTAL 25,000 275,800 26 587 395 1 134 0 9 615\nNote: STD - Standard\n REPL - Replacement\n M.CYCLE - Motorcycle\n131\nTABLE 57: PRODUCTION OF PLATE NUMBERS REPORT FOR YEAR 2018 IN LAGOS STATE\nSOURCE: Lagos State Number Plate Production Authority\nMONTH STD PLATE M.CYCLE\nLWA/FANCY \n(OKADA)\nFANCY \n(VEHICLE)\nREPL.S\nTD\nREPL. \nM.CYCLE\nOFFICIAL \nSTD\nOFFICIAL \nM.CYCLE\nOUT OF \nSERIES ARTICULATED SECURITY DEALER TOTAL\nJAN 2,000 10,100 5 82 28 - 24 - 12,239\nFEB 1,000 20,600 6 83 26 - 71 100 77 21,963\nMAR 4,000 20,000 3 89 27 - 19 48 24,186\nAPR 3,000 25,400 3 59 - - 25 102 28,589\nMAY 2,000 15,200 - 63 - - 34 75 17,372\nJUN 2,000 20,400 2 67 - - 25 63 22,557\nJUL 8,000 40,000 5 69 44 - 35 87 48,240\nAUG 2,000 10,000 6 39 36 2 15 116 12,214\nSEP 7,000 35,000 5 87 69 1 24 68 42,254\nOCT 5,000 25,000 2 76 60 2 21 24 30,185\nNOV 5,000 25,000 3 67 44 1 19 57 30,191\nDEC 2 26,000 72 80 1 26 80 26,261\nTOTAL 41,000 272,700 42 853 414 7 338 0 100 797\nNote: STD - Standard\n REPL - Replacement\n M.CYCLE - Motorcycle\n132\nTABLE 58: PRODUCTION OF PLATE NUMBERS REPORT FOR YEAR 2019 IN LAGOS STATE\nSOURCE: Lagos State Number Plate Production Authority\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY -- 70 3,120,000 1,907,936\n2 FEBRUARY -- 70 3,120,000 1,818,639\n3 MARCH -- 70 3,120,000 1,817,177\n4 APRIL -- 70 3,120,000 1,735,967\n5 MAY -- 70 3,120,000 1,947,447\n6 JUNE -- 70 3,120,000 1,880,192\n7 JULY -- 70 3,120,000 1,772,046\n8 AUGUST -- 70 3,120,000 1,772,325\n9 SEPTEMBER -- 70 3,120,000 1,539,599\n10 OCTOBER -- 70 3,120,000 1,380,000\n11 NOVEMBER -- *130 3,120,000 2,600,000\n12 DECEMBER -- *170 3,120,000 2,745,000\n37,440,000 22,916,328\nNOTE:\n* 60 number of buses deployed in November 2015 by new operator\n* 100 number of buses deployed in November 2015 by new operator\n133\nTABLE 59: NUMBER OF BRT BUSES BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS: \nYEAR 2015\nNUMBER OF BRT BUSES OWNED BY NUMBER OF PASSENGERS\nTOTAL\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nS/N MONTH\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY -- 434 9,634,560 2,346,482\n2 FEBRUARY -- 434 9,634,560 2,777,113\n3 MARCH -- 434 9,634,560 2,436,925\n4 APRIL -- 434 9,634,560 3,456,235\n5 MAY -- 434 9,634,560 3,614,129\n6 JUNE -- 434 9,634,560 3,280,961\n7 JULY -- 434 9,634,560 3,254,404\n8 AUGUST -- 434 9,634,560 3,538,259\n9 SEPTEMBER -- 434 9,634,560 3,532,172\n10 OCTOBER -- 434 9,634,560 3,680,723\n11 NOVEMBER -- 434 9,634,560 4,395,635\n12 DECEMBER -- 434 9,634,560 4,578,848\n115,614,720 40,891,886\n134\nTABLE 60: NUMBER OF BRT BUSES BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS: \nYEAR 2016\nNUMBER OF BRT BUSES OWNED BY NUMBER OF PASSENGERS\nTOTAL\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nS/N MONTH\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY -- 434 9,634,560 4,377,306\n2 FEBRUARY -- 434 9,634,560 4,056,258\n3 MARCH -- 434 9,634,560 3,947,829\n4 APRIL -- 434 9,634,560 3,542,981\n5 MAY -- 434 9,634,560 3,674,009\n6 JUNE -- 434 9,634,560 3,449,502\n7 JULY -- 434 9,634,560 3,541,167\n8 AUGUST -- 434 9,634,560 3,684,127\n9 SEPTEMBER -- 434 9,634,560 3,348,006\n10 OCTOBER -- 434 9,634,560 3,582,161\n11 NOVEMBER -- 434 9,634,560 3,491,583\n12 DECEMBER -- 434 9,634,560 3,503,171\n115,614,720 44,198,100\n135\nNUMBER OF PASSENGERS\nTABLE 61: NUMBER OF BRT BUSES BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS: \nYEAR 2017\nS/N NUMBER OF BRT BUSES OWNED BY\nTOTAL\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nMONTH\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY\n --\n434 8,671,104 3,303,745\n2 FEBRUARY\n --\n434 8,671,104 3,091,005\n3 MARCH\n --\n434 8,671,104 3,280,309\n4 APRIL\n --\n434 8,671,104 3,042,158\n5 MAY\n --\n434 8,671,104 2,947,372\n6 JUNE\n --\n434 8,671,104 2,983,863\n7 JULY\n --\n434 8,671,104 2,984,832\n8 AUGUST\n --\n434 8,671,104 2,811,932\n9 SEPTEMBER\n --\n434 8,671,104 2,665,679\n10 OCTOBER\n --\n434 8,671,104 2,666,428\n11 NOVEMBER\n --\n434 8,671,104 2,312,410\n12 DECEMBER\n --\n434 8,671,104 2,831,133\n104,053,248 34,920,866\n136\nTOTAL\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nTABLE 62: NUMBER OF BRT BUSES BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS: \nYEAR 2018\nS/N MONTH NUMBER OF BRT BUSES OWNED BY NUMBER OF PASSENGERS\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY 0 434 5,474,040 2,873,419\n2 FEBRUARY 0 434 5,474,040 2,247,454\n3 MARCH 0 434 5,474,040 1,857,665\n4 APRIL 0 434 5,474,040 2,922,168\n5 MAY 0 434 5,474,040 3,254,087\n6 JUNE 0 434 5,474,040 3,028,335\n7 JULY 0 434 5,474,040 3,298,938\n8 AUGUST 0 434 5,474,040 3,386,062\n9 SEPTEMBER 0 434 5,474,040 3,475,010\n10 OCTOBER 0 434 5,474,040 3,610,939\n11 NOVEMBER 0 434 5,474,040 3,564,154\n12 DECEMBER 0 434 5,474,040 3,762,707\n65,688,480 37,280,938\n137\nTOTAL 434\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nTABLE 63: NUMBER OF BRT BUSES BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS: \nYEAR 2019\nS/N NUMBER OF BRT BUSES OWNED BY NUMBER OF PASSENGERS MONTH\n \nTARGET ACTUAL\n1 IKORODU TBS 27 170 120,000 63,656 60mins\nORIGIN DESTINATION TARGET ACTUAL\n1 MARYLAND\nIKOTUN/IGANDO/I\nYANA IPAJA 42 50 35,000 15,500 120mins\n138\nTABLE 64: NUMBER OF BRT ROUTES AND BUSES BY PASSENGERS: YEAR 2015\nNAME OF ROUTE\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nTABLE 65: NUMBER OF BUS FRANCHISEE SERVICES (BFS) ROUTES AND BUSES BY PASSENGERS: \nYEAR 2015\nNAME OF ROUTE AVERAGE NUMBER OF \nPASSENGERS PER DAY \nFOR THE ROUTE\nAVERAGE \nTIME TAKEN \nPER TRIP\nAVERAGE \nTIME TAKEN \nPER TRIP\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nS/N\nS/N\nORIGIN DESTINATION\nNUMBER OF \nDESIGNATED \nBUS STOP TO \nTHE ROUTE\nNUMBER OF \nDESIGNATED \nBUS STOP TO \nTHE ROUTE\nNUMBER OF \nBUSES \nDESIGNATED TO \nTHE ROUTE\nNUMBER OF \nBUSES \nDESIGNATED TO \nTHE ROUTE\nAVERAGE NUMBER OF \nPASSENGERS PER DAY \nFOR THE ROUTE\n \nTARGET ACTUAL\n1 IKORODU TBS 27 434 141,000 400,000 102 mins\nORIGIN DESTINATION TARGET ACTUAL\n1\nMARYLAND IKOTUN/IGANDO/I\nYANA IPAJA 42 50 37,916 18,047 120 mins\n \nTARGET ACTUAL\n1 IKORODU TBS 45 434 400,000 160,000 91 mins\n139\nTABLE 66: NUMBER OF BRT ROUTES AND BUSES BY PASSENGERS: YEAR 2016\nNAME OF ROUTE\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nTABLE 67: NUMBER OF BUS FRANCHISEE SERVICES (BFS) ROUTES AND BUSES BY PASSENGERS: YEAR 2016\nNAME OF ROUTE\nAVERAGE NUMBER OF \nPASSENGERS PER DAY FOR \nTHE ROUTE\nNUMBER OF \nDESIGNATED \nBUS STOP TO \nTHE ROUTE\nNUMBER OF \nBUSES \nDESIGNATED TO \nTHE ROUTE\nNUMBER OF \nBUSES \nDESIGNATED TO \nTHE ROUTE\nAVERAGE TIME \nTAKEN PER \nTRIP\nAVERAGE TIME \nTAKEN PER \nTRIP\nAVERAGE NUMBER OF \nPASSENGERS PER DAY FOR \nTHE ROUTE\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nTABLE 68: NUMBER OF BRT ROUTES AND BUSES BY PASSENGERS: YEAR 2017.\nNAME OF ROUTE\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nNUMBER OF \nDESIGNATED \nBUS STOP TO \nTHE ROUTE\nNUMBER OF \nBUSES \nDESIGNATED TO \nTHE ROUTE\nAVERAGE TIME \nTAKEN PER \nTRIP\nAVERAGE NUMBER OF \nPASSENGERS PER DAY FOR \nTHE ROUTE\nS/N\nS/N\nS/N\nORIGIN\nORIGIN\nDESTINATION\nDESTINATION\nNUMBER OF \nDESIGNATED \nBUS STOP TO \nTHE ROUTE\n \nTARGET ACTUAL\n1 Ikorodu TBS 29 386 289,037 97,002 67mins\n \nTARGET ACTUAL\n1 Ikorodu TBS 29 319 250,515 119,490 89mins\nORIGIN DESTINATION TARGET ACTUAL\n1\nN/A\nN/A 0 NA NA NA NA\n140\nTABLE 69: NUMBER OF BRT ROUTES AND BUSES BY PASSENGERS: YEAR 2018\nNAME OF ROUTE\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nTABLE 70: NUMBER OF BRT ROUTES AND BUSES BY PASSENGERS: YEAR 2019\nNAME OF ROUTE\nNUMBER OF \nDESIGNATED \nBUS STOP TO \nTHE ROUTE\nNUMBER OF \nDESIGNATED \nBUS STOP TO \nTHE ROUTE\nNUMBER OF \nBUSES \nDESIGNATED TO \nTHE ROUTE\nNUMBER OF \nBUSES \nDESIGNATED TO \nTHE ROUTE\nAVERAGE TIME \nTAKEN PER \nTRIP\nAVERAGE TIME \nTAKEN PER \nTRIP\nAVERAGE NUMBER OF \nPASSENGERS PER DAY FOR \nTHE ROUTE\nAVERAGE NUMBER OF \nPASSENGERS PER DAY FOR \nTHE ROUTE\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nTABLE 71: NUMBER OF BUS FRANCHISEE SERVICES (BFS) ROUTES AND BUSES BY PASSENGERS: YEAR 2019\nNAME OF ROUTE\nAVERAGE NUMBER OF \nPASSENGERS PER DAY FOR \nTHE ROUTE\nNUMBER OF \nDESIGNATED \nBUS STOP TO \nTHE ROUTE\nNUMBER OF \nBUSES \nDESIGNATED TO \nTHE ROUTE\nAVERAGE TIME \nTAKEN PER \nTRIP\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nS/N\nS/N\nS/N\nORIGIN\nORIGIN\nDESTINATION\nDESTINATION\nMONTH 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 TOTAL\nJAN 2 8 137 119 63 50 379\nFEB 8 6 86 103 95 57 355\nMAR 9 2 77 115 95 57 355\nAPR 7 4 93 102 71 61 338\nMAY 5 1 81 84 53 64 288\nJUN 14 5 116 42 52 44 273\nJUL 8 3 45 116 62 51 285\nAUG 6 5 78 113 75 65 342\nSEP 9 2 134 86 42 23 296\nOCT 7 1 144 112 50 67 381\nNOV 6 40 129 79 61 86 401\nDEC 8 35 133 133 37 83 429\nTOTAL 89 112 1,253 1,204 756 708 4,122\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nMONTH 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 TOTAL\nJAN 2 1 4 4 9 47 11\nFEB 4 2 4 4 8 57 14\nMAR 6 1 4 8 6 57 19\nAPR 4 - 1 3 1 61 8\nMAY 3 - - 1 1 64 4\nJUN 5 2 48 1 - 44 56\nJUL 4 1 4 3 1 51 12\nAUG 3 2 1 10 1 56 16\nSEP 4 1 4 5 1 22 14\nOCT 2 1 4 10 1 65 17\nNOV - 4 2 4 4 85 10\nDEC 3 3 6 6 - 82 18\nTOTAL 40 18 82 59 33 691 923\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\n141\nTABLE 72: MONTHLY NUMBER OF ROAD ACCIDENTS \nRECORDED BY LAGOS METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSPORT \nAUTHORITY: YEAR 2014 - 2019\nTABLE 73: MONTHLY NUMBER OF PERSONS INJURED IN ROAD \nACCIDENTS RECORDED BY LAGOS METROPOLITAN AREA \nTRANSPORT AUTHORITY: YEAR 2014 - 2019\nMONTH 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 TOTAL\nJAN - 3 2 2 1 3 11\nFEB - - 2 2 1 0 5\nMAR - - 1 2 3 0 6\nAPR - - 1 - 1 0 2\nMAY - - 1 - 1 0 2\nJUN - 1 2 - - 0 3\nJUL - - 2 - 2 0 4\nAUG - - - 4 1 9 5\nSEP 4 - 1 - - 1 5\nOCT 1 - - - 1 2 2\nNOV - - 1 1 1 1 4\nDEC - - 1 1 1 1 4\nTOTAL 5 4 14 12 13 17 65\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nFATAL SERIOUS MINOR\n2014 5 40 44 89\n2015 4 18 90 112\n2016 14 82 1,157 1,253\n2017 12 59 1,133 1,204\n2018 13 33 710 756\n2019 17 12 679 708\nTOTAL 65 244 3,813 4,122\n142\nTABLE 74: MONTHLY NUMBER OF PERSONS KILLED IN ROAD \nACCIDENTS RECORDED BY LAGOS METROPOLITAN AREA \nTRANSPORT AUTHORITY: YEAR 2014 - 2019\nTABLE 75: CLASSIFICATION OF \nROAD ACCIDENTS RECORDED BY \nLAGOS METROPOLITAN AREA \nTRANSPORT AUTHORITY: YEAR \n2014 - 2019\nCATEGORY OF \nYEAR TOTAL ACCIDENT\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nFUNCTIONAL NON FUNCTIONAL FUNCTIONAL NON FUNCTIONAL\n1 JANUARY - - 386 48\n2 FEBRUARY - - 386 48\n3 MARCH - - 386 48\n4 APRIL - - 386 48\n5 MAY - - 386 48\n6 JUNE - - 386 48\n7 JULY - - 386 48\n8 AUGUST - - 386 48\n9 SEPTEMBER - - 386 48\n10 OCTOBER - - 386 48\n11 NOVEMBER - - 386 48\n12 DECEMBER - - 386 48\n386 48\n143\nTABLE 76: NUMBER OF BRT BUSES BY OWNERSHIP AND STATUS: YEAR \n2018\nNUMBER OF BRT BUSES OWNED BY\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE\nTOTAL\nS/N MONTH\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nFUNCTIONAL NON FUNCTIONAL FUNCTIONAL NON FUNCTIONAL\n1 JANUARY - - 340 94\n2 FEBRUARY - - 340 94\n3 MARCH - - 340 94\n4 APRIL - - 340 94\n5 MAY - - 340 94\n6 JUNE - - 340 94\n7 JULY - - 340 94\n8 AUGUST - - 340 94\n9 SEPTEMBER - - 340 94\n10 OCTOBER - - 340 94\n11 NOVEMBER - - 340 94\n12 DECEMBER - - 340 94\n144\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE\nMONTH\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\nS/N\nTABLE 77: NUMBER OF BRT BUSES BY OWNERSHIP AND STATUS: YEAR \n2019\nNUMBER OF BRT BUSES OWNED BY\nMONTH MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL GRAND TOTAL\nJanuary 2 1 3 47 0 47 50\nFebruary 0 0 0 57 0 57 57\nMarch 0 0 0 57 0 57 57\nApril 0 0 0 61 0 61 61\nMay 0 0 0 64 0 64 64\nJune 0 0 0 44 0 44 44\nJuly 0 0 0 51 0 51 51\nAugaust 7 2 9 56 0 56 65\nSeptember 1 0 1 22 0 22 23\nOctober 2 0 2 65 0 65 67\nNovember 0 1 1 85 0 85 86\nDecember 1 0 1 82 0 82 83\nSOURCE: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority\n145\nTABLE 78: NUMBER OF RECORDED CASUALTIES IN ROAD ACCIDENTS \nBY GENDER IN LAGOS STATE: Y2019\nCASUALTY\nDEAD INJURED\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE \n(FRANCHISEES) TARGET ACTUAL TARGET ACTUAL TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY 25 522 439 961 49 3,507,840 1,432,171 3,512,000 3,568,408 7,019,840 5,000,579 \n2 FEBRUARY 22 522 439 961 49 3,086,899 1,320,007 3,090,560 3,371,287 6,177,459 4,691,294 \n3 MARCH 26 522 459 981 53 3,648,154 1,270,719 3,818,880 3,925,018 7,467,034 5,195,737 \n4 APRIL 24 522 545 1067 53 3,367,526 1,160,990 4,185,600 3,360,566 7,553,126 4,521,556 \n5 MAY 24 522 597 1119 53 3,367,526 1,174,838 4,584,960 4,350,525 7,952,486 5,525,363 \n6 JUNE 25 522 602 1124 55 3,507,840 1,284,243 4,816,000 3,396,920 8,323,840 4,681,163 \n7 JULY 26 522 614 1136 55 3,648,154 1,391,243 5,108,480 3,684,106 8,756,634 5,075,349 \n8 AUGUST 26 522 634 1156 55 3,648,154 1,304,243 5,274,880 3,961,896 8,923,034 5,266,139 \n9 SEPTEMBER 25 522 660 1182 55 3,507,840 1,227,911 5,280,000 4,133,964 8,787,840 5,361,875 \n10 OCTOBER 26 522 740 1262 57 3,648,154 1,287,648 6,156,800 4,560,629 9,804,954 5,848,277 \n11 NOVEMBER 26 522 760 1282 57 3,648,154 1,339,692 6,323,200 4,640,480 9,971,354 5,980,172 \n12 DECEMBER 25 522 787 1309 57 3,507,840 1,364,404 6,296,000 3,875,526 9,803,840 5,239,930 \n 15,558,109 42,094,081 58,447,360 46,829,325 100,541,441 62,387,434 \n146\nTABLE 79: NUMBER OF LAGBUS BUSES BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS: YEAR 2015\nNUMBER OF PASSENGERS BY \nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TOTAL\nSOURCE: LAGBUS Asset Management Limited\n NUMBER OF LAGBUS \nOWNED BY\nGRAND TOTAL \nS/N MONTH\nNO. OF \nWORKING \nDAYS\nTOTAL\nNUMBER \nOF \nROUTES \nPLIED BY \nBUSES\nFARE AVERAGE \nTIME TAKEN \nPER TRIP\nORIGIN DESTINATION N TARGET ACTUAL hh:mm:ss\n1 LEVENTIS EKO HOTEL 21 5 70 1,500 1,317 00:34:30\n2 AGEGE-PEN CINEMA IJU 15 15 50 5,250 4,500 00:23:00\n3 OSHODI U-TURN 18 15 100 6,750 6,000 00:52:00\n4 OSHODI IYANA IPAJA 13 8 70 4,000 3,200 00:49:00\n5 BERGER IKEJA 13 5 100 1,000 32 32:30:00\n6 PARK AND RIDE TBS 11 10 120 3,000 775 00:43:30\n7 ALAPERE CMS 9 5 80 1,500 852 00:36:30\n8 MILE 12 UNDERBRIDGE INNER MARINA 6 10 120 4,000 4,412 00:57:30\n9 OJUBODE (IKORODU) OBALENDE 6 30 200 12,000 10,379 01:24:00\n10 IYANA IPAJA BROAD STREET 8 15 180 4,500 2,602 01:14:00\n11 DOPEMU BROAD STREET 8 12 160 3,600 2,249 01:09:30\n12 OSHODI BERGER 9 5 100 1,750 2,149 00:32:30\n13 BERGER TBS 12 20 150 9,000 7,643 00:42:30\n14 BERGER LEVENTIS 10 10 150 4,500 2,219 00:39:00\n15 MILE 12 UNDERBRIDGE OSHODI 6 10 100 3,500 3,079 00:33:30\n16 OSHODI CMS/OBALENDE 15 45 100 22,500 26,105 00:47:30\n17 AGEGE-PEN CINEMA SANGO TOLLGATE 15 7 100 1,750 7,749 00:37:30\n18 AGEGE-PEN CINEMA OSHODI 8 15 70 6,000 7,500 00:49:00\n19 OSHODI WHARF 17 10 120 3,000 1,384 00:52:00\n20 SANGO TOLLGATE OSHODI 7 55 150 24,750 18,050 01:12:30\n21 KETU TOS BENSON 7 15 100 4,500 1,523 00:49:00\n22 AGRIC(IKORODU) MARYLAND 9 10 100 1,800 1,200 00:55:00\n23 IJORA OWODE ONIRIN 17 10 120 4,000 4,619 01:02:30\n24 MILE 12 UNDERBRIDGE YABA 12 10 100 3,500 1,487 00:39:00\n25 FESTAC LEVENTIS/CMS 15 10 180 3,000 1,200 01:12:00\n26 MILE 2 CMS 7 10 120 3,000 980 00:44:00\n27 OSHODI-MUSHIN-YABA IDUMOTA(TOM JONES 17 15 100 6,000 5,040 00:46:00\n28 IKOTUN OSHODI 11 15 120 4,500 5,040 00:59:30\n29 CELE-MILE 2-ORILE INNER MARINA 14 10 120 3,000 3,360 01:12:30\n30 AJAH CMS 20 45 150 15,120 15,120 00:33:30\n31 AJAH OBALENDE 18 15 150 6,000 1,680 00:31:00\n32 AJAH OSHODI 18 15 250 6,000 5,040 00:55:00\n33 IKORODU-TMB CMS 11 20 200 7,000 6,720 01:15:00\n34 ODOGUNYAN KETU 7 15 150 5,250 5,040 00:38:30\n35 SANGO TOLLGATE OSHODI-MOSHALASHI 26 10 200 3,000 3,360 01:22:30\n36 ABESAN-EGBEDA IKOTUN-CELE-MILE 2 25 10 170 2,500 1,680 00:57:30\n37 AGBARA TIN CAN APAPA 17 5 170 1,680 1,008 01:25:00\n38 YABA OYINGBO-IDUMOTA 7 10 50 3,360 3,360 00:29:00\n39 OSHODI MILE 2 8 8 50 2,688 2,688 01:07:30\n40 IYANA-IPAJA OJODU/BERGER 8 5 120 1,680 1,680 00:48:00\n41 AGBARA MILE 2 21 15 120 3,750 5,040 01:06:00\n42 OGBA OBALENDE 12 5 150 1,000 1,680 00:47:00\n43 SANGO TOLLGATE\nAGEGE-ALAUSA \nSECRETARIAT 25 5 150 1,680 1,680 01:08:00\n44 AGBARA TBS 24 5 250 1,000 1,680 01:25:00\n45 IGBOGBO MARYLAND/IKEJA 14 5 150 1,250 1,680 01:33:00\n46 IJEDE IKORODU 4 7 50 1,400 2,352 00:26:00\n47 IKOTUN IYANA OBA 21 5 100 1,250 1,000 00:34:00\n48 MILE 2 IDUMOTA 10 5 120 1,500 980 01:25:00\n49 IYANA IPAJA IDDO 8 10 200 3,500 1,225 01:14:00\n50 YABA OBALENDE 6 10 70 3,360 2,500 00:29:00\n51 IKORODU MILE 2 24 20 250 6,000 6,000 02:14:00\n52 IKORODU-FUNSO WILLIAMS CMS 15 20 200 7,000 6,000 01:24:00\n53 ITA OLUWO TOS BENSON IKORODU 5 5 50 1,000 800 00:40:00\n54 ABESAN-IYANA IPAJA OSHODI 12 5 100 1,250 1,000 01:14:00\n55 BERGER OBALENDE 11 10 200 4,000 2,016 00:50:00\n56 IKORODU OSHODI 11 55 150 22,000 18,480 00:50:00\n724 757 7,320 270,868 236,817\n147\nSOURCE: LAGBUS Asset Management Limited\nTABLE 80: NUMBER OF LAGBUS ROUTES AND BUSES BY PASSENGERS: YEAR 2015\n NAME OF ROUTE AVERAGE NUMBER OF \nPASSENGERS PER DAY \nFOR THE ROUTE\nTOTAL\nS/N\nNO. OF \nDESIGNATE\nD BUS \nSTOP TO \nTHE ROUTE\nNO. OF \nBUSES \nDESIGNAT\nED TO THE \nROUTE\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE \n(FRANCHISEES) TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY 25 249 781 1030 66 6,000,694 5,253,014 \n2 FEBRUARY 22 249 781 1030 66 5,629,552 5,797,309 \n3 MARCH 26 249 781 1030 66 6,234,884 5,796,123 \n4 APRIL 24 249 781 1030 66 5,425,867 6,447,133 \n5 MAY 24 249 781 1030 66 6,630,435 6,199,663 \n6 JUNE 25 249 781 1030 66 5,607,634 6,383,430 \n7 JULY 26 249 781 1030 66 6,090,419 7,162,041 \n8 AUGUST 26 249 781 1030 66 6,319,367 5,880,120 \n9 SEPTEMBER 25 249 781 1030 66 6,434,468 6,001,427 \n10 OCTOBER 26 249 781 1030 66 7,018,214 6,669,707 \n11 NOVEMBER 26 249 781 1030 66 7,176,206 4,935,680 \n12 DECEMBER 25 249 781 1030 66 7,342,319 4,595,896 \n 71,121,543 75,910,059 \n148\nTABLE 81: NUMBER OF LAGBUS BUSES BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS: YEAR 2016\nGRAND TOTAL \nS/N MONTH NO. OF WORKING DAYS TOTAL NUMBER OF ROUTES \nPLIED BY BUSES\nSOURCE: LAGBUS Asset Management Limited\n NUMBER OF LAGBUS OWNED BY NUMBER OF PASSENGERS \nAVERAGE TIME TAKEN PER \nTRIP\nORIGIN DESTINATION TARGET ACTUAL hh:mm:ss\n1 LEVENTIS EKO HOTEL 9 5 239 221 00:40:00\n2 CMS AJAH 8 19 324 300 01:29:00\n3 AJAH OBALENDE 25 15 329 305 01:35:00\n4 AJAH OSHODI 22 19 270 250 01:57:00\n5 FESTAC CMS BROAD STREET 9 9 301 279 01:20:00\n6 MILE 2-ORILE IDUMOTA 10 8 518 480 01:05:00\n7 IJEDE IKORODU 15 4 404 374 00:26:00\n8 OSHODI-MUSHIN CMS - 8 834 772 01:59:00\n9 IKOTUN OSHODI 26 7 905 838 01:35:00\n10 OSHODI CMS 7 23 767 710 01:00:00\n11 ABESAN-IDIMU-IKOTUN MILE 2 18 3 526 487 01:28:00\n12 CELE(OSHODI-APAPA EXPRESS ROAD) CMS INNER MARINA 15 8 487 451 01:42:00\n13 IYANA IPAJA-AGEGE OJODU BERGER 20 8 454 420 02:58:00\n14 AGEGE-PEN CINEMA IJU 13 3 712 659 01:31:00\n15 AGEGE-PEN CINEMA ALAUSA SECRETARIAT 6 6 532 493 00:40:00\n16 IYANA IPAJA IDDO 20 12 346 320 01:48:00\n17 YABA OYINGBO-IDUMOTA 8 29 770 713 00:35:00\n18 OSHODI U-TURN 13 6 363 336 01:00:00\n19 OSHODI IYANA-IPAJA 8 8 540 500 00:47:00\n20 IKORODU-KETU CMS - 81 324 300 02:50:00\n21 OSHODI APAPA WHARF 9 5 327 303 01:42:00\n22 IGBOGBO MARYLAND 5 6 473 438 02:45:00\n23 IKORODU OSHODI 12 4 454 420 02:05:00\n24 IKORODU-MILE 12 OSHODI- MILE 2 12 87 433 401 01:30:00\n25 BERGER IKEJA 7 4 130 120 00:45:00\n26 OGBA-BERGER OBALENDE 11 5 594 550 01:27:00\n27 AGRIC(IKORODU) OSHODI 11 4 421 390 01:30:00\n28 PARK AND RIDE TBS 25 10 162 150 01:00:00\n29 ALAPERE CMS 7 5 251 232 01:00:00\n30 MILE 12 UNDERBRIDGE INNER MARINA 18 11 282 261 01:00:00\n31 OJUBODE (IKORODU) OBALENDE 8 25 259 240 02:18:00\n32 IDDO OJUBODE (IKORODU) 19 4 108 100 01:30:00\n33 IDDO MILE12 UNDERBRIDGE 8 2 359 332 00:58:00\n34 IYANA IPAJA BROAD STREET 19 12 130 120 01:22:00\n35 DOPEMU BROAD STREET 16 12 194 180 01:25:00\n36 OSHODI BERGER 10 5 860 796 01:02:00\n37 BERGER TBS 9 12 450 417 01:00:00\n38 BERGER LEVENTIS 7 5 350 324 01:00:00\n39 MILE 12 UNDERBRIDGE OSHODI 6 1 54 50 00:50:00\n40 OSHODI OBALENDE 13 34 11,176 10,349 01:25:00\n41 AGEGE-PEN CINEMA SANGO TOLLGATE 10 2 130 120 01:20:00\n42 AGEGE-PEN CINEMA OSHODI 11 23 758 702 00:50:00\n43 OSHODI WHARF 12 14 327 303 01:42:00\n44 SANGO TOLLGATE OSHODI 18 52 369 342 02:35:00\n45 KETU TOS BENSON IKORODU 12 1 144 133 00:50:00\n46 AGRIC(IKORODU) MARYLAND 9 2 84 78 01:00:00\n47 AGRIC(IKORODU) OBALENDE 22 5 54 50 02:18:00\n48 IJORA OWODE ONIRIN 14 10 548 507 01:05:00\n49 MILE 12 UNDERBRIDGE YABA 12 5 315 292 00:55:00\n50 OSHODI ABESAN 17 9 108 100 02:49:00\n51 OKE OKO-ISHAWO AGRIC - 3 242 224 00:35:00\n52 OSHODI AYOBO 23 9 108 100 02:55:00\n53 YABA OBALENDE 4 5 907 840 00:29:00\n648 674 31,506 29,172\n149\nSOURCE: LAGBUS Asset Management Limited\nTABLE 82: NUMBER OF LAGBUS ROUTES AND BUSES BY PASSENGERS: YEAR 2016\n NAME OF ROUTE\nAVERAGE NUMBER OF PASSENGERS PER DAY FOR THE ROUTE\nTOTAL\nS/N\nNO. OF DESIGNATED BUS STOP TO THE \nROUTE\nNO. OF BUSES DESIGNATED TO THE \nROUTE\nGOVERNMENT\nPRIVATE \n(FRANCHI\nSEES) TARGET ACTUAL TARGET ACTUAL TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY 25 246 404 650 65 1,349,817 1,322,764 4,412,038 2,923,173 5,761,855 4,245,937 \n2 FEBRUARY 24 246 461 707 65 1,454,616 1,218,034 4,904,685 3,439,988 6,359,301 4,658,022 \n3 MARCH 27 246 444 690 65 1,475,314 1,174,029 4,882,429 3,507,600 6,357,743 4,681,629 \n4 APRIL 23 180 430 610 65 1,075,045 936,760 5,604,701 2,804,439 6,679,746 3,741,199 \n5 MAY 27 180 447 627 65 1,106,380 897,011 5,289,136 3,695,403 6,395,516 4,592,414 \n6 JUNE 23 180 430 610 65 1,174,011 865,966 5,397,724 2,481,988 6,571,736 3,347,954 \n7 JULY 25 180 314 494 65 1,255,332 730,179 6,141,703 1,717,665 7,397,034 2,447,844 \n8 AUGUST 27 180 293 473 65 1,383,328 769,095 4,554,528 1,867,420 5,937,856 2,636,515 \n9 SEPTEMBER 26 180 247 427 65 1,193,172 642,085 4,951,015 1,567,003 6,144,187 2,209,088 \n10 OCTOBER 27 180 313 493 65 1,264,140 548,184 5,587,951 2,472,700 6,852,091 3,020,884 \n11 NOVEMBER 26 180 302 482 65 1,143,440 575,452 3,847,490 2,385,800 4,990,930 2,961,252 \n12 DECEMBER 26 180 260 440 65 1,045,787 503,498 3,608,813 2,054,000 4,654,600 2,557,498 \n 10,183,057 14,920,382 59,182,213 30,917,179 74,102,595 41,100,236 \n150\nTABLE 83: NUMBER OF LAGBUS BUSES BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS: YEAR 2017\nNUMBER OF PASSENGERS BY \nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TOTAL\nSOURCE: LAGBUS Asset Management Limited\n NUMBER OF \nLAGBUS OWNED BY\nGRAND TOTAL \nS/N MONTH\nNO. OF \nWORKING \nDAYS\nTOTAL\nNUMBER \nOF \nROUTES \nPLIED BY \nBUSES\nAVERAGE \nTIME \nTAKEN \nPER TRIP\nORIGIN DESTINATION TARGET ACTUAL hh:mm:ss\n1 LEVENTIS EKO HOTEL 9 5 956 124 00:40:00\n2 CMS AJAH 24 24 22275 5453 01:29:00\n3 AJAH OBALENDE 27 6 2475 1797 01:35:00\n4 AJAH OSHODI 23 11 9900 3450 01:57:00\n5 FESTAC CMS BROAD STREET 9 8 1109 1154 01:20:00\n6 MILE 2-ORILE IDUMOTA 10 - - - 01:05:00\n7 IJEDE IKORODU 15 5 990 732 00:26:00\n8 OSHODI-MUSHIN CMS - 13 17325 4007 01:59:00\n9 IKOTUN OSHODI 24 6 9,900 718 01:35:00\n10 OSHODI CMS 6 23 17,325 4,007 01:00:00\n11 ABESAN-IDIMU-IKOTUN MILE 2 19 3 9,900 1,421 01:28:00\n12\nCELE(OSHODI-APAPA EXPRESS \nROAD) CMS INNER MARINA 15 13 7,425 1,016 01:42:00\n13 IYANA IPAJA-AGEGE OJODU BERGER 20 6 3,960 3,063 02:58:00\n14 AGEGE-PEN CINEMA IJU 12 4 2,176 1,225 01:31:00\n15 AGEGE-PEN CINEMA ALAUSA SECRETARIAT 6 6 3,465 3,294 00:40:00\n16 IYANA IPAJA IDDO 20 11 9,900 2,628 01:48:00\n17 YABA OYINGBO-IDUMOTA 8 19 4,950 444 00:35:00\n18 OSHODI U-TURN 12 1 1,338 213 01:00:00\n19 OSHODI IYANA-IPAJA 8 4 2,451 1,868 00:47:00\n20 IKORODU-KETU CMS - 64 9,990 10,200 02:50:00\n21 OSHODI APAPA WHARF 9 5 1,109 1,193 01:42:00\n22 IGBOGBO MARYLAND 5 6 2,475 948 02:45:00\n23 IKORODU OSHODI 12 67 38,115 22,445 02:05:00\n24 IKORODU-MILE 12 OSHODI- MILE 2 12 87 38,115 22,445 01:30:00\n25 BERGER IKEJA 7 - - - -\n26 OGBA-BERGER OBALENDE 11 10 7,425 6,914 01:27:00\n27 AGRIC(IKORODU) OSHODI 11 4 - - -\n28 PARK AND RIDE TBS 25 6 972 497 01:00:00\n29 ALAPERE CMS 7 5 985 691 01:00:00\n30 MILE 12 UNDERBRIDGE INNER MARINA 18 - - - -\n31 OJUBODE (IKORODU) OBALENDE 8 25 4,388 5,194 02:18:00\n32 IDDO OJUBODE (IKORODU) 19 4 138 100 01:30:00\n33 IDDO MILE12 UNDERBRIDGE 8 2 454 327 00:58:00\n34 IYANA IPAJA BROAD STREET 19 12 2,912 1,480 01:22:00\n35 DOPEMU BROAD STREET 16 10 4,436 2,014 01:25:00\n36 OSHODI BERGER 10 6 3,099 2,634 01:02:00\n37 BERGER TBS 9 12 6,457 6,570 01:00:00\n38 BERGER LEVENTIS 7 4 1,270 1,245 01:00:00\n39 MILE 12 UNDERBRIDGE OSHODI 6 1 54 50 00:50:00\n40 OSHODI OBALENDE 13 30 29,966 12,947 01:25:00\n41 AGEGE-PEN CINEMA SANGO TOLLGATE 10 1 130 120 01:20:00\n42 AGEGE-PEN CINEMA OSHODI 11 21 4,263 10,753 00:50:00\n43 OSHODI WHARF 11 5 1,109 935 01:42:00\n44 SANGO TOLLGATE OSHODI 18 26 9,900 7,885 02:35:00\n45 KETU TOS BENSON IKORODU 12 1 144 133 00:50:00\n46 AGRIC(IKORODU) MARYLAND 9 2 84 78 01:00:00\n47 AGRIC(IKORODU) OBALENDE 22 5 54 50 02:18:00\n48 IJORA OWODE ONIRIN 14 7 2,679 1,466 01:05:00\n49 MILE 12 UNDERBRIDGE YABA 12 4 2,073 509 00:55:00\n50 OSHODI ABESAN 17 6 9,900 274 02:49:00\n51 OKE OKO-ISHAWO AGRIC - 00:35:00\n52 OSHODI AYOBO 23 9 9,900 274 02:55:00\n53 YABA OBALENDE 4 5 4,620 4,927 00:29:00\n662 620 325,036 161,912\nSOURCE: LAGBUS Asset Management Limited\nTABLE 84: NUMBER OF LAGBUS ROUTES AND BUSES BY PASSENGERS: YEAR 2017\n NAME OF ROUTE\nAVERAGE NUMBER \nOF PASSENGERS \nPER DAY FOR THE \nROUTE\nTOTAL\nS/N\nNO. OF \nDESIGNATED \nBUS STOP TO \nTHE ROUTE\nNO. OF \nBUSES \nDESIGNATE\nD TO THE \nROUTE\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE \n(FRANCHISEES) TARGET ACTUAL TARGET ACTUAL TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY 25 143 - 143 6 1,322,764 473,731 - - 1,322,764 473,731\n2 FEBRUARY 24 154 - 154 6 1,218,034 437,814 - - 1,218,034 437,814\n3 MARCH 27 143 - 143 6 1,174,029 407,933 - - 1,174,029 407,933\n4 APRIL 23 125 - 125 6 936,760 347,101 - - 936,760 347,101\n5 MAY 27 108 - 108 6 897,011 252,821 - - 897,011 252,821\n6 JUNE 23 92 - 92 6 865,966 170,493 - - 865,966 170,493\n7 JULY 25 87 - 87 6 730,179 188,786 - - 730,179 188,786\n8 AUGUST 27 88 - 88 6 769,095 186,405 - - 769,095 186,405\n9 SEPTEMBER 26 81 - 81 6 642,085 147,955 - - 642,085 147,955\n10 OCTOBER 27 81 - 81 6 548,184 185,565 - - 548,184 185,565\n11 NOVEMBER 26 68 - 68 6 575,452 147,113 - - 575,452 147,113\n12 DECEMBER 26 69 - 69 6 503,498 100,061 - - 503,498 100,061\n 10,183,057 3,045,778 - - 10,183,057 3,045,778\nSOURCE: LAGBUS Asset Management Limited\nTABLE 85: NUMBER OF LAGBUS BUSES BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS: YEAR 2018\nNUMBER OF PASSENGERS BY \nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TOTAL\nGRAND TOTAL \nS/N MONTH\nNO. OF \nWORKIN\nG DAYS\nTOTAL\nNUMBER \nOF ROUTES \nPLIED BY \nBUSES\n NUMBER OF LAGBUS \nOWNED BY\nAVERAGE \nTIME \nTAKEN \nPER TRIP\nORIGIN DESTINATION TARGET ACTUAL hh:mm:ss\n1 PARK AND RIDE TBS 25 6 972 497 1:00\n2 ALAPERE CMS 6 5 985 691 1:00\n3 OSHODI BERGER 10 6 3,099 2,634 1:02\n4 BERGER TBS 9 12 6,457 6,570 1:00\n5 BERGER LEVENTIS 7 4 1,270 1,245 1:00\n6 OSHODI OBALENDE 13 30 29,966 12,947 1:25\n7 OSHODI CMC 6 - - - 1:25\n76 63 42,749 24,584\nSOURCE: Lagos Bus Service Limited\n153\nTABLE 86: NUMBER OF LAGBUS ROUTES AND BUSES BY PASSENGERS: YEAR 2018\n NAME OF ROUTE AVERAGE NUMBER OF \nPASSENGERS PER \nDAY FOR THE ROUTE\nTOTAL\nS/N\nNO. OF \nDESIGNATED \nBUS STOP TO \nTHE ROUTE\nNO. OF BUSES \nDESIGNATED \nTO THE ROUTE\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE \n(FRANCHISEES) TARGET ACTUAL TARGET ACTUAL TARGET ACTUAL\n1 MAY 22 60 60 4 509,600 251,659 509,600 251,659 \n2 JUNE 22 60 60 7 642,096 340,111 340,111 642,096 \n3 JULY 25 64 64 8 659,277 596,136 659,277 596,136 \n4 AUGUST 25 100 100 8 1,030,120 809,546 809,546 1,030,120 \n5 SEPTEMBER 25 100 100 8 1,030,120 892,933 892,933 1,030,120 \n6 OCTOBER 26 100 100 9 1,030,120 990,662 1,030,120 990,662 \n7 NOVEMBER 26 150 150 9 1,545,180 1,085,160 1,545,180 1,085,160 \n8 DECEMBER 25 150 150 10 1,545,180 1,241,059 1,545,180 1,241,059 \n 6,207,266 7,991,693 - - 6,207,266 7,991,693 \nSOURCE: LAGBUS Asset Management Limited\n154\nTABLE 87: NUMBER OF LAGBUS BUSES BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS: YEAR 2019\nNUMBER OF PASSENGERS BY \nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TOTAL\nGRAND TOTAL \nS/N MONTH\nNO. OF \nWORKIN\nG DAYS TOTAL\nNUMBER \nOF ROUTES \nPLIED BY \nBUSES\n NUMBER OF LAGBUS \nOWNED BY\nAVERAG\nE TIME \nTAKEN \nPER \nTRIP\nTARGET ACTUAL\n1 ALAPERE CMS 6 5 - 374\n2 ALAPERE OSHODI 6 2 - 247\n3 ALAUSA IKEJA 7 5 - 288\n4 BERGER TBS 9 30 455 217\n5 BERGER LEVENTIS 8 5 455 239\n6 BERGER OSHODI 9 12 585 428\n8 DOPEMU IKEJA 7 3 650 527\n9 IKEJA BERGER 16 12 672 759\n10 IYANA IPAJA IKEJA 9 10 672 527\n11 LEVENTIS OSHODI 8 - 454 177\n12 OBALENDE BERGER 5 - - 139\n13 OBALENDE OSHODI 8 34 520 386\n14 OBALENDE IKEJA 10 15 455 390\n15 OJOTA(TOLLGATE) TBS 8 7 120 181\n16 OWORO BERGER 4 - - 470\n17 OWORO OBALENDE 5 2 - 163\n18 OWORO OSHODI 7 - - 310\n19 OWORO TBS 5 3 - 535\n20 OWORO IKEJA 9 - - 8\n21 PARK AND RIDE TBS 9 5 80 56\n155 150 5,118 6,421\n155\nTABLE 88: NUMBER OF LAGBUS ROUTES AND BUSES BY PASSENGERS: YEAR 2019\nNAME OF ROUTE\nTOTAL\nSOURCE: Lagos Bus Service Limited\nS/N\nORIGIN DESTINATION\nNUMBER OF \nDESIGNATED \nBUS STOP \nTO THE \nROUTE\nNUMBER OF \nBUSES \nDESIGNATED \nTO THE \nROUTE hh:mm:s\ns\nAVERAGE NUMBER \nOF PASSENGERS \nPER DAY FOR THE \nROUTE\nFUNCTIONAL NON FUNCTIONAL FUNCTIONAL NON FUNCTIONAL\n1 JANUARY 172 74 404 377\n2 FEBRUARY 169 77 461 320\n3 MARCH 164 82 444 337\n4 APRIL 158 22 430 351\n5 MAY 151 29 447 334\n6 JUNE 146 34 430 351\n7 JULY 140 40 314 467\n8 AUGUST 130 50 293 488\n9 SEPTEMBER 108 72 247 534\n10 OCTOBER 102 78 313 468\n11 NOVEMBER 100 80 305 479\n12 DECEMBER 99 81 260 521\nFUNCTIONAL NON FUNCTIONAL FUNCTIONAL NON FUNCTIONAL\n1 JANUARY 86 57 - -\n2 FEBRUARY 86 68 - -\n3 MARCH 83 60 - -\n4 APRIL 76 49 - -\n5 MAY 67 39 - -\n6 JUNE 63 29 - -\n7 JULY 58 29 - -\n8 AUGUST 57 31 - -\n9 SEPTEMBER 54 27 - -\n10 OCTOBER 54 27 - -\n11 NOVEMBER 45 23 - -\n12 DECEMBER 45 24 - -\n156\n TABLE 89: NUMBER OF LAG BUSES BY OWNERSHIP AND STATUS: YEAR 2017\nNUMBER OF LAGBUS OWNED BY\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE\n TABLE 90: NUMBER OF LAG BUSES BY OWNERSHIP AND STATUS: YEAR 2018\nS/N MONTH\nSOURCE: LAGBUS Asset Management Limited\nMONTH\nSOURCE: Lagos Bus Service Limited\nNUMBER OF BRT BUSES OWNED BY\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE\nS/N\nFUNCTIONAL NON FUNCTIONAL FUNCTIONAL NON FUNCTIONAL\n1 MAY 60 0 - -\n2 JUNE 60 0 - -\n3 JULY 64 0 - -\n4 AUGUST 100 0 - -\n5 SEPTEMBER 100 0 - -\n6 OCTOBER 100 0 - -\n7 NOVEMBER 150 0 - -\n8 DECEMBER 150 0 - -\nMONTH\n TABLE 91: NUMBER OF LAG BUSES BY OWNERSHIP AND STATUS: YEAR 2019\nNUMBER OF BRT BUSES OWNED BY\nSOURCE: Lagos Bus Service Limited\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE\nS/N\nMONTH 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 TOTAL\nJAN 27 15 21 29 17 - 109\nFEB 34 25 28 21 12 - 120\nMAR 32 20 31 25 11 - 119\nAPR 37 20 18 19 11 - 105\nMAY 36 13 16 15 7 36 87\nJUN 28 16 29 13 7 36 93\nJUL 32 21 26 13 6 40 98\nAUG 15 32 34 10 3 45 94\nSEP 37 30 25 15 5 40 112\nOCT 27 22 34 13 9 54 105\nNOV 36 20 27 15 5 57 103\nDEC 31 12 28 13 7 83 91\nTOTAL 372 246 317 201 100 391 1,236\nSOURCE: LAGBUS Asset Management Limited\nMONTH 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 TOTAL\nJAN 3 4 - 1 0 8\nFEB 3 2 2 2 2 11\nMAR 2 2 3 2 0 9\nAPR 2 1 2 - 1 6\nMAY - - - - 0 0 0\nJUN 1 - 1 - 1 0 3\nJUL 3 2 2 - 0 0 7\nAUG 8 - 2 - 0 0 10\nSEP 5 - 3 - 1 0 9\nOCT 1 1 - 1 0 0 3\nNOV 1 - 1 1 0 0 3\nDEC 2 1 - - 1 0 4\nTOTAL 31 13 16 7 6 0 73\nSOURCE: LAGBUS Asset Management Limited\n158\nTABLE 92: MONTHLY NUMBER OF ROAD ACCIDENTS \nRECORDED BY LAGBUS ASSETS MANAGEMENT IN LAGOS \nSTATE: YEAR 2014 - 2019\nTABLE 93: MONTHLY NUMBER OF PERSONS INJURED IN ROAD \nACCIDENTS RECORDED BY LAGBUS ASSETS MANAGEMENT IN \nLAGOS STATE: YEAR 2014 - 2019\nMONTH 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 TOTAL\nJAN - - 1 - 0 1\nFEB - - - - 0 0\nMAR - - 1 1 0 2\nAPR 2 - - - 0 2\nMAY - - 2 - 0 0 2\nJUN - - 1 - 0 0 1\nJUL - - - - 0 0 0\nAUG - - 6 - 0 0 6\nSEP - 1 - - 0 0 1\nOCT - - - - 0 0 0\nNOV 1 - - 2 1 0 3\nDEC 1 - - 1 0 1 2\nTOTAL 4 1 11 4 1 1 20\nSOURCE: LAGBUS Asset Management Limited\nFATAL SERIOUS MINOR TOTAL\n2014 4 31 372 407\n2015 1 13 246 260\n2016 11 16 317 344\n2017 4 7 201 212\n2018 1 6 100 107\n2019 1 0 390 391\nTOTAL 21 73 1,236 1,330\nLagos Bus Service Limited\nMALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL\n2014 3 1 4 27 4 31 35\n2015 0 1 1 12 1 13 14\n2016 7 4 11 15 1 16 27\n2017 2 2 4 5 2 7 11\n2018 1 0 1 4 2 6 7\n2019 1 0 1 0 0 0 1\nTOTAL 13 8 21 63 10 73 94\nSOURCE: LAGBUS Asset Management Limited\nLagos Bus Service Limited\n159\nYEAR\nYEAR GRAND \nTOTAL\nTABLE 94: MONTHLY NUMBER OF PERSONS KILLED IN ROAD \nACCIDENTS RECORDED BY LAGBUS ASSETS MANAGEMENT IN \nLAGOS STATE: YEAR 2014 - 2019\nTABLE 95: TYPE OF MOTOR \nACCIDENTS RECORDED BY LAGBUS \nASSETS MANAGEMENT: YEAR 2014 - \n2019\nTYPES OF ACCIDENT\nSOURCE: LAGBUS Asset Management Limited\nTABLE 96: NUMBER OF RECORDED CASUALTIES IN ROAD \nACCIDENTS BY GENDER RECORDED BY LAGBUS ASSETS \nMANAGEMENT: YEAR 2014-2019\nCASUALTY\nDEAD INJURED\nPRIVATE COMMERCIAL PRIVATE COMMERCIAL\nJAN 24,598 42,112 574 501 67,785 \nFEB 27,957 44,830 634 466 73,887 \nMAR 34,947 42,578 320 350 78,195 \nAPR 28,407 44,019 294 281 73,001 \nMAY 25,727 43,253 518 533 70,031 \nJUN 24,304 39,874 193 607 64,978 \nJUL 21,400 63,258 525 775 85,958 \nAUG 25,869 56,056 1,457 1,633 85,015 \nSEPT 29,084 64,474 1,308 1,427 96,293 \nOCT 28,701 41,094 1,055 834 71,684 \nNOV 29,187 42,802 1,064 1,336 74,389 \nDEC 41,669 62,776 755 1,000 106,200 \nTOTAL 341,850 587,126 8,697 9,743 947,416 \nMONTH \nFAKE \nDOCUMENTS\nNUMBER OF \nRWC/HP/VL/ \nINS.\nNUMBER \nOF DRIVER \nLICENCE\nVEHICLES \nNOT ROAD \nWORTHY/ \nOVERLOADI\nNG UNPAINTED TOTAL\nJAN 1,691 310 824 452 21 3,298 \nFEB 803 104 335 219 18 1,479 \nMAR 368 67 180 106 2 723 \nAPR 647 108 293 199 6 1,253 \nMAY 1,337 308 642 429 43 2,759 \nJUN 1,744 380 842 571 50 3,587 \nJUL 1,625 283 822 617 28 3,375 \nAUG 1,976 379 1,160 652 30 4,197 \nSEPT 1,681 950 810 688 27 4,156 \nOCT 1,182 805 601 571 20 3,179 \nNOV 1,985 958 834 791 47 4,615 \nDEC 1,260 683 748 623 45 3,359 \nTOTAL 16,299 5,335 8,091 5,918 337 35,980 \nNOTE: \nRWC - Road Worthiness Certificate\nMOT - Ministry Of Transportation\nVL - Vehicle Licence\nHP - Hackney Permit\nINS - Insurance\n160\nTABLE 97: STATISTICS ON RENEWAL BY TYPE OF VEHICLES : YEAR 2015\nVEHICLE TRICYCLES/MOTORCYCL\nTABLE 98: STATISTICS ON VIOLATION OF TRAFFIC OFFENCES YEAR 2015\nMONTH TOTAL\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nPRIVATE COMMERCIAL PRIVATE COMMERCIAL\nJAN 30,797 52,726 1,111 969 85,603\nFEB 34,390 55,146 1,354 995 91,885\nMAR 48,875 59,548 1,089 1,191 110,703\nAPR 32,890 50,966 1,252 1,197 86,305\nMAY 23,557 39,606 829 853 64,845\nJUN 33,044 54,213 606 1,905 89,768\nJUL 20,455 60,458 986 1,455 83,354\nAUG 35,162 76,192 1,554 1,741 114,649\nSEPT 32,162 71,296 1,087 1,186 105,731\nOCT 34,250 49,039 1,091 863 85,243\nNOV 34,261 50,244 798 1,003 86,306\nDEC 39,177 59,022 1,066 1,411 100,676\nTOTAL 399,020 678,456 12,823 14,769 1,105,068 \nMONTH \nFAKE \nDOCUMENTS\nNUMBER OF \nRWC/HP/VL/ \nINS.\nNUMBER \nOF DRIVER \nLICENCE\nVEHICLES \nNOT ROAD \nWORTHY/ \nOVERLOADI UNPAINTED TOTAL\nJAN 1,738 954 931 767 56 4,446 \nFEB 1,843 949 1,097 884 58 4,831 \nMAR 2,234 968 1,186 836 58 5,282 \nAPR 2,291 800 1,209 818 45 5,163 \nMAY 1,390 462 833 543 53 3,281 \nJUN 2,364 758 1,363 934 72 5,491 \nJUL 1,868 631 1,068 706 83 4,356 \nAUG 2,502 838 1,486 811 59 5,696 \nSEPT 1,316 338 752 407 89 2,902 \nOCT 1,980 519 1,147 459 85 4,190 \nNOV 2,122 711 1,342 548 40 4,763 \nDEC 2,178 626 1,450 794 103 5,151 \nTOTAL 23,826 8,554 13,864 8,507 801 55,552 \nNOTE: \nRWC - Road Worthiness Certificate\nMOT - Ministry Of Transportation\nVL - Vehicle Licence\nHP - Hackney Permit\nINS - Insurance\n161\nTABLE 99: STATISTICS ON RENEWAL BY TYPE OF VEHICLES : YEAR 2016\nTOTAL\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nVEHICLE TRICYCLES/MOTORCYCL\nTABLE 100: STATISTICS ON VIOLATION OF TRAFFIC OFFENCES: YEAR 2016\nMONTH\nPRIVATE COMMERCIAL PRIVATE COMMERCIAL\nJAN 28,699 54,818 708 1,098 85,323\nFEB 27,878 53,465 805 947 83,095\nMAR 33,393 67,431 899 1,051 102,774\nAPR 24,858 45,681 389 601 71,529\nMAY 21,646 44,303 831 1,133 67,913\nJUN 19,394 39,302 704 674 60,074\nJUL 23,689 48,652 761 1,271 74,373\nAUG - - - - -\nSEPT - - - - -\nOCT - - - - -\nNOV - - - - -\nDEC - - - - -\nTOTAL 179,557 353,652 5,097 6,775 545,081 \nMONTH \nFAKE \nDOCUMENTS\nNUMBER OF \nRWC/HP/VL/ \nINS.\nNUMBER \nOF DRIVER \nLICENCE\nVEHICLES \nNOT ROAD \nWORTHY/ \nOVERLOADI\nNG UNPAINTED TOTAL\nJAN 1,717 338 1,056 389 68 3,568 \nFEB 2,247 409 967 571 88 4,282 \nMAR 2,777 409 1,556 2,659 243 7,644 \nAPR 2,766 205 833 367 26 4,197 \nMAY - - - - - -\nJUN - - - - - -\nJUL - - - - - -\nAUG - - - - - -\nSEPT - - - - - -\nOCT - - - - - -\nNOV - - - - - -\nDEC - - - - - -\nTOTAL 9,507 1,361 4,412 3,986 425 19,691 \nNOTE: \nRWC - Road Worthiness Certificate\nMOT - Ministry Of Transportation\nVL - Vehicle Licence\nHP - Hackney Permit\nINS - Insurance\n162\nTOTAL\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nTABLE 102: STATISTICS ON VIOLATION OF TRAFFIC OFFENCES: YEAR 2017\nTABLE 101: STATISTICS ON RENEWAL BY TYPE OF VEHICLES : YEAR 2017\nMONTH\nVEHICLE TRICYCLES/MOTORCYCL\nPRIVATE COMMERCIAL PRIVATE COMMERCIAL\nJAN 33,106 23,783 6,329 6,838 70,056\nFEB 31,160 17,942 1,653 2,485 53,240\nMAR 38,229 18,662 1,674 4,341 62,906\nAPR 32,808 17,561 510 2,556 53,435\nMAY 31,972 18,113 149 1,918 52,152\nJUN 29,167 16,496 66 1,777 47,506\nJUL 33,520 19,944 82 2,271 55,817\nAUG 34,150 17,140 6 1,870 53,166\nSEPT 30,386 15,785 8 2,120 48,299\nOCT 47,083 22,993 3 2,878 72,957\nNOV 48,902 22,696 3 2,360 73,961\nDEC 56,887 18,442 - 1,826 77,155\nTOTAL 447,370 229,557 10,483 33,240 720,650 \nPRIVATE COMMERCIAL PRIVATE COMMERCIAL\nJAN 25,356 38,124 0 3,040 66,520\nFEB 19,458 40,303 0 1,717 61,478\nMAR 23,196 46,974 0 3,099 73,269\nAPR 23,370 49,161 0 2,470 75,001\nMAY 26,427 45,471 0 3,730 75,628\nJUN 24,680 43,846 0 2,112 70,638\nJUL 34,455 61,432 0 4,172 100,059\nAUG 26,167 52,657 0 3,944 82,768\nSEPT 27,305 47,070 0 3,992 78,367\nOCT 25,858 50,111 0 4,540 80,509\nNOV 26,540 53,873 0 4,874 85,287\nDEC 25,332 71,173 0 3,476 99,981\nTOTAL 308,144 600,195 0 41,166 949,505 \n163\nTOTAL\nTOTAL\nTABLE 103: STATISTICS ON RENEWAL BY TYPE OF VEHICLES : YEAR 2018\nVEHICLE TRICYCLES/MOTORCYCL\nTABLE 104: STATISTICS ON RENEWAL BY TYPE OF VEHICLES : YEAR 2019\nMONTH\nMONTH\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nVEHICLE TRICYCLES/MOTORCYCL\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nS/N MONTH\nFAKE \nDOCUMENTS\nNO \nRWC/HP/V\nL/INS\nNO DRIVER \nLICENCE\nVEHICLES NOT \nROAD \nWORTHY/OVERL\nOADING UNPAINTED TOTAL\n1 January 0 18,883 0 0 0 18,883\n2 February 0 6,987 0 0 0 6,987\n3 March 0 24,606 0 0 0 24,606\n4 April 0 3,671 0 0 0 3,671\n5 May 0 9,815 0 0 0 9,815\n6 June 0 10,239 0 0 0 10,239\n7 July 0 1,563 0 0 0 1,563\n8 August 0 1,080 0 0 0 1,080\n9 September 0 1,354 246 0 0 1,600\n10 October 0 1,496 420 0 0 1,916\n11 November 0 3,798 400 0 0 4,198\n12 December 0 744 0 0 0 744\nTOTAL 0 84,236 0 0 85,302\nNOTE: \nRWC - Road Worthiness Certificate\nMOT - Ministry Of Transportation\nVL - Vehicle Licence\nHP - Hackney Permit\nINS - Insurance\n164\nSOURCE: PRS( Ministry Of Transportation)\nTABLE 105: STATISTICS ON VIOLATION OF TRAFFIC OFFENCES: YEAR 2019\nPRIVATE COMMERCIAL PRIVATE COMMERCIAL\nJANUARY 33,106 23,783 6,329 6,838 70,056 \nFEBRUARY 31,160 17,942 1,653 2,485 53,240 \nMARCH 38,229 18,662 1,674 4,341 62,906 \nAPRIL 32,808 17,561 510 2,556 53,435 \nMAY 31,972 18,113 149 1,918 52,152 \nJUNE 29,167 16,496 66 1,777 47,506 \nJULY 33,520 19,944 82 2,271 55,817 \nAUGUST 34,150 17,140 6 1,870 53,166 \nSEPTMBER 30,386 15,785 8 2,120 48,299 \nOCTOBER 47,083 22,993 3 2,878 72,957 \nNOVEMBER 48,902 22,696 3 2,360 73,961 \nDECEMBER 56,887 18,442 - 1,826 77,155 \nTOTAL 447,370 229,557 10,483 33,240 720,650\nPRIVATE COMMERCIAL PRIVATE COMMERCIAL\nJANUARY 25,356 38,124 3,040 66,520 \nFEBRUARY 19,458 40,303 1,717 61,478 \nMARCH 23,196 46,974 3,099 73,269 \nAPRIL 23,370 49,161 2,470 75,001 \nMAY 26,427 45,471 3,730 75,628 \nJUNE 24,680 43,846 2,112 70,638 \nJULY 34,455 61,432 4,172 100,059 \nAUGUST 26,167 52,657 3,944 82,768 \nSEPTMBER 27,305 47,070 3,992 78,367 \nOCTOBER 25,858 50,111 4,540 80,509 \nNOVEMBER 26,540 53,873 4,874 85,287 \nDECEMBER 25,332 71,173 3,476 99,981 \nTOTAL 308,144 600,195 41,166\n165\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nTABLE 106: MONTHLY NUMBER OF ROADWORTHINESS CERTIFICATES ISSUED FOR \nRENEWAL BY TYPE OF VEHICLES IN YEAR 2018\nVEHICLE TRICYCLE/OKADA\nTABLE 107: MONTHLY NUMBER OF ROADWORTHINESS CERTIFICATES ISSUED FOR \nRENEWAL BY TYPE OF VEHICLES IN YEAR 2019\nVEHICLE TRICYCLE/OKADA\nMONTH\nMONTH\nTOTAL\nTOTAL\nMONTH VEHICLE MOTORCYCLE TOTAL\nJAN\n 1,084 66,710 67,794 \nFEB\n 1,100 72,787 73,887 \nMAR\n 670 77,525 78,195 \nAPR\n 575 72,426 73,001 \nMAY\n 1,051 68,980 70,031 \nJUN\n 800 58,948 59,748 \nJUL\n 1,300 84,658 85,958 \nAUG\n 3,090 81,925 85,015 \nSEPT\n 2,735 93,556 96,291 \nOCT\n 1,889 69,795 71,684 \nNOV\n 2,400 71,989 74,389 \nDEC\n 2,145 70,892 73,037 \nTOTAL\n 18,839 890,191 909,030 \n166\nTABLE 108: NUMBER OF VEHICLES AND MOTORCYCLES \nINSPECTED : YEAR 2015\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nMONTH VEHICLE MOTORCYCLE TOTAL\nJAN\n 2,080 83,523 85,603\nFEB\n 2,349 89,536 91,885\nMAR\n 2,280 108,423 110,703\nAPR\n 2,449 83,856 86,305\nMAY\n 1,682 63,163 64,845\nJUN\n 2,511 87,257 89,768\nJUL\n 2,441 80,913 83,354\nAUG\n 3,295 111,354 114,649\nSEPT\n 2,273 103,458 105,731\nOCT\n 1,954 83,289 85,243\nNOV\n 1,801 84,505 86,306\nDEC\n 2,477 98,199 100,676\nTOTAL 27,592 1,077,476 1,105,068 \n167\nTABLE 109: NUMBER OF VEHICLES AND MOTORCYCLES \nINSPECTED : YEAR 2016\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nMONTH VEHICLE MOTORCYCLE TOTAL\nJAN\n 1,806 83,517 85,323\nFEB\n 1,752 81,343 83,095\nMAR\n 1,950 100,824 102,774\nAPR\n 990 70,539 71,529\nMAY\n 1,964 65,949 67,913\nJUN\n 1,378 58,696 60,074\nJUL\n 2,032 72,341 74,373\nAUG\n- - -\nSEPT\n- - -\nOCT\n- - -\nNOV\n- - -\nDEC\n- - -\nTOTAL 11,872 533,209 545,081 \n168\nTABLE 110: NUMBER OF VEHICLES AND MOTORCYCLES \nINSPECTED : YEAR 2017\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nMONTH VEHICLE MOTORCYCLE TOTAL\nJAN\n 13,167 56,889 70,056\nFEB\n 4,138 49,102 53,240\nMAR\n 6,015 56,891 62,906\nAPR\n 3,066 50,369 53,435\nMAY\n 2,067 50,085 52,152\nJUN\n 1,843 45,663 47,506\nJUL\n 2,353 53,464 55,817\nAUG\n 1,876 51,290 53,166\nSEPT\n 2,128 46,171 48,299\nOCT\n 2,881 70,076 72,957\nNOV\n 2,363 71,598 73,961\nDEC\n 1,826 75,329 77,155\nTOTAL 43,723 676,927 720,650 \n169\n TABLE 111: NUMBER OF VEHICLES AND MOTORCYCLES \nINSPECTED : YEAR 2018\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nMONTH VEHICLE MOTORCYCLE TOTAL\nJAN\n 3,040 63,480 66,520\nFEB\n 1,717 59,761 61,478\nMAR\n 3,099 70,170 73,269\nAPR\n 2,470 72,531 75,001\nMAY\n 3,730 71,898 75,628\nJUN\n 2,112 68,526 70,638\nJUL\n 4,172 95,887 100,059\nAUG\n 3,944 78,824 82,768\nSEPT\n 3,992 74,375 78,367\nOCT\n 4,540 75,969 80,509\nNOV\n 4,874 80,413 85,287\nDEC\n 3,476 96,505 99,981\nTOTAL 41,166 908,339 949,505 \n170\n TABLE 112: NUMBER OF VEHICLES AND MOTORCYCLES \nINSPECTED : YEAR 2019\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\n2015 2016 2017 2018 2019\nJAN 4,477 3,516 4,216 - 342 12,551\nFEB 4,922 1,409 5,203 - 400 11,934\nMAR 5,300 753 8,209 - 525 14,787\nAPR 5,338 1,541 3,331 - 508 10,718\nMAY 3,332 3,300 - - 1,059 6,632\nJUN 5,365 4,279 - - 840 9,644\nJUL 4,542 4,058 - - 1,157 8,600\nAUG 6,215 4,393 - - 950 10,608\nSEPT 3,465 4,182 - - 1,477 7,647\nOCT 4,919 3,011 - - 1,433 7,930\nNOV 5,423 3,957 - - 2,002 9,380\nDEC 6,985 3,255 - - 481 10,240\nTOTAL 60,283 37,654 20,959 - 11,174 97,937\n171\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nTABLE 113: NUMBER OF VEHICLES IMPOUNDED: YEAR 2015 - 2019\nMONTH TOTAL\nMONTH\nNO. OF \nAPPLICANTS \nFOR DRIVER'S \nLICENSE\nNO. OF FAILED \nAPPLICANTS \nFOR DRIVER'S \nLICENSE\nNO. OF \nAPPLICANTS FOR \nRIDER'S CARD\nNO. OF FAILED \nAPPLICANTS FOR \nRIDER'S CARD\nJAN 374 9,367 - -\nFEB 483 11,846 - -\nMAR 314 10,408 - -\nAPR 241 8,169 - -\nMAY 232 8,420 - -\nJUN 334 9,999 - -\nJUL 231 9,100 - -\nAUG 231 9,431 - -\nSEPT 187 8,326 - -\nOCT 105 6,845 - -\nNOV 175 6,655 - -\nDEC 172 9,428 - -\nTOTAL 3,079 107,994 - -\n172\nTABLE 114: STATISTICS ON VEHICLE/ RIDER'S \nLICENSES PROCESSED: YEAR 2014\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nMONTH\nNO. OF \nAPPLICANTS \nFOR DRIVER'S \nLICENSE\nNO. OF FAILED \nAPPLICANTS \nFOR DRIVER'S \nLICENSE\nNO. OF \nAPPLICANTS FOR \nRIDER'S CARD\nNO. OF FAILED \nAPPLICANTS FOR \nRIDER'S CARD\nJAN 198 6,558 - -\nFEB 153 7,783 - -\nMAR 114 6,310 - -\nAPR 121 4,517 - -\nMAY 143 4,955 - -\nJUN 196 6,807 - -\nJUL 213 7,325 - -\nAUG 219 8,778 - -\nSEPT 155 8,404 - -\nOCT 79 7,165 - -\nNOV 283 8,043 - -\nDEC 254 7,423 - -\nTOTAL 2,128 84,068 - -\n173\nTABLE 115: STATISTICS ON VEHICLE/ RIDER'S \nLICENSES PROCESSED: YEAR 2015\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nMONTH\nNO. OF \nAPPLICANTS \nFOR DRIVER'S \nLICENSE\nNO. OF FAILED \nAPPLICANTS \nFOR DRIVER'S \nLICENSE\nNO. OF \nAPPLICANTS FOR \nRIDER'S CARD NO. OF FAILED \nAPPLICANTS FOR \nRIDER'S CARD\nJAN - - - -\nFEB - - - 9,185\nMAR - - - 7,557\nAPR - - - 4,691\nMAY - - - 4,059\nJUN - - - 6,701\nJUL - - - 3,518\nAUG - - - 5,498\nSEPT - - - 3,236\nOCT - - - 1,121\nNOV - - - 4,449\nDEC - - - 6,734\nTOTAL - 56,749 - -\n174\nTABLE 116: STATISTICS ON VEHICLE/ RIDER'S \nLICENSES PROCESSED: YEAR 2016\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nMONTH\nNO. OF \nAPPLICANTS \nFOR DRIVER'S \nLICENSE\nNO. OF FAILED \nAPPLICANTS \nFOR DRIVER'S \nLICENSE\nNO. OF \nAPPLICANTS FOR \nRIDER'S CARD NO. OF FAILED \nAPPLICANTS FOR \nRIDER'S CARD\nJAN - - - 4,901\nFEB - - - 3,221\nMAR - - - 3,611\nAPR - - - 1,409\nMAY - - - 2,310\nJUN - - - 2,397\nJUL - - - 1,390\nAUG - - - 1,100\nSEPT - - - 1,125\nOCT - - - 4,951\nNOV - - - 5,815\nDEC - - - 4,152\nTOTAL - 36,382 - -\n175\nTABLE 117: STATISTICS ON VEHICLE/ RIDER'S \nLICENSES PROCESSED: YEAR 2017\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nMONTH\nNO. OF \nAPPLICANTS \nFOR DRIVER'S \nLICENSE\nNO. OF FAILED \nAPPLICANTS \nFOR DRIVER'S \nLICENSE\nNO. OF \nAPPLICANTS FOR \nRIDER'S CARD NO. OF FAILED \nAPPLICANTS FOR \nRIDER'S CARD\nJAN 8 27,521 457 -\nFEB 40 3,436 536 -\nMAR 40 6,105 517 -\nAPR 40 5,631 311 -\nMAY 271 3,840 - -\nJUN 229 3,660 429 -\nJUL 500 5,232 768 63 \nAUG 516 4,892 575 46 \nSEPT 171 3,338 455 32 \nOCT 395 4,884 374 41 \nNOV 384 5,591 331 54 \nDEC 252 4,636 262 40 \nTOTAL 2,846 78,766 5,015 276 \n176\nTABLE 118: STATISTICS ON VEHICLE/ RIDER'S \nLICENSES PROCESSED: YEAR 2018\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nMONTH\nNO. OF \nAPPLICANTS \nFOR DRIVER'S \nLICENSE\nNO. OF FAILED \nAPPLICANTS \nFOR DRIVER'S \nLICENSE\nNO. OF \nAPPLICANTS FOR \nRIDER'S CARD\nNO. OF FAILED \nAPPLICANTS FOR \nRIDER'S CARD\nJAN 318 4,818 503 65 \nFEB 282 3,460 362 40 \nMAR 327 4,619 404 40 \nAPR 312 4,509 393 38 \nMAY 390 5,448 433 54 \nJUN 309 5,564 376 51 \nJUL 449 6,999 329 18 \nAUG 340 5,875 - - \nSEPT 328 5,482 31 - \nOCT 296 5,110 814 21 \nNOV 332 5,032 963 21 \nDEC 216 4,485 745 16 \nTOTAL 3,899 61,401 5,353 364 \n177\nTABLE 119: STATISTICS ON VEHICLE/ RIDER'S \nLICENSES PROCESSED: YEAR 2019\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nS/N MOTOR PARKS PRIVATE PUBLIC TOTAL\n1 Jibowu 1 1 2\n2 Onipanu - 1 1\n3 Palm groove - 1 1\n4 Ojota 7 1 8\n5 Ketu - 1 1\n6 Ikosi- Ketu - 1 1\n7 Agric, Ikorodu - 1 1\n8 Ikorodu - 4 4\n9 Bariga - 1 1\n10 Mile 12 Ketu - 1 1\n8 13 21\n1 Obalende - 1 1\n2 Ajah - 1 1\n3 Ibeju- Lekki - 1 1\n4 Epe - 2 2\n5 Agbowa - 1 1\n6 Imota - 1 1\n- 7 7\n1 Ojuelegba 2 2 4\n2 Yaba 1 1 2\n3 Iwaya - 1 1\n4 Makolo - 1 1\n5 Oyingbo 2 2 4\n6 Lagos - 4 4\n7 Otto 6 - 6\n8 Iddo 1 2 3\n9 Ijora 4 2 6\n10 Ajegunle - 1 1\n11 Sari Iganmu - 1 1\n12 Akorede- Motor Park - 1 1\n16 18 34\n178\nTABLE 120: STATISTICS OF MOTOR PARKS IN LAGOS STATE: \nYEAR 2015\nYABA GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nEPE GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nMAINLAND GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nS/N MOTOR PARKS PRIVATE PUBLIC TOTAL\n1 Ifelodun - 1 1\n2 Volkswagon 2 - 2\n3 Okokomaiko 1 1 2\n4 Badagry - 5 5\n5 Amuwo- Odofin - 2 2\n6 Agboju - 1 1\n7 Abule - Ado - 1 1\n8 Cele - 1 1\n9 Ikotun/Mushin - 1 1\n10 Ikotun Egbe - 1 1\n11 Mile 2 1 1 2\n12 CMS 1 - 1\n13 Iyana - Oba - 1 1\n14 Igbo Elerin Junction - 1 1\n15 Morogbo Badagry - 1 1\n16 Seme Badagry - 2 2\n17 Mosan Okunola - 1 1\n18 Iyana Ipaja 3 3 6\n19 Idimu - 1 1\n20 Ikotun - 1 1\n21 Igando - 1 1\n22 Ipaja - 1 1\n8 28 36\n179\nTABLE 120(CONTD): STATISTICS OF MOTOR PARKS IN \nLAGOS STATE: YEAR 2015\nBADAGRY GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\n1 Ojodu Berger 2 1 3\n2 Ogba - 1 1\n3 Agege - 3 3\n4 Iju - 1 1\n5 Ishaga - 1 1\n6 Ayobo - 1 1\n7 Iyana- Ipaja - 1 1\n8 Dopemu Station 1 - 1\n9 Ikeja - 2 2\n10 Ojota - 2 2\n11 Abule- Egba - 1 1\n12 Kola, Alagbado - 1 1\n13 Ile - Epo - 1 1\n14 Oshodi - 2 2\n15 Illupeju - Oshodi - 1 1\n16 Mushin - 1 1\n3 20 23\n35 86 121\n180\nTABLE 120(CONTD): STATISTICS OF MOTOR PARKS IN \nLAGOS STATE: YEAR 2015\nIKEJA GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nGRAND TOTAL\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nS/N MOTOR PARKS PRIVATE PUBLIC TOTAL\n1 Jibowu 1 1 2\n2 Onipanu - 1 1\n3 Palm groove - 1 1\n4 Ojota 7 1 8\n5 Ketu - 1 1\n6 Ikosi- Ketu - 1 1\n7 Agric, Ikorodu - 1 1\n8 Ikorodu - 4 4\n9 Bariga - 1 1\n10 Mile 12 Ketu - 1 1\n8 13 21\n1 Obalende - 1 1\n2 Ajah - 1 1\n3 Ibeju- Lekki - 1 1\n4 Epe - 2 2\n5 Agbowa - 1 1\n6 Imota - 1 1\n- 7 7\n1 Ojuelegba 2 2 4\n2 Yaba 1 1 2\n3 Iwaya - 1 1\n4 Makolo - 1 1\n5 Oyingbo 2 2 4\n6 Lagos - 4 4\n7 Otto 6 - 6\n8 Iddo 1 2 3\n9 Ijora 4 2 6\n10 Ajegunle - 1 1\n11 Sari Iganmu - 1 1\n12 Akorede- Motor Park - 1 1\n16 18 34\n181\nTABLE 121: STATISTICS OF MOTOR PARKS IN LAGOS STATE: \nYEAR 2016\nYABA GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nEPE GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nMAINLAND GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nS/N MOTOR PARKS PRIVATE PUBLIC TOTAL\n1 Ifelodun - 1 1\n2 Volkswagon 2 - 2\n3 Okokomaiko 1 1 2\n4 Badagry - 5 5\n5 Amuwo- Odofin - 2 2\n6 Agboju - 1 1\n7 Abule - Ado - 1 1\n8 Cele - 1 1\n9 Ikotun/Mushin - 1 1\n10 Ikotun Egbe - 1 1\n11 Mile 2 1 1 2\n12 CMS 1 - 1\n13 Iyana - Oba - 1 1\n14 Igbo Elerin Junction - 1 1\n15 Morogbo Badagry - 1 1\n16 Seme Badagry - 2 2\n17 Mosan Okunola - 1 1\n18 Iyana Ipaja 3 3 6\n19 Idimu - 1 1\n20 Ikotun - 1 1\n21 Igando - 1 1\n22 Ipaja - 1 1\n8 28 36\n182\nTABLE 121(CONTD): STATISTICS OF MOTOR PARKS IN \nLAGOS STATE: YEAR 2016\nBADAGRY GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\n1 Ojodu Berger 2 1 3\n2 Ogba - 1 1\n3 Agege - 3 3\n4 Iju - 1 1\n5 Ishaga - 1 1\n6 Ayobo - 1 1\n7 Iyana- Ipaja - 1 1\n8 Dopemu Station 1 - 1\n9 Ikeja - 2 2\n10 Ojota - 2 2\n11 Abule- Egba - 1 1\n12 Kola, Alagbado - 1 1\n13 Ile - Epo - 1 1\n14 Oshodi - 2 2\n15 Illupeju - Oshodi - 1 1\n16 Mushin - 1 1\n3 20 23\n35 86 121\n183\nTABLE 121(CONTD): STATISTICS OF MOTOR PARKS IN \nLAGOS STATE: YEAR 2016\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nIKEJA GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nGRAND TOTAL\nS/N MOTOR PARKS PRIVATE PUBLIC TOTAL\n1 Jibowu 1 1 2\n2 Onipanu - 1 1\n3 Palm groove - 1 1\n4 Ojota 7 1 8\n5 Ketu - 1 1\n6 Ikosi- Ketu - 1 1\n7 Agric, Ikorodu - 1 1\n8 Ikorodu - 4 4\n9 Bariga - 1 1\n10 Mile 12 Ketu - 1 1\n8 13 21\n1 Obalende - 1 1\n2 Ajah - 1 1\n3 Ibeju- Lekki - 1 1\n4 Epe - 2 2\n5 Agbowa - 1 1\n6 Imota - 1 1\n- 7 7\n1 Ojuelegba 2 2 4\n2 Yaba 1 1 2\n3 Iwaya - 1 1\n4 Makolo - 1 1\n5 Oyingbo 2 2 4\n6 Lagos - 4 4\n7 Otto 6 - 6\n8 Iddo 1 2 3\n9 Ijora 4 2 6\n10 Ajegunle - 1 1\n11 Sari Iganmu - 1 1\n12 Akorede- Motor Park - 1 1\n16 18 34\n184\nYABA GROUP\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nSUB-TOTAL\nEPE GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nMAINLAND GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nTABLE 122: STATISTICS OF MOTOR PARKS IN LAGOS STATE: \nYEAR 2017\nS/N MOTOR PARKS PRIVATE PUBLIC TOTAL\n1 Ifelodun - 1 1\n2 Volkswagon 2 - 2\n3 Okokomaiko 1 1 2\n4 Badagry - 5 5\n5 Amuwo- Odofin - 2 2\n6 Agboju - 1 1\n7 Abule - Ado - 1 1\n8 Cele - 1 1\n9 Ikotun/Mushin - 1 1\n10 Ikotun Egbe - 1 1\n11 Mile 2 1 1 2\n12 CMS 1 - 1\n13 Iyana - Oba - 1 1\n14 Igbo Elerin Junction - 1 1\n15 Morogbo Badagry - 1 1\n16 Seme Badagry - 2 2\n17 Mosan Okunola - 1 1\n18 Iyana Ipaja 3 3 6\n19 Idimu - 1 1\n20 Ikotun - 1 1\n21 Igando - 1 1\n22 Ipaja - 1 1\n8 28 36\n185\nTABLE 122(CONTD): STATISTICS OF MOTOR PARKS IN \nLAGOS STATE: YEAR 2017\nBADAGRY GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\n1 Ojodu Berger 2 1 3\n2 Ogba - 1 1\n3 Agege - 3 3\n4 Iju - 1 1\n5 Ishaga - 1 1\n6 Ayobo - 1 1\n7 Iyana- Ipaja - 1 1\n8 Dopemu Station 1 - 1\n9 Ikeja - 2 2\n10 Ojota - 2 2\n11 Abule- Egba - 1 1\n12 Kola, Alagbado - 1 1\n13 Ile - Epo - 1 1\n14 Oshodi - 2 2\n15 Illupeju - Oshodi - 1 1\n16 Mushin - 1 1\n3 20 23\n35 86 121\n186\nTABLE 122(CONTD): STATISTICS OF MOTOR PARKS IN \nLAGOS STATE: YEAR 2017\nIKEJA GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nGRAND TOTAL\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nS/N MOTOR PARKS PRIVATE PUBLIC TOTAL\n1 Jibowu 1 1 2\n2 Onipanu - 1 1\n3 Palm groove - 1 1\n4 Ojota 7 1 8\n5 Ketu - 1 1\n6 Ikosi- Ketu - 1 1\n7 Agric, Ikorodu - 1 1\n8 Ikorodu - 4 4\n9 Bariga - 1 1\n10 Mile 12 Ketu - 1 1\n8 13 21\n1 Obalende - 1 1\n2 Ajah - 1 1\n3 Ibeju- Lekki - 1 1\n4 Epe - 2 2\n5 Agbowa - 1 1\n6 Imota - 1 1\n- 7 7\n1 Ojuelegba 2 2 4\n2 Yaba 1 1 2\n3 Iwaya - 1 1\n4 Makolo - 1 1\n5 Oyingbo 2 2 4\n6 Lagos - 4 4\n7 Otto 6 - 6\n8 Iddo 1 2 3\n9 Ijora 4 2 6\n10 Ajegunle - 1 1\n11 Sari Iganmu - 1 1\n12 Akorede- Motor Park - 1 1\n16 18 34\n187\nTABLE 123: STATISTICS OF MOTOR PARKS IN LAGOS STATE: \nYEAR 2018\nYABA GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nEPE GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nMAINLAND GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nS/N MOTOR PARKS PRIVATE PUBLIC TOTAL\n1 Ifelodun - 1 1\n2 Volkswagon 2 - 2\n3 Okokomaiko 1 1 2\n4 Badagry - 5 5\n5 Amuwo- Odofin - 2 2\n6 Agboju - 1 1\n7 Abule - Ado - 1 1\n8 Cele - 1 1\n9 Ikotun/Mushin - 1 1\n10 Ikotun Egbe - 1 1\n11 Mile 2 1 1 2\n12 CMS 1 - 1\n13 Iyana - Oba - 1 1\n14 Igbo Elerin Junction - 1 1\n15 Morogbo Badagry - 1 1\n16 Seme Badagry - 2 2\n17 Mosan Okunola - 1 1\n18 Iyana Ipaja 3 3 6\n19 Idimu - 1 1\n20 Ikotun - 1 1\n21 Igando - 1 1\n22 Ipaja - 1 1\n8 28 36\n1 Ojodu Berger 2 1 3\n2 Ogba - 1 1\n3 Agege - 3 3\n4 Iju - 1 1\n5 Ishaga - 1 1\n6 Ayobo - 1 1\n7 Iyana- Ipaja - 1 1\n8 Dopemu Station 1 - 1\n9 Ikeja - 2 2\n10 Ojota - 2 2\n11 Abule- Egba - 1 1\n12 Kola, Alagbado - 1 1\n13 Ile - Epo - 1 1\n14 Oshodi - 2 2\n15 Illupeju - Oshodi - 1 1\n16 Mushin - 1 1\n3 20 23\n35 86 121\n188\nGRAND TOTAL\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nBADAGRY GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nTABLE 123(CONTD): STATISTICS OF MOTOR PARKS IN \nLAGOS STATE: YEAR 2018\nIKEJA GROUP\nSUB-TOTAL\nTABLE 123(CONTD): STATISTICS OF MOTOR PARKS IN \nLAGOS STATE: YEAR 2018\nS/N MOTOR PARK LOCATION CATEGORY OBSERVATIONS REMARKS\nYABA GROUP\ni. has perimeter fence.\nii. Private guards in place.\niii.CCTV in place.\niv. Runs a beer parlour.\nv. plies the Eastern part of the country.\nvi. Fully illuminated.\ni. road side park.\nii. No gate/fence.\niii. No toilet facilities.\ni. parking space provided beside the road.\nii. Security arrangement in place ie, has private guards and metal detector.\niii. Mobile toilet in place.\niv. Partly fenced.\ni. bad roads all over the park, needs surface dressing.\nii. CCTV under construction.\niii. Perimetre fencing available.\niv. Shanties litter the park.\nv. presence of Local Government very visible.\ni. park on lease, permanent structure may not be feasible.\nii. CCTV not in place.\ni. Bus depot.\nii. Private security outfit in place.\niii. CCTV not in place.\ni. No CCTV in place.\nii. Security arrangement in place.\ni. road side park.\nii. Nothing on ground apart from vehicles.\niii. not conducive for Motor Park.\n9 Agofure Motors, inter-state Ojota B i. no security arrangement in place. Private Motor Park\n10 Freeman Motors, inter-state Ojota B i. same as above. Private Motor Park\n11 Dominion Express inter-state Ojota B i. no security arrangement in place. Private Motor Park\ni. a alarge expanse of land.\nii. Lacks virtually every infrastructure of a park.\niii. more of a market place.\ni. there is access control at the park.\nii. Local Government control of park observed.\niii. lots of shanties at the park making it vulnerable.\niv. bear parlour exist at the park.\ni. presently displaced because of the road construction on that axis.\nii. office was logged and not accessible.\niii. no parking space for vehicles.\niv. Owutu motor park suggested as alternative.\ni. picking and dropping of passengers along the road.\nii. No security arrangement.\ni. road side park.\nii. no security arrangement.\ni. park on lease.\nii. no security arrangement.\ni. it is more of a market plan than Motor Park.\nii. no security arrangement.\ni. Egress and ingress.\nii. Large space of land, Local Government presence high.\niii. Park not illuminated.\niv. Artisans all over the park\ni. surface dressing of the road urgently needed.\nii. Human traffic high making it vulnerable.\niii. Perishable goods market/park in existence.\niv.management of the park by NURTW/LG/HAUSA TRADERS.\nEPE GROUP\ni. no gates, fence under construction.\nii. Abandoned vehicle available at RTEAN controlled areas.\ni. no fence, no gates.\nii. Park needed to be seperated from LAWMA office.\ni. no gates.\nii. Fence need to be constructed.\niii. Park very dirty.\n4 Epe-T-Junction Garage-NURTW Epe C i. operates on virgin land that needst o be developed. Public Motor Park\ni. sales/consumption of alchoholic beverage booming at the park.\nii. No gates, fence.\niii. No security arrangements.\ni. large expanse of land.\nii. No gates, fense.\niii. No security arrangements.\n7 i. no gate/fense.\nii. Sales/consumption of alchoholic beverages high.\niii. No security arrangements.\n189\nTABLE 124: STATISTICS ON MOTOR PARKS IN LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\n12\n13\n14\n15\n16\n17\n18\n19\n20\n1\n2\n3\n5\n6\nIfesinachi Motors\nOnipan-Ile Epo phase i&ii-NURTW\nPalmgroove Inter-State NURTW\nOjota Main Garrage Inter-State(NURTW)\nBiode Motor Park, inter-state NURTW\nMutual-LAGBUS\nEfos Express inter-stste\nOyemekun Motors, inter-state\nKetu-Alapere Motor Park, NURTW, (intra city)\nKetu Terminus(comprising of ikosi-isheri branches A\u0002D) NURTW\nOwutu Motor Park(RTEAN)-intra-city\nBenson Motor Park-NURTW/RTEAN, inter-state \nloading, LAGBUS also operates at the park\nOgolonto Taxi/Kabukabu Park\nGarrage Roundabout Park, inter-state-RTEAN\nSabo Motort Park\nApelehin Motor Park, NURTW/RTEAN-intra-city\nMile 12 H/T Motor Park-inter-state-NURTW\nObalende Motor Park-NURTW/RTEAN\nAjah Motor Park-NURTW\nIbeju-Lakki Motor Park-NURTW\nEpe Main Garage-RTEAN\nAgbowa Motor Park-NURTW/RTEAN\nImota Motor Park-NURTW/RTEAN\nJibowu\nOnipanu\nPalmgroove\nOjota\nOjota\nOjota\nOjota\nOjota\nKetu\nIkosi-Ketu\nAgric,Ikorodu\nIkorodu\nIkorodu\nIkorodu\nIkorodu\nBariga\nMile 12-Ketu\nObalende\nAjah\nIbeju-Lekki\nEpe\nAgbowa\nImota\nA\nC\nB\nA\nA\nB\nB\nC\nC\nA\nC\nC\nC\nC\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nPrivate Mortor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPrivate/Public Motor \nPark\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nSOURCE: Ministry of Transportation\n140\nS/N MOTOR PARK LOCATION CATEGORY OBSERVATIONS REMARKS\nMAINLAND GROUP\n1 CTN Express(Private -inter-state Jibowu B i. security arrangement in place. Private Motor Park\n2 Peace Express Service(Private Park), inter-state Ojuelegba B i. security arrangement in place. Private Motor Park\n3 Goshen Voyage Nig Ltd(private park), inter-state Ojuelegba B i. security arrangement in place. Private Motor Park\ni. not illuminated at all.\nii. Convenience is not palatable at all.\niii. No gate/fense.\n5 Repo World Ltd, inter-state Ojuelegba B i. no security arrangement in place. Private Motor Park\ni. No gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\n7 Yaba Main Park-NURTW Yaba C i. no security arrangement in place. Public Motor Park\n8 Iwaya Park-NURTW Iwaya B i. picking/dropping of passengers carried outside the park. Public Motor Park\ni. park very dirty\nii. No organization at the park.\n10 Oyingbo Park-NURTW Oyingbo C i. environment very dirty. Public Motor Park\n11 Bonny Way Motor Park-NURTW Oyingbo C i. no security arrangement in place. Public Motor Park\ni. no gate.\nii. Surface dressing needed.\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\ni. no security arrangement in place.\nii. No illumination at all.\ni. no gate/fence.\nii. Security arrangement in place.\ni. no gate/fence.\nii. Security arrangement in place.\n18 G.U.D Motors Ltd Otto C i. no security arrangement in place. Private Motor Park\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\niii. Dirty environment.\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\niii. Dirty environment.\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\niii. Dirty environment.\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\niii. Dirty environment.\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\niii. Dirty environment.\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\niii. Dirty environment.\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\niii. Dirty environment.\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\niii. Dirty environment.\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\niii. Dirty environment.\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\niii. Dirty environment.\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\niii. Dirty environment.\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\niii. Dirty environment.\n31 Ijora Central Park-NURTW Ijora C i. started loading under the ijora bridge a week ago. Public Motor Park\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\niii. Dirty environment.\ni. not fully illuminated.\nii. No gate.\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\niii. Dirty environment.\ni. no gate/fense.\nii. no security arrangement in place.\niii. Dirty environment.\nBADAGRY GROUP\ni. illegal structure.\nii. No fence.\niii. Abandoned vehicle found at the park.\n2 Goody Edosa Motors Volkwagen C i. not conducive for park. Private Motor Park\n3 Ohoniba Line Volkwagen C i. not conducive for park. Private Motor Park\ni. no security arrangement in place.\nii. No toilet facilities in place.\niii. Area not conducive for motor park.\n5 i. no security arrangement in place.\nii. No toilet facilities in place.\niii. Area not conducive for motor park.\n190\nTABLE 124 (CONTD): STATISTICS ON MOTOR PARKS IN LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\n4\n6\n9\n12\n13\n14\n15\n16\n17\n19\n20\n21\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n27\n28\n29\n30\n32\n33\n34\n35\n1\n4\nOjuelegba Main Park, intra-city-RTEAN\nGod is Good Motors, inter-state\nMakoko Park-NURTW\nKanuri Park\nKwara Express Park\nEbute Ero Park-NURTW\nAdeniji Park-NURTW\nMarina Park-NURTW\nObalende Park-NURTW\nB & S Motor Park\nRite on Time Ltd\nBonny Way Motors\nGod Bless Ezenwata Ltd\nGobison Motor Park\nIddo Motor Park\nIddo Phase 1 Park\nIddo Luxury Park\nEkwos Nig Ltd\nYoung Shall Grow Motors\nJoint Progressive Transport Service, NURTW/RTEAN\nKas Mag Line Ltd\nApapa & Tamola Park, inter-state\nAjegunle Park-NURTW/RTEAN\nSari Iganmu Park-NURTW/RTEAN\nAkorede Motor Park, NURTW/RTEAN\nAnu Oluwa Unit, inter-state-NURTW\nGod is Good Motors \nIwaju International Park, RTEAN-inter-city\nOjuelegba\nYaba\nMakoko\nOyingbo\nOyingbo\nLagos\nLagos\nLagos\nLagos\nOtto\nOtto\nOtto\nOtto\nOtto\nIddo\nIddo\nIddo\nIjora\nIjora\nIjora\nIjora\nIjora\nAjegunle\nSari Iganmu\nIfelodun\nOkokomaiko\nBadagry\nC\nC\nB\nC\nB\nC\nC\nB\nB\nB\nB\nC\nC\nC\nC\nC\nC\nC\nC\nC\nC\nC\nB\nC\nC\nB\nB\nB\nPrivate Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPrivate Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nSOURCE: Ministry of Transportation\n140\nS/N MOTOR PARK LOCATION CATEGORY OBSERVATIONS REMARKS\ni. shanties in the park.\nii. Urgent need for fence to demarcate the park from the estate.\niii. Abandoned vehicle at the park making it vulnerable.\ni. no fence in the park.\nii. No toilet facilities at the park.\ni. no fence in the park.\nii. Shanties found at the park.\ni. no fence in the park.\nii. Shanties found at the park.\ni. surface dressing needed for the roads.\nii. No fense.\ni. no fence in the park.\nii. Shanties found at the park.\n12 Isolo Motor Park-NURTW Ikotun/Mushin C i. surface dressing needed. Public Motor Park\n13 Jakande Junction Park-NURTW Ikotun Egbe C i. lacks virtually everything. Public Motor Park\n14 Mile 2 Oke, NURTW- Interstate Mile 2 B i. shanties in the park. Public Motor Park\n15 LAGBUS CMS C i. road side loading of passengers. Private Motor Park\n16 Edo-Delta Phase 2 Mile 2 B i. no fence. Private Motor Park\n17 Amuwo Odofin, NURTW Odofin B i. need to replace the open space, land belong to water corperation Public Motor Park\n18 Iya-Oba Park, NURTW-Interstate/city Iyana-Oba B i. need to relocate , present park obstructs traffic. Public Motor Park\ni. shanties all over the park.\nii. No fence/toilet.\ni. surface dressing of the roads.\nii. Shanties in the park.\niii. No fence, no gate.\ni. uniform men disturbs operators at the park.\nii. Shanties in the park.\niii. No fence, no gate.\ni. vulnerable.\nii. Shanties in the park.\niii. Surface dressing of the roads is needed.\niv. Abandoned vehicles at the park.\nv. Local Government presence high.\nvi. no gate, no fence.\ni. no gate, no fence.\nii. Shanties in the park.\ni. abandoned vehicles in the park.\nii. Vulnerable.\ni. Shanties in the park.\nii. No fence, no gate.\niii. Need to relocate to somewhere else.\ni. loading of passengers along the road.\nii. No gate/fence.\niii. No security arrangement in place at the park.\n27 Oremeji Park-NURTW Iyana-Ipaja C i. park operating illegally. Public Motor Park\ni. loading of passengers along the road.\nii. No gate/fence.\niii. No security arrangement in place at the park.\ni. fully illuminated.\nii. Security arrangement in place.\n30 Iyare Motors Iyana-Ipaja A i. motor park conducive for operation. Private Motor Park\n31 G. Agofure Iyana-Ipaja C i. proper security arrangement in place. Private Motor Park\n32 Chukwubuikem Motors Iyana-Ipaja A i. park conducive for operations. Private Motor Park\ni. selling of ram & cow at the park.\nii. Shanties at the park.\niii. Sale/consumption of alchoholic beverages.\ni. park completely taken by market women.\nii. Shanties at the park causing serious traffic on that axis.\ni. park very untidy.\nii. Shanties at the park.\niii. No illumination.\niv. No gate/fence.\ni. shanties at the park.\nii. No fence.\niii. Sale/consumption of alchoholic beverages.\nIKEJA GROUP\n1 Ojodu Motor Park, intracity/interstate-NURTW Ojodu-Berger B i. surface dressing of the road needed. Public Motor Park\n2 Akute Investment Ojodu-Berger B i. no security arrangement in place. Private Motor Park\n3 LAGBUS Ojodu-Berger B i. no security arrangement in place. Private Motor Park\ni. one of the parks lacks entry/exit gate.\nii. Dirty environment.\niii. Surface dressing needed at the park.\n5 Agege Pen Cinema, Intracity/Interstate- NURTW Agege B i. Surface dressing needed at the park. Public Motor Park\ni. no security arrangement at the park.\nii. No fence, no gate.\niii. Surface dressing needed at the park.\n7 Ishaga Garage-NURTW Ishaga B i. no fence, no gate. Public Motor Park\ni. park in good condition.\nii. Security arrangement in place.\ni. park in good condition.\nii. Security arrangement in place.\ni. park in good condition.\nii. Security arrangement in place.\ni. park in good condition.\nii. Security arrangement in place.\ni. heavy presence of trucks/Trailers.\nii. No security arrangement in place.\n13 Ikeja Main Park-NURTW Ikeja B i. entry/exit gates needed to be repaired. Public Motor Park\n14 Owena Park, Intracity/Inter-state-NURTW Ojota B i. proximity of the park with LAWMA dumpsite a big problem. Public Motor Park\ni. no fence.\nii. Local Government presence very heavy.\n16 Nitel/Agip Park, Intracity/Interstate-NURTW Agege C i. No gate, no fence. Public Motor Park\n17 Abule-Egba, Interstate-NURTW Abule-Egba B i. dispute over ownership of land affecting development of the park. Public Motor Park\ni. no fence, no gate.\nii. No security arrangement in place.\ni. large presence of Hausa men doing nothing, a serious security concern.\nii. No illumination.\ni. security arrangement in place.\nii. Park conducive for operation.\ni. very dirty.\nii. Surface dressing of the roads needed at the park.\niii. No security arrangement at the park.\ni. perimetre fencing needed.\nii. No gate.\ni. surface dressing of the roads at the park.\nii. Park almost taken over by market men/women.\n191\nTABLE 124 (CONTD): STATISTICS ON MOTOR PARKS IN LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\n6\n7\n8\n9\n10\n11\n19\n20\n21\n22\n23\n24\n25\n26\n28\n29\n33\n34\n35\n36\n4\n6\n8\n9\n10\n11\n12\n15\n18\n19\n20\n21\n22\n23\nAmuwo-Odofin Park-RTEAN\nMile 12, Diamond Chapter, RTEAN-inter-state\nAgboju Park-RTEAN\nAbule Ado Park-RTEAN\nPromise Chapter, Inter-state/city-NURTW/RTEAN\nCele Motor Park, inter-state/city-NURTW\nAgboroko first gate-RTEAN\nVictory Chapel-NURTW/RTEAN\nMorogbo Motor Park, intercity-NURTW/RTEAN\nAjara Roundabout Motor Park, Phases i&ii\u0002NURTW/RTEAN\nJ4 Park-NURTW/RTEAN\nJ5\nOkoko Motor Park-RTEAN\nMosan-Okunola interstate Park-NURTW\nAraromi Unit, Phases i&ii, intercity/state-NURTW\nIyana-Ipaja Park\nCouncil Park-NURTW\nIkotun Motor Park, Interstate-NURTW\nIgando Motor Park-NURTW\nIpaja Phase i&ii NURTW\nOgba Motor Park i&ii-NURTW\nIju Garage-NURTW\nTotal Garage- NURTW\nAyobo Garage-NURTW\nAlagbaa A&B Intracity/Interstate-NURTW\nLAGBUS\nMongoro Park, Interstate-NURTW\nKudirat Abiola Park-NURTW\nUnity Park-NURTW\nIle-Epo Park-NURTW\nAsejere Park-NURTW\nAso-Rock Park-NURTW\nSaudi Park, Intracity/Interstate-NURTW\nMushin Main Garage-NURTW\nAmuwo\u0002Odofin\nBadagry\nAgboju\nAbule Ado\nBadagry\nCele\nBadagry\nIgbo-Elerin \nJunction\u0002okokomaiko\nMorogbo, \nBadagry\nBadagry\nSeme-Badagry\nSeme-Badagry\nOkokomaiko\nMosan\u0002Okunola\nIyana-Ipaja\nIyana-Ipaja\nIdimu\nIkotun\nIgando\nIpaja\nOgba\nIju\nAgege\nAyobo\nIyana-Ipaja\nDopemu \nStation\nIkeja\nOjota\nKola, \nAlagbado\nIle-Epo\nOshodi\nOshodi\nIlupeju/Oshodi\nMushin\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nC\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nC\nC\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nB\nC\nB\nB\nB\nB\nC\nB\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nSOURCE: Ministry of Transportation\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\nPublic Motor Park\n140\nS/N YEAR NUMBER OF VEHICLE\n1 2005 27,004 \n2 2006 28,805 \n3 2007 32,388 \n4 2008 77,008 \n5 2009 119,035 \n6 2010 62,581 \n7 2011 47,544 \n8 2012 20,469 \n9 2013 13,676 \n10 2014 4,713 \n11 2015 1,248 \n12 2016\n13 2017 545,081 \n14 2018 687,001 \n15 2019 533,940 \nMinistry of Transportation\n192\nTABLE 125: HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON MOT \nCERTIFICATION: YEAR 2005 - 2019\nS/N MONTH NUMBER OF VEHICLE\n1 JANUARY 141 \n2 FEBRUARY 78 \n3 MARCH 126 \n4 APRIL 79 \n5 MAY 89 \n6 JUNE 83 \n7 JULY 58 \n8 AUGUST 158 \n9 SEPTEMBER 227 \n10 OCTOBER 72 \n11 NOVEMBER 67 \n12 DECEMBER 70 \n 1,248\n193\nTABLE 126: STATISTICS ON MOT CERTIFICATION: \nYEAR 2015\nTOTAL\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\n2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019\n1 AGEGE 1 2 2 2 2 12 12 12 12 12 12\n2 AJEROMI-IFELODUN 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4\n3 ALIMOSHO - 2 3 3 3 21 21 21 21 21 21\n4 AMUWO-ODOFIN 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4\n5 APAPA 1 1 1 1 1 12 12 12 12 12 12\n6 BADAGRY - - - - 0 - - - - - 0\n7 EPE - - - - 0 - - - - - 0\n8 ETI-OSA 1 1 1 1 1 14 14 14 14 14 14\n9 IBEJU - LEKKI - - - - 0 - - - - -\n10 IFAKO-IJAYE 1 1 1 1 1 13 13 13 13 13 13\n11 IKEJA 7 7 7 7 7 19 19 19 19 19 19\n12 IKORODU 1 1 1 1 1 23 23 23 23 23 23\n13 KOSOFE 6 7 7 7 7 30 30 30 30 30 30\n14 LAGOS ISLAND 1 1 1 1 1 13 13 13 13 13 13\n15 LAGOS MAINLAND - - - - 0 34 34 34 34 34 34\n16 MUSHIN 7 7 7 7 7 29 29 29 29 29 29\n17 OJO - - - - 0 1 1 1 1 1 1\n18 OSHODI- ISOLO 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 10 10\n19 SOMOLU - - - - 0 15 15 15 15 15 15\n20 SURULERE 7 7 6 6 6 35 35 35 35 35 35\n38 42 42 42 42 289 289 289 289 289 289\n194\nTABLE 127: STATISTICS OF MECHANIC VILLAGE AND TAXI PARKS BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT \nAREAS: YEAR 2015 - 2019\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Transportation\nMECHANIC VILLAGE TAXI PARKS\nTOTAL\nS/N LOCAL GOVT. AREA\nNUMBER LENGTH \n(KM) NUMBER LENGTH (KM) NUMBER LENGTH (KM) NUMBER LENGTH (KM) NUMBER LENGTH (KM)\n1 AGEGE - - - - - - - -\n2 AJEROMI IFELODUN - - - - 1 7.20 - -\n1 0.31\n3 ALIMOSHO 5 2.455 1 0.105 3 7.95 1 27.43\n1 3.4\n4 AMUWO ODOFIN 9 6.237 2 3.100 - - 1 1.40\n5 APAPA - - - - - - - -\n6 BADAGRY - - - - - - 2 1.28\n1 6.65\n7 EPE - - - - 2 4.18 - -\n8 ETI-OSA 3 1.530 1 0.586 - - - -\n9 IBEJU LEKKI - - - - - - - -\n10 IFAKO IJAIYE - - 1 1.600 3 5.97 1 0.84\n11 IKEJA - - - - - - - -\n12 IKORODU 2 6.480 - - - - - -\n1 7.114\n13 KOSOFE - - 6 2.030 2 2.23 1 0.94\n1 0.7\n14 LAGOS ISLAND - - 1 1.678 - - - -\n15 LAGOS MAINLAND - - - - - - - -\n16 MUSHIN - - - - - - - -\n17 OJO - - - - - - - -\n18 OSHODI/ISOLO 1 0.704 3 1.895 - - - -\n19 SHOMOLU 1 0.550 - - - - - -\n2 0.89\n20 SURULERE 2 1.400 - - - - - -\n23 19.356 15 4.264 11 27.53 6 31.89 7 19.064\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Works and Infrastructure (Office of Works)\n195\nTOTAL\nS/N\nLOCAL \nGOVERNMENT \nAREA\nTABLE 128: STATISTICS OF ROADS CONSTRUCTED BY LENGTH(KM) ACCORDING TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT \nAREAS: YEAR 2015 - 2019\nYEAR 2015 YEAR 2016 YEAR 2017 YEAR 2018 YEAR 2019\n2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 TOTAL\n29 13 22 62 52 23 15 39 4 43\n22 9 9 29 57 3 11 2 0.34 2.64 2.98\nNUMBER OF \nSTREETLIGHTS \nINSTALLED 315 1217 787 1435 519 102 1098 177 1275\n1 1 - 1 - - - 0\n- - 1 1 - - 0\n2 - - - 3 - 1 4 1 5\n- - - - - - - 0\n1 2 - 1 4 - 4 4 4\n1 1 - - - - 0\n306.49 13.10 20.07 40.69 30.91 10.99 37.999 5.392 43.39\n179.75 94.20 22.10 19.48 49.15 88.03 210.15 662.86\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Works and Infrastructure (Office of Infrastructure)\n196\nTABLE 129: SUMMARY OF ROADS AND BRIDGE CONSTRUCTED/ REHABILITATED BY \nLENGTH(KM): YEAR 2010 - 2019\n INDICATORS\nNUMBER OF ROADS \nCONSTRUCTED\nNUMBER OF ROADS \nREHABILITATED/UP \nGRADED\nNUMBER OF PRIVATE \nPARTNERSHIP ROAD \nPROJECTS \nCOMPLETED\nTOTAL LENGTH OF \nROADS \nCONSTRUCTED(KM)\nTOTAL LENGTH OF \nROADS \nREHABILITATED(KM)\nNUMBER OF JETTIES \nAND TERMINAL \nBUILDING\nNUMBER OF \nOVERHEAD LINK \nBRIDGES \nCONSTRUCTED\nNUMBER OF \nOVERHEAD LINK \nBRIDGES \nREHABILITATED\nNUMBER OF \nPEDESTRIAN \nBRIDGES \nCONSTRUCTED\nNUMBER OF \nPEDESTRIAN \nBRIDGES \nREHABILITATED/RE\u0002CONSTRUCTED\nNUMBER LENGTH \n(KM) NUMBER LENGTH (KM) NUMBER LENGTH (KM) NUMBER LENGTH (KM) NUMBER LENGTH (KM)\n1 AGEGE - - - - - - - - - -\n2 AJEROMI IFELODUN - - - - - - - - - -\n3 ALIMOSHO 1 7.200 3 10.715 - - - - - -\n4 AMUWO ODOFIN - - - - 2 2.46 - - - -\n5 APAPA - - - - - - - - -\n6 BADAGRY - - - - - - - - -\n7 EPE - - 1 0.850 1 9.67 - - - -\n8 ETI-OSA - - - - 1 0.30 - - - -\n9 IBEJU LEKKI - - - - - - - - - -\n10 IFAKO IJAIYE - - - - - - - - - -\n11 IKEJA - - - - - - - - - -\n12 IKORODU - - 2 2.400 - - - - - -\n13 KOSOFE - - - - 2 2.24 - - - -\n14 LAGOS ISLAND - - - - - - - - - -\n15 LAGOS MAINLAND - - - - - - - - - -\n16 MUSHIN - - 1 0.700 - - 1 0.340 - -\n17 OJO - - - - - - - - - -\n18 OSHODI/ISOLO 2 1.603 2 3.740 1 0.91 - - - -\n19 SHOMOLU - - - - - - - -\n1 2.64\n20 SURULERE - - 2 2.610 4 3.46 1 -\n3 8.803 11 21.015 11 19.04 2 0.34 1 2.64\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Works and Infrastructure (Office of Works)\n197\nYEAR 2019\nTOTAL\nS/N\nLOCAL \nGOVERNMENT \nAREA\nTABLE 130: STATISTICS OF ROADS REHABILITATED/UPGRADED BY LENGTH(KM) ACCORDING \nTO LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS: YEAR 2015 - 2019\nYEAR 2015 YEAR 2016 YEAR 2017 YEAR 2018\nYEAR 2019\n1 AGEGE - - - - 0\n2 AJEROMI IFELODUN - - 240 - 240\n3 ALIMOSHO 83 357 338 915 130 1823\n4 AMUWO ODOFIN - - - 40 40\n5 APAPA 244 244 - - 488\n6 BADAGRY - - - 42 300 342\n7 EPE - 28 343 - 371\n8 ETI-OSA 51 - 10 - 61\n9 IBEJU LEKKI - - - - 0\n10 IFAKO IJAIYE - 64 234 - 298\n11 IKEJA - - - - 0\n12 IKORODU 96 80 - - 176\n13 KOSOFE - 69 132 33 23 257\n14 LAGOS ISLAND - 56 - - 56\n15 LAGOS MAINLAND - - - - 0\n16 MUSHIN - 23 - 10 33\n17 OJO - - - - 0\n18 OSHODI/ISOLO 23 194 26 - 243\n19 SHOMOLU - - - - 118 118\n20 SURULERE 22 87 99 - 208\n519 1202 1422 1040 571 4754\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Works and Infrastructure (Office of Works)\n198\nTABLE 131: STATISTICS OF STREET LIGHTS INSTALLED ACCORDING TO LOCAL \nGOVERNMENT AREAS: YEAR 2015 - 2019\nTOTAL\nS/N LOCAL GOVERNMENT \nAREA YEAR 2015 YEAR 2016 YEAR 2017 YEAR 2018 TOTAL\nS/N\nLOCAL GOVERNMENT \nAREA NUMBER OF BRIDGES\nLENGTH OF \nBRIDGES (KM)\n1 ALIMOSHO 4 0.16\n2 AJEROMI- IFELODUN - -\n3 AMUWO ODOFIN - -\n4 APAPA 1 0.06\n5 BADAGRY 2 2.73\n6 EPE - -\n7 ETI-OSA 1 1.78\n8 IFAKO IJAIYE 2 0.74\n9 IKEJA 1 0.10\n10 IKORODU - -\n11 KOSOFE 2 0.13\n12 LAGOS ISLAND - -\n13 MUSHIN - -\n14 OSHODI- ISOLO 1 0.15\n15 SURULERE - -\n14 5.85\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Works and Infrastructure (Office of Works)\n199\nTABLE 132 : STATISTICS ON LENGTH OF BRIDGES COMPLETED \nACCORDING TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS: YEAR 2017 \nTOTAL\nS/N\nLOCAL GOVERNMENT \nAREA NUMBER OF \nBRIDGES\nLENGTH OF \nBRIDGES (KM)\n1 AGEGE 2 0.06\n2 AJEROMI- IFELODUN - -\n3 ALIMOSHO - -\n4 AMUWO ODOFIN 1 0.03\n5 APAPA - -\n6 BADAGRY - -\n7 EPE - -\n8 ETI-OSA - -\n9 IBEJU LEKKI - -\n10 IFAKO IJAIYE 1 0.70\n11 IKEJA - -\n12 IKORODU - -\n13 KOSOFE 1 0.03\n14 LAGOS ISLAND - -\n15 LAGOS MAINLAND - -\n16 MUSHIN - -\n17 OJO - -\n18 OSHODI- ISOLO - -\n19 SHOMOLU - -\n20 SURULERE - -\n5 0.82\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Works and Infrastructure (Office of Works)\n200\nTABLE 133 : STATISTICS ON LENGTH OF BRIDGES COMPLETED \nACCORDING TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS: YEAR 2018 \nTOTAL\nS/N\nLOCAL GOVERNMENT \nAREA\nNUMBER OF \nBRIDGES\nLENGTH OF \nBRIDGES (KM)\n1 AGEGE\n2 AJEROMI- IFELODUN\n3 ALIMOSHO 1 0.15\n4 AMUWO ODOFIN\n5 APAPA\n6 BADAGRY 1 0.3\n7 EPE\n8 ETI-OSA\n9 IBEJU LEKKI\n10 IFAKO IJAIYE\n11 IKEJA\n12 IKORODU 1 0.24\n13 KOSOFE\n14 LAGOS ISLAND\n15 LAGOS MAINLAND\n16 MUSHIN\n17 OJO\n18 OSHODI- ISOLO\n19 SHOMOLU\n20 SURULERE\n3 0.69\nSOURCE: Ministry Of Works and Infrastructure (Office of Works)\n201\nTOTAL\nTABLE 134 : STATISTICS ON LENGTH OF BRIDGES COMPLETED \nACCORDING TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS: YEAR 2019 \n2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 TOTAL\n1 AGEGE 25 28 34 58 50 40 15 250\n2 AJEROMI-IFELODUN 5 8 12 18 13 9 5 70\n3 ALIMOSHO 56 83 159 151 109 88 110 756\n4 AMUWO-ODOFIN 10 13 16 46 15 11 6 117\n5 APAPA 9 8 9 6 9 6 3 50\n6 BADAGRY 24 12 9 25 34 24 11 139\n7 ETI-OSA 48 53 74 58 39 25 5 302\n8 EPE 11 20 30 70 39 19 14 203\n9 IBEJU-LEKKI 1 2 1 2 6 4 2 18\n10 IFAKO-IJAYE 18 35 57 75 47 32 25 289\n11 IKEJA 73 105 160 148 142 104 45 777\n12 IKORODU 45 54 104 117 59 15 21 415\n13 KOSOFE 59 83 115 113 95 23 21 509\n14 LAGOS ISLAND 22 18 22 9 15 7 12 105\n15 LAGOS-MAINLAND 29 41 25 28 24 14 21 182\n16 MUSHIN 30 34 24 21 35 23 21 188\n17 OJO 9 13 9 14 12 7 8 72\n18 OSHODI-ISOLO 35 31 42 59 88 40 17 312\n19 SOMOLU 23 27 35 52 41 19 5 202\n20 SURULERE 36 37 51 65 52 22 17 280\n568 705 988 1135 924 532 384 5,236\nSOURCE: Lagos State Public Works Corporation \n202\nTABLE 135: SUMMARY OF ROADS MAINTAINED /REHABILITATED BY PUBLIC WORKS \nCORPORATION ACCORDING TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS: YEAR 2011 - 2017\nYEAR\nTOTAL\nS/N\nLOCAL \nGOVERNMENT \nAREA\n2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018\n1 Agege 16,250 1,387 1,581 6,786 3,950 3,450 5,724 11,327 50,455\n2 Ajeromi/Ifelodun 4,850 5,029 5,733 2,106 1,027 1,200 - - 19,945\n3 Alimosho 34,687 10,703 12,201 17,667 8,611 10,800 12,161 14,294 121,124\n4 Amuwo-odofin 9,820 3,725 4,247 5,382 1,185 1,800 8,750 906 35,815\n5 Apapa 2,850 311 355 702 711 1,500 1,239 - 7,668\n6 Badagry 33,580 4,824 5,499 2,925 2,686 3,750 1,104 - 54,368\n7 Epe 17,795 5,927 6,757 6,786 3,081 7,050 187 14,800 62,383\n8 Eti osa 23,100 4,191 4,778 8,190 3,081 1,800 16,792 760 62,692\n9 Ibeju Lekki 82 - 93 234 474 900 43,641 - 45,424\n10 Ifako-Ijiaye 9,355 2,721 3,102 8,775 3,713 6,600 894 3,870 39,030\n11 Ikeja 33,395 12,315 14,039 17,316 11,218 16,800 21,446 24,424 150,953\n12 Ikorodu 22,450 6,416 7,314 13,689 4,661 4,350 2,700 - 61,580\n13 Kosofe 25,840 10,416 11,878 13,221 7,505 11,250 10,253 11,466 101,829\n14 Lagos Island 1,550 1,161 1,324 1,053 1,185 1,950 1,801 4,300 14,324\n15 Lagos Mainland 11,884 2,881 3,284 3,276 1,896 3,150 422 4,373 31,166\n16 Mushin 13,200 1,657 1,889 2,457 2,765 4,500 1,590 2,680 30,738\n17 Ojo 7,430 3,298 3,760 1,638 948 1,650 14,635 - 33,359\n18 Oshodi-Isolo 15,865 4,092 4,665 6,903 4,345 5,400 5,919 1,953 49,142\n19 Somolu 5,910 2,626 2,994 6,084 3,239 3,000 1,109 - 24,962\n20 Surulere 13,325 1,493 1,702 7,605 4,108 5,850 5,061 5,100 44,244\n303,136 85,255 97,195 132,795 70,389 96,750 155,428 100,253 1,041,201\nSOURCE: Lagos State Public Works Corporation \n203\nTABLE 136: STATISTICS OF ROADS MAINTAINED/REHABILATED BY LENGTH ACCORDING TO LOCAL \nGOVERNMENT AREAS: YEAR 2011 - 2018\nTOTAL\nS/N LGA\nTOTAL\n\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY - 128 12 1,536,000 1,798,343 \n2 FEBRUARY - 134 12 1,608,000 1,794,421 \n3 MARCH - 134 13 1,742,000 1,794,848 \n4 APRIL 2 129 13 1,833,000 1,789,212 \n5 MAY 2 139 15 2,115,000 1,790,899 \n6 JUNE 2 139 15 2,115,000 1,788,315 \n7 JULY 2 139 16 2,256,000 1,787,478 \n8 AUGUST 2 140 16 2,272,000 1,788,487 \n9 SEPTEMBER 2 146 16 2,368,000 1,788,036 \n10 OCTOBER 2 147 16 2,384,000 1,879,098 \n11 NOVEMBER 2 147 16 2,384,000 1,867,045 \n12 DECEMBER 2 147 16 2,384,000 1,902,631 \n 24,997,000 21,768,813\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY 2 148 14 2,100,000 1,973,542\n2 FEBRUARY 2 151 14 2,142,000 1,974,740\n3 MARCH 2 152 14 2,156,000 2,175,034\n4 APRIL 2 153 14 2,170,000 2,293,421\n5 MAY 2 153 14 2,170,000 2,295,832\n6 JUNE 2 155 14 2,198,000 2,297,543\n7 JULY 2 158 14 2,240,000 2,297,893\n8 AUGUST 2 160 14 2,268,000 2,299,345\n9 SEPTEMBER 2 163 14 2,310,000 2,313,736\n10 OCTOBER 2 163 14 2,310,000 2,176,483\n11 NOVEMBER 2 165 14 2,338,000 1,760,799\n12 DECEMBER 2 165 14 2,338,000 1,818,555\n26,740,000 25,676,923\n204\nNUMBER OF FERRIES OWNED BY NUMBER OF PASSENGERS \nTABLE 137: NUMBER OF FERRIES BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS: YEAR 2014\nNUMBER OF FERRIES OWNED BY NUMBER OF PASSENGERS NUMBER OF \nROUTES \nPLIED BY \nFERRIES\nS/N MONTH\nS/N\nNUMBER OF \nROUTES \nPLIED BY \nFERRIES\nMONTH\nTOTAL\nTABLE 138: NUMBER OF FERRIES BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS: YEAR 2015\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\nTOTAL\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY 2 148 14 2,100,000 2,255,125\n2 FEBRUARY 2 151 14 2,142,000 1,813,731\n3 MARCH 2 152 14 2,156,000 1,666,147\n4 APRIL 2 153 14 2,170,000 2,013,282\n5 MAY 2 153 14 2,170,000 1,603,311\n6 JUNE 2 155 14 2,198,000 1,733,879\n7 JULY 2 158 14 2,240,000 1,545,628\n8 AUGUST 2 160 14 2,268,000 1,410,233\n9 SEPTEMBER 2 163 14 2,310,000 1,265,159\n10 OCTOBER 2 163 14 2,310,000 1,238,789\n11 NOVEMBER 2 165 14 2,338,000 1,159,141\n12 DECEMBER 2 165 14 2,338,000 1,147,412\n26,740,000 18,851,837\n205\nS/N MONTH\nTABLE 139: NUMBER OF FERRIES BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS: YEAR 2016\nNUMBER OF FERRIES OWNED BY NUMBER OF PASSENGERS \nTOTAL\nNUMBER OF \nROUTES \nPLIED BY \nFERRIES\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY - 172 19 1,016,520 1,157,684\n2 FEBRUARY - 181 19 1,069,710 1,232,931\n3 MARCH - 187 19 1,105,170 1,238,518\n4 APRIL - 200 19 1,182,000 1,155,647\n5 MAY - 205 19 1,211,550 1,141,285\n6 JUNE - 217 19 1,282,470 1,157,659\n7 JULY - 223 19 1,317,930 1,158,581\n8 AUGUST - 231 19 1,365,210 1,088,253\n9 SEPTEMBER - 237 19 1,400,670 1,147,016\n10 OCTOBER - 242 19 1,430,220 1,128,182\n11 NOVEMBER - 248 19 1,465,680 1,089,526\n12 DECEMBER - 254 19 1,501,140 1,092,347\n15,348,270 13,787,629\n206\nNUMBER OF FERRIES OWNED BY NUMBER OF PASSENGERS \nTOTAL\nNUMBER OF \nROUTES \nPLIED BY \nFERRIES\nS/N MONTH\nTABLE 140: NUMBER OF FERRIES BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS: YEAR 2017\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY - 254 25 1,116,520 1,098,364\n2 FEBRUARY - 286 25 1,169,710 1,096,682\n3 MARCH - 295 25 1,205,170 1,101,149\n4 APRIL - 314 25 1,282,000 1,145,597\n5 MAY - 326 25 1,311,550 1,150,617\n6 JUNE - 332 25 1,382,470 1,096,472\n7 JULY - 350 25 1,417,930 1,099,372\n8 AUGUST - 356 25 1,465,210 1,082,447\n9 SEPTEMBER - 371 25 1,500,670 1,064,975\n10 OCTOBER - 391 25 1,530,220 1,067,903\n11 NOVEMBER - 401 25 1,565,680 1,064,261\n12 DECEMBER - 409 25 1,601,140 1,067,771\n16,548,270 13,135,610\n207\nTABLE 141: NUMBER OF FERRIES BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS: YEAR 2018\nNUMBER OF FERRIES OWNED BY NUMBER OF PASSENGERS \nNUMBER OF \nROUTES \nPLIED BY \nFERRIES\nS/N MONTH\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\nTOTAL\n GOVERNMENT PRIVATE TARGET ACTUAL \n1 JANUARY - 356 25 1,300,000 1,133,586 \n2 FEBRUARY - 362 25 1,400,000 1,112,308 \n3 MARCH - 365 25 1,300,000 1,068,988 \n4 APRIL - 367 25 1,300,000 1,060,352 \n5 MAY - 372 26 1,300,000 1,162,919 \n6 JUNE - 373 26 1,300,000 1,190,087 \n7 JULY - 375 28 1,300,000 1,226,413 \n8 AUGUST - 379 28 1,300,000 1,167,398 \n9 SEPTEMBER - 382 28 1,300,000 1,232,007 \n10 OCTOBER - 382 28 1,300,000 1,236,811 \n11 NOVEMBER - 386 29 1,300,000 1,238,340 \n12 DECEMBER - 396 29 1,300,000 1,241,632 \nTOTAL - 15,700,000 4,495 14,070,841 \n208\nMONTH\nNUMBER OF \nROUTES \nPLIED BY \nFERRIES \nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\nTABLE 142: NUMBER OF FERRIES BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS: YEAR 2019\nNUMBER OF FERRIES OWNED BY NUMBER OF PASSENGERS S/N \nS/N NAME OF JETTIES NUMBER OF PASSENGER\n1 ADDAX 1,166,613\n2 ALEX 1,105,471\n3 AGBOYI KETU 878,227\n4 BADORE 878,566\n5 BAYEKU 1,640,588\n6 CMS 1,131,587\n7 COCONUT 1,614,250\n8 ELEGBATA 782,056\n9 EPE 195,232\n10 FALOMO 272,847\n11 IJEDE 1,481,788\n12 IJEGUN EGBA 2,177,664\n13 IJORA 244,142\n14 IYA AFIN 306,375\n15 LAGBASA 548,772\n16 LIVERPOOL 2,272,921\n19 METRO FERRY 1,238,770\n18 ORIGIN 1,349,075\n19 OJO 1,014,593\n20 OWORONSHOKI 17,647\n21 IBESHE 136,407\n22 OKE IRA NLA 632,664\n23 SAGBOKOJI 1,596,121\n24 SLAVE ROUTE 186,783\n25 TAKWA BAY 1,005,299\n26 TIN CAN 1,802,465\nTOTAL 25,676,923\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\n209\nTABLE 143: NAME OF FERRY JETTIES BY PASSENGERS : \nYEAR 2015\nS/N NAME OF JETTIES NUMBER OF PASSENGER\n1 ADDAX 917,171\n2 ALEX 1,030,051\n3 AGBOYI KETU 481,829\n4 BADORE 440,318\n5 BAYEKU 929,651\n6 CMS 813,075\n7 COCONUT 1,381,738\n8 ELEGBATA 502,209\n9 EPE 277,693\n10 FALOMO 105,052\n11 IJEDE 893,743\n12 IJEGUN EGBA 1,730,047\n13 IJORA 47,703\n14 IYA AFIN 766,247\n15 LAGBASA 317,707\n16 LIVERPOOL 1,709,951\n19 METRO FERRY 367,308\n18 ORIGIN 762,093\n19 OJO 1,047,844\n20 OWORONSHOKI -\n21 IBESHE 56,630\n22 OKE IRA NLA 547,450\n23 SAGBOKOJI 1,191,409\n24 SLAVE ROUTE 249,348\n25 TAKWA BAY 879,228\n26 TIN CAN 1,406,342\nTOTAL 18,851,837\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\n210\nTABLE 144: NAME OF FERRY JETTIES BY PASSENGERS : \nYEAR 2016\nS/N NAME OF JETTIES NUMBER OF PASSENGER\n1 ADDAX 383,332\n2 ALEX 854,546\n3 AGBOYI KETU 498,633\n4 BADORE 441,370\n5 BAYEKU 561,928\n6 CMS 732,807\n7 COCONUT 859,631\n8 ELEGBATA 119,465\n9 EPE 299,922\n10 FALOMO 110,987\n11 IJEDE 666,543\n12 IJEGUN EGBA 909,125\n13 IJORA 18,668\n14 IYA AFIN 865,763\n15 LAGBASA 152,288\n16 LIVERPOOL 1,480,432\n17 EBUTE IKORODO 682,337\n18 OJO 334,559\n19 IBESHE 61,270\n20 OKE IRA NLA 590,629\n21 SAGBOKOJI 943,421\n22 SLAVE ROUTE 428,914\n23 TAKWA BAY 485,004\n24 TIN CAN 1,306,055\n13,787,629\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\n211\nTABLE 145: NAME OF FERRY JETTIES BY PASSENGERS : \nYEAR 2017\nTOTAL\nS/N NAME OF JETTIES NUMBER OF PASSENGER\n1 ALEX 837,425\n2 AGBOYI KETU 521,448\n3 BADORE 328,175\n4 BAYEKU 609,530\n5 CMS 726,929\n6 COCONUT 833,490\n7 ELEGBATA 175,916\n8 EPE 306,060\n9 FALOMO 113,879\n10 IJEDE 682,823\n11 IJEGUN EGBA 993,541\n12 IJORA 19,448\n13 IYA AFIN 851,305\n14 LAGBASA 127,590\n15 LIVERPOOL 1,172,957\n16 EBUTE IKORODU 755,367\n17 OJO 394,106\n18 IBESHE 68713\n19 OKE IRA NLA 666,338\n20 SAGBOKOJI 849,962\n21 SLAVE ROUTE 466,548\n22 TAKWA BAY 422,125\n23 TIN CAN 1,211,935\n13,135,610\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\n212\nTABLE 146: NAME OF FERRY JETTIES BY PASSENGERS : \nYEAR 2018\nTOTAL\nS/N NAME OF JETTIES NUMBER OF PASSENGERS\n1 ALEX 771,079\n2 AGBOYI KETU 489,073\n3 BADORE JETTY 315,723\n4 BAYEKU JETTY 652,875\n5 CMS 734,531\n6 COCONUT 841,780\n7 ELEGBATA JETTY 208,535\n8 EPE JETTY 290,246\n9 EBUTE IKORODU 655,169\n10 FALOMO 131,058\n11 IBESHE 33,512\n12 IJEDE 599,776\n13 IJEGUN EGBA 1,104,421\n14 IJORA 12,813\n15 IYAFIN JETTY 856,269\n16 LIVERPOOL 1,126,749\n17 LANGBASA 168,751\n18 OWOROSHOKI\n19 OKE IRA NLA JETTY 709,595\n20 OJO TERMINAL 660,731\n21 SAGBOKOJI JETTY 836,938\n22 SLAVE ROUTE 458,078\n23 TAKWABAY 547,698\n24 TINCAN 836,023\n 13,041,423\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\n 213\nTOTAL\nTABLE 147: NAME OF FERRY JETTIES BY PASSENGERS : \nYEAR 2019\nORIGIN DESTINATION TARGET ACTUAL\n1 Ebute- Ikorodu Lagos Island 48\n 2,838 3,840 30'\nBadore\nAddax\nFalomo\n25'\nElegbata\n35'\n3 Baiyeku Lagos Island\n3 1,000 837 20'\n4\nLangbasa\nBaiyeku\n8 800 634 14'\n5\nBadore\nAddax/Island\n4 2,000 1,839 15'\n6 Lagos Island Ibeshe/Offin\n3 300 257 25'\n7 Oke Ira Nla Baiyeku\n3 2,400 2,431 10'\nAgboyi 1\n5'\nAgboyi 2\n3'\nOko Agbon\n10'\nFalomo\nAddax\nElegbata\nCMS\n10 Falomo Apapa\n10 400 462 15'\n95 16,980 14,410 \nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\n214\nTABLE 148 : NUMBER OF FERRY ROUTES BY PASSENGERS : YEAR 2017\nNAME OF ROUTE\nAVERAGE NUMBER OF \nPASSENGERS PER DAY \nFOR THE ROUTE\nSub-Total\n 2,777\n 2,077\n 258\nS/N\n2\n8\n9\nIjede\nAgboyi Ketu\nIbeshe\nNUMBER OF \nFERRIES \nDESIGNATED \nTO THE \nROUTE\n5\n5\n6\n 3,000\n 3,000\n 240\nAVERAGE \nTIME \nTAKEN PER \nTRIP\n20'\n20'\nORIGIN DESTINATION TARGET ACTUAL\n11 Takwa Bay CMS\n17 2,040 1,612 8'\nItumagan\n5'\nIgboalejo\n8'\nIlutuntun\n11'\nKandomen\n14'\nTomoron\n16'\nEbute Ojo\n10 20'\n13 Sabokoji Alex\n20 4,000 3,514 5'\n14 Ijegun Egba Ibeshe/Ibasa\n20 6,000 4,146 5'\n15 Iya Afin Izigi\n10 4,000 3,566 10'\nOndo\n2hrs30'\nIwopin\n35'\nFaga\n30'\nEmina\n40'\nAbomiti\n45'\nMakoko\n15'\nBishopkoji\n25'\n18 Slave Route Gberefun\n6 2,400 1,914 4'\n19 Coconut Igbologun\n32 4,480 3,582 10'\n156 32,420 25,413 \n251 49,400 39,823\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\n215\nTABLE 148 (CONTD): NUMBER OF FERRY ROUTES BY PASSENGERS : YEAR 2017 \nNAME OF ROUTE\nAVERAGE NUMBER OF \nPASSENGERS PER DAY \nFOR THE ROUTE\nSub-Total\nGRAND TOTAL\n 5,751\n 1,250\n 78\nS/N\n12\n16\n17\nLiverpool\nEpe Ayetoro\nIjora\nNUMBER OF \nFERRIES \nDESIGNATED \nTO THE \nROUTE\n25\n5\n11\n 7,000\n 1,500\n 1,000\nAVERAGE \nTIME \nTAKEN PER \nTRIP\nORIGIN DESTINATION TARGET ACTUAL\nBadore\nOke Ira Nla\nVI/ Falomo\nElegbata\nBadore\n10'\nOke Ira Nla\n15'\nVI/ Falomo\n25'\nElegbata\n15'\nLanbgasa\nOke Ira Nla\nVI/ Falomo\n25'\nElegbata\n30'\nAgboyi 1\n10'\nAgboyi 2\n5'\nOko Agbon\n5'\nVI/ Falomo\nApapa\nElegbata\nCMS\nBadagry 45'\nBishopkoji\nOgogoro Village\nTakwa Bay 15'\nApapa 15'\nIjede 30'\nBariga 20'\nIkorodu\n25'\nOfin 20'\nSabokoji\nManager\n199 21,445 20,004 \nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\n216\nNAME OF ROUTE\nAVERAGE NUMBER OF \nPASSENGERS PER DAY \nFOR THE ROUTE\nSub-Total\n 3,147\n 2,845\n 2,539\n 2,174\n 286\n 5,049\n 475\n 3,489\nS/N\n1\n2\n3\n4\n5\n6\n7\n8\nEbute- Ikorodu\nIjede\nBayeku\nAgboyi Ketu\nIbeshe\nCMS\nFalomo\nAlex\nNUMBER OF \nFERRIES \nDESIGNATED \nTO THE \nROUTE\n68\n12\n12\n8\n4\n43\n11\n41\n 3,400\n 3,600\n 2,880\n 2,365\n 320\n 5,160\n 440\n 3,280\nTABLE 149: NUMBER OF FERRY ROUTES BY PASSENGERS : YEAR 2018\nAVERAGE \nTIME \nTAKEN PER \nTRIP\n35'\n10'\n25'\n10'\n5'\nORIGIN DESTINATION TARGET ACTUAL\n9 Temidire Tincan First Gate\n2 4,000 5,049 5'\nItumagan\nIgbo Elejo\nBadagry\n45'\nKandomen\nTomoron\nAgbara\n35'\nEbute Ojo\n25'\nIgbologun\n10'\nSnake Island\n15'\n12 Slave Route Point of no return\n12 2,040 1,944 5'\nIbasa\n5'\nIbese\n10'\nRainbow 2\n5'\nIrewe\n12'\nAgaja\n15'\nCoconut\nTincan\n15 Iya Afin Isigi\n20 3,600 3,548 15'\nVI/ Falomo\nElegbata\nOndo 120'\nIwopin 30'\nFaga\nEmina\nAbomiti 12'\n210 29,440 26,497 \n409 50,885 46,501\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\n217\nTABLE 149(CONTD): NUMBER OF FERRY ROUTES BY PASSENGERS : YEAR 2018 \nNAME OF ROUTE\nAVERAGE NUMBER OF \nPASSENGERS PER DAY \nFOR THE ROUTE\nSub-Total\nGRAND TOTAL\nS/N\n10\n11\n13\n14\n16\n17\nLiverpool\nCoconut\nIjegun Egba\nOjo\nOfin\nEpe\nNUMBER OF \nFERRIES \nDESIGNATED \nTO THE \nROUTE\n55\n15\n43\n39\n4\n20\n 7,000\n 3,000\n 6,000\n 1,560\n 640\n 1,600\n 4,889\n 3,473\n 4,140\n 1,643\n 536\n 1,275\nAVERAGE \nTIME \nTAKEN PER \nTRIP\n10'\n15'\n25'\n20'\n10'\nORIGIN DESTINATION TARGET ACTUAL \n1 ALEX SAGBOKOJI,MANAGER 35 800 575 10' 100\n2 AGBOYI KETU OKO AGBON, AGBOYI 1 AND AGBOYI 2 8 750 360 5' 100\n3 BADORE JETTY IJEDE AND VI 6 2,500 1,099 10', 30' 350, 800\n4 BAYEKU JETTY VI,OKE IRA NLA,LANGBASA 5 3,000 1,706 15', 25' 300, 700\n5 CMS\nSAGBOKOJI,BISHOP \nKOJI,APAPA,LIVERPOOL AND IKORODU 20 3,500 2,060 15', 28' 200 700\n6 COCONUT IGBOLOGUN 25 3,500 2,400 15', 23' 100\n7 ELEGBATA JETTY\nEBUTE \nIKORODU,OFFIN,BAYEKU,IJEDE,EBUTE \nOJO AND BADAGRY 65 2,000 598 25' 700\n8 EPE JETTY\nOLOMI,IGBOGUN,OBADA,IWOPIN,LEKKI \nODE \nOMI,AWODIKORA,EBA,IROKUN,IGBO \nAPAWA,ABOMUTI,ABA \nALAYE,SAGA,{(ONDO),AGBALA \nOLOPEMEJI,IGBO EDU,AGERIGE} 25 1,500 873 75' 500, 2000\n9 EBUTE IKORODU VI, ELEGBATA, APAPA CMS 66 5,500 3,855 30' 700\n10 FALOMO EBUTE IKORODU,OFFIN,BAYEKU,IJEDE 58 1,500 455 30' 700\n11 IBESHE VI, ELEGBATA, CMS 4 500 156 23' 700\n12 IJEDE ELEGBATA 10 4,000 1,907 30', 15' 800, 350\n13 IJEGUN EGBA IBASA,IBESHE E, ILASHE 46 4,500 2,774 15' 100,200,300\n14 IJORA ELEGBATA, MAKOKO,CMS 6 300 89 15' 200\n15 IYAFIN JETTY IZIGI 9 3,500 2,352 15' 200\n16 LIVERPOOL\nEBUTE OJO, IJEGUN,ITUNAGAN,IGBO \nELEJO,SAGBOKOJI,BADAGRY,ETEGBIN,\nCMS AND AGBARA 62 4,000 2,774 30', 55' 900, 1,300\n17 LANGBASA BAYEKU JETTY 3 600 367 15' 400\n18 OWOROSHOKI VI 150 20 20'\n19 OKE IRA NLA JETTY BAYEKU JETTY,IJEDE 3 3,500 1,852 15' 400\n20 OJO TERMINAL\nIREWE,IKARE,IBESHE,APAPA,AGAJA \nAND CMS,EBUTE ERO 45 3,500 2,512 15', 28' 300, 700\n21 SAGBOKOJI JETTY ALEX,CMS 21 3,500 2,380 15' 100, 200\n22 SLAVE ROUTE POINT OF NO RETURN, 8 2,000 1,275 5' 100\n23 TAKWABAY\nCMS,LIVERPOOL,APAPA AND OUTSIDE \nBAR 42 2,000 912 18' 300, 500\n24 TINCAN OJO,TEMIDIRE 32 5,500 3,484 20', 5' 700, 500\n604 62,100 36,835\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\n218\nAVERAGE \nCHARGES \nPER TRIP \nN\nTABLE 150: NUMBER OF FERRY ROUTES BY PASSENGERS : YEAR 2019\n NAME OF ROUTE\nAVERAGE NUMBER OF \nPASSENGERS PER DAY \nFOR THE ROUTE\nTOTAL\nS/N \nNUMBER OF \nFERRIES \nDESIGNATED \nTO THE \nROUTE\nAVERAGE \nTIME TAKEN \nPER TRIP \n(MIN.)\n2015 2016 2017 2018 2019\nJANUARY 2 3 - - 1 6\nFEBRUARY - 1 - - 2 3\nMARCH 1 1 - - 0 2\nAPRIL - - 1 - 2 3\nMAY - - - - 0 0\nJUNE 2 - - 3 4 9\nJULY 3 - - 1 4\nAUGUST 2 - 2 - 1 5\nSEPTEMBER 4 1 - - 0 5\nOCTOBER 4 - 3 - 0 7\nNOVEMBER - - - 2 1 3\nDECEMBER 1 - - - 2 3\nTOTAL 19 6 6 6 13 50\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\n219\nTABLE 151: STATISTICS ON WATER ACCIDENTS RECORDED BY \nLAGOS STATE WATERWAYS AUTHORITY: YEAR 2015- 2019\nYEAR\nMONTH TOTAL\n2015 2016 2017 2018 2019\nJANUARY - 8 - - 2 10\nFEBRUARY - 4 - - - 4\nMARCH - - - - - -\nAPRIL - - - - 1 1\nMAY - - - - - -\nJUNE - - - - 22 22\nJULY 7 - - - - 7\nAUGUST 7 - 4 - 5 16\nSEPTEMBER 15 - - - - 15\nOCTOBER - - - - - -\nNOVEMBER - - - 31 5 36\nDECEMBER 1 - - - 8 9\nTOTAL 30 12 4 31 43 120\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\n220\nTABLE 152: STATISTICS ON PERSONS INJURED IN WATER \nACCIDENTS RECORDED BY LAGOS STATE WATERWAYS \nAUTHORITY: YEAR 2015- 2019\nYEAR\nMONTH TOTAL\nMONTH NUMBER\nJANUARY 2\nFEBRUARY\nMARCH\nAPRIL 1\nMAY\nJUNE 1\nJULY -\nAUGUST -\nSEPTEMBER -\nOCTOBER -\nNOVEMBER 5\nDECEMBER -\nTOTAL 9\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\n221\nTABLE 153: STATISTICS ON PERSONS INJURED IN WATER ACCIDENTS \nRECORDED BY LAGOS STATE WATERWAYS AUTHORITY: YEAR 2019\nMONTH NUMBER\nJANUARY -\nFEBRUARY 3\nMARCH -\nAPRIL 2\nMAY -\nJUNE 21\nJULY -\nAUGUST 5\nSEPTEMBER -\nOCTOBER -\nNOVEMBER -\nDECEMBER 3\nTOTAL 34\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\n222\nTABLE 154: STATISTICS ON PERSONS KILLED IN WATER ACCIDENTS \nRECORDED BY LAGOS STATE WATERWAYS AUTHORITY: YEAR 2019\n TYPES OF ACCIDENT \nFATAL SERIOUS MINOR TOTAL \n34 4 5 43\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\nCASUALTY \nMALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL\n28 6 34 1 8 9\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority\n223\nTABLE 155: TYPE OF BOAT/FERRY ACCIDENTS RECORDED BY LAGOS \nSTATE WATERWAYS AUTHORITY: YEAR 2019\nTABLE 156: NUMBER OF RECORDED CASUALTIES BY GENDER IN BOAT/FERRY \nACCIDENTS: YEAR 2019\nDEAD INJURED\nGRAND \nTOTAL\n43\nTABLE 156: NUMBER OF RECORDED CASUALTIES BY GENDER IN BOAT/FERRY \nTABLE 157: LIST OF FERRY OPERATORS BY LOCATION IN LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2018 \nS/N NAME OF OPERATOR/VESSEL LOCATION\n1 MUHAMODU SEKONI\n2 SABITU BELLO \n3 SALIU IBRAHEEM\n4 SAKA SEKONI\n5 ABASS WAHAAB\n6 SHEREEF BELLO\n7 IDOWU AKIBU\n8 ALAUSA GBANGBOSE\n9 SOLIU BELLO\n10 SOLIUN AKINBU\n11 YOKOR YOKER\n12 LATECOR MARINE\n13 OMO OBA 1\n14 MKKEY MARINE\n15 MORE MONEY\n16 CHIET EOUWPOBENDOM\n17 MFM\n18 MTAININE\n19 T.O.K MARINE\n20 AWAJIS\n21 OWA ABAYO\n22 AWAJIS\n23 PRESSY MARINE\n24 IDEBU\n25 IBRAHIM\n26 YUSUF\n27 SUNNY\n28 MICHEL\n29 BAABATUNDE\n30 ABUDU\n31 SAMSON\n32 BENARD\n33 PETER\n34 SILAS\n35 PUAL\n36 SEGUN\n224\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority \nIREDE\nTAKWA BAY\nIJEDE\nYAFIN\nTABLE 157 (CONTD): LIST OF FERRY OPERATORS BY LOCATION IN LAGOS STATE \nS/N NAME OF OPERATOR/VESSEL LOCATION\n37 SAMUEL\n38 SHINA\n39 SEJIRO\n40 SEWEDO\n41 SUNDAY\n42 PESU\n43 SEUN\n44 OPEYEMI\n45 ROMEO\n46 SARA\n47 SUNDAY\n48 STEVENE\n49 SUNDAY\n50 RAMONI\n51 BENABEI\n52 HABEEB\n53 VICTOR\n54 STEVENE\n55 TENTINO\n56 AYBEE\n57 SAMSONDEEN\n58 YOKER\n59 LATECO MARINE\n60 MICKEY MARINE \n61 MORE MONEY\n62 CHIEF EDUKPO BENJAMIN\n63 AWAJIS\n64 ONA ABAYO\n65 MFM\n66 MF DIVINE\n67 PRESSY MARINE\n225\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority \nSLAVE ROUTE\nCMS\nTABLE 157 (CONTD): LIST OF FERRY OPERATORS BY LOCATION IN LAGOS STATE \nS/N NAME OF OPERATOR/VESSEL LOCATION\n68 ANUMU\n69 BAALE\n70 ADOF\n71 BABA MARRY\n72 SUNDAY\n73 WAZO\n74 LANGBANSA\n75 DAISI\n76 WISDOM\n77 JUWON\n78 MR. ALEX\n79 SHOLA\n80 KEHINDE\n81 F.O\n82 PRINCE BAYO\n83 IBUKUN\n84 SHOLA\n85 MAYOWA\n86 UNCLE ELISHA\n87 JAMES\n88 MAVELOUS\n89 BABA BILIK\n90 PRINCE IWALOKUN\n91 OLATUNBOSUN\n92 JACK\n93 ORIS\n94 KUNLE\n95 OMONIYI\n96 TAIWO\n97 GBOGBO ILE\n98 GANIU\n99 ABEBE\n100 ALBOL\n101 WASIU\n102 GILO\n103 MUFO\n104 EDEMA\n105 JUJU\n106 OMONOJO\n107 ABOI\n108 BABA IFE\n109 SAMSON\n110 RAFIU\n111 SEMIU\n112 SULAIMON\n113 WASIU\n114 FATAI\n115 FATAI\n116 KEYINDE\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority \n226\nLIVEROOL\nTABLE 157 (CONTD): LIST OF FERRY OPERATORS BY LOCATION IN LAGOS STATE \nS/N NAME OF OPERATOR/VESSEL LOCATION\n117 ABDULAZEEZ\n118 SULAIMON\n119 TAIYE OGUNGBE\n120 SHANISON\n121 BASHIRU\n122 KAREEM\n123 WALIU\n124 IDRIS\n125 SOLIU\n126 SOLIU\n127 MUMUNI\n128 LATEEF\n129 RAFIU\n130 RASAK\n131 RASHEED\n132 TOPE\n133 GBASU\n134 SUNDAY\n135 EBEL\n136 RASAK\n137 ADE\n138 TAIYE \n139 ROTIMI\n140 SEGUN\n141 SHAMSON\n142 BOLANLE\n143 ABEY\n144 ILIAS\n145 BELLO\n146 IDOWU\n147 KASANU\n148 TAIYE\n149 PADONU\n150 SULAIMON\n151 JOHN\n152 JELILI\n153 MUSIBAU\n154 PETER\n227\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority \nEBUTE OJO\nTABLE 157 (CONTD): LIST OF FERRY OPERATORS BY LOCATION IN LAGOS STATE \nS/N NAME OF OPERATOR/VESSEL LOCATION\n155 MUSIBAU\n156 OLA IYA\n157 BABA ISHAU\n158 AWOTUNDE\n159 SHEGUN\n160 MUSTAPHA\n161 AKEBAJE\n162 SALIU\n163 IGWE\n164 ELEMERE\n165 MUSA\n166 AY CEO\n167 SAKA\n168 MUTIU\n169 AINO\n170 ANGEL\n171 S.O.J\n172 ALUFA\n173 TITILOPE\n174 TUMIWA\n175 MUTIU\n176 OMOLEWA\n177 ORELOPE\n178 K.SO\n179 OMO OBA 1\n180 OMO OBA 3\n181 WEATAN\n182 WAIBO\n183 OLORUNWA\n184 TWICE\n185 JERRA\n186 TATTA\n187 YEKINE\n188 AJAKA\n189 ROMARRIO\n190 GAFARU\n191 HANO\n192 GOD DAY\n193 SAHBA\n194 KAZEEME\n195 FRIDAY\n196 MARTAYAS\n228\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority \nCOCONUT\nSABOKOJI\nTABLE 157 (CONTD): LIST OF FERRY OPERATORS BY LOCATION IN LAGOS STATE \nS/N NAME OF OPERATOR/VESSEL LOCATION\n197 KOLA\n198 BAYO\n199 ENIYAN\n200 OMOLAYE\n201 SEYI\n202 PENTICOST\n203 HAPPY\n204 ADEOLA\n205 MERCY\n206 JOSE\n207 MONDAY\n208 KEHINDE\n209 FEMI\n210 KOLA\n211 YOMI\n212 ABIJA\n213 PAPA\n214 EBIKEL\n215 OBI\n216 ADEOYE\n217 OGOLONO\n218 DELE\n219 APOSTLE\n220 BABA .70\n221 ROTIMI\n222 BENARD\n223 OFFICER\n224 OMOLERE\n225 OBAT\n226 SUNDAY\n227 HENRY\n228 WASIU\n229 SULE\n230 SOLA\n231 A.Y\n232 ENI\n233 ADEMOLA\n234 LUKAY\n235 LEYE\n236 BLESSING\n237 KWAWE\n238 BODE\n239 EDMORE\n240 SAMUEL\n241 ONOLA\n242 EMIE\n243 LADOL\n244 NURU MILL II\n245 ENE\n246 BE-GOOD\n247 MR. TOHEEB\n248 MRS. OLA\n249 OBODO 1 CAPTAIN\n250 TOLU\n251 FRANCIS\n252 OBODO 2 CAPTAIN\n253 LASTBORN\n254 ALAPA\n229\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority \nEBUTE IKORODU\nALEX\nOKE IRA\nS/N NAME OF OPERATOR/VESSEL LOCATION\n1 MAKARIOUS IKORODU\n2 FORT CRUISE IKORODU\n3 SUPREME IKORODU\n4 DIVINE BLESSING 3 IKORODU\n5 THE LORD IS MY SHEPHERD IKORODU\n6 YELLOW GUDDER IKORODU\n7 BELL MARINE 1 IKORODU\n8 GROOVELINE IKORODU\n9 NIBIZO IKORODU\n10 ID SMADAS IKORODU\n11 AKINS IKORODU\n12 TIDE BREAKER-MTN IKORODU\n13 ANOT IKORODU\n14 DESTINY IKORODU\n15 MOAB FERRY IKORODU\n16 BELL MARINE 2 IKORODU\n17 LALEK VENTURES IKORODU\n18 LITTLE CEASER IKORODU\n19 G&D IKORODU\n20 G T WATERLINE IKORODU\n21 OOREYEMI IKORODU\n22 DALACHI IKORODU\n23 T.BEN IKORODU\n24 GOLDEN GLORY 3 IKORODU\n25 MOAB 2 IKORODU\n26 CARROLL IKORODU\n27 MADONNAL IKORODU\n28 DERETAN IKORODU\n29 HERITAGE MARINE IKORODU\n30 FAZMA IKORODU\n31 GOODNESS IKORODU\n32 MOAB 4 IKORODU\n33 GIDI IKORODU\n34 THE LORD IS MY SHEPHERD IKORODU\n35 SAVVY 2 IKORODU\n36 WAXI IKORODU\n37 GOD PROTECTION 2 IKORODU\n38 SEALINK 2 IKORODU\n39 AL-FISCO IKORODU\n230\nTABLE 158: LIST OF FERRY OPERATIONS BY LOCATION IN LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority \nS/N NAME OF OPERATOR/VESSEL LOCATION\n40 TOLKHEN VENTURES IKORODU\n41 AKINS IKORODU\n42 G&D IKORODU\n43 OPEMIPO IKORODU\n44 DIVINE BLESSING 3 IKORODU\n45 BELL MARINE IKORODU\n46 GROOVELINE 2 IKORODU\n47 BELL MARINE IKORODU\n48 MAKARIOIUS IKORODU\n49 BOFFARK IKORODU\n50 BELL MARINE 1 IKORODU\n51 GROOVELINE IKORODU\n52 GT WATERLINE IKORODU\n53 AGBOYI 1 AGBOYI KETU\n54 AGBOYI 2 AGBOYI KETU\n55 OKO AGBON AGBOYI KETU\n56 OKO AGBON2 AGBOYI KETU\n57 PAPER SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n58 AWOTO SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n59 IPOUT SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n60 POPO SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n61 BLESSING SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n62 GEBEL SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n63 ALEX SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n64 LADOL SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n65 MUSHER SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n66 JESUTO SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n67 APOLARI SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n68 EDWARD SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n69 OJU EKO SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n70 APOLARI SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n71 PHILIP SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n72 EDWARD SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n73 ONORE SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n74 BLESSING SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n75 SUNDAY SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n76 JESUFUN SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n77 OLAMIDE SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n78 PROSPER 2 SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n79 BLESSING SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n231\nTABLE 158 (CONTD): LIST OF FERRY OPERATIONS BY LOCATION IN LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority \nS/N NAME OF OPERATOR/VESSEL LOCATION\n80 MONDAY SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n81 ABRAHAM SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n82 GODDAY SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n83 PROSPER 1 SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n84 JOHN SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n85 ABOTO SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n86 AKEEM SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n87 PAKO BOAT20 SAGBOKOJI JETTY\n89 BORIPE ETEGBIN\n90 OCEAN CROWN 1 ETEGBIN\n91 WOODEN BOAT ETEGBIN\n92 HOLY APOSTLE 1 ETEGBIN\n93 WOODEN BOAT ETEGBIN\n94 HOLY APOSTLE 2 ETEGBIN\n95 WOODEN BOAT ETEGBIN\n96 IBUKUN OLUWA ETEGBIN\n97 WOODEN BOAT ETEGBIN\n98 WOODEN BOAT ETEGBIN\n99 WOODEN BOAT ETEGBIN\n100 WOODEN BOAT ETEGBIN\n101 WOODEN BOAT ETEGBIN\n102 AYODELE ETEGBIN\n103 WOODEN BOAT ETEGBIN\n104 OCEAN CROWN 2 ETEGBIN\n105 ADELEKAN ETEGBIN\n106 WOODEN BOAT ETEGBIN\n107 WOODEN BOAT ETEGBIN\n108 DON S MARINE 1 ETEGBIN\n109 SIM TOP ETEGBIN\n110 WOODEN BOAT ETEGBIN\n111 DON S MARINE 2 ETEGBIN\n112 WOODEN BOAT ETEGBIN\n113 WOODEN BOAT ETEGBIN\n114 WOODEN BOAT ETEGBIN\n115 WOODEN BOAT ETEGBIN\n116 AIYEPE ETEGBIN\n118 ALLAHA MARINE EBUTE OJO\n119 ALLHUMA AMIN EBUTE OJO\n120 OPEYEMI 1 EBUTE OJO\n121 OLUWASEUN EBUTE OJO\n232\nTABLE 158 (CONTD): LIST OF FERRY OPERATIONS BY LOCATION IN LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority \nS/N NAME OF OPERATOR/VESSEL LOCATION\n122 ABIOLA EBUTE OJO\n123 DEAMILOLA EBUTE OJO\n124 AIYELOJA EBUTE OJO\n125 SOLUTION EBUTE OJO\n126 SIR YOUNG EBUTE OJO\n127 ESE EBUTE OJO\n128 NEXT LEVEL EBUTE OJO\n129 CHARLY BOY EBUTE OJO\n130 VEDCELE EBUTE OJO\n131 LAND NACO EBUTE OJO\n132 EXODUS EBUTE OJO\n133 SOLUTION EBUTE OJO\n134 A.P EBUTE OJO\n135 OPEYEMI EBUTE OJO\n136 ECLO LIMA EBUTE OJO\n137 OLUWASEUN EBUTE OJO\n138 OPEYEMI 2 EBUTE OJO\n139 OLUWANISHOLA 3 EBUTE OJO\n140 DE CONQUEROR EBUTE OJO\n141 ADEX EBUTE OJO\n142 MINSTRY EBUTE OJO\n143 OPEYEMI EBUTE OJO\n144 ODUNAYO EBUTE OJO\n146 Tarzan 1 BADORE\n147 Tarzan 2 BADORE\n148 Tarzan 3 BADORE\n149 Tarzan 4 BADORE\n151 TREASURE BAYEKU\n152 OLUWALOGBON BAYEKU\n153 OBODO BAYEKU\n154 ORISUMBARE BAYEKU\n155 LANGBASA 2 BAYEKU\n156 OBODO 2 BAYEKU\n157 TREASURE BAYEKU\n159 ANTORENCE MARINE IJEDE\n160 BAMAERD GLOBAL SOLUTION IJEDE\n161 TARZAN IJEDE\n163 KOKO LIVERPOOL\n164 THE WIL B DONE LIVERPOOL\n165 AIYEPE LIVERPOOL\n233\nTABLE 158 (CONTD): LIST OF FERRY OPERATIONS BY LOCATION IN LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority \nS/N NAME OF OPERATOR/VESSEL LOCATION\n166 MONEY MONEY LIVERPOOL\n167 GBOYEGA LIVERPOOL\n168 SANI LIVERPOOL\n169 BABA SHADE LIVERPOOL\n170 ALBERT LIVERPOOL\n171 DEWUNMI LIVERPOOL\n172 OTUN LIVERPOOL\n173 CELESTINE LIVERPOOL\n174 PAPA LIVERPOOL\n175 EZE KING LIVERPOOL\n176 WAZO LIVERPOOL\n177 SUCCESS D LIVERPOOL\n178 ANUMU LIVERPOOL\n179 EVER GREEN LIVERPOOL\n180 EDEMA LIVERPOOL\n181 SHIMAMA LIVERPOOL\n182 GOD GLORY LIVERPOOL\n183 STACKS LIVERPOOL\n184 KENNY LIVERPOOL\n185 OBA LIVERPOOL\n186 OYINBO LIVERPOOL\n187 OLUWASEUN LIVERPOOL\n188 OPEYEMI LIVERPOOL\n189 BENUA LIVERPOOL\n190 SOLO LIVERPOOL\n191 JAMES LIVERPOOL\n192 AMS LIVERPOOL\n193 MERCY LIVERPOOL\n194 FOREMAN LIVERPOOL\n195 HAPPY LIVERPOOL\n196 OLUWATOBI LIVERPOOL\n197 SHOLLYBEST LIVERPOOL\n198 BAYELSA LIVERPOOL\n199 HALELUYAH LIVERPOOL\n200 OPEYEMI 7 LIVERPOOL\n201 ACTION LIVERPOOL\n202 KAPO LIVERPOOL\n203 ODODO LIVERPOOL\n204 OLUWALA LIVERPOOL\n205 PSALM 35 LIVERPOOL\n234\nTABLE 158 (CONTD): LIST OF FERRY OPERATIONS BY LOCATION IN LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority \nS/N NAME OF OPERATOR/VESSEL LOCATION\n206 ANY COLOUR LIVERPOOL\n207 ANTHONY LIVERPOOL\n208 OMONUWA LIVERPOOL\n209 BABA SUNDAY LIVERPOOL\n210 ALAFIA 1 LIVERPOOL\n211 EMMANUEL LIVERPOOL\n212 OPEYEMI LIVERPOOL\n213 ABIOLA LIVERPOOL\n214 GOD BLESS LIVERPOOL\n215 PETER LIVERPOOL\n216 SUNDAY LIVERPOOL\n217 MATHEW LIVERPOOL\n218 ANDOLF LIVERPOOL\n219 JOSHUAL LIVERPOOL\n220 ENERGY LIVERPOOL\n221 F & G LIVERPOOL\n222 ABBEY LIVERPOOL\n223 MODUPE LIVERPOOL\n224 BIOLUWA LIVERPOOL\n225 IMOLE AYO LIVERPOOL\n226 SEN MARINE LIVERPOOL\n227 SPAKO LIVERPOOL\n228 ISE LIVERPOOL\n229 ELISHA LIVERPOOL\n230 OLUWANISHOLA LIVERPOOL\n231 OLUWADAMILOLA LIVERPOOL\n232 FODILULAHI LIVERPOOL\n233 SEASIDE LIVERPOOL\n234 GOD GIFT LIVERPOOL\n235 TWINS LIVERPOOL\n236 F.A.M LIVERPOOL\n237 AYODELE LIVERPOOL\n238 ADEX LIVERPOOL\n239 DAMILOLA LIVERPOOL\n240 MINISTRY LIVERPOOL\n241 SIMPTOP LIVERPOOL\n242 ONLY GOD LIVERPOOL\n243 HARBARYOMMY LIVERPOOL\n244 AKOREDE LIVERPOOL\n245 BABA IBO LIVERPOOL\n235\nTABLE 158 (CONTD): LIST OF FERRY OPERATIONS BY LOCATION IN LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority \nS/N NAME OF OPERATOR/VESSEL LOCATION\n246 OLAIYA LIVERPOOL\n247 DAGOON PEACE LIVERPOOL\n248 YAH AAFAR LIVERPOOL\n249 SEKLE LIVERPOOL\n250 PAW PAW LIVERPOOL\n251 OTO AWORI LIVERPOOL\n252 EMMU LIVERPOOL\n253 OMO OBA LIVERPOOL\n254 CHALLENGE LIVERPOOL\n255 ONE WITH GOD LIVERPOOL\n256 ODUNAYO LIVERPOOL\n257 SEALINK 3 LIVERPOOL\n258 GOSHEN LIVERPOOL\n259 OCEAN CROWN LIVERPOOL\n260 OLAOLUWA LIVERPOOL\n261 BAKE LIVERPOOL\n262 NO GO SLOW LIVERPOOL\n263 PRESSY LIVERPOOL\n264 AIYEPE LIVERPOOL\n236\nTABLE 158 (CONTD): LIST OF FERRY OPERATIONS BY LOCATION IN LAGOS STATE: YEAR 2019\nSOURCE: Lagos State Waterways Authority \nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY - 58 - 2,320\n2 FEBRURARY - 57 - 2,280\n3 MARCH - 56 - 2,240\n4 APRIL - 57 - 2,166\n5 MAY - 55 - 2,035\n6 JUNE - 56 - 1,960\n7 JULY - 57 - 2,103\n8 AUGUST - 61 - 2,440\n9 SEPTEMBER - 62 - 2,294\n10 OCTOBER - 54 - 1,782\n11 NOVEMBER - 55 - 1,980\n12 DECEMBER - 50 - 1,600\n- 25,200\n237\nTABLE 159 : NUMBER OF BOATS BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS, \nLAGOS STATE: YEAR 2014\nTOTAL\nNUMBER OF BOATS/FERRIES \nOWNED BY\nNUMBER OF PASSENGERS\nSOURCE: National Inland Waterways Authority, Lagos Area Office\nS/N MONTH\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY - 120 - 108,000\n2 FEBRURARY - 122 - 109,800\n3 MARCH - 129 - 116,100\n4 APRIL - 131 - 117,900\n5 MAY - 131 - 113,400\n6 JUNE - 126 - 117,000\n7 JULY - 130 - 116,100\n8 AUGUST - 129 - 117,900\n9 SEPTEMBER - 131 - 119,700\n10 OCTOBER - 133 - 122,400\n11 NOVEMBER - 136 - 122,400\n12 DECEMBER - 136 - 122,400\n- 1,403,100\n238\nTABLE 160 : NUMBER OF BOATS BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS, \nLAGOS STATE: YEAR 2015\nTOTAL\nSOURCE: National Inland Waterways Authority, Lagos Area Office\nNUMBER OF BOATS/FERRIES \nOWNED BY\nNUMBER OF PASSENGERS\nS/N MONTH\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY - 133 - 6,353\n2 FEBRURARY - 117 - 5,777\n3 MARCH - 123 - 5,524\n4 APRIL - 111 - 5,000\n5 MAY - 117 - 5,777\n6 JUNE - 116 - 5,682\n7 JULY - 112 - 5,001\n8 AUGUST - 118 - 5,784\n9 SEPTEMBER - 121 - 5,217\n10 OCTOBER - 120 - 5,200\n11 NOVEMBER - 122 - 5,217\n12 DECEMBER - 114 - 5,523\n- 66,055\n239\nTABLE 161 : NUMBER OF BOATS BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS, \nLAGOS STATE: YEAR 2016\nSOURCE: National Inland Waterways Authority, Lagos Area Office\nNUMBER OF BOATS/FERRIES \nOWNED BY\nNUMBER OF PASSENGERS\nTOTAL\nS/N MONTH\nGOVERNMENT PRIVATE TARGET ACTUAL\n1 JANUARY - 117 - 5,777\n2 FEBRURARY - 113 - 5,431\n3 MARCH - 108 - 5,021\n4 APRIL - 102 - 5,000\n5 MAY - 119 - 5,784\n6 JUNE - 131 - 5,842\n7 JULY - 125 - 5,019\n8 AUGUST - 118 - 5,784\n9 SEPTEMBER - 122 - 5,217\n10 OCTOBER - 123 - 5,524\n11 NOVEMBER - 126 - 5,349\n12 DECEMBER - 119 - 5,200\n- 64,948\n240\nSOURCE: National Inland Waterways Authority, Lagos Area Office\nNUMBER OF BOATS/FERRIES \nOWNED BY\nNUMBER OF PASSENGERS\nTABLE 162 : NUMBER OF BOATS BY OWNERSHIP AND PASSENGERS, \nLAGOS STATE: YEAR 2017\nTOTAL\nS/N MONTH\nORIGIN DESTINATION TARGET ACTUAL\n1 CMS APAPA 2 - 1,380 10\n2 CMS EBUTE 10 - 200 30\n3 CMS MAJIDUN 8 - 160 30\n4 CMS BAYEKU 1 - 20 30\n5 CMS ORIGIN 9 - 180 30\n6 VICTORIA ISLAND EBUTE 9 - 180 35\n7 VICTORIA ISLAND MAJIDUN 10 - 200 35\n8 VICTORIA ISLAND BAYEKU 2 - 40 35\n9 VICTORIA ISLAND ORIGIN 6 - 120 35\n10 VICTORIA ISLAND IJEDE 4 - 80 35\n11 CMS IJEDE 3 - 60 30\n64 - 2,620 335\nORIGIN DESTINATION TARGET ACTUAL\n1 IKORODU CMS 49 - 1,470 40\n2 IKORODU VICTORIA ISLAND 54 - 1,620 40\n3 IKORODU APAPA 15 - 450 40\n4 CMS APAPA 4 - 120 5\n5 VICTORIA ISLAND IJEDE 5 - 150 60\n6 CMS BADORE 3 - 90 60\n7 CMS BAYEKU 6 - 180 60\n136 - 4,080 305\n241\nAVERAGE \nTIME TAKEN \nPER TRIP \n(MINUTES)\nTABLE 163: NUMBER OF BOAT/FERRY ROUTES BY PASSENGERS, LAGOS STATE : YEAR \n2014\nNAME OF ROUTE\nAVERAGE NUMBER \nOF PASSENGERS PER \nDAY FOR THE ROUTE\nTOTAL\nTABLE 164: NUMBER OF BOAT/FERRY ROUTES BY PASSENGERS, LAGOS STATE : YEAR \n2015\nS/N\nNUMBER OF \nBOATS/FERRIES \nDESIGNATED TO \nTHE ROUTE \nAVERAGE \nTIME TAKEN \nPER TRIP \n(MINUTES)\nS/N\nNUMBER OF \nBOATS/FERRIES \nDESIGNATED TO \nTHE ROUTE \nSOURCE: National Inland Waterways Authority, Lagos Area Office\nSOURCE: National Inland Waterways Authority, Lagos Area Office\nNAME OF ROUTE\nAVERAGE NUMBER \nOF PASSENGERS PER \nDAY FOR THE ROUTE\nTOTAL\nORIGIN DESTINATION TARGET ACTUAL\n1 IKORODU CMS 55 - 1,155 30\n2 IKORODU VI 54 - 2,268 30\n3 VI(MAROKO) IKOYI 12 - 144 5\n4 CMS APAPA 4 - 1,300 10\n5 AJAH IJEDE 5 - 210 30\n6 CMS BADORE 3 - 126 30\n7 LANGBASA IKORODU 6 - 144 60\n8 EBUTE ERO IKORODU 30 - 630 25\n9 SABOKO GI CMS 20 - 480 30\n10 CMS TAKWABAY 21 - 950 25\n210 - 7,407 275\nORIGIN DESTINATION TARGET ACTUAL\n1 IKORODU CMS 50 - 1,050 30\n2 IKORODU VI 47 - 1,087 30\n3 VI(MAROKO) IKOYI 3 - 96 5\n4 CMS APAPA 4 - 1,300 10\n5 AJAH IJEDE 5 - 110 30\n6 CMS BADORE 3 - 126 30\n7 LANGBASA IKORODU 6 - 144 60\n8 EBUTE ERO IKORODU 28 - 588 25\n9 SABOKO GI CMS 15 - 360 30\n10 CMS TAKWABAY 20 - 916 25\n181 - 5,777 275\n242\nAVERAGE \nTIME TAKEN \nPER TRIP \n(MINUTES)\nNAME OF ROUTE\nAVERAGE NUMBER \nOF PASSENGERS PER \nDAY FOR THE ROUTE S/N\nNUMBER OF \nBOATS/FERRIES \nDESIGNATED TO \nTHE ROUTE \nSOURCE: National Inland Waterways Authority, Lagos Area Office\nSOURCE: National Inland Waterways Authority, Lagos Area Office\nTOTAL\nTABLE 166: NUMBER OF BOAT/FERRY ROUTES BY PASSENGERS, LAGOS STATE : YEAR \n2017\nNAME OF ROUTE\nAVERAGE NUMBER \nOF PASSENGERS PER \nDAY FOR THE ROUTE\nTOTAL\nS/N\nNUMBER OF \nBOATS/FERRIES \nDESIGNATED TO \nTHE ROUTE \nAVERAGE \nTIME TAKEN \nPER TRIP \n(MINUTES)\nTABLE 165: NUMBER OF BOAT/FERRY ROUTES BY PASSENGERS, LAGOS STATE : YEAR \n2016\nPORTS 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019\nLagos Port Complex 1,510 1,503 1,410 1,183 19,799,086 1,151 1034\nTin Can Island Complex 1,615 1,692 1,656 1,529 14,333,787 1,350 1311\nRivers Port 609 435 373 314 3,508,391 312 325\nOnne Port Complex 439 847 741 669 26,434,936 681 726\nCalabar Port 823 269 306 206 2,253,012 174 165\nDelta Ports 373 603 528 469 6,845,915 507 690\nGrand Total (Nigeria) 5,369 5,349 5,014 4,370 73,175,127 4,175 4251\nTotal (Lagos State) 3,125 3,195 3,066 2,712 34,132,873 2,501 2345\nProportion of Lagos \nState to Nigeria 58.2 59.7 61.1 62.1 46.6 59.9 55.0\nPORTS 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019\nLagos port Complex 20,344,118 20,645,269 20,250,771 19,055,385 18,909,238 19,799,086 21\nTincan Island Port Complex 16,134,153 17,500,804 16,407,133 15,316,244 15,520,925 14,333,787 17\nRivers Port Complex 4,935,944 6,225,008 4,457,785 3,546,745 3,462,425 3,508,391 4\nOnne Port Comp;lex 24,773,387 27,968,861 26,314,828 23,896,730 25,836,246 26,434,936 27\nCalabar Port 1,732,286 2,361,477 2,127,259 2,277,477 2,159,099 2,253,012 2\nDelta Ports 10,361,746 10,199,169 7,708,399 6,726,511 6,015,333 6,845,915 9\nGrand Total (Nigeria) 78,281,634 84,900,588 77,266,175 70,819,092 71,903,266 73,175,127 80\nTotal (Lagos State) 36,478,271 38,146,073 36,657,904 34,371,629 34,430,163 34,132,873 38\nProportion of Lagos \nState to Nigeria 46.6 44.9 47.4 48.5 47.9 46.6 48.0\nPORTS 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019\nLagos port Complex 34,189,172 37,041,879 36,290,502 33,503,583 31,932,784 30,525,406 29\nTincan Island Port Complex 40,096,754 47,231,548 45,864,565 44,227,295 41,477,915 37,814,600 44\nRivers Port Complex 6,207,092 6,761,057 5,423,002 4,997,148 5,277,722 4,904,106 5\nOnne Port Comp;lex 38,612,995 43,916,846 44,053,589 39,802,364 42,818,946 42,977,511 44\nCalabar Port 2,834,884 4,008,361 3,796,652 4,142,830 3,880,058 4,050,302 4\nDelta Ports 8,687,160 7,860,797 5,822,393 6,800,324 6,182,396 8,399,880 12\nGrand Total (Nigeria) 130,628,057 146,820,488 141,250,703 133,473,544 131,569,821 128,671,805 138\nTotal (Lagos State) 74,285,926 84,273,427 82,155,067 77,730,878 73,410,699 68,340,006 73\nProportion of Lagos \nState to Nigeria 56.9 57.4 58.2 58.2 55.8 53.1 53.0\nSource: Nigerian Ports Authority\n243\nTABLE 167: NUMBER OF VESSELS (SHIP TRAFFIC) IN NIGERIA: YEAR 2013 - 2019\nTABLE 168: VOLUME OF CARGO THROUGHPUT (MILLION METRIC TONS): YEAR 2013 - 2019\nTABLE 169:SHIP TRAFFIC (GROSS REGISTERED TONNAGE IN MILLION): YEAR 2013 - 2019\nPORTS NUMBER OF VESSELS\nGROSS REGISTERED \nTONNAGE\nLagos Port Complex 1,154 31,614,347\nTin Can Island Complex 1,307 40,694,756\nRivers Port 309 5,405,540\nOnne Port Complex 671 42,563,511\nCalabar Port 403 3,992,370\nDelta Ports 448 6,086,833\nGrand Total (Nigeria) 4,292 130,357,357\nTotal (Lagos State) 2,461 72,309,103\nProportion of Lagos State \nto Nigeria 57.3 55.5\nPORTS NUMBER OF VESSELS\nGROSS REGISTERED \nTONNAGE\nLagos port Complex 1 2,876\nTincan Island Port Complex - -\nRivers Port Complex 484 451,050\nOnne Port Complex 1,916 3,671,556\nCalabar Port 37 5,905\nDelta Ports 8,212 1,453,773\nGrand Total (Nigeria) 10,650 5,585,160\nTotal (Lagos State) 1 2,876\nProportion of Lagos State \nto Nigeria 0.01 0.1\nPORTS INWARD OUTWARD THROUGHPUT\nLagos port Complex 17,533,020 1,566,670 19,099,690\nTincan Island Port Complex 14,580,670 883,715 15,464,385\nRivers Port Complex 2,407,704 1,129,169 3,536,873\nOnne Port Comp;lex 2,034,033 24,015,193 26,049,226\nCalabar Port 2,106,036 81,653 2,187,689\nDelta Ports 4,437,625 760,148 5,197,773\nGrand Total (Nigeria) 43,099,088 28,436,548 71,535,636\nTotal (Lagos State) 32,113,690 2,450,385 34,564,075\nProportion of Lagos State \nto Nigeria 74.5 8.6 48.3\nSource: Nigerian Ports Authority\n244\nTABLE 170: NUMBER AND GROSS REGISTERED TONNAGE(GRT) \nOF OCEAN GOING VESSELS IN NIGERIA PORTS: YEAR 2017 \nTABLE 171: NUMBER AND GROSS REGISTERED (GRT) OF \nSERVICE BOATS IN NIGERIAN PORTS: YEAR 2017\nTABLE 172: VOLUME OF CARGO THROUGHPUT (MILLION METRIC TONS) BY \nTRADE RECORDED BY NIGERIAN PORTS: YEAR 2017\nPORTS NUMBER OF VESSELS\nGROSS REGISTERED \nTONNAGE\nLAGOS PORT COMPLEX 1,151 30,525,406 \nTIN CAN ISLAND COMPLEX 1,350 37,814,600 \nRIVERS 312 4,904,106 \nONNE 681 42,977,511 \nCALABAR 174 4,050,302 \nDELTA 507 8,399,880 \nGrand Total (Nigeria) 4,175 128,671,805 \nTotal (Lagos State) 2,501 68,340,006\nProportion of Lagos State to \nNigeria 59.9 53.1\nPORTS NUMBER OF VESSELS\nGROSS REGISTERED \nTONNAGE\nLAGOS PORT COMPLEX - - \nTIN CAN ISLAND COMPLEX - - \nRIVERS 660,647 480 \nONNE 7,371,970 3,641 \nCALABAR 9,259 33 \nDELTA 2,267,604 11,166 \nGrand Total (Nigeria) 15,320 10,309,480 \nTotal (Lagos State) 0 0\nProportion of Lagos State to \nNigeria 0.0 0.0\nPORTS INWARD OUTWARD THROUGHPUT\nLAGOS PORT COMPLEX 18,658,026 1,231,060 19,799,086\nTIN CAN ISLAND COMPLEX 1,168,392 13,165,395 14,333,787\nRIVERS 404,097 3,104,294 3,508,391\nONNE 23,897,130 2,537,806 26,434,936\nCALABAR 83,170 2,169,842 2,253,012\nDELTA 1,192,297 5,653,618 6,845,915\nGrand Total (Nigeria) 45,288,981 27,976,146 73,175,127 \nTotal (Lagos State) 31,823,421 2,399,452 34,132,873 \nProportion of Lagos State to \nNigeria 8.6 70.3 46.6 \nSource: Nigerian Ports Authority\n245\nTABLE 173: NUMBER AND GROSS REGISTERED TONNAGE(GRT) OF OCEAN GOING \nVESSELS IN NIGERIAN PORTS: YEAR 2018 \nTABLE 174: NUMBER AND GROSS REGISTERED (GRT) OF \nSERVICE BOATS IN NIGERIAN PORTS: YEAR 2018\nTABLE 175: VOLUME OF CARGO THROUGHPUT (MILLION METRIC TONS) BY TRADE \nRECORDED BY NIGERIAN PORTS: YEAR 2018\nPORTS NUMBER OF VESSELS\nGROSS REGISTERED \nTONNAGE\nLAGOS PORT COMPLEX 1,034 29,446,754 \nTIN CAN ISLAND COMPLEX 1,311 44,231,391 \nRIVERS 325 5,134,445 \nONNE 726 43,749,724 \nCALABAR 165 3,609,967 \nDELTA 690 12,405,182 \nGrand Total (Nigeria) 4,251 138,577,463 \nTotal (Lagos State) 2,345 73,678,145\nProportion of Lagos State to \nNigeria 55% 53.0\nPORTS NUMBER OF VESSELS\nGROSS REGISTERED \nTONNAGE\nLAGOS PORT COMPLEX 279 344,349\nTIN CAN ISLAND COMPLEX 149 321,036\nRIVERS 248 265,763\nONNE 3,304 7,488,081\nCALABAR 17 2,123\nDELTA 11,084 1,973,733\nGrand Total (Nigeria) 15,081 10,395,085 \nTotal (Lagos State) 428 665,385\nProportion of Lagos State to \nNigeria (%) 2.8 6.0\nPORTS INWARD OUTWARD THROUGHPUT\nLAGOS PORT COMPLEX 1 20 21\nTIN CAN ISLAND COMPLEX 2 15 17\nRIVERS - 4 4\nONNE 24 3 27\nCALABAR - 2 2\nDELTA 3 6 9\nGrand Total (Nigeria) 50 30 80 \nTotal (Lagos State) 35 3 38 \nProportion of Lagos State to \nNigeria (%) 70.0 10.0 47.5\nSource: Nigerian Ports Authority\n246\nTABLE 178: VOLUME OF CARGO THROUGHPUT (MILLION METRIC TONS)BY TRADE \nRECORDED BY NIGERIAN PORTS: YEAR 2019\nTABLE 176: NUMBER AND GROSS REGISTERED TONNAGE(GRT) OF OCEAN GOING \nVESSELS IN NIGERIA PORTS: YEAR 2019 \nTABLE 177: NUMBER AND GROSS REGISTERED (GRT) OF \nSERVICE BOATS IN NIGERIAN PORTS: YEAR 2019\nTABLE 185: VOLUME OF CARGO THROUGHPUT (MILLION METRIC TONS) BY TYPE AT NIGERIAN PORTS: YEAR 2017\nINWARD OUTWARD INWARD OUTWARD INWARD OUTWARD\nLagos Port Complex 5,563,614 1,466,425 5,588,204 97,915 6,381,202 2,330 19,099,690\nTin Can Island Complex 5,866,090 883,715 2,319,578 - 6,395,002 - 15,464,385\nRivers Port 205,635 52,843 1,086,682 - 1,115,387 1,076,326 3,536,873\nOnne Port Complex 1,808,484 181,141 - 722,159 225,549 23,111,893 26,049,226\nCalabar Port 74,862 81,653 521,511 - 1,509,663 - 2,187,689\nDelta Ports 1,282,843 657,231 302,519 5,550 2,852,263 97,367 5,197,773\nGrand Total (Nigeria) 14,801,528 3,323,008 9,818,494 825,624 18,479,066 24,287,916 71,535,636\nTotal (Lagos State) 11,429,704 2,350,140 7,907,782 97,915 12,776,204 2,330 34,564,075\nProportion of Lagos State to \nNigeria 77.2 70.7 80.5 11.9 69.1 0.01 48.3\nNUMBER TON NUMBER TON\nLagos port Complex 35 180,476 3,843,747 73,468 67,280 1,310,295\nTincan Island Port Complex 85,115 250,846 4,894,266 125,138 47,002 852,059\nRivers Port Complex 113 1,293 29,315 871 628 13,041\nOnne Port Comp;lex - 9,605 1,609,876 8,062 1,409 149,696\nCalabar Port - - - - - -\nDelta Ports - 70 1,948 - - -\nGrand Total (Nigeria) 85,263 442,290 10,379,152 207,539 116,319 2,325,091\nTotal (Lagos State) 85,150 431,322 8,738,013 198,606 114,282 2,162,354\nProportion of Lagos State to \nNigeria 99.9 97.5 84.2 95.7 98.2 93.0\nSource: Nigerian Ports Authority\n247\nTABLE 179: VOLUME OF CARGO THROUGHPUT (MILLION METRIC TONS) BY TYPE AT NIGERIAN PORTS: YEAR 2017 \nGENERAL CARGO DRY BULK LIQUID BULK\nTABLE 180: CONTAINER TRAFFIC STATISTICS AT NIGERIAN PORTS: YEAR 2017\nTHROUGHPUT\nINWARD OUTWARD\nLADEN LADEN\nPORTS\nPORTS NO. OF EMPTY NO. OF EMPTY \nINWARD OUTWARD INWARD OUTWARD INWARD OUTWARD\nLAGOS PORT COMPLEX 6,265,253 1,158,686 4,830,670 72,374 7,472,103 0 19,799,086\nTIN CAN ISLAND COMPLEX 6,310,162 1,168,392 1,714,945 0 5,140,288 0 14,333,787\nRIVERS 292,761 8,723 1,209,151 0 1,602,382 25,194,485 28,307,502\nONNE 2,190,728 392,817 124,486 782,409 222,592 994,468 4,707,500\nCALABAR 13,988 12,113 492,370 71,057 1,663,484 0 2,253,012\nDELTA 1,952,395 677,754 406,735 0 3,294,488 514,543 6,845,915\nGrand Total (Nigeria) 17,025,287 3,418,485 8,778,357 925,840 19,395,337 26,703,496 76,246,802\nTotal (Lagos State) 12,575,415 2,327,078 6,545,615 72,374 12,612,391 0 34,132,873\nProportion of Lagos State to \nNigeria 73.9 68.1 74.6 7.8 65.0 0.0 44.8\nNUMBER TON NUMBER TON\nLAGOS PORT COMPLEX 294,626 218 4,074,048 159,112 75,223 1,062,943 \nTIN CAN ISLAND COMPLEX 387,353 - 5,253,365 325,829 88,179 978,866 \nRIVERS 7,471 - 122,423 735 97 4,443 \nONNE 118,530 - 1,970,728 100,055 15,106 280,664 \nCALABAR 524 - 3,691 - - - \nDELTA 528 - 10,432 - - 2,375 \nGrand Total (Nigeria) 218 809,032 11,434,687 585,731 178,605 2,329,291 \nTotal (Lagos State) 218 681,979 9,327,413 484,941 163,402 2,041,809 \nProportion of Lagos State to \nNigeria 84.3 100 81.6 82.8 91.5 87.7 \nSource: Nigerian Ports Authority\n248\n TABLE 181: VOLUME OF CARGO THROUGHPUT (MILLION METRIC TONS) BY TYPE AT NIGERIAN PORTS: YEAR 2018 \nGENERAL CARGO DRY BULK LIQUID BULK\n TABLE 182:CONTAINER TRAFFIC STATISTICS AT NIGERIAN PORTS: YEAR 2018\nTHROUGHPUT\nINWARD OUTWARD\nLADEN LADEN\nPORTS\nPORTS NO. OF EMPTY NO. OF EMPTY \nINWARD OUTWARD INWARD OUTWARD INWARD OUTWARD\nLAGOS PORT COMPLEX 9 1 4 0 7 0 21\nTIN CAN ISLAND COMPLEX 6 2 2 0 7 0 17\nRIVERS 1 0 1 0 2 0 4\nONNE 3 0 0 1 0 23 27\nCALABAR 0 0 0 0 2 0 2\nDELTA 1 1 0 0 5 2 9\nGrand Total (Nigeria) 20 4 7 1 23 25 80\nTotal (Lagos State) 15 3 6 0 14 0 38\nProportion of Lagos State to \nNigeria 75.0 75.0 85.7 0.0 60.9 0.0 47.5\nNUMBER TON NUMBER TON\nLAGOS PORT COMPLEX 249,413 457 5,603,422 108,426 47,285 798,769 \nTIN CAN ISLAND COMPLEX 242,718 - 4,934,358 237,874 39,260 1,759,479 \nRIVERS 39,250 65 386,919 12,409 538 2,435 \nONNE 85,768 - 2,300,507 74,451 9,351 224,638 \nCALABAR 145 - 2,744 - - - \nDELTA 3,949 - 13,663 - 122 1,647 \nGrand Total (Nigeria) 522 621,243 13,241,613 433,160 96,556 2,786,968 \nTotal (Lagos State) 457 492,131 10,537,780 346,300 86,545 2,558,248 \nProportion of Lagos State to \nNigeria 79.2 88.0 79.6 79.9 89.6 91.8 \nSource: Nigerian Ports Authority\n249\nTHROUGHPUT\n TABLE 183: VOLUME OF CARGO THROUGHPUT (MILLION METRIC TONS) BY TYPE AT NIGERIAN PORTS: YEAR 2019\nLADEN LADEN\nPORTS\nPORTS NO. OF EMPTY NO. OF EMPTY \nGENERAL CARGO DRY BULK LIQUID BULK\n TABLE 184:CONTAINER TRAFFIC STATISTICS AT NIGERIAN PORTS: YEAR 2019\nINWARD OUTWARD\nS/N LAGOS PORT TIN CAN PORT\n1 Apapa Boat Club Ibru\n2 Atlantic Shrimpers Ltd Bovas Oil\n3 Chevron Nig. Plc Capital Oil & Gas\n4 Christlieb Plc Daddo International Ltd\n5 Delmar Jetty Dee Jones Ltd\n6 Emsee (Ibru) Jetties Fatgbems Petroleum Ltd\n7 Fishries Services Index Petrolube Africa Ltd.\n8 Genesis World Wide Integrated Oil & Gas\n9 Gulf Agency &Shipping Nig. Ltd. MRS\n10 Julius Berger Obat Petroleum Oil\n11 Julius Berger Rahamaniyya\n12 Ladol Swift Oil\n13 Lister Oil Jetty Techno Oil\n14 Manucom Fishing Company Tincan Midstream\n15 Marbach Global Rading Company Westcom Technologies\n16 Mosheshe Orc Side IBRU\n17 Obelawo Farcha Ind. Ltd Bovas Oil\n18 ocean Fisheries (cottoil Ltd) Capital Oil & Gas\n19 Osadjere Fishing Co Ltd. Daddo International Ltd\n20 Port & Terminal Multi-Services Ltd. Dee Jones Ltd\n21 Standard Flour Mills Fatgbems Petroleum Ltd\n22 Yinka Folawiyo Energy Ltd. Index Petrolube Africa Ltd.\nSource: Nigerian Ports Authority\n250\nTABLE 185: APPROVED JETTIES AT LAGOS AND TIN CAN PORTS: YEAR 2018 \nTABLE 186: APPROVED JETTIES AT LAGOS PORT COMPLEX AND TIN CAN PORTS: YEAR 2019\nS/N LAGOS PORT TIN CAN PORT\n1 Osadjere Fishing Co Ltd. Underwater Engerinering \n2 Atlantic Shrimpers Ltd Capital Oil Jetty(A)\n3 Ocean Fisheries Capital Oil Jetty(B)\n4 Standard Flour Mills Ibafon (Ibru) Jetty\n5 Oister Oil Ltd Intergrated Oil Jetty\n6 Obelawo Farcha Industries . Ltd Dantata/MRS Jetty\n7 Fishries Services ltd Obat Oil Jetty\n8 Apapa Boat Club Rahamaniya Oil Jetty(RAJ)\n9 YINKA Folawiyo & Sons Deejones Oil Jetty\n10 Webeco(Former Christlieb Plc) Fatgbems Oil Jetty\n11 Onado/Spm Energy Services Ltd Bovas Oil Jetty\n12 Swift Oil Jetty\n13 Index Oil Jetty\n14 Techno Oil Jetty\n15 Emadeb Oil Jetty\n16 A.A Rano Oil Jetty\n17 Deep Water Oil Jetty\n18 Wosbab\n19 Stallionaire\n20 S.B Bakare\n21 Nakem\n22 Brawal\n23 Seagold\n24 Atlantic Shimpers\n25 Royal Salt \n26 Union Dicon Salt\n27 Karflex\n28 Orc Fisheries \n29 Bridge Deck\n30 Nakem\nSource: Nigerian Ports Authority\n251\n2015 2016 2017 2018 2019\nLAGOS PORT COMPLEX 0 0 0 0 0\nTIN CAN ISLAND PORT 0 0 0 0 0\nONNE PORT COMPLEX 0 0 0 0 0\nCALABAR PORT 3,307 12,946 6,704 6,566 4,891\nDELTA PORT 0 0 0 0 0\nTOTAL 3,307 12,946 6,704 6,566 4,891\nSource: Nigerian Ports Authority\n252\nNUMBER OF PASSENGERS PORT\nTABLE 187: STATISTICS ON PASSENGERS TRAFFIC ACROSS SEA PORTS IN \nNIGERIA: YEAR 2015 - 2019\n"
  },
  {
    "url": "https://zenodo.org/records/10411123",
    "text": "Transport Starter Data Kit: Historical socio-transport data for Nigeria\n\nPublished December 20, 2023 | Version 3.0\n\nDataset Open\n\n# Transport Starter Data Kit: Historical socio-transport data for Nigeria\n\nShow affiliations\n\n- 1. Loughborough University\n- 2. Imperial College London\n- 3. SLOCAT Partnership\n\nThis Transport Starter Data Kit contains historical annual data (1990–2021) on passenger and freight activity, segregated by mode and fuel. Additionally, historical data on energy intensities, load factors, vehicle stock, population (total, urban, rural, growth), and GDP (total, agriculture, construction, mining, manufacturing, service, energy, growth) are included in the kit, within the 'Data' tab. The historical data can be used as a foundation for transport-energy modelling and/or to identify areas of improvement. This data was verified through consultation with relevant stakeholders before publishing. The definition used for each vehicle mode is found in the 'Definitions' tab, and the description of each data observation status is found in the 'Notes' tab. All data sources are linked where possible.\n\n## Files\n\n### Nigeria.pdf\n\n### Files (485.5 kB)\n\nmd5:467588ae7376787280fedbe87f11cfee\n\nmd5:a065ac3a8fc2ffbb40eb2c4a659cbb58\n\n| Name | Size | Download all |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| 309.0 kB | Preview Download |\n| 176.6 kB | Download |\n\nJump up"
  },
  {
    "url": "https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/9807eea1f8c4b3fd9199798ca33144f8-0090012025/original/Lagos-2pgs.pdf",
    "text": "Context\n\nToday, 55% of the world’s population lives in cities, a share expected to reach 70% by 2050. To keep up with this growth and expand access to opportunities, developing countries are investing heavily in mass transit systems. Understanding how these investments impact commuters and reshape existing paratransit networks is key to ensuring future accessibility for all. Ambitious mobility plans for Lagos Lagos, Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest city with 22 million inhabitants, is known for its persistent traffic congestion challenge, where an average commute takes about four hours a day, and most of the vehicles on the road are over 15 years old. To address the challenges in its public transit system, the Lagos State government, through the Lagos Metropolitan Transport Authority (LAMATA), launched the Bus Reform Initiative (BRI) to establish a more efficient and comfortable public bus system — the first step towards a multimodal transport system for Lagos. Between 2019 and 2022, the initiative introduced 820 modern buses on 64 new routes, replacing smaller paratransit minibuses. The new buses offer amenities such as air conditioning and have better emissions standards. A joint research program to understand their impacts The research described in this brief aimed to assess the impact of the Bus Reform Initiative and collect data on mobility in Lagos. It was\n\nconducted jointly by LAMATA, researchers at the World Bank, the University of California, Berkeley, and Columbia University. The team used multiple methods for this research. They applied quasi-experimental approaches to track paratransit activity and analyzed changes in traffic congestion and public bus usage using GPS data, bus swipe card data, a paratransit census, and surveys of drivers and commuters. They also conducted an experiment to understand commuter preferences.\n\nImpacts of the BRI\n\nThe new system is a net benefit for commuters The research estimates that the new system generated $1.84 million in monthly value for commuters. This estimate is based on a model of how commuters choose transportation modes considering price, time, and amenities like comfort and safety. By incorporating usage data\n\n## Impacts of Introducing Public Transportation in Rapidly Growing Cities\n\nNigeria Country Brief | September 2025\n\nfrom the first year, the model reveals the total value commuters place on the new system across all these attributes combined.\n\nCommuters benefit from improved comfort and safety with the new public transit system. The team’s surveys find that men and women highly value the new public transit option concerning trip safety. Women in particular face safety concerns in existing minibuses, called danfos, with 42% reporting verbal sexual harassment. The system even helped commuters who didn’t use it: 28% of the total commuter benefits from the new infrastructure came from the competitive response it triggered in the private sector. After it opened, many danfo drivers shifted to other routes, increasing service and lowering fares, which benefited many riders. This highlights the broader impact of public investments that might be overlooked if analysis focuses only on the public system. The system generated an estimated fare revenue of $1.17–$1.33 million, based on e-ticketing data from 51 BRI routes operating between November 2022 and March 2023¹.\n\nThe benefit-to-cost ratio for commuters is therefore estimated at 1.4–1.57. These are short term benefits observed within a year of opening and likely underestimate the long-term impact. The new system is cleaner The team estimates that the new system reduced CO2 emissions by 9% on treated routes. But managing paratransit is still important for mobility In comparison, danfos drivers have lost from the new system: they faced increased competition, amounting to $1.1 million per month in losses for the sector, roughly 60% of the benefit to commuters. However, paratransit is still key for mobility: the old fleet of danfos still accounts for 52% of motorized journeys in Lagos.\n\n¹ This calculation excludes first and last mile and BRT routes, and routes with fewer than 5 operational days in a month during this period.\n\nProject team The principal investigators for the World Bank are Alice Duhaut and Geetika Nagpal, together with Nick Tsivanidis (University of California, Berkeley) and Daniel Björkegren (Columbia University). The Bus System Unit of LAMATA is the research partner in Lagos. Nuruddeen S. Umar and Segun Adebamiji are providing field implementation support.\n\nThe ieConnect for Impact program is a collaboration between the World Bank’s Development Impact group and the Transport Global Practice. This program is part of the Development Impact Fund (DIF) multi-donor trust fund and is funded with UK International Development from the UK government and the European Union (EU). For more information about the ieConnect for Impact Program, visit the ieConnect Webpage or contact ieconnect@worldbank.org.\n\n"
  },
  {
    "url": "https://www.lamata-ng.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/ICR1-WB-Version.pdf",
    "text": "Document of\nThe World Bank\nReport No: ICR00001848\nIMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT\n(IDA-37200 IDA-37201)\nON A\n{LOAN/CREDIT} \nIN THE AMOUNT OF {SDR, EURO, etc.} {0.0} MILLION\n(US$ {0.0} MILLION EQUIVALENT)\nTO THE\n{BORROWER}\nFOR A\n{PROJECT NAME}\nMarch 29, 2011\n{Sector Department}\n{Country Department}\n{Region}\nCURRENCY EQUIVALENTS\n(Exchange Rate Effective 00000000)\nCurrency Unit =\n1.00 = US$ [ ]\nUS$ 1.00 = [ ]\nFISCAL YEAR\nABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS\nVice President:\nCountry Director:\nSector Manager:\nProject Team Leader:\nICR Team Leader:\nCOUNTRY\nProject Name\nCONTENTS\nData Sheet\nA. Basic Information\nB. Key Dates\nC. Ratings Summary\nD. Sector and Theme Codes\nE. Bank Staff\nF. Results Framework Analysis\nG. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs\nH. Restructuring \nI. Disbursement Graph\n1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design............................................... 1\n2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 1\n3. Assessment of Outcomes............................................................................................ 2\n4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome........................................................... 3\n5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ....................................................... 3\n6. Lessons Learned ......................................................................................................... 3\n7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ............ 3\nAnnex 1. Project Costs and Financing............................................................................ 4\nAnnex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................... 5\nAnnex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis................................................................... 6\nAnnex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes .............. 7\nAnnex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results............................................................................. 9\nAnnex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results................................................... 10\nAnnex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR..................... 11\nAnnex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders....................... 12\nAnnex 9. List of Supporting Documents...................................................................... 13\n MAP \nI N S E R T \nD A T A S H E E T\nH E R E \nAFTER APPROVAL BY COUNTRY DIRECTOR\nAN UPDATED DATA SHEET SHOULD BE INSERTED \nMANUALLY IN HARD COPY\nBEFORE SENDING A FINAL ICR TO THE PRINT SHOP.\nNOTE: The Data Sheet is generated by the system\nusing the information entered in the Operations Portal\neach time you use “Send Draft”, “Print” or “Submit Final” functions.\n1\n1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design \n1.1 Context at Appraisal\nThe Lagos urban transport project was designed in challenging circumstances. The Lagos \nmetropolitan area had a population estimated at over 10 million in 2000, and projected \n(conservatively) to grow to more than 25 million by 2025. However, transport \ninfrastructure and services were at levels that supported a population of no more than 6 \nmillion. As a result, the level of efficiency and productivity in the metropolitan area had\nbeen adversely affected by a growing weakness in the physical infrastructure required to\nsupport basic needs of the population. The density of the road network at about 0.4 \nkm/1000 population, for example, was quite low even by African standards. The \nprovision of bus public transport was highly fragmented with multiple private operators, \noperating small buses of poor quality and in absence of any management or a regulatory \nauthority. Despite the city size, there were no organized mass transit systems. Over the \nyears, the quality of public transport in Lagos State had degenerated, especially after the \nmovement of the federal capital from Lagos to Abuja. Like any other state in Nigeria, \nLagos State lacked institutional capacity and adequate funding for the management of \ntransport infrastructure to meet the demand of its teaming population. \nPublic transport environment: Public transport operation in Lagos is almost entirely \nowned and managed by the private sector—principally individuals owning one or two \nsecond-hand vehicles that they rent out to drivers on a daily basis. The existing bus fleet \nis estimated at 75,000. Minibuses (danfos) make up the bulk of the fleet, and their \nnumbers are rising as the number of midi-buses (molues) dwindles. Every danfo and \nmolue is affiliated with one of several associations, the largest being the National Union \nof Road Transport Workers (NURTW). Buses account for almost 82 percent of the share \nof motorized person trips (10 percent regular size buses and 72 percent mini buses), the \ntaxis and private cars account for about 13 percent, and the reminder five percent \naccounted by motor cycles, locally known as okadas. These vehicles are often reckless, \nnot roadworthy, and contribute heavily to pollution. However, they are an integral part of \nLagos’s transport network and most Lagosians still use them in absence of alternatives, \nwith close to 16 million trips made daily in the city. Despite poor service conditions and \nlow availability, such public transport was unaffordable especially for people in the \nlowest quintile, costing over 20 percent of the household’s disposable income. \nInstitutional and Regulatory Context: The institutional structure of Nigeria has three \nlevels: federal, state and local. At the federal level, the Ministry of Transport (MOT) \nmakes national transport policy and the Ministry of Works (MOW) develops the federal \nroad network. Urban transport was devolved to the states by the 1999 Constitution, and \nthe states make their own laws on traffic and transport. Federal agencies with divisions in \nthe states include the Nigeria Police – Lagos State Traffic Division, which includes \nTraffic Wardens, and the Federal Road Safety Commission which is responsible for \ntraffic control and enforcement, primarily on federal roads.\n2\nAt the Lagos State Government (LSG), the MOT is the primary agency for transport \npolicy formulation and implementation. The state ministry comprises five functional \ndivisions. The Motor Vehicle Administration is the regulatory authority for public \ntransport. There is also a Transport Operations Division. The Local Government Councils \nare responsible for local traffic management schemes, parking control and management \nof public transport terminals. In 2000, the Lagos metropolitan area consisted of 18 local \ngovernment areas (LGA) out of 20 in the state, with their own elected governments.\nThese LCDAs have a works department and a traffic management unit responsible for \nroad maintenance and traffic management on local government roads. As a result, more \nthan 100 agencies at local, state or federal government levels had a role in transport \nprovision and/or services in the city. Often, most agencies develop and implement their \nown policies and programs in isolation, and without much regard for its effect on policies \nof other agencies. \nKey issues in the city transport system are: (a) insufficient and poorly managed and \nregulated services and infrastructure; (b) lack of clear and coherent policies; and (c) weak \nand disorganized institutions. The central urban transport context can be described as \nfollows: a growing urban population inadequately served by the transport system, \ndeclining standards of public transport, overlaps and conflicts among the agencies \nresponsible for planning and implementing transport solutions, massive growth in the use \nof minibus services, growing dependence on private transport (cars and motorcycles), \nincreasing congestion, inadequate and deteriorating transport infrastructure, and poor \nfacilities for non-motorized transport (walking and bicycling). \nMany of the observed shortcomings in the transportation system in Lagos stem from the \nsector’s management weaknesses. These include (i) absence of a well articulated and \nadopted policy and strategic framework for the sector; (ii) fragmentation and duplication \nof institutional responsibilities among various agencies at the three levels of government; \n(iii) lack of inter-agency co-ordination among the various bodies; and (iv) absence of \nstandard procedures for the technical and economic evaluation of programs and projects.\nRecognizing a need to improve the transport sector in the Lagos state, a number of \nstudies were conducted in the 90s to define appropriate solutions. The Lagos Mass \nTransit and Transport Systems Management Program study was undertaken in 1992. This \nwork set out to identify actions necessary to address the complex transport situation in \nLagos. The study had as one of its recommendations, the creation of Lagos Metropolitan \nArea Transport Authority (LAMATA) to coordinate transport policies, programs and \nactions of all agencies at different tiers of government. \n1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators \nThe project development objective of the LUTP was to: (a) improve the management of \nthe Lagos metropolitan transport sector; (b) enhance the public transport road network in \nan environmentally, socially and financially sustainable manner; (c) enhance bus \nservices; (d) promote water and non-motorized transport; and (e) prepare future phases of \nthe program. \n3\nThe key outcome/impact indicators identified in PAD were (Please see Table 1 for outcome \nand output indicators):\nKey outcome/impact indicators\n(i) Reduction of time and money (as a portion of the overall income) spent by poor \nhouseholds for personal travel activities; \n(ii) Reduction of accidents (relative to vehicle-kilometers driven), and particularly of \nthose involving pedestrians; and \n(iii)Number of person-days of labor created (by the road rehabilitation and \nmaintenance program).\n1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and \nreasons/justification\nThe Project was restructured twice, in June 2005 and August 2005. The project also \nreceived additional financing in April 2007 for an amount of SDR 33.6 million (US$50 \nmillion equivalent). \nHowever, the Project Development Objectives did not change as a result of restructuring \nand additional financing. Nevertheless, the changes resulted in reallocation of credit \nproceeds and modification of result indicators.\nProject Restructuring\nThe first restructuring was undertaken in June 2005 for the following reasons:\na) One of the components to be financed in this project was maintenance of the \ndeclared road network, which includes federal, state, and local roads. During \npreparation, there were no clear agreements at different levels of government on \nthe works to be carried out by the implementing agency. The federal roads were \nbeing maintained by the Federal Ministry of Works and the project focus was \nlimited to maintaining state and local roads. As a result, the credit had to be \nreallocated to redirect allocation of funds from federal to state and local roads; \nb) During initial years of project implementation, LSG faced challenges in co\u0002financing equivalent of $7 million annually as agreed during project design. As a \nresult, the requirement for the state to pay annually $7 million was reduced to $2 \nmillion; and\nc) In view of the changing government policies and to maintain flexibility in \nimplementation, the dated covenant related to the direct transfer of user charges to \nthe Transport Fund was cancelled and it was kept as a performance indicator.\nIn August 2005, the project was again restructured to introduce the following changes: \na) Apply 100 percent IDA financing to all expenditures (including taxes); and \nb) Reduce annual payment to the Transport Fund from $7 million to $2 million. \nAdditional financing\n4\nAdditional financing for the project was approved on April 10, 2007 for an amount of \nSDR 33.6 million (US$50 million equivalent) and the related amended Agreement was \nsigned on October 30, 2007. The justification for additional financing was:\na) Increase in the cost of road works due to an increase in the price of diesel and \npremium motor spirit1, depreciation of Naira2, and further deterioration in the \ncondition of the road network due to delay between design and construction; and\nb) Scale up the bus services enhancement component, with a focus on implementing \na pilot bus franchise scheme along Iyana Ipaja-Ikotun/Igando corridor. Financing \nwas to be provided for infrastructure such as bus shelters, terminals, lay-byes, \nstreet lights, traffic lights and other facilities necessary for bus franchise \noperation. As a result, the project investments were more closely aligned with the \ndevelopment objectives. \nThe credit proceeds were reallocated and result indicators modified to reflect changes in \nthe project design. The closing date was extended by one year from June 30, 2008 to \nJune 30, 2009.\n \n1 The price of diesel increased from N21/liter to N85/liter and of premium motor spirit from N22 to \nN65/liter over the period 2003 and 2006\n2 The value of Naira against dollar depreciated from N 117 in 2002 to N 128 in 2006\n5\nTable 1: Key Result Indicators (Original and Revised) \nOriginal Indicators Revised Indicators\nKey Outcome Indicators\n1. Reduction of time and money spent by \npoor households for travel\n- Time spent by poor households on \ntravel along project corridors\n- Money spent by poor households as \na share of income along project corridor\n2. Reduction of accidents Dropped\n3. Number of person-days of labor \ncreated\nNumber of person-days of labor created\n4. Length of bus-km franchise per day\nIntermediary Outcomes\n(i) Capacity Building\n1. LAMATA is fully functional LAMATA is fully functional\n2. Total financial contribution of LSG \nannually is at least $7 million\nTotal financial contribution of LSG annually \nis at least $2 million\n3. LAMATA’s operating costs remain \nless than 6 percent\nLAMATA’s operating costs remain less than \n6 percent\n4. Road user charges directly transferred \nto Transport Fund increase from $1 \nmillion in 2003 to $5 million in 2007\nTotal road user charges directly transferred \nto Transport Fund are $5 million by the end\u0002of-project\n5. TMUs operational in priority LGAs TMUs operational in 4 LGAs\n(ii) Road Network Efficiency\n1. Reduction in travel time by motorized modes \non the Declared Road Network\n(iii) Bus Services Enhanced\n1. Percentage of bus operations governed \nby new regulatory framework\nAmended as in outcome indicator 4\n2. Implementation of the bus pilot project - Decrease in average waiting time on \npilot bus route\n- Increase in passenger satisfaction \nalong pilot bus route\n(iv) Water Transport Promotion\n1. Privatization of LSFSC Privatization of LSFSC\n2. First ferry concession operational First ferry concession operational\n3. Increase in jetties passengers per day\n(v) Preparation of Future Phases\n1. Transport sector institutional reform \nplan prepared\nTransport sector institutional reform plan \nprepared\nOutput Indicators\n1. Length of roads rehabilitated Length of roads rehabilitated\n2. Length of overlays placed Length of overlays placed\n3. Number of junctions improved\n4. Improvement/construction of jetties for \nsmall boats\nImprovement/construction of jetties for small \nboats\n5. Transport master plan produced Transport master plan produced\n6\nProject Schedule\nThe original project closing date was June 30, 2008. With the additional financing, the \nclosing date was extended for the first time to June 30, 2009. The closing date was \nextended a second time to August 31, 2010 in order to complete implementation of the \nongoing activities. The closing date was extended a third time to December 31, 2010 to \nallow full disbursement of the committed funds and complete the on-going contracts to \nattain project objectives.\n1.4 Main Beneficiaries\nThe primary beneficiaries of the project are the people of Lagos State who are expected \nto benefit from improved road network and organized public transport system. The \nproject investments have resulted in a decline in transport expenditure and travel time, \nand improvements in road safety. On average, cost to bus users along the project corridor \nhas reduced by about 30 percent, and considerable savings in time has been realized both \nin terms of travel time and waiting time. Moreover, over 1.6 million jobs were created \nduring the project. The individuals and organizations benefitting from the project are \ndiverse as brought out in stakeholder analysis conducted as part of project impact \nmonitoring and is presented in Table 2.\nTable 2: Stakeholder Analysis\nS.N Beneficiary Primary benefits\n1. State Government - Reduced need for subsidy\n- Enhanced productivity\n- Increase in employment opportunities\n2. Public transport users - Reduced travel time\n- Reduced travel costs\n- Improved quality of life\n- Improved transport facilities for women, \nphysically challenged\n3. General traffic - Reduced congestion in corridor, allowing time \nand cost savings \n- Reduced accident rate\n4. Population along corridor - Improved quality of life\n- Improved public transport access opportunities\n- Reduced pollution, as a result of reduced \ncongestion and lower VKT\n5. Bus transport operators/ \nassociations\n- Improved access to finance\n-\n6. Bus drivers/owners - Better work environment\n- Better organized\n- Improved revenue\n7\n7. Vendors and commerce along \ncorridors\n- Improved business opportunities\n- Higher land values\n8. Bus suppliers - Opportunity for sales and service support, \nincluding supply of higher specification vehicles\n- Development of contract maintenance\n9. Pedestrians - Improved quality of life\n- Safe walking environment\n- Improved access to physically challenged, old \nand young people\n10. Commercial banks - Opportunities for productive investment outside \nthe usual sectors\n- Development of innovative finance mechanisms \nfor the informal sector that has wider \ndevelopment implications\n1.5 Original Components \nThe project consisted of five components as follows: \nComponent 1: Capacity Building (Total US$27.59 million, of which US$13.32 million \nto be financed by IDA)\nThis component comprised of three sub-components: (a) institutional strengthening to \nbring into operational effectiveness the Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority \n(LAMATA) including establishment of units responsible for procurement, financial \nmanagement and safeguards, creation of a dedicated Transport Fund, and construction of \na office building for LAMATA; (b) strengthening the capacity of existing transport sector \nagencies, in particular the Lagos State Ministry of Transportation (LSMT), the Lagos \nState Ministry of Works (LSMW), the Lagos State Ministry for Women Affairs and \nPoverty Alleviation, the Nigeria Traffic Police Traffic Unit, and the establishment of \nTraffic Management Units (TMUs) in key LGAs; and (c) the operating cost of LAMATA \nincluding external audits and carrying out of other activities consistent with the sector \npolicy and strategy.\nComponent 2: Road network Efficiency Improvement (Total US$98.53 million, of \nwhich US$78.90 million to be financed by IDA)\nThis component comprised of three sub-components: (a) maintenance and rehabilitation \nmeasures on a priority 400 km of the 632 km of the declared road network (including \nbridges) in the Lagos Metropolitan Area; (b) rehabilitation and improvement of major \njunctions on the road network using low cost TSM measures; and (c) preparation and \nimplementation of TSM measures to improve traffic flow in Lagos Island and Ikeja. \nComponent 3: Bus Service Enhancement (Total US$ 0.73 million, of which US$0.66 \nmillion to be financed by IDA)\nThis component comprised of two sub-components: (a) establishment of an effective \nregulatory framework for bus service provision by the private sector; and (b) preparation \n8\nof pilot demonstration project for the provision and financing by the private sector to \nimprove bus services. \nComponent 4: Water Transport Promotion (Total US$ 2.90 million, of which $2.4 \nmillion to be financed by IDA)\nThis component comprised of four sub-components: (a) development and implementation \nof a detailed strategic plan for improving use of the waterways of Metropolitan Lagos for \ntransport services, including establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework; (b) \nprivatization of the Lagos State Ferry Services Corporation and disposal of existing state \nowned ferries; (c) encouragement of private sector participation in the provision of water \ntransport services; and (d) rehabilitation and addition to existing terminal facilities.\nComponent 5: Preparation of follow-on phases (Total US$5.25 million, of which \nUS$ 4.7 million to be financed by IDA)\nThis component comprised of four sub-components: (a) preparation of a Transport \nMaster Plan for Lagos Metropolitan Area; (b) preparation of an institutional reform plan \nfor the transport sector, in particular on reform of the Motor Vehicle Administration \n(MVA); (c) preparation of a strategy for the enhanced use of intermediate means of \ntransport; and (d) necessary studies and preparatory activities for the next phase of the \nimplementation of the policy and strategy, including preparation of resettlement plans for \nthe implementation of rail mass transit in the Agege to Iddo corridor. \n1.6 Revised Components\nThe components were not revised during the two restructurings. However, there was a \nreallocation of credit proceeds due to a reduction in the counterpart funding from $35.0 \nmillion to $15.0 million, and the corresponding reduction in project cost from $135.0 \nmillion to $115.0 million (IDA share of US$100.0 million remained the same). \nHowever, in the Restructuring Paper, IDA financing is reflected as US$110.8 million \n(which includes $10.8 million exchange rate gains; the SDR amount remained the same). \nThe co-financing from LSG was reduced from $7 million annually to $2 million starting \n20053.\nThe project component allocations were further revised as part of additional financing in \n2007. In addition to addressing the increase in the cost of works due to an increase in\ninput prices, the allocations were revised with a focus on scaling-up bus services \ncomponent to implement a pilot bus franchise scheme along Iyana Ipaja-Ikotun/Igando \ncorridor with investments in bus shelters, terminals, lay-byes, street lights, traffic lights \n \n3 As a result, total LSG contribution was to be $15 million ($7 million in 2004 and $2 \nmillion each in years 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008).\n9\nand other facilities necessary for bus operation. The objective was two-fold: a) to realign\nthe project focus from making investments mainly in road construction and maintenance \nto also finance public transport infrastructure components to improve public transport \nservices; and b) to develop a comprehensive integrated program of complimentary \nimprovements which combines public transport, NMT and roadway infrastructure, \noperations management and public transport service improvements by focusing on a \nspecific corridor to increase over-all travel speed, reliability and safety. The changes \nwere designed to align the investments with development objectives in an attempt to \nenhance public transport in an environmentally, socially, and financially sustainable \nmanner. The changes in design were also consistent with comments received from the \npeer reviewers.\nTable 3. Project Costs by component\n (US$ million) \nComponent\nAppraisal estimates Estimates at Additional \nFinancing (AF)\nTotal IDA Total IDA\nCapacity building 27.6 13.3 20.8 18.4\nRoad network efficiency \nimprovement\n98.5 78.9 133.3 121.9\nBus service \nenhancement\n0.7 0.7 11.2 11.0\nWater transport \npromotion\n2.9 2.4 4.1 3.8\nPreparation of follow-up \nphases\n5.3 4.7 6.4 5.7\nTOTAL 135.0 100.0 175.8 160.8\n1.7 Other significant changes\nThere were no other changes in design, scope and scale, implementation arrangements \nand schedule, and funding allocations.\n2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes \nFederal versus state: (a) lack of a clear agreement on the ability of LAMATA to carry \nout maintenance on the federal roads led to delays in project start-up. The project had to \nbe restructured to clarify the roles. (b) challenges faced by the state in initial years to \nraise counterpart funding led to delays and restructuring; (c) delays in setting up the Trust \nFund and making direct transfers. However, while these issues led to delays in project \ntake-off, in the long term they were addressed satisfactorily and the outcomes were fully \nachieved.\nInstitution building, regulatory framework, enforcement: (a) Delays in getting \nsuitable professional staff in LAMATA: To meet its objectives and goals, LAMATA \n10\nneeded to have in its employment qualified and experienced staff in departments, such as \ntraffic management, transport economist etc, which are not easy to recruit. It took a few \nyears to recruit the required professional staff in LAMATA, which initially slowed \nproject implementation. (b) Delays in clarifying roles and functions across multiple \nagencies: Getting the multiple stakeholders on-board and accept the proposed reform \nprogram has taken time and led to initial delays: Resistance to change by agencies and \norganizations currently involved in transport operations and management has been one of \nthe key challenges in implementation. As an example, it took some time for some state \nagencies and institutions to appreciate the role and functions of LAMATA as the agency \nresponsible for bus regulations and enter into concessional contracts with bus operators. \nIn 2007, the LAMATA law had to be amended to make it as the agency responsible for \nentering into regulatory contracts with the bus operators. (c) Delays in setting up the \nregulatory framework: The regulations governing the operation of road transport need to \nbe in compliance with the relevant federal legislation. For example, the standards for the \nuse and construction of motor vehicles are set out in the National Road Traffic \nRegulations of 1997, empowered under the Federal Road Safety Commission Act. These \nRegulations also established the Federal office of the State Director of Motor Vehicle \nAdministration with powers, inter alia, to set the maximum and minimum fares that may \nbe charged for stage carriage (local bus services). In addition, effective enforcement of \nregulations ultimately rests with the powers granted to the Nigeria Police Force, which is \na federal body even though it is organized on a state basis. Whilst officers of State \nagencies do have a limited enforcement capability, they don’t hold the power of arrest \nand some of their actions require accompaniment by a police officer. Getting a full \nunderstanding and agreements on the way forward in enforcement across multiple \nagencies resulted in initial delays. However, though there were initial delays, the \noutcomes were fully achieved. \nCost increase: The delay of over 15 months between appraisal and effectiveness \nresulted in further deterioration in the condition of the project road network. This \ndeterioration in road condition coupled with an increase in cost of works (as discussed in \npara _-), led to an increase in resources required to maintain roads to the agreed standard. \nThe project implementation on some of the roads was delayed while additional resources \nwere being arranged.\nAccess to credit: The project was designed as a PPP with the public sector taking on the \nrole as a regulator and quality control and also providing financing for the infrastructure; \nthe private sector was to provide financing for bus purchase and operating services. The \nsuccess of the project therefore depended on the ability of the private sector to obtain \nfinancing for bus purchase. However, new regular size buses were available for about \n$100,000. This was a large amount to be financed by private operators, who were so far \nused to financing second hand old small buses costing less than $10,000 and often bought \nfrom personal savings. The commercial banks were unwilling to lend on long-term (the \ntypical lending term was 2-3 years against a bus life of over 10 years) and required some \nform of security of repayment. The challenge was addressed in two ways: \na) First, the scheme design gave the bank the initial lien on revenues collected \nfrom services; only the balance (after the deduction of financing costs) was \n11\npassed on to the operator. The bank also was given the right to act as ticket \ndistributor and security monitor.\nb) Second, the scheme design required the participating operators to accept \ncollective liability for all the obligations into which they enter. Any individual \ndefault, whether by embezzlement of revenues or through vehicle \nunavailability (perhaps as a result of an accident or mechanical failure), would \nbe met by an additional charge on all the remaining members. \nAs a result, though there were some delays, buses were procured and the outcomes were \nachieved.\n2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry\nProject Preparation: The project was prepared as a first phase of interventions to \naddress the issues related to a lack of institutional capacity for sector management, low \ncost recovery, poor quality of public transport coupled with adverse environmental and \nsocial impacts, and inadequate involvement of stakeholders. Taking forward the \nconcepts from earlier studies, the Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP) was prepared \non the basis of building capacity to manage and coordinate the transport system, and \nidentifying priority actions, investments and enabling measures for its improvement. An \nAPL was considered a more appropriate instrument to address the long term support \nrequired to implement the transport sector policy and strategy though the project was \ndesigned as a SIL because of the unsatisfactory macro-economic performance of Nigeria. \nFrom the outset, enhanced provision of bus services was a core component of the project \ndesign and included development of busway priority – though primarily as a \ncomplementary measure to the mass-transit railway proposal. Consideration was given to \nproviding financial support for bus renewal to demonstrate financial viability of the bus \noperations in Lagos. However, the introduction of regulatory reforms to reward efficient \nbus service coupled with improvements to the road network was expected to provide \nsufficient incentive to the private sector for enhanced provision of bus services.\nProject Design: A multi-modal transport approach was taken, recognizing the potential \nfor developing rail and inland waterway mass-transit integrated with the core road \npassenger transport network. The project focused on fast-return investments, such as \nroad maintenance, rehabilitation, and junction improvements. It also included \npreparation of technical, environmental, and social measures for possible future mass \ntransit development for possible support in a private-public financing framework.\nHowever, while the issues and the strategies to address those issues were rightly \nidentified during preparation, the initial design was complex and the investments were \nnot directly focused on achieving the desired objectives. The investments in bus services \nenhancement component, for example, were less than one percent of the total project \ncost, while enhancing bus services in a socially and financially sustainable manner was \none of the key original objectives of the project. Similarly, investments in road network \nefficiency improvements were spread throughout the city road network and as a result the \nimpact on improving traffic flow was only marginal. To address these issues, additional \nfinancing was utilized to sharpen the focus and align more closely with the project \n12\nobjectives. As part of additional financing the project design focused on: a) increasing \nthe investments to improve public transport infrastructure (depots, terminals, stops) from \nless than one percent to about seven percent; and b) investing in comprehensive, \nintegrated program of complimentary improvements along a specific route or corridor \nrather than spreading across the city. In addition, outcome indicators were better aligned \nwith the project objectives and base line data collected during preparation of additional \nfinancing. Initially, outcome and output indicators were mixed-up. Improvement in bus \nservices, for example, was intended to be measured by the “implementation of bus pilot \nproject” as part of initial project design. During additional financing, the indicator was \nmodified to measure benefits resulting from implementation of the pilot project—to \ninclude decrease in average waiting time, improvement in passenger satisfaction, and \nlength of bus-km franchised. Similarly, improvements in road network efficiency were \nmeasured by reduction in travel time by motorized modes rather than length of roads \nrehabilitated (which is an output indicator).\nInvolvement of key stakeholders was critical to successful implementation: Conception \nto implementation of the BRT scheme was achieved in a record time of 15 months (as \ncompared to four to five years in most other countries). A key success factor for the \nproject was the active involvement of key stakeholders in the scheme; the local transport \nunion was incorporated into the scheme. It successfully established a co-operative that \nwas able to attract commercial funds for the purchase and operation of 100 high capacity \nbuses and further lease of 120 high capacity buses. There is no government subsidy for \noperating the scheme; notwithstanding the scheme is financially successful. To deliver \nthis scheme, the Governor of the state demonstrated strong political leadership in the face \nof fierce opposition by other interest groups. The traveling public has since greatly \nacclaimed the introduction of the scheme.\nThe project design focused on the following:\na) The project design is driven by consideration of local requirements and what is \nmost appropriate at the local level and it combines institutional and regulatory reform \ntogether with specific investments; \nb) The design represents a local response to adapt an expensive design. Drawing \nfrom good practices from Bogota (Colombia) and Curitiba (Brazil), the system was \nadapted to a Nigerian context, as BRT ‘Lite’ (i.e. a high-quality public bus service system \nthat is affordable, reliable and safe, while retaining the most desirable BRT engineering \ncharacteristics). The services were designed to respond to the demands of various \nstakeholders: politicians, transport unions, public transport users and road users. it was \ndelivered at very low cost per kilometer as compared to BRT projects in other parts of the \nworld, making it easier to replicate along other corridors and other low-income countries \nin Sub-Saharan Africa; \nc) It encompasses all elements of public-private partnership, with the State financing \ninfrastructure and the private sector financing buses, depots and maintenance facilities. \nThe union is operating the buses and will be able to pay back the credit within 2 years. \n13\nFares are not subsidized and they are lower than those charged earlier by the mini buses; \nand \nd) The project is being implemented in full partnership and cooperation of bus \nunions and other local interests.\nQuality at Entry: The quality at entry is rated satisfactory due to the strategic choice \nmade in identification of project components, championing the establishment of a strong \nindependent transport authority as the only effective way to address the sector’s \ninstitutional weaknesses, and the sequencing of long term planning efforts in the urban \ntransport sector. \nThe project was subjected to a two-stage review at the Sixth Quality at Entry Assessment. \nAt the first stage review, the quality at entry was rated as marginally satisfactory (rating\n3), which was subsequently upgraded to satisfactory (rating 2) in the second stage review. \nBoth panels were of the view that project implementation will face serious challenges, \nfirst because the country context is difficult (as reflected by poor record of achievements \nin the past and delays in effectiveness), second: because it has too many components \nwhich make it complex and third, because the likelihood of resistance to the changes\nsought are high. The high amount dedicated to road maintenance in project components \nwas seen as a distraction from promoting the institutional and cost recovery \nimprovements. A more prudent approach would have argued for a smaller project which \nwas better focused on the provision of bus services. While the identification of specific \nrisk factors and the proposed mitigation measures were seen to be adequate, the level of \nrisk appeared to have been consistently under-rated.\nHowever, it is seen as a well justified project that attempts to address serious transport \nproblems faced by the city residents. Achievement of project objectives was expected to \ncontribute to the resolution of city’s urban transport problems.\n2.2 Implementation\n(including any project changes/restructuring, mid-term review, Project at Risk status, and actions \ntaken, as applicable) \nTo ADD\n2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization\nThe monitoring and evaluation framework was developed based on qualitative and \nquantitative performance indicators for each sub-component, with a specific focus on \ntransport, social, environmental, and capacity development aspects. The transport and \nsocial impact monitoring were conducted by the M&E unit in LAMATA on an annual \nbasis. A number of studies were conducted to monitor the impact of project investments. \nThe specific output of studies is the identification of attributes of adequate public \ntransport, which were utilized to develop design of the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) and Bus \nFranchise Scheme (BFS) corridors. The analytical scope of attributes evolved around \nfour main attributes as listed in Table 2. \n14\nTable 2: Monitoring and Evaluation Framework\nAttributes Dimensions\nAffordability Monthly spending on transport/users income\nPrice or fare; Offer of benefits for public transport (e.g. \nbus-passes) or subsidies on fares; “Opportunistic cost of \nservice”\nAvailability Routes desired by users vs available services\nLength of wait, Traveling time, Reliability, \nAvailability of services at night and at weekends\nAccessibility Walking distance to terminal or station\nAvailability of information\nAccess roads to allow vehicles in neighborhood \nSocial environment (mugging and violence) \nVehicles and bus stops adapted to vulnerable users \n(children, pregnant women, elderly, disable) \nAcceptability Safety inside vehicle\nCrew member’s attitudes (drivers and aides) \nConditions of bus stops and shelters \nCleanliness and conservation of vehicles \nComfort and capacity \nProgress towards the project objectives was measured on a regular basis through the \nfollowing actions:\na) Design and validation of the monitoring system in cooperation with the \nimplementing agency and all stakeholders;\nb) Implementation of an automated data processing system that generates the \nrelevant M&E information periodically;\nc) Periodic field data collection for input into the data processing system to \ngenerate the appropriate indicators;\nd) Collation of monthly and quarterly reports by LAMATA; and\ne) Publication and circulation of quarterly progress reports by LAMATA to all \nproject stakeholders.\n2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance\nSafeguards:\nSafeguard compliance is rated satisfactory.\nThe safeguard policies triggered are the Bank’s Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01)\nand Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12). An Environmental Management \nFramework (EMF) as well as Environmental Management Plan (EMP) was prepared with \nconsultation with stakeholders. The EMF was disclosed nationwide. LAMATA has \n15\ncreated a safeguard unit which is responsible for the implementation of environmental \nand social issues arising from the implementation of the project. The unit prepared \nprocedural manuals on environmental assessment and social assessment which were well \nimplemented during the project. The unit collaborated with information, education, and \ncommunication (IEC) strategy to gain support of the people which foster the engagement \nof the Project Affected Persons (PAPs) in the project implementation. The social impact \nof improved bus services and roads maintenance was mitigated by the creation of \nthousands of jobs on construction sites and integration of displaced drivers in the new bus \nscheme. \nIn particular, all subcomponents were screened using the safeguard checklist to ensure \nconformity to the rules and social and environmental soundness. The environmental and \nsocial management plans was well implemented, and closely monitored to ensure \ncompliance. As part of safeguards due diligence, an environmental audit was conducted \nwith a view to evaluating the project’s safeguard performance. The report of the \nenvironmental audit rated the project’s overall safeguards compliance to be satisfactory. \nFiduciary\nFiduciary compliance is rated highly satisfactory.\nProcurement: Prior to attainment the required capacity on procurement, LAMATA \nengaged the services of consultant for its procurement activities. This provided the \nrequired skill mix needed for good project preparation and implementation take-off. The \ndesign of the procurement scope, procedures, review thresholds and frequency of \nsupervision was based on analysis of Country Procurement Assessment, Country \nPerformance Portfolio Review, and procurement capacity assessment of the procurement \nunit in LAMATA. The major risks and their mitigation were clearly identified. Overall, \nin terms of procurement, clear issues were identified and sound steps undertaken to \nensure efficiency and effectiveness of procurement towards the achievement of the \nproject development objectives. \nProcurement management was vested in the procurement unit of LAMATA. The key\nfactor contributing to the satisfactory performance in procurement function included but \nnot limited to availability of competent and highly skilled staff with blend of skill and \nexperience within LAMATA organization to prepare specifications and terms of\nreference for procurement needs, good project planning and implementation, good tools \nfor monitoring and evaluation of projects, good contract management tools, and good \ncommunication arrangements. The procurement unit has performed creditably well from \nthe commencement of the project to closing of the project. It was able to adopt and \nfollow World Bank’s guidelines and procurement procedures. The unit sought and \nreceived the World Bank No Objections for all prior review contracts including \nprocurement plans and cleared all post review contracts during the World Bank post \nreview audits of procurement activities. \nFinancial Management: \n16\nAcceptable financial management arrangements were maintained during project \nimplementation. The project commenced with transaction-based disbursement method \nand converted to report-based disbursement method in 2005 after the review undertaken \nby the Bank project team found the project eligible for report-based disbursement \nmethod. It is one of only three implementing entities in the country portfolio availed the \nreport-based disbursement method. IFRs were rendered timely and of satisfactory quality. \nIn May 2009 the project won a Certificate of Excellence given by the FM Unit of the \nBank for achieving 100 percent compliance in IFR submission during the period January \n1, 2008 - December 31, 2008. All through the period of project implementation, annual \nfinancial statements were submitted timely and had unqualified opinion. The \nimplementing entity maintains a very robust computerized accounting system, migrated \nfrom Sunaccounts to Enterprise Resource Planning using oracle software. This has \nfacilitated preparation of timely and reliable financial statements. Payment processing \nprogressed to electronic processing (using Remita payment platform) from manual at \ninception. Consequently processing time was reduced from 21 to 15 days. An internal \naudit unit with two staff was set up in LAMATA in 2007.\n2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase\nWhile the BRT project has been a success, it has also raised expectations among city \nresidents to scale-up the reform and investment program and extend BRT system to other \nparts of Lagos metropolis. LAMATA with support from LSG has prepared a transport \nsector policy and a strategic plan to address mobility needs of the population in a clean, \nsafe, and affordable manner. The objective is to create an integrated multi-modal \ntransport system. Some of the key elements of the plan are: (a) extension of BRT to other \ncorridors, including Oshodi-Mile 12-Ikorodu and Oshodi-Mile 2-Obalende. The rationale \nbehind selection of these corridors is based on a comprehensive network analysis, traffic \nflows and ease of implementation; and (b) the construction of two commuter rail lines—\nAgbado to Marina (Red line on an existing railroad right-of-way) and Okokomaiko to \nMarina (Blue line). The LSG has requested Bank’s support for extension of the BRT \ncorridors while the commuter lines are being constructed using a Public Private \nPartnership model, with infrastructure being funded by the LSG under a design/build \ncontract (at a cost of over US$1 billion) and the actual railway operations being funded \nand managed by the private sector under a concession agreement. \n3. Assessment of Outcomes \n3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation\nRating: S\nThe objectives and activities designed under the proposed project are consistent with the \ngovernment’s overall strategy for non-oil dependent growth as stipulated in the National \nEconomic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) and Lagos State \nEconomic Empowerment and Development Strategy. The Federal Government of Nigeria \n(FGN) is keen to propagate the concept of sustainable urban transport that calls for \ninclusion of parameters such as safety, cleanliness, and reliability in transport systems for \n17\nNigerian cities. The project is also successful in supporting the Nigeria Vision 2020 \ndevelopmental blueprint adopted by the federal government, with a specific focus on \ndevelopment of an efficient and affordable multi-modal transportation network plan for \nmajor cities (p. 132).\nAdditionally, the World Bank and the United Kingdom’s Department for International \nDevelopment (DfID) have jointly developed the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS), \nwhich was approved by the Bank on July 28, 2009. The CPS is aligned with the pillars of \nboth the NEEDS and State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy, \nespecially the second pillar that focuses on improved environment and services for non\u0002oil growth. The transportation strategic priority for Lagos identified in the CPS is to, “put \nin place an integrated mass transit program with emphasis on road, rail, and water \ntransportation services through LAMATA, and public-private partnership by \nstrengthening traffic management mechanisms…” (p. 92). The project has successfully \nremoved some of the key bottlenecks to sustainable transport by facilitating market \ntransformation, strengthening institutional capacity and laying the basis for acceptability \nof the reform program. \nThe project activities are strategically aligned with all three pillars of the NEEDS. On \nempowering people and improving social service, the project components were \nidentified based on broad consultation, involving users and community residents. The \nproject would support development of an information, education, and communication \nstrategy not only to guide the involvement of transport users and beneficiary communities \nin the planning and implementation of project elements, but also for use as a monitoring \nand evaluation tool to provide feedback on the project’s impact. On fostering economic \ngrowth, the project has a strong focus on developing an enabling environment for \nincreased private sector participation in the sector, and improving delivery of services. \nThose services – improved affordable mobility in Lagos – are themselves critical to \nensuring the ongoing economic productivity of Nigeria’s largest city. On improving \ngovernance, a key element of the project is to strengthen LAMATA, increase its \nbudgetary accountability and improve its sector planning and programming capacity. \nThis strengthening is likely to have ripple effects, since within Nigeria, LAMATA is \nalready held up as a model of public sector governance.\n3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives\nRating: Highly Satisfactory\nObjective 1: Improve management of the transport sector in the Lagos metropolitan \narea, including institutional, regulatory and policy aspects\nThe objective was fully met. \n18\n(a) Strengthening capacity of LAMATA is expected to be the most enduring impact of the \nproject4. The effectiveness of LAMATA was driven by its structure as an independent \nlegal entity, separate from the line ministry with strong leadership, and competent and \nhighly motivated staff. Some of the key factors driving the success of LAMATA \ninclude:\n Established as an independent Authority along the lines of a private sector organization;\n Operated as a business unit, observing best practices and acting as agents of change;\n Strong leadership supported by competent staff;\n Management by a Board of Directors, with a non-executive Chairman and a broad based \nmembership drawn from amongst stakeholders, including the private sector;\n Staff remuneration based on private sector benefits;\n Corporate governance, social responsibility, corporate credibility were high on its agenda; \nand\n System of continuous engagement with the public and system users to allow acceptance, \ncooperation, and collaboration.\nSince its establishment, LAMATA has succeeded in contributing to increased awareness for \ntraffic management, transparency and discipline in procurement processes and involving the users \nin decision-making processes. LAMATA activities are now widely recognized by government, \nparticipating communities and development partners as an efficient and high-performing initiative \nthat has significantly contributed to the city’s poverty reduction goals notably by improving \naccessibility in low-income areas, involving communities in identification of priority programs \nand improving sector management.\nThe project supported strengthening the capacity of LAMATA in a number of areas, including:\na) Developing a transport sector strategy;\nb) Creating organizational and institutional capacity for the planning and management of the \nState's transport system; \nc) Supporting studies to raise the level of cost recovery in the transport sector; \nd) Strengthening capacity in safeguards management, procurement and financial \nmanagement; and\ne) Developing a PPP framework for public sector bus operations.\n \n4 LAMATA has received multiple awards over the past few years for its spearheading best practices in \ntransport management and planning, including:\n Award for Excellence, World Bank Africa Region (2010)\n Transport Planner of the Year 2009 award to MD by Transport Planning Society (UK) (2009)\n World Bank award of Certificate of Excellence for 100% compliance on IFR submissions (2008)\n Award as the Most Supportive Government Agency by Busworld, Lagos (2007)\n Award of recognition by National Association of the Blind (2010)\n Merit Award from the Department of Transport Planning and Management, Olabisi Onabanjo \nUniversity, Ogun State (2007)\n Award as Best Transport Administrator to MD by Nigeria Auto Media Awards (2009)\n Corporate award by Yolas Consultants\n19\nIn effect, LAMATA has become a model for other state governments in Nigeria and other \ncountries in terms of efficiency, capability, data repository and expertise in project \nfinancing and implementation.\n(b) Developing role of LAMATA as regulator: One of the key outcomes was \nestablishment of an effective bus regulatory framework for bus services provision, \nwhich supported implementation of a pilot bus franchising scheme. The original \npowers granted to LAMATA in the domain of passenger transport had been \nlimited to its planning and co-ordination and not to its actual regulation. However \nthe revised LAMATA Law, passed by the House in late 2006, defined its function\ninter alia to ‘plan, regulate and co-ordinate the supply of adequate and effective \npublic transport in all travel modes and supporting infrastructure within \nmetropolitan Lagos’ and granted specific powers to make regulations (with the \napproval of the Governor) with respect to its functions. This has now made the \nrole of LAMATA as the sector regulator unambiguous. The Law also granted \npowers to the Authority inter alia to ‘prepare plans for the management and \ndevelopment of transportation in metropolitan Lagos’ and, in conjunction with the \nMinistry of Works, to ‘construct, re-construct, maintain and manage transport\ninfrastructure and facilities’ necessary for the discharge of its functions. This \nlegislation thus empowered LAMATA to act as the sponsor and promoter of \nmass-transit schemes in Lagos, and hence to develop the BRT-Lite system.\n(c) Sustainability of Funding: The project financed studies and provided technical \nassistance to LAMATA which led to setting up a transport fund. The transport \nfund was financed by dedicated funding from: (a) Lagos State budget provision; \n(b) license fees (hackney permit, road taxes, license plate registration, vehicle \nregistration)5; (c) bus concession fees; (d) other road user charges (tolls). In \ndiscussions with the representatives of the 36 states, LAMATA has successfully \nmade a case with the Joint Tax Board at the Federal Government level to increase \nroad user charges, to be shared between LAMATA (50 percent), state treasury \noffice (40 percent), Motor Vehicle Authority (five percent), and state MOT (five \npercent). As a result, LAMATA is able to meet 60 percent of the total funding \nrequirements of US$42 million in 2008 (an increase from less than 20 percent in \n2004) with the World Bank financing the balance 40 percent. The transport fund \nhas shown a steady increase since its inception in 2006.\n(d) The project financed creation of Traffic Management Units (TMUs) responsible \nfor effective traffic management on local government roads and to develop the \n \n5 LAMATA is responsible for regulating traffic along the pilot bus franchise and BRT corridor and \nenforcing and monitoring franchise agreement. For providing this technical assistance, LAMATA \ncharges an annual franchise fee which has provided an additional funding source for LAMATA activities \nand helps to achieve cost recovery. \n20\ncapacity to be able to define functional road hierarchy and the preparation and \nimplementation of appropriate traffic management plans for the area. During \nproject restructuring, the number of TMUs to be created were reduced to four, \nEti-Osa, Surulere, Mushin, and Ikeja. Eventually, during reprioritization of the \navailable resources, the number of TMUs to be established was reduced to two, \nwith a focus on Alimosho (the area in which Bus Franchise Scheme is situated) \nand Oshodi, the local government area at the hub of the BRT scheme where BRT \nscheme (Obalende to Ikorodu) is located. The TMUs are Key tasks performed \nare: \n Development of a Local Area Traffic Plan;\n Development of a Parking Policy and implementation Plan;\n Development of Traffic solutions to identified traffic and accident black spots;\n Action on remedial works and planned maintenance on priority local roads; and\n Provision of equipment and training.\nObjective 2: Enhance the public transport road network in an environmentally, socially, \nand financially sustainable manner.\nThe objective was fully met.\nThe investments in road network efficiency improvements have resulted in:\na) Reduced delays at major intersections;\nb) Person days of employment created; and\nc) Improved quality of road network resulting from: i) setting up a procurement \nmanagement system to carry out road condition surveys; ii) setting up a GIS \nsystem; and iii) adoption of maintenance manual.\nLAMATA has started, for the first time in the country, the design and execution of \nmaintenance work with participation of the private sector through awarding contracts to \nlocal consultants and contractors. Experience has shown that the output of maintenance \nworks through contracts is more efficient, cost effective and better in quality compared \nwith the traditional methods of using force accounts procedures. This has contributed to \nenhancing efficiency of the existing road space, thereby reducing vehicle operating cost \nand improving road safety. \nThe works to improve junctions comprised better physical design of roundabouts, \ndedicated right and left turning lanes, introduction of other relatively simple \nimprovements and measures like repair of existing traffic lights, introduction of traffic \nlight regulated measures, pedestrian safety measures such as zebra crossing, road signs at \njunctions, road bumps and drop curbs. Ex-post assessment of the “as is” condition of the \n57 junctions suggest that at least 71 percent are in efficient conditions meaning that the \nTSM measure is functioning to reduce traffic congestion. A site inspection of 21 roads \nrehabilitated under the program reveals that they are still structurally intact after over \nthree years of usage. However, there is a need to continue the maintenance regime if the \ngains are to be sustained.\n21\nEnvironmental impact: The project has contributed to monitoring and reducing \ngreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from public transport. Specifically, pollution levels \nhave fallen in Lagos as a result of replacing old and small buses with an organized public \ntransport system. There has also been a modal shift from private cars to buses to the tune \nof about 5-10 percent. This has resulted in CO2 reduction of 24,677 tons in 2009. \nSimilar reduction in particulates present in the atmosphere was recorded at about -33.\nThe data (first in Lagos) will serve as baseline to measure project impacts. This shows \nthat environmental and transport objectives can both be met when addressed as a problem \nof management and planning, not simply of hardware and technology. \nSocial Impact: The project contributed to poverty alleviation, improved access for \nwomen and children, reduced cost of travel, and made public transport more affordable \nespecially for users in the lowest income quintile (for details please see Section 3.5 a, \npage __)\nFinancial Impact: The project contributed to financial sustainability by helping set up a \nTransport Fund with dedicated funding from user charges (for details please see __). By \nfinancing investments in public transport infrastructure and creating a conducive \nenvironment for private sector participation in bus operations, the project has successfully \ndemonstrated viability of a PPP model.\nObjective 3: Enhance bus services.\nThe objective was fully met.\nThe investments in bus service enhancement resulted in:\na) Implementation of pilot bus franchise scheme along Iyana-Ipaja-Ikotun corridor \n(operations started in June 2009;\nb) Development of bus terminals, bus stops, bus shelters, lay-byes, and traffic \nsystem management measures along the corridor and regulation of ticketing \nactivities;\nc) Implementation of BRT system along Mile 2 to CMS corridor (operations started \nin March 20086); and\nd) Successful demonstration of a PPP scheme, with the private sector providing \nservices and public sector providing infrastructure and regulatory framework.\nThe Lagos BRT scheme has positively affected the metropolis in a number of key ways: \n \n6 The financing for construction of the BRT was provided by the LSG; Bank financed \nfeasibility studies, exposure to good practices through study tours, participation in\ninternational seminars and knowledge sharing.\n22\n1. Patronage has exceeded expectations. Average ridership is twice the forecast, \ncarrying about 4 million passengers monthly. \n2. Passenger fees have been reduced and fares are not subsidized. Passengers now \npay on average 30 percent less than previously, and enjoy fare stability, although \nfuel costs have risen by over 100 percent in the past few years. They also enjoy an \naverage reduction in: journey time by 40 percent; waiting time by 35 percent, and \nreduced exposure to theft. \n3. The scheme has attracted patronage from clients that had hitherto shied away \nfrom public transport: children, car owners, the elderly and the mobility-impaired. \n4. The scheme has created direct employment for over 1,500 people, mostly \ngraduates, and indirect employment to over 500,000 people in Lagos. \n5. The scheme has empowered local operators to successfully run public transport \nservices, and enticed local banks, financiers and vehicle suppliers for other \nplanned BRT schemes. \n6. The scheme has demonstrated and confirmed the strategic role of public \ntransportation in Lagos to the extent that planned State investments in the sub\u0002sector have risen 50-fold. \n7. Ambient concentrations of pollutants which pose health hazards have been \nreduced along the BRT corridor, preliminary data suggests.\nObjective 4: Promote water and non-motorized transport\nThe objective was fully met.\nThe investments in water transport promotion resulted in:\na) Development and implementation of a detailed strategic plan for improving the \nuse of the waterways of Metropolitan Lagos for transport services, including \nestablishing an appropriate regulatory framework;\nb) repairs of the jetties and the privatization of the Ferry services resulted in \ncommencement of water transport, with the Ebute Ipakodo Metro Ferry Service \nrunning from Ikorodu to Lagos;\nc) Encouragement of private sector participation in the provision of water transport\nservices; and \nd) Rehabilitation and addition to existing terminal facilities.\nObjective 5: Prepare future phases of the program\nThe objective was fully met.\nPlease check out a 3-minute video on Lagos BRT on the following web link:\nhttp://streaming3.worldbank.org/ramgen/ext/media/LagosTransportMIX.rm\n23\nPreparation of follow-on phases which includes the participatory preparation of a \nTransport Master Plan for metropolitan Lagos; the preparation of an institutional reform \nplan for the transport sector, in particular on reform of the Motor Vehicle Administration \n(MVA) system; the preparation of a strategy for the enhanced use of intermediate means \nof transport (IMT) in metropolitan Lagos; and all the necessary studies and preparatory \nactivities for the next phase for the implementation of the policy and strategy, including \nthe preparation of resettlement plans for the implementation of rail mass transit in the \nAgege to Iddo corridor. \na) Government has commenced construction of the urban rail in Lagos, which was \none of the recommendations of the Transport Master Plan; and\nb) Government has begun expansion of BRT system to other corridors in the city as \npart of the master plan.\n3.3 Efficiency\nRating: Highly Satisfactory\nEconomic rate of return: An ex-post economic analysis was carried out for routine \nmaintenance, rehabilitation, bridge repairs, and traffic management components. The \noverall rate of return is 67 percent as compared to 56 percent at appraisal, suggesting that \ngreater economic benefits were realized after improvements than expected before. \nHolding suppliers, contractors, and consultants accountable: Reversing the prevailing\nculture whereby suppliers, contractors, and consultants paid little attention to quality, \ntimeliness, and cost of services was a key challenge faced by LAMATA. In response, \nLAMATA designed terms of references and product specifications clearly and precisely, \nleaving little room for ambiguity. The expectations are made clear and a rigorous \nselection procedure is followed to ensure that suppliers that are best able to deliver are \nappointed. Once appointed, further discussions and monitoring are initiated to reinforce \nLAMATA expectations and performance guarantees exercised if necessary. \nCost Efficiency in Civil Work Rates per Kilometer: The procurement process followed \nby LAMATA with its competitive bidding requirements, among other factors, has \nensured greater efficiency in terms of delivery of road works at relatively lower cost per \nkm compared to output from other Ministries and agencies. Other factors resulting in this \ncost-effectiveness of LAMATA contracts include:\na) Regularity of payment, which reduces built-in costs of funds.\nb) Professional culture within the organization.\nc) Efficient monitoring and management of contracts.\nd) Strict penalty for non-performance.\ne) General atmosphere in the contracting industry towards improved accountability \nand delivery.\nIn response to the above, empirical data confirms that the average cost per kilometer of \nroad contracts in Lagos and Nigeria are about two-to-three times the cost of those \n24\nexecuted by LAMATA. Although some caution must be exercised because of the \nchanges in the general price level and exchange rates over the time period. In addition, \nthere are likely to be differences in composite road designs by different agencies (e.g. a \nstandard LAMATA road will have pedestrian walkways, TSM measures etc.). The above \nnevertheless provide a reasonable guide as to cost-effectiveness of LAMATA road \ncontracts.\nTechnical, Financial, and Institutional Audits: Independent technical and financial audits \nof the road works are built into the monitoring framework. The civil works have been \naudited by the Authority’s external auditors and an expatriate consultant. The reports of \naudits have been most favorable and underline the Authority’s commitment to quality \nstandards in its civil works implementation.\n3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating\nRating: Highly Satisfactory\nAfter years of struggling with a lack of reliable public transport, Nigerians living in \nLagos finally got to experience their first organized and efficient bus transport system. \nLaunched in March 2008, a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system provides Lagos commuters, \nwith a clean, safe, affordable and reliable means of getting around in the city. The BRT is \na bus-based mass transit system that delivers fast, comfortable and cost-effective service. \nThrough the provision of exclusive right-of-way lanes and excellence in customer \nservice, BRT essentially emulates the performance and amenity characteristics of a \nmodern rail-based transit system, but at a fraction of the cost and creates a demand for \ngas which is currently being flared-off. In a city such as Lagos with 17 million people, \nthis is no small feat.\nEmployment Generation: A total of 1.7 million person days of labor was created during \nthe project life. This represents number of labor days employed by contractors on routine \nmaintenance. The data was collected from time/labor sheets submitted to LAMATA by \nthe contractors. The contractors employed laborers mostly from the localities and \ncommunities in which routine maintenance was being carried out. \n3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts\n(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development\nThe beneficiaries and stakeholders are in agreement with the substantial reduction in time \nand money spent by poor household in the state on transportation since the introduction \nof BRT system in Lagos State. Following the tremendous impact of the scheme, the \npublic requested for more coverage of BRT scheme to other parts of the state. For instant, \nmarket women requested for some form of concession in which special BRT/BFS cargo \nbuses are introduced into the fleet to ply the routes at some specific times so that the \nwomen could have access to cheaper fares to ease the transportation of wares from the \nmarket depot at Mile 12 along the corridors. Furthermore, many parents now use BRT \nbuses to take their children to school because it is cheaper, efficient in time and safer than \n25\nother public transport system in the metropolis. The elderly and the physically \nchallenged, on the other hand, requested for buses that provide for easy access to embark \nand disembark; and the same time reserve seats for them as well as pregnant women. \nMarket women also requested for some form of concession in which special BRT/BFS \ncargo buses are introduced into the fleet to ply the routes at some specific times so that \nthe women could have access to cheaper fares to ease the transportation of wares from \nthe market depot at Mile 12 along the corridor. LAMATA is considering these requests \nwith the objective of reducing poverty among women and encouraging business growth \nof this category of users. \nThe impact of the BRT on the lives of children has been immense. Children that were \ninterviewed during the ICR survey were full of appreciation for the service free \ntransportation that they enjoy with the BRT buses. In the past, parents had the extra \nburden of first ensuring that their kids were safely transported to school every morning \nbefore going to their respective places of work. Respondents confirmed that they are \nrelatively confident in the safety of the BRT buses that they leave their children to board \nand dismount the buses at the stops close to their schools. This is an unexpected positive \nresult from the BRT which should be developed further in future phases such that a \nsystem of having some designated number of buses in the franchisee’s fleet to be \ndedicated to school runs in the mornings and afternoon during normal school closing \nperiods should be examined. \nThe BRT scheme also has been able to win over professionals with motor cars who have \ntransferred to the BRT or those other commuters who ordinarily would not, as a result of \ntheir social standing commuted with the former public transports plying the BRT corridor \n(molues and danfos). A growing number of high income people are beginning to use the \nBRT buses. \n(b) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)\nThe BRT Lite scheme exceeded expectations in daily patronage with daily averages of \nabout 180,000, at least 200 percent above expectation. The stability in fares in the BRT \nbecause of the agreement between LAMATA and the Franchisees that fares be \nmaintained for a period of years led to a positive impact on the project. Commuters are \nable to budget exact amount of money required for transportation on monthly basis. The \nBRT scheme also has been able to win hitherto unlikely passengers such as those with \nmotor cars who have transferred to the BRT or those other commuters who ordinarily \nwould not, as a result of their social standing commuted with the former public transports \nplying the BRT corridor (molues and danfos). A growing number of such classes of \npeople are beginning to use the BRT buses. Many more are likely to join if the future \nphases of planning takes care to create feeder networks from many passenger hubs \naround Lagos connecting to the BRT corridor and when a fully integrated inter modal \ntransport system is in place. \nBRT has prompted action and development of the overall city plan as well offer an \nopportunity to address issues along a specific corridor. Driven by the success of the \n26\ninitial efforts, the city has prepared a Lagos Transport master Plan, which includes for \nmore widely adopted regulation within public transport provision, an extend network of \nBRT and development of a complementary feeder services network, with the objective of \nincreasing efficiency of the system.\nRoad safety data is not available but anecdotal evidence and consumer surveys suggest a \nhigh reduction in road accidents.\nIt is recognized that many informal sector workers with roadside activities will be \naffected by the development of the pilot bus franchise scheme, as most areas of \nencroachment will be taken back for public use. The early activities under the \nResettlement Action Plan initiatives are very relevant to the pilot and it is important that \nthese activities are continued and actions implemented. Any retrospective reversals or \ndiminution of support would have adverse influences on the pilot.\nGeneral image and citizen perception: The general image and public perception of the \nreforms and resulting improvement in bus operations was obtained through analysis of \nmedia reports, websites, user group interviews, chat forums, focus group transcripts, and \nfrom directly observing and talking to users. Provision of organized public transport \nsystem is seen as a significant departure from previous operations and the level of service \nis seen as unequivocally superior. There is notable pride in the BRT which is seen as \nsymbolic of the city’s ability to deliver and compete in an international context. \nImprovement raises expectations which at times have led to negative comments. In \nLagos there are calls to address capacity issues and expand the organized bus system to \nother corridors. Areas not currently served wish to be connected. The city has price \nsensitive population and there has been underlying fear of fare rise which have been \nprotested against when occurring in the city. Some negative comments emanate from \nnon users, in particular car drivers who have seen some highway capacity removed in \nfavor of BRT lanes. \nBusinesses within the catchment area of BRT stated that the system has a positive influence \neffect upon recruitment and are proud to state their location in relation to BRT stations.\nThe overall positive response from users has been seen to have political influence with \nBRT forming part of the 2011 election manifesto in Lagos. \nDevelopment of Lagos CO2 Emissions Assessment Handbook: This handbook \nprovides the reader with a straightforward and comprehensive guide to calculating the \nimpact on carbon emissions from the implementation of a new transport scheme, \nincluding the collection of the necessary data required for this task. The objective of the \nmanual is to set out the monitoring and evaluation framework for the estimation of \ncarbon emissions savings through the implementation of new BRT lines in Lagos. \nThis document gives practical instructions on the collection of the data required for the \ncalculation of emissions estimates, including specifications for each of the different \nsurveys required, advice on choice of survey location and a schedule for survey timings. \n27\n3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops\nThe project was developed within a city with little public knowledge of good planning, \nwhat organized public transport might be like, and a history of poor delivery of transport \nimprovements and systems that sought to ensure that profit was directed to the \nentrenched interests. As such, the potential for skepticism and suspicion of motives and \nintentions was rife. Therefore, a series of community engagement strategies were \ndeveloped by LAMATA aimed at developing a similar level of ownership of the project \nwithin the citizens of Lagos that existed with the delivery orientated stakeholders.\nA number of surveys were planned, designed, and implemented at various stages of pre\u0002design, pre-delivery, construction, and operation phase to assess the impact of project \ninterventions on multiple beneficiaries. The intended beneficiaries are local communities \nsituated within and around project interventions, public transport users and the urban \npoor in general. \nDuring project implementation, a number of workshops were held which involved a \nbroad section of stakeholders and these helped considerably in defining the project and \nachieving its public acceptance. Existing and prospective bus operators have been closely \ninvolved in the definition of the bus services enhancement component of the project. \nDuring project implementation, stakeholder involvement was principally through the \nSafeguards and the External Relations Units of LAMATA. The latter has the mandate to \nfollow up on issues raised by the public, and chairs an internal user’s services group \nwhich meets regularly to consider matters brought before it or required to be addressed. \nMinutes of this group were usually forwarded to the Managing Director and the \nCorporate and Legal Secretary\nThe needs of the traveler were determined using the following methods:\na) Ethonographic observation. This method consisted of discreet observation \nof travelers’ access to transport, their contacts and relationships with the \nvarious actors involved in transport, and their demeanors and actions.\nb) Quantitative/qualitative surveys. Surveys were conducted to establish \nformal data such as fare elasticity and value of time, but also to gather \ndetails on the relative importance of walk, wait, and travel times, transport \nchoice issues, and the most important obstacles to the ideal use of \ntransport.\nc) Focus groups. A series of focus groups were held to explore in detail the \nissues related to travel in Lagos by different demographic groups, as well \nas to test the features that may or may not be applied within a BRT \nsystem.\nIn order to continue to foster scheme support, take on board and improve services and \nfurther increase knowledge of BRT-Lite, the following initiatives were launched to \nsupport the operations phase:\n28\na) BRT Parliament: When BRT-Lite was 100 days old a BRT parliament was \nestablished in order to assess and debate performance and issues. The \nparliament consists of senior LAMATA officers, the lending bank, State \nGovernment representatives, user representatives (including the physically \nchallenged and commuters). It is moderated independently by a senior \nacademic from the University of Lagos. It is attended by approximately \n1500 people and televised.\nb) A Customer relations management line was established whereby those \nwith comments and/ or questions could ring or text 24 hours a day 7 days \nper week. The line is manned by two operators. The nature of comment is \nlogged and summarized in a Customer Relations Managers report and \ncomplaint tracking\nc) BRT Half-hour TV. From May 2008 a live TV program shown on Sunday \n(repeated Tuesday) was established to examine BRT issues. The program \noften consists of an interview with someone involved with BRT-Lite \nand/or someone who has an opinion on it or its operation. The program \nhas a weekly audience of approximately 5 million.\n4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome \nRating: Moderate\nKey risks identified at appraisal were:\n Inability of LAMATA to operate independently due to political interference\n Insufficient counterpart funding \n Inability to generate user charges\n Road network efficiency gains are used up by traffic growth\n Inability to gain broad acceptance of regulatory reforms from the private sector\n Unwillingness of private bus operators to take advantage of opportunities \nprovided by introduction of franchise services\n Water transport fails to take a significant share of the overall transport system\n Lack of interest in the private sector to invest into the railway\nWhile there were initial challenges in project implementation, both in terms of\ninstitutional support and public acceptance, gradually the risks were mitigated through \ngood planning, government’s commitment, consensus building among diverse \nstakeholders, and effective monitoring and evaluation.\n29\n5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance \n5.1 Bank Performance \n(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry\nRating: satisfactory\nThe project issues were well identified. A number of urban transport specialists were \ninvolved in designing the project who conducted a candid assessment of financial \nmanagement issues (and associated risks), prepared background work on a number of \nissues, including linkages between urban transport and poverty, and championed \nestablishment of a strong independent transport authority as the only effective way to \naddress the sector’s institutional weaknesses. However as observed earlier, the project \ndesign was complex and this was a high risk project. There was no QER which may have \nhelped address some of the initial risks including comments provided by the peer \nreviewers and with questions raised at Board discussions.\n(b) Quality of Supervision\nRating: Highly Satisfactory\nDuring implementation of the project, the Bank prepared 17 Implementation Status \nReports (ISRs). These reports were very detailed and sufficiently informative. During \nthe initial years, disbursements were low and there were two changes in the TTLs. In \nAugust 2005, the development outcomes and implementation progress was rated as \nmoderately unsatisfactory. Subsequently there was change in the TTL, and the project \nwas restructured. The ratings improved to satisfactory in February 2006 and \ndisbursement ratio improved. From August 2005 to project closing in December 2010, \nthe TTL and the task team remained the same and the outcome ratings were satisfactory. \nThe additional financing in 2007 allowed the project design to be more closely aligned to \nproject objectives.\nExtensive monitoring surveys were conducted during the mission and a number of \nstakeholder workshops were held. Working closely with the implementing agency, the \nfeedback from consultations was utilized to adapt the project design. In partnership with \nLAMATA management, a number of workshops and training sessions were organized to \nbuild the capacity of LAMATA staff and other state agencies in transport planning and \nmanagement. \nSome of the key contributions of the supervision missions are the following:\n The Bank acted as a stakeholder in the real sense of the word throughout the \nimplementation process, listening to the Borrower and seeking ways to resolve all \nissues in a collaborative manner.\n Technical Assistance has been useful and at par with the real needs of the project \ncomponents. Assistance with the planning and feasibility study on the BRT and in \nembarking on study tours for the BRT abroad made the conception and \nimplementation of the BRT successful.\n30\n Bank processes and procedures especially on Procurement and Financial \nManagement set the project on a sound footing and gave credibility to LAMATA \nas a transparent organization. \n The Bank was proactive in discharging its obligations, so there was little or at worst \nthere were only minimal delays in no objection.\n The Bank’s relationship with LAMATA was one of mutual respect and LAMATA \nwas accorded with much respect when it was obvious that operations as regards \nfinancial management and procurement were credible, the reporting system to the \nBank was upgraded.\nThe Bank played a key role in ensuring that the necessary tools and understanding for \nimplementation through efficient procurement management was put in place by \nconducting a thorough training for the procurement unit and the project management \nteam in LAMATA. The Bank also undertook regular supervision missions culminating in \nextensive discussions on the way forward with the borrower. \n(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance\nRating: Highly Satisfactory\nThe Bank provided an environment to:\n Connect ideas and action;\n Bring international experience and an understanding of what works and what does \nnot in different environments, ability to benchmark to international standards;\n Assist in development of a multi-sectoral and a holistic approach, with linkages to \nmacro-economic environment, and other cross-cutting issues (social, \nenvironment, economic, climate change); and\n An honest broker and facilitator.\nThe bulk of the financing for implementation of the BRT system was provided by the \nstate and the private sector (local banks, bus operator, bus supplier) but, it was all made \npossible by the Bank playing a critical role in bringing international knowledge and \nproviding a platform for open and transparent discussions. A number of study tours were \norganized to expose key stakeholders, including the private sector to good practices in \nbus planning and reform and BRT designs, to countries in Latin America and Europe. \nThe Bank’s presence was seen as a risk mitigation factor by the private sector and \nprovided them confidence in the knowledge that Bank’s procurement and financial \nmanagement processes were being followed by the implementing agency.\n5.2 Borrower Performance\n(a) Government Performance\nRating: HS\n31\nThe state government’s performance7on the LUTP stood the project in good stead and \naccounted for a great part of the success. Some of the more remarkable actions are as \nfollows:\nThe project was initiated during Asiawaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s time as Governor of \nLagos State. His commitment to an integrated transport system with BRT as a first point \nof delivery gave context and support to the BRT feasibility study and was articulated by \nhis then Commissioner of Transport. The Commissioner led the delegation to view BRT \nsystems in South America and was appointed to chair the BRT Steering Committee \nproviding knowledge and experience. He was able to display political commitment to the \ntechnical development team and take back knowledge to the Governor. Governor \nTinubu’s term as State Governor ended on May 2007 when Babatunde Raji Fashola was \nelected as Governor. The momentum created by the implementation of BRT-Lite at that \ntime, and the positive public perception, together with the subscription by the new \nGovernor to the previous Governor’s commitment to the development of an integrated \ntransport network, ensured that momentum was not lost, and continuity maintained.\nBold Project Ownership and Management: At the institutional level, the focus is on \ndeveloping a single agency responsible for urban transport planning and regulation at the \nstate and local levels, with dedicated funding arrangements. The government established, \nempowered and resourced a Transport Authority, Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport \nAuthority (LAMATA) to plan and deliver the scheme. Government successfully gained \nthe buy-in of different agencies, especially those responsible for traffic control and \nenforcement and environmental management. The government sought and took \nadvantage of the technical expertise of the World Bank transport team. \nOther factors:\n Coming in to provide support when there was risk to the project such as the low \nsupply of buses to the first BRT from the bank as against the demand by the \nFranchisee and facilitating LAGBUS to lease 100 buses to 1st BRT Cooperative. \n Lending its weight of support to the IEC by launching the products of LAMATA \nsuch as the commissioning of the BRT and road rehabilitation projects.\n Stepping in to resolve issues of potential conflicts between MoW, MoT, LAGBUS \nand LAMATA whenever such issues arose.\n Lobbying the FGN to resolve the conflict on the federal roads on the DRN.\n(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance\nRating: HS\n \n7 There were considerable delays in project effectiveness and initial start-up due to a lack of common \nunderstanding between the state and federal governments. The “government” performance rated here \nrelates to support from the state government.\n32\nPowers for the primary traffic management and enforcement in the State lies with the \nLagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA), a body that reports to the \nCommissioner of Transportation. Co-operation between LAMATA and LASTMA the \ntwo authorities has improved markedly in recent years, and LASTMA were prepared to \ncommit significant resource to the BRT-Lite scheme needed to protect the exclusive use \nof its infrastructure and to manage traffic conflicts in the box junctions at the various \nhighway merges and demerges.\nThe support of a State initiative ‘Kick Against Indiscipline’ (KAI) could be called upon \nto help with public management within the BRT-Lite system, particularly at the stations \nand terminals. This covered aspects such as trading and hawking on the walkways / \nsidewalks, and orderly queuing at the bus stops and vehicle parks (terminals).\nThe strength and professionalism and the democratic leadership style of the Managing \nDirector contributed to the success of the project. Key contributions:\n Recognition of the importance of hiring competent people to LAMATA and giving \nthe people an opportunity to do their work without interference.\n A democratic leadership style that listens to the views of others, brainstorms with \nthe senior staff and allows superiority of arguments to prevail.\n Enforcing a culture of dedication, focus and integrity and exhibiting these qualities \nas example for others. The work environment is kept strictly official and staffs are \nmade to reflect on daily achievements. \n Team work was a culture in LAMATA. It was the norm rather than the exception \nand this brought tremendous progress to the organization. To foster closer team \nrelations, strategic retreats were held for all staff of LAMATA.\n Goal oriented and so, corporate goals are disseminated to all staff, Departmental \nobjectives, goals and key performance indicators are set and from the department \nindividual goals and KPIs are also set thereby achieving a job-centric organization.\n Staffs are made to be part of the achievement of LAMATA and so enjoy ownership \nof LAMATA and the LUTP. \n The MD of LAMATA surrounded himself with highly knowledgeable and capable \nhands while at the same time he was breeding leaders in all departments and units \nof the Authority and leading by example.\n(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance\nRating: HS\n6. Lessons Learned \nSetting up a strong institutional basis for coordinated planning and regulation is critical \nto the success of urban transport projects. The Bank urban transport policy paper “Cities \non the Move” (2002) identifies institutional weaknesses as the source of many observed \nfailures in urban transport in developing countries. Strengthening urban transport\ninstitutions often requires legislative, institutional, and management changes at the \n33\nnational, state, and municipal level to minimize jurisdictional and functional impediments \nto efficient and effective service delivery. Strengthening transport also requires setting up \ndedicated institutional bodies for urban transport planning and regulation, with \ncommitment from the highest levels of government and a champion to further the cause of \ngood management. The establishment of LAMATA with the overall responsibility for \ntransport planning and coordination in the Lagos metropolitan area was central to bringing \nabout reforms in the sector.\nInteractions with the borrower and beneficiaries should take place in a context of their \nchoosing. The impact of ongoing changes in policy, governance, and institutional \nframeworks in countries like Nigeria should not be underestimated. Where the \nrequirements bring about changes in roles, responsibilities, and relationships, there is a \nneed to understand the impact on the culture and values of the societies, sectors, and \ninstitutions for which the change is proposed. It is critical to understand the broader \ncountry-specific context. Experience shows that best results are achieved through long\u0002term relationships where new ideas can be introduced indirectly and gradually, in pursuit \nof a shared vision and road map. The design of this project was driven by consideration \nof city requirements and what is most appropriate in the national context. Development \nof a communications strategy, with the participation of key stakeholders was central to \ninvolving all interest groups in the design and implementation. \nAllow a measure of flexibility in the design and set reasonable targets. The growing \nproblem of urban mobility is the result of a complex interplay of factors, cutting across \nmultiple disciplines and involves many stakeholders. There are no easy or quick fix \nsolutions and any design requires adaptation to local context. It is important to build \nflexibility in project design and be willing to make changes in design as new lessons are \nlearnt during implementation. This project was restructured twice together with one \nadditional financing to align more closely with objectives and improve project impact. \nImplementation of BRT is a big challenge and requires considerable up-front \ndiscussions and consensus building. BRT is a “system” and requires extensive up-front \nplanning and discussions that consider all the relevant issues as a package, including the \ndesign of the bus-way; design of the stops and junctions; design of the ticketing systems, \nfare levels, and structures; regulation and ownership of the buses; safety; and \nenforcement of the regulations. A successful system requires ownership by existing \noperators, drivers, and users and incorporation of their specific concerns in the design. \nThe project clearly demonstrated that investments in BRT “hardware” will come about \nonly after an understanding and acceptance of the broader reform program and an \nappreciation of the complexity of issues involved. \nDemonstration of good results is essential to gain support for implementing a reform\nprogram: The urban transport environment in many cities is characterized by multiple \nshortcomings at institutional, regulatory, management, planning and implementation, and \nfinancial levels. Lagos is no exception. Addressing these multiple dimensions requires \ntackling all issues simultaneously rather than in a segmented piece-meal fashion. \nFocusing only on road improvements or bus fleet renewal or traffic management or \n34\ninstitutional development by itself, FOR EXAMPLE, while desirable, may not produce \nmeasurable outcomes. What is required is a comprehensive integrated program of \ncomplimentary improvements which combines public transport, NMT and roadway\ninfrastructure, operations management and public transport service improvements to \nincrease over-all travel speed, reliability and safety. Such a comprehensive approach can \nbest be implemented at a corridor level rather than across the whole city. This is exactly \nthe approach followed in this project and with documented good results and public \nappreciation of the project investments it has now become much easier to scale-up the \nreform program more widely across the city. \nNeed for a strong political and technical commitment: Bringing about reforms in the \nurban transport sector requires a strong political champion and a dedicated and competent \ntechnical team. There are a number on entrenched interests in this sector which often \ncontrol the market through self-regulation. In Lagos, union control is enforced by \ncontracted youths (area boys) who extract payment from the operators and can resort to \nviolence should this be withheld. These payments pass through the Union chain of \ncommand and used to “manage” the operations by seeking favors from politicians and \npolice. To change this atomized system to an organized and disciplined operation \nrequires political support at the highest level and a willingness to take risks. The \nrelationship between technical development and political will is clear in Lagos with the \nvision and determination of political leaders supported by a dependable and committed \ntechnical team. Without this synergy and trust, it may be difficult to bring about the \nfundamental change as seen in Lagos.\nIn summary, key lessons can be identified as:\n Look for the best fit, not best practice (recognize that there is no single BRT system \nprescription)\n Charismatic leadership, political will, and project ownership is central to effective \nimplementation\n Stability and continuity in the project team—both at the Bank and the implementing \nagency, is critical to project success.\n Do not measure success by project completion; the critical issue is how it is \nmanaged and operated in a sustained manner\n Implement a comprehensive integrated corridor based approach to get quick results\n Pay attention to project management, be flexible in approach\n Provide opportunities to learn from good examples in other parts of the world\n Conduct frequent reviews, keep people informed; communications is key\n Human resource needs of an urban transport project are very different from a \ntraditional engineering project; \n A unique brand identity and quality image are important as passenger information \nand marketing devices\n Begin integration with land use planning early\n Work hard to overcome the negative image of most bus “systems”\n Ensure that decision-makers and the general public know what BRT is and what its \npotential benefits might be for their city\n35\n Use transportation planning to sort out BRT and other alternatives \no Begin with market analysis\no Match markets with service plans, plan for running ways, vehicles, \nstations, etc\no Focus on system integration\n The chances of success are greatest when development and management of urban \ntransport reforms is led by city level of government. \n A good project monitoring system is necessary for effective management-- close \nmonitoring combined with extensive consultations allows for timely adjustments \n Key to a successful project design is based on an approach which is:\no comprehensive (covers multiple administrative boundaries, is multi\u0002modal),\no continuous (plans, planning data and tools are updated on a regular basis),\no cooperative (all stakeholders participate, develop communications plan and \nstakeholder analysis), \no connected (capital projects are consistent with adopted long range plans), \no championed (support at the highest political level, ownership), and \no change incrementally (scale-up interventions in an incremental fashion \nand allow flexibility in design).\n7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners \n(a) Borrower/implementing agencies\nThe report prepared by government is included in Annex __. In this report, government \nhas highlighted the important results achieved by the project, such as ______. The \ngovernment specially found …………………………………(LAMATA To ADD A \nBRIEF TEXT, ONE OR TWO PARAS)\n(b) Cofinanciers\nNone\n(c) Other partners and stakeholders\n(e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society)\n36\nAnnex 1. Project Costs and Financing \n(a) Project Cost by Component\n (US$ million) Figures in parentheses show IDA financing\nComponent\nAppraisal \nestimate\nEstimates \nat restruc\u0002turing\nEstimates at \nAdditional \nFinancing \n(AF)\nActual/ latest \nestimates\nPercentage \nof estimates \nat AF\nCapacity building 27.6 (13.3) 20.8 (18.4) 20.8 (18.4) 44.28 (8.9)\nRoad network efficiency \nimprovement\n98.5 (78.9) 94.5 (83.1) 133.3 \n(121.9)\n158.8 (141.7)\nBus service enhancement 0.7 (0.7) 1.9 (1.7) 11.2 (11.0) 8.7 (8.6)\nWater transport \npromotion\n2.9 (2.4) 2.2 (1.9) 4.1 (3.8) 5.3 (2.4)\nPreparation of follow-up \nphases\n5.3 (4.7) 6.4 (5.7) 6.4 (5.7) 6.8 (3.8)\nTOTAL 135.0\n(100.0)\n125.8 \n(110.8)\n175.8 \n(160.8)\n223.8 (165.4)\n(b) Financing\nSource of Funds\nAppraisal \nestimate\nEstimates at \nrestructuring\nEstimates at \nAdditional \nFinancing \n(AF)\nActual/ \nlatest \nestimates\nPercentage \nof estimates \nat AF\nBorrower – Counterpart \nFund\n35.0 15.0 15.0 23.29\n -Transport Fund 35.210\n Sub-total 35.0 15.0 15.0 58.4 389.3\nIDA 100.0 100.0 150.0 150.0 100.0\nExchange gains 10.8 10.8 15.4\nTOTAL 135.0 125.8 175.8 223.8 127.3\n \n8 The substantial increase in financing by the LSG for capacity building component is because: a) the \nclosing date was extended three times from June 30, 2008 to December 31, 2010. Therefore the cost \nincurred during these additional two-and-a-half years was not part of the original estimates; and b) over the \nyears, LAMTA is not only responsible for LUTP implementation but a much broader scope of planning and \nregulation activities assigned by the LSG. These include BRT planning and regulation, design and \nplanning of blue and red rail lines, among others. This increase in activities has resulted in an increase in \noperating cost and staff size. \n9\nIncludes: (i) $15 million for LAMATA capacity building; and (ii) $8.2 million contribution from LSG for \nroutine maintenance. This amount excludes LASG contribution for BRT construction and service lane \nimprovement, estimated at $42 million. \n10 Includes: (i) $24.1 million from license fees (hackney permit, road taxes, license plate registration, auto \nregistration); and (ii) $11.1 million from other user charges, including income from sale of bidding\ndocuments, sale of maps from GIS, income from advertisement along BRT route, franchise fee from BRT \noperations and lease income from bus depots.\n37\nAnnex 2. Outputs by Component \nComponent 1: Capacity building (Appraisal estimate: US$__million, restructuring \nestimate: US$ ___ million, additional financing estimate: US$ ___ million, actual cost: \nUS$ ___ million)\nThe credit financed goods and consultancy services for the following activities:\nTable __:\nSubcomponents Details\n1 LAMATA Technical assistance for LAMATA to develop the capacity to \neffectively discharge its duties.\n1.1 Office equipment and \nvehicles\nPurchase of 30 vehicles\n1.2 Technical assistance Provide technical assistance in areas such as road management, \ntraffic management, public transport planning, financial \nmanagement, procurement, environmental and social assessment, \ntraffic law enforcement, transport economics, general \nmanagement, etc\n1.3 Training Training of LAMATA staff\n1.4 Information, Education \nand Communication\nProvide technical assistance to LAMATA to design and \nimplement a communication policy, strategy, and action plan to \npromote dialogue and consensus partnerships toward achieving \nits objectives\n1.5 Sectoral environmental \nand social assessment\nConsultancy support to prepare detailed Resettlement Policy \nFramework\n1.6 Elaboration of a cost \nrecovery strategy and \nimplementation plan.\nTechnical assistance to develop a road map for moving towards \nfull cost recovery by the sector in the long term.\n1.7 A traffic enforcement \nstrategy and plan\nTechnical assistance for developing the traffic enforcement\nframework and implement the critical elements of the plan\n1.8 LAMA TA building Preparation of building design and bidding documents\n1.9 Operating Costs operating costs of LAMATA \n1.10 Other Activities Technical assistance to develop transport sector policy and \nstrategy of LSG for five years \n1.11 Lagos State Ministry of \nTransport\nTechnical assistance to strengthen policy-making and sector \nperformance monitoring and evaluation functions\n1.12 Lagos State Ministry of \nWorks\nTechnical assistance to improve planning for road investments \n1.13 Lagos State Ministry of \nWomen's Affairs and \nPoverty Alleviation\nTechnical assistance to strengthen poverty and gender impact \nmonitoring capacity\n1.14 Nigerian Police Traffic \nUnit\nTechnical assistance to enhance traffic enforcement capacity in \nLagos. \n38\nComponent 2: Road network efficiency improvement (Appraisal estimate: \nUS$__million, restructuring estimate: US$ ___ million, additional financing estimate: \nUS$ ___ million, actual cost: US$ ___ million)\nThe credit financed works, goods and consultancy services for the following activities:\n 76 kilometers of road overlay\n 50 kilometer of roads rehabilitated\n 70 junctions improved\nComponent 3: Bus services enhancement (Appraisal estimate: US$__million, \nrestructuring estimate: US$ ___ million, additional financing estimate: US$ ___ million, \nactual cost: US$ ___ million)\nThe credit financed works, goods and consultancy services for the following activities:\n Implementation of a pilot bus franchise scheme on the Iyana-Ipaja corridor \n(___km) and the credit financed consultancy support for developing:\no a conceptual framework for the scheme\no Bus route and terminal survey\no Bus franchise implementation strategy\no Topographical surveys of bus terminals along the corridor\no Infrastructure design to complement franchise scheme\no Formation of associations/companies by small operators\no Bus regulatory framework\n Works and goods to support implementation of the bus franchise scheme, \nincluding:\no Depot, terminals, bus stops\no Road surface overlays\n Improvements to Bus Rapid Transit corridor, including\no Road surface improvements\no Bus stops, terminals\no Communications\nComponent 4: Water transport promotion (Appraisal estimate: US$__million, \nrestructuring estimate: US$ ___ million, additional financing estimate: US$ ___ million, \nactual cost: US$ ___ million)\nThe credit financed works, goods and consultancy services for the following activities:\n Consultancy services to support:\n1.15 Traffic Management \nUnits\nTechnical assistance for the creation of Traffic Management \nUnits in LGAs\n39\no Development of a detailed strategic plan for improving the use of \nwaterways\no Studies to support privatization of the Lagos State Ferry Services \nCorporation\no Studies to define role of the private sector\n Works and goods to support:\no Repair of four terminals (Agboyi Ketu, Ijegun Egba, Iya Afin, and Epeme)\nComponent 5: Preparation of future phases (Appraisal estimate: US$__million, \nrestructuring estimate: US$ ___ million, additional financing estimate: US$ ___ million, \nactual cost: US$ ___ million)\nThe credit financed goods and consultancy services for the following activities:\n Report of the Lagos BRT Feasibility Studies\n Detailed designs of BRT infrastructure along Oshodi-Mile 2-Obalende and \nOshodi-Mile 12-Ikorodu corridors\n 2020 Strategic Transport Master Plan \n Identification and selection of MRT network, comprising 7 LRMT corridors, 9 \nBRT & 10 Water commuter routes.\n Blue Line & Red Line – PPP transaction advisory services in progress\n Operations/maintenance concessions (PSP)\n Future plans to develop and implement full multimode MRT network\n1\nAnnex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis\nIntroduction: An ex-post economic analysis was carried out for routine maintenance, \nrehabilitation, bridge repairs, and traffic management components. \nThe project integrates components that complement each other, and hence aims to deliver \nsignificant benefits to economic activities and quality of life in the State. Many of these \nbenefits cannot be quantified, and are consequently not captured in the analysis. \nNonetheless, traffic accidents are expected to reduce substantially in the project areas \nwhere traffic management and non- motorized transport (pedestrian walkways) modes are \nto be improved. \nAlthough there are no specific mechanisms for estimating and quantifying the impact of \nroad investment on socio-economic developments specifically, cost-benefit analysis was \napplied to evaluate the economic rate of return. The impact of road investments can be \nmeasured in terms of direct benefits, indirect benefits, and induced benefits. Direct \nbenefits refer to those benefits that have direct positive impact on the road user and \ninclude savings in VOCs, travel time savings, reduced accident costs due to the upgrade \nof the roads, and possible savings in road maintenance costs. Direct benefits are usually \nquantifiable and can be expressed in monetary terms. It is therefore easier to establish \nthese benefits accurately to a certain extent. Indirect benefits refer to those benefits that \ndo not impact directly on the road user and have a wider impact, such as employment \nopportunities that are related to road investments. Induced benefits refer to those benefits \nthat can be attributed to local economic development as a result of road investments. \nThese include enhanced self-sufficiency, increased production and efficiency as a result \nof, among other things, improved access to markets for agriculture produce, improved \naccess to social services such as healthcare and educational facilities, and an increase in \nhousehold income and subsequently, a more equal distribution of income.\nEconomic and Financial Analysis: The economic analysis was completed for about 567 \nkm of roads excluding the length of bridges that was considered separately. The total cost \nof US$118.87million was estimated for the implementation of road and junction \nimprovement program over the five-year period.\nThe cost estimates were made for following type of works:\nRoutine and recurrent maintenance $47.01 million\nOverlay and rehabilitation $59.26 million\nBridge repairs $ 6.48 million\nTraffic system management $ 6.12 million\nDemand analysis: Traffic count surveys were conducted in 2009 at 30 selected roads for \nthree days on each of the roads and the average was calculated to obtain an average daily \ntraffic figure. The average daily traffic volume of 30 selected roads in Lagos metropolis \n2\nwas estimated at 8,981. The traffic volume by type of vehicle is presented in Table __. \nAverage growth rates of 3 percent for cars, 4.5 percent for public transport vehicles, and 5\npercent for trucks assumed in the PAD were considered to be an underestimate of the true \ntraffic growth rate. Following previous studies, annual growth rates of 5 percent for trucks \nand 7 percent for other vehicles were assumed to be reasonable for road traffic and were \napplied in the analysis. \nTable : Traffic volume and average daily traffic of some selected roads in Lagos metropolis \nVehicle type Average daily traffic volume/road Total %\nCars 3104 34.6\nMinibus 1354 15.1\nTaxi 333 3.7\nMotorcycles 3533 39.3\nHeavy duty vehicles 204 2.3\nKeke NAPEP 453 5.0\nTotal 8981 100.0\nUser Benefits: The quantification of road user benefits was computed on the basis of \nsavings in travel time and vehicle operating cost. The project would result in \nconsiderable benefits in terms of improved traffic safety, environmental benefits, carbon \ndioxide emissions reduction, air quality improvement, non-motorized transport \nimprovement, and improved travel reliability, which were not quantified. Therefore, the \neconomic benefits obtained in the analysis represent the low-end of total realizable \nbenefits. \nCost: Unit costs for various items of maintenance and rehabilitation operations were \nobtained \nfrom selected executed contract documents, and subjected to further verification by \nconsulting appropriate contractors. The unit costs for individual intervention strategies \nwere provided into the HDM to perform economic analysis for the defined road work \noptions. The various costs and prices obtained were computed in both financial and \neconomic terms. While financial costs were composed of current market prices, taxes and \nduties; economic costs represented the real cost to the economy of the resources actually \nused in providing the materials and services.\nEconomic Analysis: The Economic Analysis was carried out so as help in evaluating the \nfeasibility on improving the roads under LUTP. The road condition data, the appropriate \nunit costs for rehabilitation and maintenance operations, and the appropriate costs for \nvehicle operation parameters were fed into the HDM program to determine the economic \nreturns of investments on each of the roads. The analysis period was carried out using a \ndiscount rate of 12 percent. \n3\nHDM program was used to calculate Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and Net Present \nValue (NPV) for each of the proposed road works. NPV of road and junction improvement \nprogram was estimated to be US$170 million with aggregate ERR of 67 percent. \nTable :\nEconomic Cost \n($ Million)\nBenefits \n($ Million)\nERR \n(%)\nAt \nappraisal\nEx-post At \nappraisal \nEx-post At \nappraisal\nEx-post\nRoutine & \nrecurrent \nmaintenance\n45.5 47.0 62.9 65.9 48 44\nOverlay & \nrehabilitation\n46.2 59.3 134.5 164.9 65 64\nBridge repair 5.6 6.5 10.1 11.4 52 76\nTraffic \nsystem \nmanagement\n5.5 6.1 43.4 46.5 58 87\nTotal 102.8 118.9 250.9 288.8 56 67\n4\nAnnex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes \n(a) Task Team members\nNames Title Unit Responsibility/\nSpecialty\nLending\nAdenike Sherifat Oyeyiola Sr. Financial Management \nSpecialist AFTFM FMS\nAkintola Fatoyinbo Sr. Communications Specialist\nAnthony Hegarty Lead Financial Management \nSpecialist FMS\nBayo Awosemusi Lead Procurement Specialist AFTPC Procurement\nBenjamin Vannier Project Assistant AFTTR Assistant\nClementine du Payrat Project Assistant - Assistant\nDan Aronson Lead Social Scientist - Safeguards\nDieter Schelling Team Leader - Team Leader\nEdward Olowo-Okere Sr. Financial Management \nSpecialist FMS\nGeorge Banjo Sr. Transport Specialist ECSS5 Technical\nHubert Nove-Josserand Sr. Urban Transport Specialist SACIN Engineering\nJocelyne do Sacramento Language Program Assistant AFTTR Prog. Support\nKaren Hudes Sr. Counsel - Legal\nKristine Drike Economist - Economist\nScott Sinclair Lead Financial Specialist Disbursement\nSubhash C. Seth Consultant AFTTR Engineering\nMark Walker Lead Counsel Legal\nMelanie Jaya Program Assistant Prog. Support\nNina Chee Environmental Specialist Safeguards\nNtombie Siwale Team Assistant AFTTR Prog. Support\nSupervision/ICR\nAmos Abu Sr Environmental Spec. AFTEN Safeguards\nSameer Akbar Sr Environmental Spec. ENV Environmental \nmanagement\nAkinrinmola Oyenuga \nAkinyele Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTFM FMS\nBayo Awosemusi Lead Procurement Specialist AFTPC Procurement\nGeorge A. Banjo Sr Transport. Spec. ECSS5 Technical\nRoger Gorham Transport. Economist AFTTR Environmental \nmanagement\nAisha D.A. Kaga Program Assistant AFCW2 Assistant\nAntoine V. Lema Senior Social Development Spec AFTCS Safeguards\nRegina Oritshetemeyin \nNesiama Program Assistant ECSHD Assistant\nAnne Njuguna Program Assistant AFTTR Assistant\n5\nHubert Nove-Josserand Operations Adviser SACIN Engineering\nComfort Onyeje Olatunji Program Assistant SASDO Assistant\nAfrica Eshogba Olojoba Sr Environmental Spec. AFTEN Safeguards\nOlatunji Ahmed Transport Specialist AFTTR Engineering\nAdenike Sherifat Oyeyiola Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTFM FMS\nJustin Runji Sr Transport. Spec. AFTTR Engineering\nSubhash C. Seth Consultant AFTTR Engineering\nThomas Kwasi Siaw Anang Procurement Specialist AFTPC Procurement\nRajiv Sondhi Senior Finance Officer CTRFC FMS\nSamuel L. Zimmerman Consultant MNSSD Technical\n(b) Staff Time and Cost\nStage of Project Cycle\nStaff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)\nNo. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including \ntravel and consultant costs)\nLending\nFY02 70 447.84\nFY03 17 98.58\nFY04 0.00\nFY05 0.00\nFY06 0.00\nFY07 0.00\nFY08 0.00\nTotal: 87 546.42\nSupervision/ICR\nFY02 0.00\nFY03 16 86.53\nFY04 34 176.48\nFY05 41 228.77\nFY06 59 310.38\nFY07 46 186.21\nFY08 36 180.66\nFY09 30 0.00\nTotal: 262 1169.03\n6\nAnnex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results\nThe project was developed within a city with little public knowledge of LAMATA, what \norganized public transport might be like, a history of poor delivery of transport improvements and \nsystems that sought to ensure that profit was directed to the entrenched interests. As such, the \npotential for skcepticism and suspicion of motives and intentions was rife. Therefore, the \nobjective of the community engagement strategy launched by LAMATA at project \ncommencement was aimed at developing a similar level of ownership of the project within the \ncitizens of Lagos that exists with the delivery orientated stakeholders\nA number of surveys were planned, designed, and implemented at various stages of project \nimplementation to assess the impact of project interventions on multiple beneficiaries. The \nintended beneficiaries are local communities situated within and around project interventions, \npublic transport users and the urban poor in general. \nMethodology: Two evidence based approaches were employed: desk reviews and field surveys in \ngathering reliable data needed to prepare an ex-post evaluation of project interventions on key \nstakeholder beneficiaries. \nDesk reviews: LAMATA conducted economic analysis of roads maintained in the DRN and \nconsistently tracked progress of key outcome and output indicators by facilitating conduct of \nbaseline/follow-on studies on different project components, including pilot BRT scheme. Copious \ndata provided a rich and available source of secondary information for evaluation. \nField surveys – Field investigations were carried out primarily to clarify and update secondary \nsources of information obtained during desk reviews. They include data collection instruments such \nas questionnaire administration, focus group discussions, field observations and key informant \ninterviews. These instruments were designed to elicit both qualitative and quantitative information \non socio-economic, transport and environment impact of project interventions on beneficiaries. By \nrandom sampling, 500 households in the DRN were selected for user beneficiary responses on time \nand money spent on transport activities. A total of 900 respondents including commuters and \ntransport operators were interviewed to evaluate BRT scheme on service quality, waiting, loading, \ntravel time, cost savings, etc.\nValidity of Survey Instruments – Survey instruments were pre-tested to ascertain suitability for \nrespondents. The pre-test exercise afforded an opportunity to train enumerators, modify vague \nquestions and improve quality of instruments used. For robustness and validity, instruments were \nscrutinized to ensure adequate collation of all relevant field information.\nData Analysis – Quantitative tools such as traffic data frequency tables, charts and sensitivity \nanalysis were used to analyze baseline information and impact on beneficiaries after project \ninterventions. ERRs were used to conduct economic evaluation of road investments in the DRN, \nincluding user benefits on VOCs, time and income savings. Qualitative information, administered \nquestionnaires, and key informant interviews were also used in evaluating performance of project \nbeneficiaries. \nCross section of respondents: The table below shows a cross section of user and other key \nstakeholder beneficiary respondents interviewed during the course of ICR field investigations.\nTable __: Cross section of respondents\n7\nCategory Typical Respondents\n1 Institutional  LAMATA \n LASTMA\n Road Safety\n Nigerian Police\n LASG MoT\n LASG MoW\n LASG Monistry of Women Affairs\n LGA (ALIMOSHO, IKEJA)\n FERMA\n LASEPA\n2 Contractors /Road Rehabilitation and \nMaintenance \nRoad rehabilitation and routine maintenance \ncontractors.\nRoutine maintenance labourers\nCommunities around TSM junctions.\nCommuters on the 9 selected roads of the DRN for \nKPI survey\n3 Bus Transport Service Providers First BRT Cooperative (NURTW)\nIgbatuntun City Bus Cooperative (NURTW)\nDanfo owners\nOther transport providers \n4 Beneficiaries –Users Commuters on BRT and BFS Corridors\nSchool children\nMarketers\nWomen\nDisabled\n5 Gender and Disadvantaged groups Women groups and NGOs\nMarket women associations\n6 NGOs and other Civil Society \nOrganisations\nEnvironmental scientists and NGOs\nSurveys carried out at the BRT Design Phase\nThe BRT component of the project was defined according to the needs of the users and as such \ndesign was based upon an understanding of current difficulties experienced in using existing \npublic transport. A series of structured focus group discussions were held in order to understand \nexisting problems and test design concepts. Separate groups were held for younger and older \ncitizens, as well as males and females. The needs of women were noted to be quite different to \nthat of men, whereby women often felt intimidated by the competition for entry on arriving buses \nand overcrowding in vehicles. Younger men were best able to compete for entry but were often \nput off by the threat of violence and intimidation. All were dissatisfied by the overall cost of \ntravel and long and variable journey times.\nTo understand the views of citizens and users following implementation, it is important to briefly \nexplore their views of public transport services before implementation in order to put those \ncomments in context. The focus groups undertaken with public transport users highlighted four \nkey issues with services:\n Safety\n Comfort\n Fare differential\n8\n Long journey times\nPersonal safety was a particular concern on board Danfo’s with robberies being a genuine risk \nalong with drivers not stopping for passengers to board and alight. On board Molue’s which were \nperceived to be safer than Danfo’s due to increased numbers of passengers on board, female \nparticipants highlighted incidents of sexual harassment.\nComfort was also an issue with overcrowding and a lack of an individual seat for every passenger \ncited as key issues. Journey times were also cited as issues in the surveys. Journey times are \naffected by both long journey distances and more importantly congestion of routes. The lack of \nalternative modes necessitated the use of public transport services and there was a level of \nacceptance with what was available.\nPre Delivery Phase\nThere were approximately 6 million people within the catchment corridor of the project and \nwithin this catchment three target groups were identified:\na) Those that have no vehicles and are captive to public transport who will be \nprimary beneficiaries of BRT (approximately 65 percent of total catchment);\nb) Those that have cars but are reluctant users. Given the right set of conditions they \nwould use BRT (approximately 25 percent); and\nc) Super rich. They will not be BRT users but have a strong voice and are able to \nexert influence (approximately 10 percent)\nContact with each of these parties in order to develop knowledge of BRT and the benefits to users \nwere essential. The approach was to build upon the same principles that gave birth to the project \nconcept, that of developing engagement from receiving and not giving information. As such each \ngroup was consulted upon and the scheme explained as a means of solving their own problems; \nnot those identified by others and not imposing alien solutions upon users. Through this approach, \na sense of local ownership was developed resulting in the project being seen as a user project and \nnot one of technocrats or bureaucrats. The influence of such an approach spread to the often \nskeptical press whose reports both through and after construction, whilst sometimes pointing out \nproblems, where not overtly negative and were quick to emphasize the positives.\nThe public relations strategy through development and construction consisted of advertising \nwithin the corridor, in newspapers, radio and on TV. TV commercials included a 90 second \ndemonstration on how to use BRT, getting and paying for a ticket, how to wait, board and alight. \nBillboards were set up along the corridor and third party advocacy was applied where those with \na voice in the community (local government chairman, local chiefs and community leaders) were \nwelcomed to discussions on BRT; how it would operate and how people might benefit. Road \nshows were held at which handbills were distributed in a range of languages that explained the \nproject. \nCommunity meetings were endorsed by local community leaders through the prior discussions \nand were attended by senior LAMATA officers. The intention was to ensure that LAMATA was \nnot a faceless organization, allow access to real decision makers and show accountability. The \neffect was to raise LAMATA’s profile in general but also develop as an organization that listens \nand delivers.\n9\nIn parallel, meetings continued to be held with bus association and its members at a local level, \ntaxis drivers and haulage operators. Through the consultation process it became more clear that \nall users had the potential to benefit from the project and that the key objective was to ‘Return life \nback to the citizens of Lagos’\nThe approach to consultation as a means of gathering information made a genuine and \nmeaningful contribution to scheme development. The project was not just about BRT-Lite but \nabout facilitating movement within the corridor. As such works encompassed:\na) Segregated BRT running way for the majority of the corridor to ensure better and \nmore reliable run times achieved largely by part removal of the median between \nmain and service roads. This offered significant improvements to journey time \nand journey time reliability of direct benefit to the primary target group and gives \na realistic alternative to the secondary target group.\nb) Narrowing of the median to ensure main carriageway widths remained, largely,\nunaltered. This ensured the support of the super rich together with hauliers.\nc) Banning of Molue and Danfo from the main carriageway. Increasing capacity of \nmain carriageway and ensuring that travelers have an option of using BRT or \nother forms of public transport. This form of self balancing ‘partial regulation’. \nensured that the limited capacity of BRT-Lite in early operation had a release \nvalve but also allowed some freedom of choice for captive users\n.\n“Though there are still traffic jams on Ikorodu Road, especially during the rush hours, anyone\ncaught in such traffic snarls is in such a situation by his choice because they have the option\nof keeping their vehicles at home and using the BRT buses, which are clean and safe.” Mr\nJide Babatola a commuter (The Punch, March 23, 2008)\nKey to both stakeholder engagement and wider marketing was the engagement of the bus union. \nWhilst the union had become convinced that it was appropriate for the city to move to a more \nregulated form of public transport provision, its many members needed convincing and \ndeveloping into ambassadors of the new transport mode. A sense of status was created for BRT \npersonnel whereby the best Molue drivers were encouraged to re-train to become BRT ‘pilots’ of \nwhich their status amongst peers was greater and there was a feeling that they were engaged in \nthe transport revolution that was sweeping across Lagos. It was also a case that there was now a \nneed for more drivers than before and a change in working conditions; the previous tense, and \noften violent, atmosphere within vehicles and at stop was being replaced by a more ordered \nhumane set of service-users. This new relationship is perceived as more synergistic as more \nrespectful drivers lead to a more compliant population which in turn leads to more and further \nrespectful drivers. BRT was seen as the catalyst for change.\nConstruction Phase\nWhilst expectations and consciousness was being raised there were specific issues to address \nduring the construction phase relating to safety of personnel and how drivers should react to the \nworks being undertaken. New street lights were erected to ensure that work on the road was \nvisible and newspaper and radio adverts reinforced the purpose of the works and the need to take \ninto account the delay and the safety issues associated with construction works.\n10\nOperation Phase\nBefore official opening of the BRT system, shadow runs were undertaken to test the \ninfrastructure and for familiarization of the BRT-Pilots. A free service was also offered to \npassengers to test the system at operational loading.\nThe official launch of BRT-Lite was preceded with the national anthem and the national pledge. \nThe program of events started at 10:00am and was overseen by the Executive and Deputy State \nGovernors. The event was televised and a Launch booklet produced, it was portrayed as a major \nstep forward in the development of the City.\nOpening of BRT-Lite saw almost immediate take up with eager customers waiting in line to buy \ntickets and board vehicles reducing the passenger ramp-up period often observed with new public \ntransport schemes. In order to continue to foster scheme support, take on board and improve \nservices and further increase knowledge of BRT-Lite, the following initiatives were launched to \nsupport the operations phase:\nd) BRT Parliament: When BRT-Lite was 100 days old a BRT parliament was \nestablished in order to assess and debate performance and issues. The parliament \nconsists of senior LAMATA officers, the lending bank, State Government \nrepresentatives, user representatives (including the physically challenged and \ncommuters). It is moderated independently by a senior academic from the \nUniversity of Lagos. It is attended by approximately 1500 people and televised.\ne) A Customer relations management line was established whereby those with \ncomments and/ or questions could ring or text 24 hours a day 7 days per week. \nThe line is manned by two operators. The nature of comment is logged and \nsummarized in a Customer Relations Managers report and complaint tracking\nf) BRT Half hour TV. From May 2008 a live TV program shown on Sunday \n(repeated Tuesday) was established to examine BRT issues. The program often \nconsists of an interview with someone involved with BRT-Lite and/or someone \nwho has an opinion on it or its operation. The program has a weekly audience of \napproximately 5 million.\nBRT and LAMATA branding was used prior to implementation and intensified post \nimplementation with all BRT related staff, and many others, issued with BRT-Lite polo shirts and \nbaseball caps. This has ensured that BRT and LAMATA are brands that have a high awareness \nthroughout the city.\nA series of focus groups were carried out with BRT users, and it was evident that the vast \nmajority of participants believed BRT-Lite to be the best means of public transport available to \nLagosians. In comparison to other bus services it was described as the safest, fastest, cheapest \nmost convenient, most comfortable and reliable service in the city and overall the quality of \nservice provided was felt to be far superior to that provided by other commercial services. \nJourney times were considered to be one of the greatest benefits of BRT particularly when \ncompared to other modes. Examples were given where journey times using BRT were around \nhalf the length of other services that did not have priority along the corridor.\nThe length of time that users generally have to wait at the BRT bus stop is an area that could be \nimproved according to users. From 7am-11am queuing for a bus is common place at stops and \n11\npeople generally wait for between 5 and 30 minutes for a bus unless there are particular issues \nalong the route such as road works or a vehicle breakdown. In the reverse direction, queuing \noccurs on a regular basis between 4pm and 8pm. At other times of day, passengers may only wait \nfor a short period of time or not at all.\n“Around 9am-10am, you will still meet passengers but around 12pm you can just walk in and\ngo. You don’t have to wait at all.”\nIn addition to the length of queues at certain times, inadequate shelters are a concern for some \nusers who are forced to wait without a shelter and exposed to (potentially) harsh weather \nconditions.\n“Not too comfortable. Especially at Ojota Station, the numbers of people that always stay\naway from the cover are much because of the queue. You have to wait under the Sun.”\nDespite the length of the queues and inadequate shelter at some stops, users generally tend to \nqueue automatically in an orderly manner without any need for security staff to keep order.\nIndeed the civilized nature of the queue at bus stops and the lack of intimidation when waiting for \nthe bus were seen as major benefits of BRT in comparison to other bus services.\nThe BRT service was praised in enabling passengers to alight more easily than when travelling by \nsmaller buses. In particular, the use of the bell to alert the driver of the need to stop and the \nattitude of the drivers themselves were seen to contribute in this way to a superior service to the \nDanfo and Molue buses.\nAlthough most users prefer to sit whilst travelling on the bus, they often find themselves standing \nat peak times. In the main the need to stand is accepted on the basis that this happens on many \nbus services around the world, although requests were made for more BRT buses on the route. \nOverall the standing experience on the BRT bus was acknowledged as being safer and more \ncomfortable than on Molue services. \nThere were mixed opinions of the BRT bus drivers in terms of their driving style. Some people \nfelt that the drivers were good while others had experienced instances of reckless or aggressive \ndriving and insisted that the drivers be trained, monitored and dismissed if they fail to provide a \nminimum level of service. However, the overall view was that the BRT-Lite drivers were safer \nthan their Danfo/Molue counterparts.\n“Some of the drivers they drive rough, reckless”\n“BRT drivers doesn’t smoke and make call while driving compare to other commercial drivers,\nwhich causes distraction.”\nThe reliability of the BRT service in terms of both overall journey time and number of \nbreakdowns experienced was rated as being very good and superior to that of the Danfo and\nMolue services.\nFinally, in October 2010 the Lagos Governor quoted a response from a BRT user which sums\nup well the public image of BRT in Lagos.\n\"I have to make special mention of the BRT project – I am always pleased to tell anyone \nthat would listen that in my 39 years, this is the first policy project that I have \nexperienced from any government in any era of the country’s history to give the poor \nman advantage which the rich do not enjoy. Today Lagosians who used to take four buses \n12\nin perilous condition over three and half hours to get from Ikorodu to CMS between \n4.30am and 8.00am now leave Ikorodu at 6.30am and arrive at work before 8.00am. A \nreading culture is being enhanced by the BRT phenomenon alone. The orderly queues \nhave also proven that when any people (Nigerians also) are given value for money they \nwill maintain requisite order and decorum.”\nPerformance Survey:\nSurveys were set up to monitor the performance and assess the benefits realized one year after \nstarting operation. The evaluation included comprehensive qualitative and quantitative surveys \nwithin the corridor as well as focus groups involving users. At this time it was carrying over \n150,000 people per day and over 10,000 persons one way during the AM peak hour, although \nrecent reports have shown that this might have increased significantly.\nThis passenger volume is accommodated by a peak service of 150 buses per hour. BRT usage \nequates to over one quarter of all trips within the corridor despite BRT-Lite vehicles representing \njust 4 percent of all vehicles on the route. Only 31 percent of all trips are BRT only showing the \nmultimodal nature of the majority of trips in Lagos.\nBased on basic generalized cost characteristics, compared with other travel options, BRT-Lite\nis likely to be the most preferable choice for the average user. Table 9-1 compares the two \nobvious alternatives to BRT-Lite\nTable ___: Basic Journey Characteristics for BRT-Lite and its Alternatives\nTABLE\n(Box 1) Article from the Punch\nResidents Laud Introduction of Metro Buses\nThe Punch, April 16, 2007\n“The introduction of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) buses has been lauded by Lagos Island workers for \nadding value, respect and dignity to their livelihood apart from easing their means of transportation \nfrom the Lagos Mainland judging by the way they were been treated with respect by the operators of \nthe scheme.”\nThe Guardian, 18 March, 2008\n“It has taken a long time for something so exciting and full of promise to happen in Lagos…We \nreached CMS within 45 minutes (against the normal 90 minutes).”\n“I am happy for my children to use BRT to go to school. There used to be too much risk with danfo.” \n—A mother \n“My husband drops me at TBS and I get BRT to work most days.” —A commuting lawyer\n“I live in Ikorodu but work in Marina. When I closed from work by 5 pm, I decided to try this BRT \nbecause people had been talking about it. I boarded the bus at CMS and there was no problem at all. \nBut it was from Fadeyi that I began to appreciate the advantages of the BRT. When I looked out of \nthe window, all the other vehicles were caught in the go-slow and the BRT bus was just moving \nsmoothly. From CMS to Mile 12, it took me just about one hour. Before the BRT, I sometimes spent \nmore than four hours in the Ikorodu Road traffic jam. I pray to God that they can sustain it.” —A \ncommuter\n13\nThe reasons for choosing BRT-Lite were stated by users as:\n Quicker journey time (35% of respondents)\n Comfort (20%)\n Cheaper (18%)\n Safety/security (13%)\n Reliability (5%)\nEmissions were calculated before and after the introduction of BRT-Lite, these are reported in\nTable ___.\nTable ___: Environmental Emission Changes due to Lagos BRT-Lite\nThe significant decrease in particulates (PM) is attributed to the reduction in the number of\nsmaller vehicles (Danfo) in the corridor. The increase in carbon monoxide (CO) is due to the\nincreased numbers of cars and taxis in the corridor attracted by the smoother traffic flow.\nA survey of users found:\na) 85% previously took Danfo (minibuses)\nb) 8% used Molue (larger buses)\nc) 4% car users\nd) 2% taxi users\nBRT-Lite ran at a loss during the first three months of operation before turning a profit in month \nfour. Thereafter system revenue has been able to cover all operating costs and vehicle repayment. \nCurrent activities alongside the expansion of the BRT network centre upon mechanisms to secure \nprofit for the further development of the system and maintenance of its infrastructure.\nThe Needs of the Traveler\nThe needs of the traveler were determined using the following methods:\n Ethonographic observation. This method consisted of discreet observation of travelers’ \naccess to transport, their contacts and relationships with the various actors involved in \ntransport, and their demeanors and actions.\n Qualitative/qualitative surveys. Surveys were conducted to establish formal data such as fare \nelasticity and value of time, but also to gather details on the relative importance of walk, wait, \nand travel times, transport choice issues, and the most important obstacles to the ideal use of \ntransport.\n Focus groups. A series of focus groups were held to explore in detail the issues related to \ntravel in Lagos by different demographic groups, as well as to test the features that may or \nmay not be applied within a BRT system.\nThe following concerns were identified as very important to travelers:\n Safety. The incidence of crime on vehicles and while waiting for vehicles to arrive was high. \nThe crimes ranged from theft to physical abuse. The disorder and chaos surrounding public \n14\ntransport was viewed as an opportunity for criminals, and, where crime was not present, the \nalmost constant intimidation and general chaos led to undue stress on travelers.\n Fare levels. Public transport fare levels often varied according to demand, weather conditions, \nand the whim of the conductor. A significant proportion of the traveling public is highly fare \nsensitive, with some making daily decisions about whether to travel based on available funds.\n Long and unreliable journey times. The practice of vehicles not leaving until full, of short \nservices that required transferring to another vehicle, and the lack of transport penetration \ninto residential areas, together with the widespread and variable congestion ranging from \nhigh to intolerable, meant that public transport journeys were both long and uncertain. \n Comfort. The state of many buses was very bad. Lack of upholstery on seats and the rusted \nmetal edges that ripped clothing or caused injury were common. Therefore, travelers placed\nvalue on a basic level of comfort that would avoid these problems.\nIn satisfying traveler user needs the BRT system had to, above all else, have the following \nattributes:\n Safe, both on the vehicle and accessing it\n Affordable, with constant and easily understandable fares\n Reliable, offering improved and reliable journey times.\nWhat is the mode share for the BRT-Lite system?\nThe BRT-Lite system currently carries over a quarter of all the trips recorded along its corridor \n(or 37 percent of public transport trips), even though BRT-Lite vehicles represent just 4 percent \nof vehicles on the route. The system carries nearly a tenth of all trips inbound to Lagos Island, the \ncommercial heartland of Lagos and a main destination on the route. The level of demand is \ncurrently constrained by the capacity in peak periods. Thus by increasing its capacity, the BRT\u0002Lite system could tap the demand currently being served by other transport modes.\nWho uses the BRT-Lite system?\n15\nAnalysis of the occupations of BRT-Lite users demonstrates that a broad range of travelers use \nthe system. A large majority are self-employed, reflecting the local prevalence of entrepreneurs \nrunning their own businesses. Civil servants and students also constitute a significant proportion \nof the BRT-Lite ridership. And there is evidence of ridership among the higher-ranking \nemployment categories, including management, professionals, and directors. \nBRT-Lite Ridership by Occupation \nWhat were passengers riding before the BRT-Lite system opened?\nThe majority of BRT-Lite passengers were using the existing public transport: \n Eight-five percent were taking danfo, the small commuter buses.\nBlue collar\n6%\nSales \nmanager/Re\np\n6%Manageme\nnt\n8%\nStudent\n16%\nCivil Servant\n13%\nSelf\u0002employed\n26%\nOther\n6%\nPensioner/R\netired\n2%\nClerical\n4%\nProfessional\n/Specialist\n9%\nInformal \nsector \ne.g.hawkers\n4%\n16\n Eight percent were using the larger molue or commercial buses.\n Four percent of passengers were traveling by car, and a further 2 percent were traveling by \ntaxi, okada (motorcycle taxis), or kabu kabu (shared taxis).\nThe modal shift from private transport appeared to \nbe relatively low. However, evidence that even \na small proportion of previous car users have been \nwilling to use the new system is testimony to a \nchange in thinking in a society in which car \nownership is an aspiration, marking a change in status from which people rarely retreat. \nWhat is the main travel purpose of BRT-Lite users?\nSurvey data show that during the morning (0600–1000) and evening (1600–1900) peak hours the \nmajority of travelers are commuting to or from their places of work. Business customers account \nfor over a quarter of all trips, and this proportion remains fairly consistent throughout the day. \nThe majority of shopping trips occur during the inter-peak hours, accounting for a quarter of the \ntrips during this period compared with under 10 percent during the morning peak hour and 13 \npercent in the evening.\nEducation-related trips account for about 10 percent of trips \nacross the day, with a slight bias toward morning and \ninterpeak periods—that is, the main portion of return school \ntrips are likely to take place before the evening peak period.\nJourney Purpose of BRT-Lite Passengers by Time of Day \nWhat do BRT-Lite users think of the new system?\nUser opinion of the new system is strongly positive in comparison with opinion on the alternative \nmodes of transport. A majority strongly agreed that the BRT-Lite system is better than other \nmodes in all the journey attributes mentioned. In particular, respondents found the BRT-Lite \nsystem to be faster and more comfortable than the alternatives. \nIn all attributes, over 90 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the BRT-Lite \nsystem is better than the previous mode of travel. The system is, then, clearly considered to be \nsuperior to other modes by the vast majority of users.\nHow does the BRT-Lite journey compare to alternative travel options?\n52%\n26%\n9%\n13%\nMorning Peak\nCommute\nBusiness\nShopping\nEducation\n35%\n29%\n25%\n11%\nInterpeak\nCommute\nBusiness\nShopping\nEducation\n52%\n27%\n13%\n8%\nEvening Peak\nCommute\nBusiness\nShopping\nEducation\n“I am happy for my children to use BRT \nto go to school. There used to be too \nmuch risk with danfo.” —A mother \n“My husband drops me at TBS and I get BRT \nto work most days.” —A commuting lawyer\n17\nThe reasons for the popularity of the BRT-Lite \nservice became clear when respondents compared \nthe relative journey attributes of the system with \nthose of the alternative modes of transport. Because \nthe other public transport vehicles are now \nlimited to the service lanes, those that still ply the \nroute tend to focus on the shorter journeys, thereby attracting passengers who are traveling \nshorter distances or from intermediate stops where the BRT-Lite capacity is limited. It is \ntherefore necessary to transfer from one transport to another to make an end-to-end journey from \nMile 12 to CMS (central city on the Island)[]if traveling on other public transport modes. An \nexample would be a two-stage trip from Mile 12 to Ojuelegba, and then on to CMS. The \nalternative from Mile 12 is to access the island via the Third Mainland Bridge, although the \nmajority of services using this route terminate at Obalende from which a further short stage is \nrequired to reach CMS. The journey attributes for the two alternative journey options compared \nwith the BRT journey are as follows:\nTable: \nMile 12 to CMS Other public \ntransport on corridor\nVia Third \nMainland \nBridge \nBRT\u0002Lite\nTotal in-vehicle \njourney time 78 minutes 64 minutes 55 minutes\nFare (Nigerian \nnaira) 230 120 100\nInterchange 1 1 0\nTotal wait time 45 minutes 10 minutes 15 \nminutes\nFor end-to-end journeys, the advantages of traveling by BRT-Lite are clear. The journey is faster \nthan that using the other route options; passengers save about 10–20 minutes in vehicle time. \nJourney time advantages are further increased compared with other in-corridor trips by avoiding \nthe need to change transport to access the central business district. \nThe BRT-Lite offers a premium service in terms of both run time and vehicle quality, but its fares \nare actually lower than those for other travel options. The BRT-Lite fare is particularly \npreferential to competing modes along the corridor, where the requirement to transfer from one \nvehicle to another and the high fares for shorter journeys lead to a significantly higher fare for the \nfull journey. There is evidence that other operators are attempting to profit from the demand that \ndoes not choose the BRT-Lite service, primarily because of the capacity constraints of the system. \nSo, with every aspect of the BRT-Lite journey comparing favorably against the competitive \nmodes, what do BRT-Lite users point to the most important factor behind their choosing to use \nthe system?\n Quicker journey time: 35 percent of respondents\nstongly disagree\ndisagree\nnot sure\nagree\nstrongly agree\n0%\n10%\n20%\n30%\n40%\n50%\n60%\n70%\n80%\nBRT is ....... than my previous mode of travel\n18\n Comfort: 20 percent of respondents\n Cheaper than alternatives: just under 20 percent of respondents\n Safety or the improved security of the system: 13 percent of respondents\n More reliable: 5 percent of respondents.\nHas the BRT-Lite system changed passengers’ travel patterns?\nThe introduction of the BRT-Lite service has influenced some travelers to change their travel \npatterns. Nearly a quarter of travelers questioned said that their use of the service had led to a \nchange in the time of day that they traveled. Eighty percent of these said that the greater speed or \nreliability of the BRT-Lite service allowed them to travel at the time they wanted rather than \nhaving to leave early to ensure reaching their destinations in time. Just 6 percent changed their \ntime of travel for the negative reason of avoiding the queues for the service. \nFifteen percent of travelers stated that they changed the number of trips they made, of which four\u0002fifths made more trips using the BRT-Lite system for positive reasons such as the reduced \njourney time, cost, comfort, or improved accessibility. Of the respondents who said they made \nfewer trips, some of these were attributed to the reduced requirement to transfer to another \nvehicles, which again is positive, if not strictly constituting a change in the number of trips (as \nopposed to trip stages). \nEighteen percent of travelers had changed their destinations, mainly to those served by the BRT\u0002Lite route, although a couple of respondents mentioned that the BRT-Lite service allows them to \ntravel to locations farther out than was practical previously. This is a clear indicator of the \npotential of the BRT-Lite service to influence land use decisions.\nHow does the BRT-Lite system fit into the full journey pattern of travelers?\nAnalysis of trip-making patterns has shown how the BRT-Lite system occupies part of a series of \ntravel modes between origin and destination. Only around a third of travelers use the BRT-Lite \nservice as the sole means of making a journey. \nA large proportion of BRT-Lite users take danfo for a leg of their journeys, and okada is a \npopular mode as well, used as a means of access to the transport network and the BRT-Lite \ncorridor. On average, the number of stages needed for BRT-Lite passengers to make a single trip \nfor is 1.96.\nModes of Transport in the BRT-Lite Corridor\nMode taken Percentage of \ntravelers \nBRT only 31\nBRT, danfo 41\nBRT, okada 17\nBRT, danfo, \nokada\n7\nBRT, taxi 1\n.\n19\nAnnex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results\nDuring project implementation, a number of workshops were held which involved a broad section \nof stakeholders and these helped considerably in defining the project and achieving its public \nacceptance. Existing and prospective bus operators have been closely involved in the definition of \nthe bus services enhancement component of the project. During project implementation, \nstakeholder involvement was principally through the Safeguards and the External Relations Units \nof LAMATA. The latter has the mandate to follow up on issues raised by the public, and chairs \nan internal user’s services group which meets regularly to consider matters brought before it or \nrequired to be addressed. Minutes of this group were usually forwarded to the Managing Director \nand the Corporate and Legal Secretary.\nThe External Relations unit generated a list of stakeholders envisaged at inception of LUTP and \nthis was updated from time to time to reflect organizational changes. Additionally, a \nStakeholders’ forum was held in respect of the Strategic Transport Master Plan. Below are \nexcerpts in respect of a few of the forums:\n LAMATA stakeholders’ workshop on Environmental and Social challenges \nconfronting transport reforms in Lagos\nA number of workshops were held in Lagos between 2005 and 2009 to present the findings of the \nSectoral Environment and Social Assessment (SE/SA) as well as to engage stakeholders in the \nprocess of defining the next steps for implementation of the Lagos Urban Transport Project and \nLAMATA’s role in it. The following are the highlights of the workshop:\nThere are many agencies e.g. LASTMA, FRSC, LAMATA, LG, MoT etc and issues of \noverarching responsibilities arose. It was recommended that authorities should address them to \nremove overlap, rivalry, redundancy, and bottlenecks. The issue of outdated baseline information \nneeds attention through close work with regulatory institutions and academic institutions.\nOperational power issues can be resolved through agency cooperation e.g LAMATA with \nLASTMA, FMNEV and state EPA. The weak compliance with environmental regulations can be \nresolved through the energizing of EIAs to their responsibilities under the ambit of the EIA Act.\nThere are positive social and environmental impacts of the scheme on commuter time, poverty \nalleviation, economy, road safety, accident rates etc. There could also be negative impacts such as \neffect on air quality, public health, loss of natural habitats, social networks etc. The panacea lies in \necological transformation and efficient operational techniques and/or strategies.\n LAMATA/NURTW/Triple E' Stakeholders’ meetings on Resettlement Action Plan \nalong Pilot Bus Route (Iyana Ipaja/Ikotun Rd.)\nDate: 2006-2008\nVenue: NURTW (Iyana Ipaja Branch)\nPurpose of meetings: RAP issues vis-a-vis distribution of ID Cards to Project Affected Persons \n(PAP)\nIssues discussed are:\n20\n Chairman, NURTW (Ipaja Branch) said that the consultant consulted with the union \nbefore embarking on the RAP census and the union gave its support by detailing two of \nits members to work with the consultant to prevent any form of embarrassment.\n Having concluded the census, the consultant did not come back to inform the union on \nthe outcome of the job.\n That market women prevented the consultant from distributing the identity cards to \nProject Affected Persons due to lack of information on the ID card. Some of the market \nwomen and their heads gave negative meanings to the ID card and called on the union \nChairman for explanation.\n External Relations Specialist, LAMATA blamed the consultant for not contacting \nLAMATA before commencement of the distribution of the ID cards. He said LAMATA \nhas established good working relationship with NURTW both at state and branch levels \nand has always informed the union on its activities on the project. He thanked the \nChairman and the union for their support to the project right from its inception. \n The Chairman responded that RAP consultant (Triple E) should contact him at his office, \nwhen he must have contacted the market heads and resolved issues with them. He \nconfirmed that the ID card would be issued to the affected people. \n The Strategic Transport Master Plan Stakeholders’ Technical Session\nThe Strategic Transport Master Plan Stakeholders’ technical review session was held on 25th and \n26th June, 2009 at the Lekki Peninsula Resort, Ajah, Lagos. The objectives of the review were as \nfollows:\n To ensure that key transport and economic inputs from all Government ministries and \nagencies are incorporated in the Transport Master Plan\n To ensure that there are no gaps in the planning process\n To get buying from key stakeholders\nThe final resolutions as a result of the forum were as follows:\n Increase travel and transport choices\n Introduce integrated transport system\n Making transit attractive, convenient and affordable\n To make transport less polluting and less dependent on non- renewable energy\n Optimize use of roads, intersections and facilities.\n Transport infrastructural maintenance is imperative in STMP \n STMP should come up with a bus-feeder route network that will be linked to the \nresidential areas\n A proper framework should be developed for safety, funding & renewal before going \ninto the actual implementation \n Road Sector\n1. Need to enforce existing law on regulation of Okada\n21\n2. Integration and sharing of traffic data among the stakeholders i.e., LAMATA, \nLASTMA, MoT, LAGBUS etc\n3. Provision of road infrastructure \n Water\n1. Improvement in jetties construction\n2. Dredging of ferry routes\n3. Enforcing use of life jackets especially on open boats\n4. Provision of communication gadgets, control centres and effective emergency \nservices\n Rail\n1. The need to link airport and seaport with rail system\n2. The need for more consultation and collaboration on granting of level crossing \nespecially within the urban centers\n The need for an effective traffic management plan and strategies\n NMT should be encouraged by providing adequate facilities in the STMP\n The ‘walking distance ‘ should be specific and should be between 1 to 2km \nmaximum\n Okadas should be restricted to the inner roads by banning them from the major roads\n Parking policy should be implemented \n Institutional/General\n Develop Integrated multi-modal transport system\n Upgrade LAMATA to full scale Transport Authority\n Construct full high standard ring road and complimentary roads\n Clear all road encroachment including bus parks and markets\n Introduce common ticketing system\n Establish transit information centres\n Improve waterway network\n Introduce traffic control centre\n Introduce mandatory TIA\n Develop Investment strategy\n22\n The vision of the Lagos State Government is to have a modern multi-modal transport\nsystem that will make Lagos a world class city\n A central Transport Authority with all modes of transportation under its \nresponsibility & coordination.\n The new structure as proposed by the STMP was adopted with modifications to the \neffect that Licensing and enforcement should be ceded to the central Transport \nAuthority, as against the State Ministry of Transport. \n For a seamless linkage with the Ministry of Transportation, the State Commissioner \nfor Transport should be the Chairman of the Board of the Transportation Authority.\n The Transport Authority should report directly to the State Governor.\n Transport authority organogram to include department of corporate planning and \nmonitoring with responsibility for corporate planning, procurement, monitoring and \nevaluation, reporting, external relations and inter-relationship with other states’ \ntransport agencies.\n Promotion of Non Motorised Transport (NMT) should be brought forward for \nimmediate implementation. The provision of infrastructure for segregated corridors \nas well as pedestrian walkways and bicycle lanes should be adopted as state policy \nand fully implemented.\n The possibility of implementing congestion charges mid-way to 2020 should be \nconsidered as against post 2020 option\n Low emission zones and electric vehicles should be as a matter of urgency\n Extrapolations on other transport issues and developments post 2020, with strategies \nto address them should be considered in the plan.\n23\nAnnex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR \n1. INTRODUCTION\nThe population of Lagos has been growing at an unprecedented rate of 6% per annum, pressurizing \nexisting public transport (PT) infrastructure to almost breaking point. Through the phased \nimplementation of LUTP, LASG has instituted a long-term strategy that defines policies relating \nvalue and needs of the urban public transport sector to macroeconomic considerations.\nLAMATA was established by the LASG as a semi-autonomous implementing institution for LUTP. \nLAMATA is envisioned to provide a strategic planning platform for addressing long-neglected \ntransport needs of the metropolis, and to provide a common and consistent basis for implementing \nurban transport policies and programs in Lagos. With WB support, LASG conceived and \nimplemented Phase One of LUTP from inception in October 2003 to closure in December 2010. \nThe overall objective of LUTP is to provide public transport infrastructure and services for the \nurban poor at least cost with measurable reduction of time and money spent by poor households on \ntransport activities. \nAt project completion, LAMATA needed to assess overall impact of LUTP interventions made \nunder the IDA funded project components by preparing a project Implementation Completion & \nResults Report (ICR) to provide key stakeholders with reasonable justification for continuity and \nfuture LUTP implementation. This involves an ex post evaluation of LUTP objectives measured \nby key performance indicators (KPIs) defined in the inception Project Appraisal Document (PAD). \nThe ICR also examines salient lessons relevant for improving future LUTP implementation. \n2. PROJECT DESIGN & OBJECTIVES \n2.1 Project Objectives\nThe project development objective (PDO) of LUTP is to “ensure that capacity to manage the \ntransport sector in the Lagos Metropolitan Area (LMA) is sustainably improved and efficiency of \nthe PT network enhanced such that it contributes measurable to poverty reduction”. Baseline \nsurveys for socio-economic and transport impact KPIs were established within six months of \nproject effectiveness. \nKey outcome indicators measure achievement of the PDO while key output indicators measure \nsuccess of LUTP implementation, in particular progress made under the IDA funded project \ncomponents. The objectives remained unchanged throughout project implementation, which is an \nindication that the PDO and component objectives were properly conceived during project \npreparation. In line with project restructuring and redesign, planned LUTP interventions including \ntimelines agreed during project preparation were modified at mid-term in 2005. Key outcome and \noutput indicators were tracked consistently during the course of LUTP implementation. The project \nhas therefore benefited from advantages of proper planning, monitoring and evaluation. \n2.2 Project Components\nLUTP Phase One is made up of five (5) major project components as follows: \ni) Institutional Capacity Building for firmly establishing LAMATA and other transport \nrelated MDAs for effective coordination, management and financing of the transport \nsystem in LMA;\n24\nii) Road Network Efficiency involving full rehabilitation of the 632km Declared Road \nNetwork (DRN) to reduce vehicle operating costs and improve road safety;\niii) Bus Services Enhancement relating to preparation of a regulatory framework and \nenabling environment for the organized private sector provision of bus services;\niv) Water Transport Promotion for the improvement of modal diversity within an \nintegrated public transport system by promoting the enhanced provision and use of \nwater transport by the private sector.\nv) Preparation for Future Phases: Preparation of Strategic Transport Master Plan \n(STMP), and other studies for next phase implementation of LASG transport sector \npolicy and strategy, including follow-on projects such as BRT, LRMT, ITS, etc.\nThe major project components funded by IDA comprise subcomponents with specific details on \ninputs, processes, outputs (plus coverage or “reach” across beneficiary groups), outcomes & impact, \nleading to identification of KPIs at each stage in the project Log Frame results chain, as well as \nassociated risks which might impede the attainment of objectives. . \n3. PROJECT OUTCOMES AND ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES\n3.1 Overall Project Performance\nThe basis for measuring LUTP performance involves an M&E assessment of project KPIs. The \nICR has adjudged project performance highly satisfactory due to successful implementation of \nLUTP interventions by LAMATA. ICR findings show that LUTP achieved reasonable success in \nits contribution to poverty reduction. The M&E survey and assessment showed a reduction of time \nand cost savings by poor households and general improvement in social-economic status of the \nurban poor, especially communities located within and around LUTP interventions. The outcome \nindicators show that time spent by poor households on transport activities had reduced to 19.64 \nminutes at project end from 29.5 minutes at baseline and money spent by poor households on \ntransport activities had reduced by 26% at project completion compared to baseline.\nOverall efficiency of the project is deemed satisfactory. M&E findings show that inputs committed \nin terms of money, time, equipment and quality staff members were optimally utilised. Average \nERR calculated in the PAD was about 56% and on completion, ERR is about 50%. Lack of road \ncondition data and additional information on associated costs were factors responsible for a \nrelatively lower project performance rating.\nEconomic analysis was undertaken to evaluate viability of investments for road rehabilitation based \non a comparison of “with” and “without project” scenarios. Without the project, traffic becomes \nincreasingly congested and average traffic speed remains low, resulting in higher vehicle operating \ncosts (VOCs). With the project, average traffic speed increases thereby reducing VOCs. The ICR \ncost–benefit analysis covers a 15-year period using 2010 domestic prices.\n3.2 Project Performance by Component\nWith implementation of LUTP’s five (5) major components, LAMATA achieved considerable \nsuccess on all 23 key outcome and output indicators, justifying a highly satisfactory ICR rating. \nCapacity Building – LAMATA is now fully functional in terms of sustainable capacity to manage \nthe transport sector in Lagos and all necessary procedures and processes are in place, with effective \nplanning and project management functions.\nRoad Network Efficiency – LAMATA has maintained, upgraded and rehabilitated the 632 \nDeclared Road Network (DRN) thereby reducing vehicle operating costs and improving road safety.\n25\nBus Services Enhancement – With adoption of franchise regulation and licensing reforms, LASG \nhas created an enabling environment for organized private sector provision of bus services. \nLAMATA’s bus services reforms consist of two (2) subcomponents namely, BRT and BFS. The \npilot BRT “lite” scheme (Mile 12-TBS) has been highly successful and widely acclaimed as the \nfirst example of a comprehensive and integrated approach to improving PT in sub-Saharan Africa.\nWater Transport Promotion – LAMATA has successfully rehabilitated four (4) jetties essential for \nrural water transportation (RWT) of riverside dwellers and conducted comprehensive feasibility \nstudies for developing ferry services in LMA. However, responsibility for developing water \ntransportation has been ceded by law to the newly established Lagos State Waterways Authority \n(LASWA).\nPreparation for Future Phases – LAMATA has successfully prepared the 2020 STMP for LMA and \nsystematically identified a mass rapid transit (MRT) network comprising BRT, LRT and Ferry \nTransit routes. Plans are underway to expand BRT to other corridors while implementation of the \nBlue Line LRT (Okokomaiko-Marina) is already in progress.\n4. PROJECT BENEFITS AND OVERARCHING THEMES\nThe project impacted positively on both direct and indirect beneficiaries including vulnerable \ngroups consisting of women, children and the physically disadvantaged. LAMATA’s effective IEC \nstrategy ensured stakeholder awareness and support for LUTP interventions. The BRT Lite scheme \nhas considerably generated immense benefits and positively affected the metropolis in several \nways; \nFirst, patronage has exceeded expectations. Average weekday ridership is twice projected \nestimates. Second, passengers now pay on average 30% less in fares and enjoy a greater degree of \nfare stability, even though fuel costs have risen by over 100% in the past few years. Third, the \nscheme has created direct employment for over 1,500 people, mostly graduates and, indirect \nemployment for over 500,000 people in the state. Fourth, the scheme has demonstrated the capacity \nof local operators to successfully run formal PT operations and has subsequently generated intense \ninterest from local banks and financiers. \nThrough the Safeguards Unit (SU), LAMATA has successfully incorporated environmental and \nsocial issues into the planning, design and implementation of PT projects. LUTP has facilitated \nconduct of the following: (i) Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) along 5 corridors; (ii) \nResettlement Action Plan (RAP) along 4 corridors; (iii) Lagos Vehicular Emission (Air Quality) \nMonitoring Study & Oshodi/Obalende Baseline Emission Study; (iv) Socio-Economic Baseline \nSurvey for LMA & 3 Follow-on Surveys. LAMATA has effectively demonstrated the importance \nof environmental and social safeguards as key elements of an integrated urban transport \ndevelopment strategy. LAMATA is locally and internationally acknowledged for best practise \nsafeguards standards and has received several commendations from the WB.\nEffective leadership is one of the critical success factors responsible for successful implementation \nof LUTP interventions. LAMATA’s creditable performance is largely due to effective leadership \nof the Managing Director who recognized the importance of employing competent professionals. \nExemplary leadership encouraged a culture of dedication and professional integrity within \nLAMATA. \nAt project completion, sustainability and replicability appear highly probable. The rationalization \nof motor vehicle administration (MVA) has made the Transport Fund (TF) a veritable source of \nsector financial sustainability. For future sustainability of transport project investment gains made \n26\nunder LUTP One, implementation of follow-on phase supported mainly by IDA credit and AFD \nfunding assumes increased significance. It is highly critical that LAMATA remains a single \nautonomous legal entity with adequate and reliable sources of funding and financing for effective \ncoordination of urban transport policies and programs in LMA. \n5. LESSONS LEARNED\n Strict adherence to guidelines, procedures and processes were critical factors responsible \nfor successful project implementation.\n Institutional capacity building is another critical success factor for LUTP because it \nproduces knowledgeable professional staffs that are fully committed to the organization’s \nvision and mission. \n A private sector model works well within Government setting. Governments should \nincorporate PPP in Bank financed projects.\n Project success can be facilitated by a credible financial management system, a competent \nand credible Financial Department and Procurement Unit.\n Projects benefit immensely from Stakeholder involvement in the design, planning and \nimplementation life cycle and this should be vigorously encouraged.\n Environmental and social safeguards must be incorporated into the design, planning and \nimplementation of all transport projects. \nAnnex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders\n\n27\n\n28\nAnnex 9. List of Supporting Documents \nBank’s back to office and aide-memoires\nFinancial audits\nTechnical audit reports\n(LAMATA—PLEASE MAKE A ALPHABETICAL LIST (BY AUTHOR) OF ALL \nREPORTS AND STUDIES CARRIED OUT SINCE 2001)\n29\nMAP \nI N S E R T \nM A P\nH E R E \nAFTER APPROVAL BY COUNTRY DIRECTOR\nAN ORIGINAL MAP OBTAINED FROM GSD MAP DESIGN UNIT\nSHOULD BE INSERTED\nMANUALLY IN HARD COPY\nBEFORE SENDING A FINAL ICR TO THE PRINT SHOP.\nNOTE: To obtain a map, please contact \nthe GSD Map Design Unit (Ext. 31482)\nA minimum of a one week turnaround is required"
  },
  {
    "url": "https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/741091513007889315/pdf/P112956-LUTP2-ICR-AFTER-QER-FINAL4-10252017.pdf",
    "text": "Document of\n\nThe World Bank\n\nReport No: ICR00004193\n\nIMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT\n\nON A CREDIT FROM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (IDA-47670)\n\nIN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 119.60 MILLION\n\nAND\n\nON A GRANT FROM GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY (TF-97347)\n\nIN THE AMOUNT OF US$4.50 MILLION\n\nTO THE\n\nFEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA\n\nFOR THE\n\nLAGOS URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT 2 (LUTP2)\n\nOctober 25, 2017\n\nTransport and ICT Global Practice\n\nAfrica Region\n\nCURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2016)\n\nCurrency Unit = Nigerian Naira (NGN) US$1.00 = NGN 279.70\n\nFISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31\n\nABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AFD Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency) BCR Benefit–Cost Ratio BRT Bus Rapid Transit CMS Church Missionary Society CBD Central Business District CPF Country Partnership Framework CPS Country Partnership Strategy DCIP Department of Corporate and Investment Planning EA Environmental Assessment EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return EMP Environmental Management Plan ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework FCS Fare Collection System FGN Federal Government of Nigeria FMS Fleet Management Systems FM Financial Management GEF Global Environment Facility GHG Greenhouse Gas GIS Geographic Information System ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IFR Interim Financial Report ISR Implementation Status and Results Report ITS Intelligent Transport System KAMATA Kano Area Metropolitan Transportation Authority KUTPO Kano Urban Transport Project Office LAMATA Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority LCDA Local Council Development Area LGA Local Government Area LSEEDS Lagos State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy LSG Lagos State Government LUTP Lagos Urban Transport Project M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MD Managing Director MOF Ministry of Finance\n\niii\n\nMOT Ministry of Transport \nMOW Ministry of Works \nNEEDS National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy \nNMT Non-motorized Transport \nNPV Net Present Value \nO&M Operation and Maintenance \nNURTW National Union of Road Transport Workers \nPAP Project-affected Person \nPDO Project Development Objective \nPMS Pavement Management System \nPPP Public–Private Partnership \nRAP Resettlement Action Plan \nRPF Resettlement Policy Framework \nTBS Tafawa Balewa Square \nTPU Transport Planning Unit \nUIS User Information Systems \nWTP Willingness-to-Pay \n\nRegional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Rachid Benmessaoud Senior Global Practice Director: Jose Luis Irigoyen Practice Manager: Benedictus Eijbergen Task Team Leader: Roger Gorham ICR Team Leader: Fatima Arroyo Arroyo\n\niv\n\nFEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA LAGOS URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT 2 (LUTP2) CONTENTS\n\nA. Basic Information ... v \nB. Key Dates ... v \nC. Ratings Summary ... vi \nD. Sector and Theme Codes ... vi \nE. Bank Staff ... vii \nF. Results Framework Analysis ... viii \nG. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ... xiii \nH. Restructuring (if any) ... xiii \nI. Disbursement Profile ... xvi \n1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Rationale ... 1 \n2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ... 5 \n3. Assessment of Outcomes ... 12 \n4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ... 22 \n5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ... 23 \n6. Lessons Learned ... 25 \n7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ... 27 \nAnnex 1. Project Costs and Financing ... 28 \nAnnex 2. Summary of Components, Outputs and Outcomes ... 30 \nAnnex 3. Ex-Post Economic Analysis ... 34 \nAnnex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ... 36 \nAnnex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ... 38 \nAnnex 6. Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ... 47 \nAnnex 7. GHG Analysis ... 50 \nAnnex 8. Allocations per component ... 55 \n\nData Sheet\n\nA. Basic Information\n\nCountry: Nigeria Project Name:\n\nNigeria Lagos Urban Transport Project 2 (LUTP2) Project ID: P112956, P114762 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-47670, TF-97347 ICR Date: 10/25/2017 ICR Type: Core ICR\n\nSpecific Investment Loan (SIL), SIL\n\nGOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA\n\nLending Instrument:\n\nBorrower:\n\nOriginal Total Commitment\n\nSDR 119.60 million, US$4.50 million\n\nSDR 119.21 million, US$4.49 million\n\nDisbursed Amount:\n\nRevised Amount: \nEnvironmental Category: B (P112956), A (P114762) \nFocal Area: C-Climate Change \nImplementing Agencies: \nLAGOS METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSPORT AUTHORITY (LAMATA) \nCofinanciers and Other External Partners: \nGlobal Environment Facility (GEF), Agence Française de Développement (French Development \nAgency/ AFD) \n\n| B. Key Dates | | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| Nigeria Lagos Urban Transport Project 2 - | | P112956 | | |\n| Process | Date | Process | Original Date | Revised / Actual Date(s) |\n\nConcept Review: 03/18/2009 Effectiveness: 05/25/2011 05/16/2011\n\n| Concept Review: | | 03/18/2009 | | Effectiveness: | | | 05/25/2011 | | 05/16/2011 | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| | | | | | | | | | 08/16/2011 | |\n| Appraisal: | | 09/24/2009 | | Restructuring(s): | | | | | 12/03/2012 | |\n| | | | | | | | | | 06/18/2015 | |\n| Approval: | | 06/29/2010 | | Mid-term Review: | | | 03/25/2013 | | 03/18/2013 | |\n| | | | | Closing: | | | 06/30/2015 | | 05/31/2017 | |\n\nLagos Urban Transport Project 2 - P114762\n\nProcess Date Process Original Date\n\n| Concept Review: | | 03/19/2009 | | Effectiveness: | | | 05/25/2011 | | 11/25/2010 | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| Appraisal: | | 09/24/2009 | | Restructuring(s): | | | | | | |\n| Approval: | | 06/29/2010 | | Mid-term Review: | | | | | | |\n| | | | | Closing: | | | 06/30/2015 | | 05/31/2017 | |\n| | | | | | v | | | | | |\n\nRevised / Actual Date(s)\n\nvi\n\nC. Ratings Summary \nC.1 Performance Rating by ICR \nOutcomes: Satisfactory \nRisk to Development Outcome: Moderate \nBank Performance: Satisfactory \nBorrower Performance: Satisfactory \n\nC.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory\n\nQuality of Supervision: Satisfactory\n\nImplementing Agency/Agencies:\n\nHighly Satisfactory\n\nOverall Bank Performance:\n\nSatisfactory\n\nOverall Borrower Performance:\n\nSatisfactory\n\nC.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators \nNigeria Lagos Urban Transport Project 2 – P112956 \nImplementation \nPerformance \n\nIndicators\n\nQAG Assessments (if any)\n\nRating\n\nPotential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):\n\nNo\n\nQuality at Entry (QEA):\n\nNone\n\nProblem Project at any time (Yes/No):\n\nNo\n\nQuality of Supervision (QSA):\n\nNone\n\nDO rating before Closing/Inactive status:\n\nSatisfactory\n\nLagos Urban Transport Project 2 – P114762 Implementation Performance\n\nIndicators\n\nQAG Assessments (if any)\n\nRating\n\nPotential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):\n\nNo\n\nQuality at Entry (QEA):\n\nNone\n\nProblem Project at any time (Yes/No):\n\nNo\n\nQuality of Supervision (QSA):\n\nNone\n\nDO rating before Closing/Inactive status:\n\nSatisfactory\n\nD. Sector and Theme Codes Nigeria Lagos Urban Transport Project 2 - P112956\n\nOriginal Actual\n\nSector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Transportation\n\nRural and Inter-Urban Roads 6 6 \nPublic Administration - Transportation 17 17 \nUrban Transport 77 77 \n\nTheme Code (as % of total Bank financing) \nUrban and Rural Development \nUrban Development 100 100 \nUrban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 100 100 \nLagos Urban Transport Project 2 – P114762 \nSector Code (as % of total Bank financing) \nTransportation \nPublic Administration–Transportation 22 22 \nUrban Transport 78 78 \nTheme Code (as % of total Bank financing) \nUrban and Rural Development \nUrban Development 100 100 \n\n| Vice President: | Makhtar Diop | Obiageli Katryn | Ezekwesili | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| Country Director: | Rachid Benmessaoud | Onno Ruhl | | | |\n| Practice Manager/Manager:Benedictus Eijbergen | | C. Sanjivi Rajasingham | | | |\n| Project Team Leader: | Roger Gorham | Ajay Kumar | | | |\n| ICR Team Leader: | Fatima Arroyo Arroyo | | | | |\n\nE. Bank Staff \nNigeria Lagos Urban Transport Project 2 - P112956 \nPositions At ICR At Approval \n\nICR Primary Author:\n\nFatima Arroyo Arroyo \nYin Qiu \nLagos Urban Transport Project 2 - P114762 \nPositions At ICR At Approval \nVice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili \n\n| Vice President: | Makhtar Diop | Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| Country Director: | Rachid Benmessaoud | Onno Ruhl | | | |\n| Practice Manager/Manager:Benedictus Eijbergen | | C. Sanjivi Rajasingham | | | |\n| Project Team Leader: | Roger Gorham | Ajay Kumar | | | |\n| ICR Team Leader: | Fatima Arroyo Arroyo | | | | |\n\nFatima Arroyo Arroyo Yin Qiu\n\nICR Primary Author:\n\nvii\n\nF. Results Framework Analysis\n\nProject Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project development objectives are to (a) improve mobility along prioritized corridors and (b) promote a shift to more environmentally sustainable urban transport modes.\n\nRevised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The original PDO has not been revised.\n\nGlobal Environment Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The global environment objectives are to promote an incremental shift to more environmentally sustainable urban transport modes among users with relatively high carbon footprint.\n\nRevised Global Environment Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The original GEO has not been revised.\n\n(a) PDO Indicator(s)\n\n| | | Original Target | Formally | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| | | | | |\n| | | Values (from | Revised | Actual Value Achieved at |\n| Indicator | Baseline Value | | | |\n| | | approval | Target | Completion or Target Years |\n| | | documents) | Values | |\n\nAverage time spent by individuals on travel along project corridor per trip (minutes)\n\nIndicator 1:\n\nValue (quantitative or qualitative)\n\n120.00 90.00 90.00 87\n\nDate achieved 09/07/2010 06/30/2015 05/31/2017 05/31/2017\n\nComments (including % achievement)\n\nThe target objective has been met. The average time corresponds to the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) travel from Ikorodu to Tafawa Balewa Square (TBS) (including the existing BRT-lite from TBS to Mile 12 and the new BRT constructed from Mile 12 to Ikorodu). Indicator 2: Average money spent monthly by individuals on bus travel along project corridor Value (quantitative or qualitative)\n\n4,120.00 3,500.00 2,141.00\n\nDate achieved 06/15/2010 05/31/2015 05/31/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \n\nThe target objective has been met. Figures above (under “Actual” as well as “End-Target”) are converted to 2012 Naira, accounting for both inflation and devaluation of the Naira in 2016.\n\nIndicator 3:\n\nAverage number of passengers carried per standard bus per day along BRT corridors\n\n500.00 800.00 800.00 458.00\n\nValue (quantitative or qualitative)\n\nDate achieved 09/07/2010 06/30/2015 05/31/2017 05/31/2017\n\nviii ix\n\nComments (including % achievement)\n\nThe target objective has not been met. This indicator measures bus utilization efficiency. The main reasons that justify this value are lower-than- expected demand and lower seat rotation because of the higher-than-anticipated prominence of long trips. Indicator 4: Road rehabilitated, Non-Rural (kilometers) Value (quantitative or qualitative)\n\n5.50 17.80 17.05\n\nDate achieved 10/15/2014 05/31/2017 05/31/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \n\nThe target value has been achieved by 94%, although all the works of planned rehabilitation have been completed. The actual rehabilitated distance came from the 13.5km of Ikorodu-Mile 12 corridor plus 3.55km of Akin Adesola and Wempco Roads. Indicator 5: Number of direct beneficiaries Value (quantitative or qualitative)\n\n0.00 300,000 300,000 440,000\n\nDate achieved 09/07/2010 06/30/2015 05/31/2017 05/31/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \n\nThe target objective has been met. Direct beneficiaries of corridor improvement are considered public transport users in the corridor, of which 156,000 are BRT users and 284,000 are users of danfos and LAGBUS.\n\nSub Type: Supplemental\n\nNumber of women direct beneficiaries\n\nValue (quantitative or qualitative)\n\n0.00 60,000 73,320.00\n\nDate achieved 09/07/2010 05/31/2017 05/31/2017\n\nComments (including % achievement)\n\nThe target objective has been met. The number of women beneficiaries was measured as number of women direct beneficiaries in BRT. The actual number of women direct beneficiaries of the BRT services is 73,320 per day, above the target of 60,000 women users per day. Indicator 6: Number of indirect beneficiaries Value (quantitative or qualitative)\n\n437,987.00 721,031.00 721,031.00\n\nDate achieved 06/15/2010 05/31/2017 05/31/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \n\nThe target objective has been met. Indirect beneficiaries are the number of people given access to Mile 12 market within 45 minutes. This threshold accessibility enhancement has been provided for an additional 283,000 people under the project. Global Environmental Objective Indicators Indicator 7: Percent of BRT users who report owning a car or two-wheeler Value (quantitative or qualitative)\n\n14.00 20 21.00 30.00\n\nDate achieved 09/07/2010 06/30/2015 05/31/2017 05/31/2017\n\nComments (including % achievement)\n\nTarget objective met.\n\nIndicator 8: CO2 emissions from vehicles along BRT corridors (metric ton)\n\nValue (quantitative or qualitative)\n\n371,000.00 359,000.00 349,000.00\n\nDate achieved 09/07/2010 05/31/2017 05/31/2017\n\nTarget objective met. CO2 emissions were reduced by 6%. Taking into consideration the counterfactual scenario, the weighted average reduction of CO2 emissions is 13 percent when the 2016 scenario is compared with BRT and the equivalent without BRT (detailed explanation in section 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives and Global Environmental Objectives).\n\nComments (including % achievement)\n\n(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)\n\n| | | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| | | Original Target | | Actual Value |\n| | | | Formally | |\n| | | Values (from | | Achieved at |\n| Indicator | Baseline Value | | Revised Target | |\n| | | approval | | Completion or |\n| | | | Values | |\n| | | documents) | | Target Years |\n\nIndicator 1: Number of Transport Planning Units established and functioning \nValue \n(quantitative \nor qualitative) \n\n2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00\n\nThe target objective has been met.\n\nDate achieved 09/07/2010 06/30/2015 03/30/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \n\n| (including | % | | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| achievement) | | | | | |\n| Indicator 2: | | | Percent of activities in annual training plan achieved on target | | |\n\nIndicator 2: Percent of activities in annual training plan achieved on target \nValue \n(quantitative \nor qualitative) \n\n65.00 85.00 100.00\n\nThe target objective has been met.\n\nDate achieved 06/15/2010 05/31/2017 05/31/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \n\n| (including | % | | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| achievement) | | | | | |\n| Indicator 3: | | | Updated travel demand and network models, and databases are available for use | | |\n\nValue (quantitative or qualitative)\n\nTravel-demand databases systemized\n\nNo model available\n\nModel completed and running; being integrated in LAMATA evaluation system. Date achieved 06/15/2010 05/31/2017 05/31/2017 Comments (including % achievement)\n\nThe target objective has been met.\n\n| (including | % | | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| achievement) | | | | | |\n| Indicator 4: | | | Concept for hubs and terminals program in Kano developed | | |\n\nIndicator 4: Concept for hubs and terminals program in Kano developed \nValue \n(quantitative \nor qualitative) \n\nConcept developed and actionable\n\nNo concept available\n\nAchieved.\n\nDate achieved 06/15/2010 05/31/2017 05/31/2017\n\nx\n\nThe target objective has been met.\n\nComments (including % achievement)\n\nIndicator 5: Physical completion of works (percentage) \nValue \n(quantitative \nor qualitative) \n\n0.00 100.00 100.00\n\nThe target objective has been met.\n\nDate achieved 06/15/2010 05/31/2017 05/31/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \nIndicator 6: Average travel speed of public transport services along BRT corridors (kph) \nValue \n(quantitative \nor qualitative) \n\n10.00 18.00 23.00\n\nThe target objective has been met.\n\nDate achieved 06/15/2010 05/31/2017 05/31/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \nIndicator 7: Average travel time of formal public transport Mile 12- Ikorodu (minutes) \nValue \n(quantitative \nor qualitative) \n\n120.00 90.00 24.00\n\nThe target objective has been met.\n\nDate achieved 06/15/2010 05/31/2017 05/31/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \nIndicator 8: Percent of public transport users rating their BRT service as satisfactory \nValue \n(quantitative \nor qualitative) \n\n20.00 60.00 80.00\n\nThe target objective has been met.\n\nDate achieved 06/15/2010 05/31/2017 05/31/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \n\nIndicator 9:\n\nPercent of two wheelers and car owners who report having a somewhat or highly favorable impression of BRT services\n\nValue (quantitative or qualitative)\n\n42.00 65.00 67.00\n\nThe target objective has been met.\n\nDate achieved 06/15/2010 05/31/2017 05/31/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \n\n| (including | % | |\n| --- | --- | --- |\n| achievement) | | |\n| Indicator 10: | | Average travel speed along resurfaced and rehabilitated roads (kph) |\n\nIndicator 10: Average travel speed along resurfaced and rehabilitated roads (kph) \nValue \n(quantitative \nor qualitative) \n\n12.00 18.00 50.00\n\nxi\n\nThe target objective has been met.\n\nDate achieved 06/15/2010 05/31/2017 05/31/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \n\n| (including | % |\n| --- | --- |\n| achievement) | |\n| Indicator 11: | Financial and technical performance of project based on audits |\n\nIndicator 11: Financial and technical performance of project based on audits \nValue \n(quantitative \nor qualitative) \n\nSatisfactory Satisfactory Satisfactory\n\nThe target objective has been met.\n\nDate achieved 10/15/2014 05/31/2017 05/31/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \n\n| (including | % |\n| --- | --- |\n| achievement) | |\n| Indicator 12: | Traffic accident rate along project corridor |\n\nIndicator 12: Traffic accident rate along project corridor \nValue \n(quantitative \nor qualitative) \n\n139.00 112.00 96.00\n\nThe target objective has been met.\n\nDate achieved 09-07/2010 05/31/2017 05/31/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \n\nFatal\n\nSub Type: Breakdown\n\nValue (quantitative or qualitative)\n\n14.00 11.00 3.00\n\nThe target objective has been met.\n\nDate achieved 06/15/2010 05/31/2017 05/31/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \n\nSerious\n\nSub Type: Breakdown\n\nValue (quantitative or qualitative)\n\n31.00 25.00 15.00\n\nThe target objective has been met.\n\nDate achieved 06/15/2010 05/31/2017 05/31/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \n\nMinor\n\nSub Type: Breakdown\n\n94.00 76.00 48.00\n\nValue (quantitative or qualitative)\n\nThe target objective has been met.\n\nDate achieved 06/15/2010 05/31/2017 05/31/2017 \nComments \n(including % \nachievement) \n\nxii\n\nG. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs\n\n| | | Date ISR | | | | | | | | | (US$, | | millions) | | | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| No. | | | | | DO | GEO | | IP | | | | | | | | | | |\n| | | Archived | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | | | | Project 1 | | | | Project 2 | | | | |\n| | 1 | 10/21/2010 | | | S | S | | S | | | 0.00 | | | 0.00 | | | | |\n| | 2 | 05/03/2011 | | | S | S | | S | | | 0.00 | | | 0.00 | | | | |\n| | 3 | 10/09/2011 | | | S | S | MS | | | | 0.00 | | | 0.00 | | | | |\n| | 4 | 06/12/2012 | | | S | S | MS | | | | 9.44 | | | 0.31 | | | | |\n| | 5 | 01/21/2013 | | | S | S | | S | | 25.87 | | | | 0.31 | | | | |\n| | 6 | 10/01/2013 | | | S | S | | S | | 61.27 | | | | 0.31 | | | | |\n| | 7 | 06/09/2014 | | | S | S | | S | | 90.38 | | | | 0.81 | | | | |\n| | 8 | 01/12/2015 | | | S | S | | S | | 99.77 | | | | 1.97 | | | | |\n| | 9 | 10/15/2015 | | | S | S | | S | | 149.77 | | | | 3.15 | | | | |\n| 10 | | 06/30/2016 | | | S | S | | S | | 160.67 | | | | 3.48 | | | | |\n| 11 | | 01/05/2017 | | | S | S | MS | | | 160.67 | | | | 3.48 | | | | |\n| 12 | | 31/05/2017 | | | S | S | MS | | | 175.11 | | | | 4.49 | | | | |\n\nActual Disbursements\n\nH. Restructuring (if any)\n\n| | | | | | | | Amount | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| | | Board | ISR Ratings at | | | Disbursed at | | Reason for Restructuring and Key |\n| Restructuring | Approved | | Restructuring | | | Restructuring in | | Changes Made |\n| Date(s) | | | | | | US$, | millions | |\n| | PDO Change | GEO Change | DO | GEO | IP | Project1 | Project 2 | |\n\nSubstantial changes made in the first restructuring include: (a) increased US$6.8 million of LSG contribution in Component 1 to finance additional cost of the LAMATA building construction from the savings from Component 3 for routine maintenance; (b) in Component 2, reallocated IDA funds previously earmarked for the Oshodi–Mile-2–Obalende corridor to the Mile 12–Ikorodu corridor to support LSG priority and augment AFD funds allocated to it.\n\n08/16/2011 No No S S S 0 0\n\nxiii xiv\n\nMain reasons for the restructuring were the delays in effectiveness of the AFD co-financing agreement, changes in the focus of the Lagos Government’s development plans, and the commencement of works by the federal government along the Oshodi–Obalende corridor. Details of context can be referenced in section 2.2 of the ICR’s main text.\n\n12/03/2012 No No S S MS 17.96 0.31\n\nMinor changes made in the second restructuring include: (a) dropped Component 1B (head office of LAMATA) and thus reduced US$19.8 million of funding, with US$6.8 from LSG and US$13 million from IDA; (b) increased investments for Component 2B to enable IDA financing for civil works for station platforms, shelters, and footbridges along the entire Mile 12–Ikorodu corridor. IDA increased US$13 million and LSG increased US$3.4 million, with saving resources of the dropped Component 1B; (c) increased US$3.4 million of LSG funding to cover cost overruns in Component 3C; support to development of pavement management system (PMS) was originally included in Component 3B (dropped) and this activity is then moved to 3C (renamed as rehabilitation and pavement management system).\n\nMain reasons for the restructuring were to respond to changes in project activity descriptions and the reallocation of resources across project categories in order to facilitate implementation progress. Details of context can be referenced in section 2.2 of the ICR’s main text.\n\n04/25/2015 No No S S S 131.52 1.97\n\nThe M&E framework was formally modified in the third restructuring (Type II) to improve the precision of the indicators in measuring project outcomes and outputs. Details of\n\nxv\n\ncontext can be referenced in section 2.3 of the ICR’s main text.\n\nOther minor changes made in the third restructuring include: (a) reallocated US$1.44 million from Component 4 to Component 2, to upgrade and rationalize system operation and complement GEF resources to support the ITS equipment procurement; (b) Component 4D, Air Quality Monitoring, was dropped.\n\nMain reasons for the fund reallocation were: (a) the air-quality component was no longer operational in the project while a separate project under development would serve as a more appropriate engagement for this purpose; (b) the cost for the ITS component was underestimated and required additional resources to support. Details of context can be referenced in section 2.2 of the ICR’s main text.\n\nxvi\n\nI. Disbursement Profile P112956 (IDA)\n\nP114762 (GEF)\n\n1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Rationale\n\n1.1 Context at Appraisal\n\n1. Population and macroeconomic context. By 2010, Nigeria had a population of about 151 million people, with about half residing in urban areas. The Lagos metropolitan area wasthe largest city in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a population of over 17.5 million by 2008 and an annual growth rate above four percent. 1 As the principal commercial center and gateway to the country, Lagos constituted the national engine of economic development. Lagos’s seaport and international airport handled over 70 percent of the nation’s cargo. It contained the largest manufacturing sector and provided employment for over 45 percent of the country’s skilled manpower. The commercial sector was dominant with its vibrant local trading tradition. Since the relocation of the federal capital, the level of efficiency and productivity in Lagos was adversely affected by the declining quality of infrastructure necessary to support the basic needs of the growing population and production sectors.\n\n2. Public transport context. Transport infrastructure and services in Lagos remained at levels that supported a population of no more than six million since the 1990s. The density of the road network (about 0.4 km per 1,000 population) was quite low even by African standards, and the provision of bus public transport was highly fragmented with multiple private operators operating poor-quality minibuses (danfos) 2 and midibuses (molues). The very few organized mass transit systems included the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) constructed during the Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP), LAGBUS, and a handful of inland waterway ferries. Bus fares were high and consumed over 20 percent of the average household’s disposable income. Congestion, a major issue in the city, affected the cost of production and the quality of life.\n\n3. Institutional and regulatory context. Nigeria’s institutional structure comprises three levels: federal, state, and local. At the federal level, the Ministry of Transport (MOT) sets the national transport policy and the Ministry of Works (MOW) develops the federal road network. The 1999 Constitution devolved urban transport to the states, which made their own laws on traffic and transport. Federal agencies with divisions in the states included the Nigeria Police’s Lagos State Traffic Division, which included traffic wardens, and the Federal Road Safety Commission, which was responsible for traffic control and enforcement, primarily on federal roads. In the Lagos State Government (LSG), the MOT was the primary agency for transport policy formulation and implementation, while the Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA) was created during the LUTP and empowered to plan an integrated transport system for the state, with specific focus on implementing and regulating mass-transit systems. The local government councils were responsible for local traffic management schemes, parking control, and management of public transport terminals. The Lagos metropolitan area comprised 18 of the state’s 20 local government areas (LGAs), each with its own elected government. Later, 37 Local Council Development Areas (LCDAs) were created from the 20 LGAs. These LCDAs had works departments and traffic\n\n1 Source: Lagos Central Bureau of Statistics. \n2 \nDanfos are the unregulated substandard yellow minibuses that constitute the informal bus fleet in Lagos. Lagos \nState Governor Ambode intends to reform the bus sector and remove all danfos by the end of 2017. \n\nmanagement units that were responsible for road maintenance and traffic management on local government roads.\n\n4. At appraisal, government authorities had difficulty in meeting the service demands of the growing population, particularly the poor who were most dependent on public provision of all types of services including public transport. However, the effects of rapid growth affected all segments of society. The absence of policies on land use and economic development led to urban sprawl, which multiplied the challenge posed by rapid growth. The declining population density associated with sprawl had increased travel distances and raised the price of public transport. These developments affected the poor disproportionately, often effectively excluding them from work and social services. Meanwhile, the increasing use of private cars choked the roads and endangered the safety of pedestrians and the health of city residents who breathed in automobile emissions.\n\n5. The key weaknesses in the management of Lagos’ transport system were: (a) the absence of an articulated and adopted policy and strategic framework for the transport sector; (b) the fragmentation of institutional responsibilities among over 100 agencies at the three levels of government with no coordination framework; (c) the absence of a well-equipped traffic management institution, inadequately trained transport/traffic engineering staff, and involvement of traffic police with traffic management planning due to lack of a professional civilian alternative; (d) inadequately defined public transport planning and regulatory functions; and (e) the absence of standard procedures for the technical and economic evaluation of programs and projects, resulting in a strong bias toward capital expenditure rather than making better use of existing investments through better management and maintenance practices.\n\n6. With the achievements and systematic preparation under the LUTP, the LUTP2 was created to continue Bank support, in line with national and state development strategies. Besides the other achievements in institutional capacity building, road network efficiency, bus services enhancement, and waterway transport promotion, the LUTP successfully launched the first BRT line in Lagos (the 22 km BRT-lite between Mile 12 and Church Missionary Society [CMS])) where the daily ridership was over 220,000. A series of planning and stakeholder consultations were conducted under the LUTP in order to prepare for the LUTP2. Subjects included feasibility studies, route selection and design by appointed consulting firms, study tours, high-level meetings with Union 3 executives and involvement of senior government management. In particular, the formation of the Cooperative of Union Members in the BRT corridor and a steering committee comprising LAMATA and financing banks was critical to ensure that all stakeholders were fully involved and taking ownership by acquiring and operating buses and hiring and training drivers for the BRT operation.\n\n7. Overall, the LUTP2 was designed to remove some of the key bottlenecks to sustainable transport by facilitating market transformation, strengthening institutional capacity, and laying the foundation for acceptability of the reform program. After systematic preparation in technical, financial, political and operational aspects, the LUTP2 was established as\n\n3 National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW), a Nigerian organization which functions as a mixture of a public transport company, street gang, and transport workers’ union. Each danfo and molue is affiliated with one of several associations, the largest of which is the NURTW. Engagement with the NURTW was considered as a key to stakeholders’ engagement in transforming public transport into a more regulated form.\n\na continuation of Bank support to Lagos’ urban transport. The project’s objectives and activities were consistent with the government’s overall strategy for non-oil-dependent growth, as stipulated in the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) and the Lagos State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (LSEEDS). The project built on the success of the Bank-supported Urban Transport Project in Lagos, especially the LUTP, to promote the government’s agenda. The project also supported the Nigeria Vision 20:2020 developmental blueprint adopted by the federal government and the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) 4 approved by the World Bank in 2009.\n\n8. Rationale of IDA and Global Environment Facility (GEF) support. The World Bank’s continued involvement in the sector was intended to ensure: (a) consolidating and building on the achievements of the past five years under the LUTP; (b) scaling up the results achieved in Lagos and working toward support for initiatives in other large cities (for example, Kano); (c) providing confidence to the private sector and minimizing its perceived risks in undertaking public–private partnerships (PPPs) related to public transport; (d) using technical expertise for policy analyses and project formulation, coordinating and leveraging financing from other development partners (aid harmonization); and (e) helping to raise awareness of the need to go beyond investments in infrastructure and address mobility issues in the broader contexts of increasing urbanization, economic development, poverty reduction, and climate change.\n\n9. The project also fit under the GEF-4’s climate-change focal area strategy by facilitating market transformation for sustainable mobility in urban areas, thus leading to reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The project’s activities were in line with the GEF-4 Strategic Program CC SP5 because it was designed to promote the long-term shift toward low emissions and sustainable transport operations by strengthening the institutional and regulatory framework for sustainable urban transport and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of GHGs. The addition of GEF funds was meant to help Lagos to not only prioritize investment in service delivery and poverty alleviation but also, as the BRT system expanded and enhanced, to focus on issues related to service integration, improved operations and acceptability, modal integration, and, particularly, outreach and marketing to attract current non-users of public transport.\n\n1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO), Global Environmental Objectives (GEO), and Respective Key Indicators\n\n10. The project development objectives are to: (a) improve mobility along prioritized corridors, and (b) promote a shift to more environmentally sustainable urban transport modes.\n\n11. The key indicators of the expected project outcomes along the BRT corridors were the following:\n\n| | • | | Reduced travel times; | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| | • | | Reduced household expenditures on transport; | |\n| | • | | Increase in bus operational efficiency (number of passengers carried per standard bus | |\n\nper day);\n\n4 The CPS, which was jointly developed by the World Bank and the U.K. Department for International Development on July 28, 2009, was aligned with the pillars of both the NEEDS and LSEEDS, especially the second pillar which focuses on improved environment and services for non-oil growth.\n\n• Length of road network rehabilitated in the Lagos metropolitan network; \n• Number of direct beneficiaries by gender; and \n• Number of indirect beneficiaries by gender. \n\n12. The GEO is to promote an incremental shift to more environmentally sustainable urban transport modes among users with a relatively high carbon footprint.\n\n13. The key indicators of the expected global environmental objective outcomes were:\n\n• Increase in the percent of trips made by BRT among households owning cars or motorbikes; and • Reduced carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from vehicles along the BRT corridors.\n\n1.3 Revised PDO and GEO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification\n\n14. The original PDO and GEO have not been revised. However, modifications to key indicators were agreed on the mid-term review and formally adopted in the 2015 restructuring to help reflect the achievement of the PDO, in two ways: (i) the revised framework clarified and removed inconsistencies between indicator statements in different parts of the PAD and the Financing and Grant Agreements, thereby harmonizing the indicators and their intent; and (ii) some indicators required proper definition and simplification to clearly reflect the intended outcome and streamline measurement. The detailed modifications to the indicators can be referenced in Annex 5 of the Aide Memoire for the mission on April 20-25, 2015.\n\n1.4. Main Beneficiaries\n\n15. The project was designed under the strategic guidance of the NEEDS and the CPS, with the goal of contributing to the three pillars of the NEEDS: (i) empowering people and improving social service delivery; (ii) fostering economic growth, in particular in the non-oil private sector; and (iii) enhancing the government’s effectiveness and efficiency while improving governance.\n\n16. With regard to project activities that contributed to each pillar, the main beneficiaries identified are:\n\n(a) On empowering people and improving social service delivery, the project supported the development of information, education, and communication strategies that guided the involvement of transport users and beneficiary communities while monitoring and evaluating the project’s impact. The main beneficiaries included commuters with access to the planned bus corridor who benefited from improved accessibility, safety, efficiency, and affordability in public transport service.\n\n(b) On fostering economic growth, the project focused on developing an enabling environment for private-sector participation in the transport sector and improving service delivery, particularly affordable mobility in Lagos. The main beneficiaries included private companies involved in bus operations, maintenance, infrastructure\n\nconstruction; and potentially individuals receiving new employment opportunities because of project operations or improved mobility.\n\n(c) On improving governance, the project strengthened institutional capacity in terms of budget accountability and transport planning and programming capacity, while establishing a model of public-sector governance for other government agencies. The main beneficiaries were the relevant planning and implementing government agencies, especially LAMATA.\n\n1.5 Original Components (as approved)\n\n17. The original project design included the following four components. Annex 2 references the details of each of these components. Annex 8 presents the allocation per component and the co-financing distribution of different components.\n\n• Component 1: Institutional Development and Capacity Building; \n• Component 2: Improvement of Public Transport Infrastructure and Enhancement of \nTraffic Management Systems; \n• Component 3: Improvement of Lagos State Metropolitan Road Network; and \n• Component 4: Project Management and System Monitoring. \n\n1.6 Revised Components\n\n18. Project components were revised in the 2011, 2012 and 2015 restructurings. The changes in components included revision of activities and reallocation of funds. A major change in Component 2 was made in the 2011 restructuring. At appraisal, Component 2 included the BRT infrastructure construction and supervision of Oshodi–Mile 2–Obalende. However, this corridor was the responsibility of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN). After the project was approved, the FGN moved ahead with civil works for traffic-flow improvements along the corridor. It was therefore necessary to restructure the project, remove this activity, and reallocate resources. The World Bank reallocated resources to finance the Ikorodu–Mile 12 corridor, which initially was financed only by the French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement, AFD) and counterpart funding.\n\n19. The tables included in Annexes 2 and 8 reflect the full set of adjustments in component activities. Section H of the Data Sheet presents additional descriptions of changes in components during the restructurings.\n\n2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes\n\n2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry\n\n20. A sound background analysis was prepared as part of the previous urban transport project in Lagos, and lessons learned were incorporated in the design. The LUTP2 was the second phase of the LUTP implemented by the same government agency, LAMATA. The LUTP included necessary studies and preparatory activities for the next phase of the policy and strategy implementation. The project design built on the lessons learned from the previous project and other urban transport projects: (a) maintaining a strong institutional basis, LAMATA, for coordinated\n\nplanning and regulation as a critical element to the success of urban transport projects; (b) holding considerable up-front discussions, consensus building, and extensive consultations with stakeholders and senior government officials; and (c) establishing a monitoring unit in LAMATA and providing training to staff on project monitoring and evaluation, which is necessary for effective management.\n\n21. The government’s and stakeholders’ commitment to the project was evidenced during preparation. The government’s significant buy-in to the urban transport development strategy and LAMATA was demonstrated by two successive elected governors’ support. Government support was extended to continue and expand the BRT system in Lagos. As part of the LUTP’s implementation, the LSG also demonstrated ownership by introducing institutional, legal and regulatory reforms in the public transport sector. In an effort to build local ownership and reflect local needs in project design, extensive user surveys and focus group discussions were conducted to understand specific concerns and the best ways to accommodate them during implementation. LAMATA built a strong sense of ownership with the transport union as part the project design. This design was based on the premise that the project’s success depends on promoting social inclusion in transport policies and investments.\n\n22. Risks were assessed diligently, considering the World Bank’s previous engagement in urban transport in Lagos, although some risks were underestimated. Main risks were identified during project preparation, and mitigation measures were defined. Social risk was identified during preparation. Urban transport projects usually generate interference with multiple urban-space users, including commuters, residents, schoolchildren, and street traders at sites along the selected corridors. In this project, however, social risks associated with street traders were underestimated at appraisal and materialized during project implementation.\n\n2.2 Implementation\n\n23. The project was restructured for the first time in 2011, which moved apace project implementation after an initial phase of delayed activities and disbursements. The main reasons for the first restructuring were a delay in the effectiveness of the AFD co-financing agreement and changes in the focus of the federal government’s development plans for the Oshodi–Obalende corridor. Oshodi–Obalende corridor is a federal road leading to the port, which was the section initially identified for BRT investments under the project. After the project was approved, the federal government unilaterally changed the focus for this corridor and decided to finance the road’s rehabilitation with its own financing and commenced works incompatible with BRT construction. The federal government had jurisdiction in the corridor and political discussions did not achieve a change in the federal decision. As a result, this component was dropped from Bank financing. The first disbursement was delayed until December 2011 after the client set up the Designated Account. AFD co-financing for this project (US$100 million) was soon approved and became effective as of March 28, 2012. After the 2011 restructuring, all project activities were proceeding apace. The disbursement of IDA and AFD funds began to catch up and substantially improved.\n\n24. A second restructuring took place in 2012 to respond to changes in project activity descriptions and reallocation of resources across project categories, and resulted in good implementation progress. The contracts for the 13-km Ikorodu BRT extension corridor were\n\nawarded in the latter half of 2012. However, the project was restructured to adapt to the needs of fund reallocation and minor changes in project activities, resulting in slight delays in procurement for ancillary civil works contracts (construction of bus stations, footbridges and terminals) and the rehabilitation of Wempco Road. Project implementation progressed smoothly after restructuring.\n\n25. The third and last restructuring in 2015 allowed the reallocation of resources from the Air-Quality Monitoring subcomponent to support the high-standard Intelligent Transport System (ITS). The Air-Quality Monitoring subcomponent was dropped in this restructuring because it was designed to measure before and after air quality in the BRT corridor, Because baseline data were not gathered before BRT started operating due to delays in procurement, the funds to procure the air-quality monitoring devices would no longer serve its function. Meanwhile, a separate air-quality monitoring and source apportionment project for Lagos State was under discussion at the time of the restructuring, and could constitute a more appropriate engagement for the Bank to address air quality in Lagos. Simultaneously, the ITS allocation was initially underestimated and negatively affected by the exchange rate. Therefore, there was identified a need for additional resources to supplement GEF resources in support of ITS equipment procurement.\n\n26. The ITS procurement process proved successful on the second attempt after additional resources were reallocated and guidance was provided by the ITS expert who was brought on board. An initial attempt in January 2015 to procure the supply and installation of the ITS received poor and insufficient response because of the estimated scope and cost. Additional resources for the ITS component were then allocated through the third restructuring, and the Bank’s ITS expert was brought on board to provide guidance to LAMATA on preparing sufficiently for the bidding process. LAMATA launched a second bid in July 2015 that was successful in identifying a preferred bidder. The ITS contract was awarded to a consortium of international firms in association with a local firm. The ITS was fully deployed by the closing date, as evidenced during the Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) mission in May 2017.\n\n27. Persistent issues with the fare-collection system reduced BRT performance during the first months of operation. The system was initially installed directly on the BRT buses prior to shipment to Nigeria. However, the tap-on/tap-off system that had been intended to be used as the main fare-collection system did not accurately record fares, resulting in substantial underpayments. Therefore, the use of smart-card payment was suspended and replaced with a backup interim solution in which one or two staff members at each BRT station can print paper tickets from the hand-held Electronic Ticketing Machine (ETM) before passengers board. After the initial adjustment phase, this interim ticketing mechanism was working by the project’s closing date. The preferred option of a smart-card fare-collection system is expected to be fully rolled out by the end of calendar year 2017.\n\n28. State government transition in 2015 affected LAMATA, although its institutional resilience allowed it to overcome the political transition and perform highly. LAMATA has been active under three state administrations, with transitions in 2007 and 2015. Although the transition in 2007 did not cause changes to LAMATA’s management, state administration support to LAMATA was undermined in some instances. The last transition in 2015, and the only one that occurred during the project, caused a complete turnover of LAMATA;s senior management,\n\nincluding the managing director who had served LAMATA for 13 years. Nevertheless, this administration was supportive of LAMATA’s vision, recognizing its key role as urban transport planner and regulator, and considering urban transport as one of the State’s key development priorities.\n\n29. Political challenges and violence by an anti-government terror campaign in Kano during project implementation caused delays and challenged the achievement of results in that city. Violence and disruption in Kano, associated with a terror campaign by anti-government forces, were concerns during implementation. This terrorism directly affected the project by delaying the start of the concept design studies (and related data collection) for the proposed pilot bus corridor scheme, which were expected to have started in January 2012. Consultants and World Bank staff were restricted from traveling to Kano for security reasons. The extraordinary circumstances in Kano State caused delays in implementation and made it difficult for the World Bank and LAMATA 5 to closely support Kano.\n\n30. Changes to the Lagos State financial management and payment authorization process in the first quarter of 2016 slowed down procurement, disbursement and payments. In February 2016, the LSG directed that all government revenues and inflows needed to be in the Treasury’s Single Account and managed through the project’s Financial Management Unit in the State Treasury Office. The changes to the Lagos State financial management and payment authorization process led to substantial delays in payments to consultants and contractors, and the extended processing time adversely affected LAMATA’s operations. The situation of slowed procurement, disbursement and payments continued until the project’s closing date.\n\n31. Fluctuations of the Naira against SDR and the US dollar challenged LAMATA’s implementation planning. Fluctuations of the exchange rate of the Naira versus SDR and the US dollar have challenged resource planning during implementation. Exchange-rate fluctuations had both positive and negative impacts in different phases of the project. For instance, the ITS component was negatively affected by the exchange rate in 2015. On the other hand, a positive exchange rate in mid-2016 made it possible to identify additional resources available under the IDA credit to construct the Ikeja terminal. LAMATA moved quickly to use these resources for the terminal, which was nearly completed by May 2017, as the ICR team observed during its mission.\n\n2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Use\n\n32. At appraisal, the project included a comprehensive M&E framework design based on qualitative and quantitative outcome and intermediate indicators. However, some of the data collection methods could have been simplified. At appraisal, the M&E framework had nine outcome indicators. The indicators properly captured different dimensions of the transportation system, such as affordability, availability, accessibility and acceptability. The M&E framework includes transport, social, environmental, and capacity development indicators. The data collection methods for some indicators resulted in complexity and could have been simplified at appraisal. For instance, the indicator “Transport share of household expenditure on BRT corridor” needed to\n\n5 Technical cooperation outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Kano State Transport Authority (KSTA) and LAMATA.\n\nconstruct the share of household expenditure in order to calculate the indicator value. This indicator was simplified in the July 2015 restructuring.\n\n33. The midterm review took proactive action to modify the M&E framework and performance indicators in order to better monitor and reflect progress toward the PDO and GEO. During the midterm review in March 2013, the project team, the World Bank and the AFD agreed that the M&E framework should be modified to improve the precision of the indicators in measuring project and intermediate outcomes and reflect more accurately the project’s results. The modification of performance indicators required a change to the legal agreements (Type II restructuring), which was then approved and formally documented in the June 2015 restructuring paper.\n\n34. Issues in the use of the M&E framework were resolved by contracting technical support, which reinforced the project monitoring unit in LAMATA. M&E of the project was the responsibility of LAMATA’s Department of Corporate and Investment Planning (DCIP). Limitation of the DCIP’s capacity was evidenced by the monitoring of a revised structure for performance indicators and baseline values after the 2013 midterm review. LAMATA strengthened its M&E team with a consultant team to proceed with the proposed changes in the M&E framework. Technical consulting support for monitoring helped collect data on a monthly basis to track progress toward the project closing date.\n\n2.4 Safeguards and Fiduciary Compliance\n\n35. Safeguards under this project complied with the three World Bank safeguards policies triggered: (i) OP/BP 4.01 Environmental Assessment; (ii) OP/BP 4.11 Physical Cultural Resources; and (iii) OP/BP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement. At project preparation, given the nature of this project’s co-financing, all counterparts agreed that the World Bank was responsible for reviewing and approving all safeguard instruments applicable to the LUTP2, regardless of the source of financing. The Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and the Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), including several site-specific environmental management plans (EMPs) for known project activity sites, were prepared, reviewed and disclosed as required. At project completion, the overall safeguards rating was Moderately Satisfactory.\n\n36. On environmental safeguards, the project complied with safeguards policy OP/BP 4.01. A number of environmentally sensitive areas along the sites (Mile 12–Tafawa Balewa Square [TBS] BRT-lite upgrade, Mile 12–Ikorodu extension, and Ikeja bus terminal) were identified at appraisal and as the project evolved. In compliance with OP/BP 4.01, the final EA documents (Environmental and Social Impact Assessment for Mile 12–Ikorodu Road and Ikeja bus terminal, EMPs for rehabilitation of Wempco and Akin–Adesola Roads) were prepared and disclosed in Nigeria and the World Bank’s Infoshop.\n\n37. On physical cultural resources safeguards, the project triggered safeguards policy OP/BP 4.11 at project appraisal due to the substantial civil works. However, until project completion, no cultural resources were identified and therefore no corresponding measure was taken.\n\n38. On social safeguards, the project complied with safeguards policy OP/BP 4.12. Active public consultations took place with affected villages and households regarding locations of bus stations and terminals, selection of bus corridors, compensation rates, relocation arrangements, and livelihood restoration approaches and measures. These helped optimize project design and reduce project impacts. Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) were prepared, reviewed and disclosed for the affected sites along the Mile 12–Ikorodu corridor and the Mile 12–TBS corridor as well as the Ikeja bus terminal and the Ojota bus depot. The same compliance was met for the ESMF and RPF for the relevant sites, including Wempco and Akin Adesola Roads, Ikeja bus terminal, Ojota depot, and Ikorodu–Palmgrove. In total, acquired land along the BRT corridors and other sites affected 2,231 individuals 6 and all have been compensated appropriately as planned. Some social safeguards issues were not finalized by project closing and resulted in the Moderately Satisfactory rating for social safeguards. However, LAMATA and the LSG made substantial efforts after project closing to resolve all the remaining social issues by September 2017, as explained below.\n\n• First, initial plans were to relocate street traders at Ikorodu Roundabout to the newly built Oluwo Oduikan Market at Agric (constructed under the project) in order to improve traffic flows and safety around Ikorodu station. Since 2016, some of the traders, identified as Project-affected Persons (PAPs), unilaterally moved back to trade near Ikorodu station. LAMATA convened meetings in February and March 2017 with all stakeholders (Lagos State Ministry of Physical Planning and Urban Development, Ikorodu LGA, Markets Board, Markets Association, traders, and the Ikorodu traditional institution) to agree on a timeline and actions, but the PAPs then refused to comply in May 2017. After project closing, the Ikorodu West Council Development (local government) officially took over the operations of the new market. The local government then met with all stakeholders, including the PAPs, to finally reach an agreement: the PAPs have moved into the market at Agric and the market is operational.\n\n• Second, a group of plantain market traders was originally relocated from the Mile 12 terminal site to the nearby Ajelogo market, under a three-year lease agreement. Since the lease expired in 2017, these traders had to move to another location. The concerned plantain traders sent a petition letter to the World Bank in April 2017. After project closing, State Ministry of Local Government and Community Affairs led the reconciliation efforts to reach a final resolution in September 2017. An official agreement, signed by all stakeholders, stated that the LSG would move the plantain traders to a permanent site at Imota, Ikorodu once the construction is complete. The plantain traders expressed satisfaction with the final deal and pledged to work with the LSG to reestablish their livelihood.\n\n• Third, eight of the PAPs identified in the Ikeja Bus Terminal RAP failed to collect their compensation by project closing in May 2017. However, all PAPs had come to receive the compensation by September 2017.\n\n39. Financial management (FM) of the project complied with World Bank policies and procedural requirements. The project had adequate and efficient internal control systems and satisfactory banking arrangements, and there was compliance with report-based disbursement, IFR\n\n6 The total number of PAPs at all sites comprised 473 at Ikorodu, 572 at Ikorodu Market, 134 at Agric, 15 at Ogolonto, 55 at Ajegunle, 40 at Owode Section, 75 at Owode Market, and 867 at Mile 12.\n\nquarterly submission, and external audits as required. The project was adversely affected by the exchange-rate fluctuation of the US dollar against SDR and the Naira, resulting in a loss of US$14,890,705 against the original IDA allocation. The project was still able to achieve most of its budgeted activities. The quarterly interim financial report (IFR) provided explanations for variances between actual and planned activities. In addition, from early 2016, due to the changes to the Lagos State financial management and payment authorization process, the project experienced significant delays in payments to civil works contractors, although the process stabilized over time.\n\n40. Procurement under this project complied with World Bank policies and procedural requirements. Overall, the procurement of goods, civil works, and consultancy service contracts was arranged in a timely manner through appropriate proposal, review and delivery procedures. Nonetheless, the project experienced some delays in procuring the supply and installation of the ITS. The first attempt in January 2015 received poor and insufficient response from potential bidders. After consultations with World Bank ITS experts, modifications to the bidding process, as well as the hiring of an ITS consultant to supervise development and deployment, the second attempt in July 2015 proved successful and the contract was awarded to a consortium of international firms in association with a local firm.\n\n2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase\n\n41. Appropriate technical, financial, commercial and institutional arrangements have been put in place to ensure BRT’s effective operation, although efforts are needed for its broader network integration. The BRT operator has been successfully operating from the CMS to Ikorodu for more than a year. The BRT operation generates positive cash flows. Nevertheless, the operation’s financial sustainability will depend on the success of integrating BRT with the rest of the network, following the State Transport Master Plan and specifically the Bus Network Reform that the state government intends to implement. The first step of network integration was developed under this project. However, the LSG’s plan was to implement a broader bus network reform for integration. A potential new World Bank project in Lagos would support this broader network reform.\n\n42. LAMATA and the LSG have shown interest in the next phase of the project, although no formal request has been sent to the World Bank. The follow-on assistance would aim to develop a world-class integrated public transport system that would make Lagos State economically competitive and improve the standard of living of its citizens. The new operation would function as a “programmatic” approach in which the LUTP and LUTP2 establish the foundation. The next phase would serve as an instrument to achieve the existing BRT’s integration with the network as a whole. The concept of the new operation builds on the lessons learned from the LUTP and LUTP2 (see Section 6). This could involve a number of components, including: (a) support for a broad-based bus reform program focused on rationalizing the informal bus transport sector in an incremental manner; (b) support for service and modal integration; (c) extension of the BRT network and development of an integrated package of investments, including transport and land use; and (d) support for LAMATA’s continued efforts to develop and update strategic plans and provide international experience.\n\n3. Assessment of Outcomes\n\n3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation Rating: High\n\n43. Relevance of objectives: High. Project objectives were and remain highly relevant to Nigeria’s development priorities. The project contributed directly to the World Bank Group’s Nigeria CPS 2010–2013, especially the dimensions of Pillar 1: Achieving Sustainable and Inclusive Non-Oil Growth. The project continues to be aligned with the World Bank Group’s Nigeria Country Partnership Framework (CPF) 2014–2017, especially the dimension of improving the quality and efficiency of social service delivery at the state level to promote social inclusion, and strengthening governance and public sector management. The project is also aligned with the development agenda Vision 20:2020, which focuses on two transformational objectives: (i) optimizing the country’s human and natural resource potential to achieve rapid economic growth, and (ii) translating that growth into equitable social development for all citizens. The Vision 20:2020 informs the latest Nigeria CPF, which is currently under preparation.\n\n44. Relevance of design and implementation: Substantial. Project design and implementation were and remain highly relevant in achieving the PDO. Project components and expected outputs are consistent with the stated objectives, because outputs and outcomes are a direct result of the project’s causal chain. The Results Framework was appropriate, enhanced during implementation and supplemented by the already sophisticated M&E framework in LAMATA, which was provided monthly to the World Bank. Despite the project’s complexity and technical challenges, project implementation was timely and consistent with ongoing government programs.\n\n3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives and Global Environmental Objectives Rating: Substantial\n\n45. The PDOs are to (a) improve mobility along prioritized corridors, and (b) promote a shift to more environmentally sustainable urban transport modes. The GEO is to promote an incremental shift to more environmentally sustainable urban transport modes among users with a relatively high carbon footprint. The achievement of each of the elements of the PDOs and GEO is discussed in the following paragraphs.\n\nPDO1. Improving mobility along prioritized corridors Rating: High\n\n46. These were expressed by: (a) improvement of mobility in the corridor from Ikorodu to Mile 12, (b) improvement of mobility through the development of a complementary bus system, and (c) improvement of mobility in rehabilitated strategic road corridors. Table 1 explains the theory of change for PDO1.\n\nTable 1. Theory of change for PDO1. Components, Outputs, and PDO/GEO Indicators\n\n•Mile 12–Ikorodu Road is expanded from a four-lane to six-lane highway with segregated BRT lanes running in the middle.\n\nComponents Outputs PDO/GEO Indicators PDO/GEO 2B: BRT Infrastructure Construction and Supervision (Mile 12– Ikorodu/BRT– Lite Corridor Extension)\n\n•Average time spent by individuals on travel along project corridor per trip (minutes). •Average money spent monthly by poor individuals on bus travel along project corridor. •Average number of passengers carried per standard bus per day along the BRT corridor.\n\n•BRT-lite shelters are rehabilitated.\n\n2C: Upgrade of BRT Lite (Mile 12–CMS)\n\nTo improve mobility along prioritized corridors\n\n2E: Development of Complementary Bus Systems\n\n(No PDO indicator linked to this component)\n\n•Bus-route network study is georeferenced and can be viewed in GIS packages with recommendations on three types of services, including mass-transit routes, high-capacity/tributary routes, and standard routes. •19 additional motor park locations have been identified and would form “Transit Hub” interchanges. •Ikeja bus terminal is constructed.\n\n| 3C: | | •Wempco Road in Ogba (1.9 | km) and Akin •Road | rehabilitated, | non-rural | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| Rehabilitation | | Road in Victoria Island | (1.65 km) are | (kilometers) | | | | |\n| (and PMS) | | upgraded and rehabilitated to be divided | | | | | | |\n| | | highways and provided | with covered | | | | | |\n\ndrainage and necessary road furniture.\n\nImprovement of mobility in Ikorodu to Mile 12 corridor\n\n47. The project achieved a significant improvement in mobility along the prioritized \ncorridor with the construction of BRT from Mile 12 to Ikorodu. The improvement of mobility \nfor BRT users included the enhancement of availability, affordability, accessibility and \nacceptability of BRT. This improvement is not limited to vehicle movement; it goes further by \nimproving travel experience and removing barriers for mobility. The improvement of mobility and \nits links with PDO indicators is assessed by considering a multi-criteria framework, as described \nin Table 2. Activities under Component 2: “Improvement of Public Transport Infrastructure and \nEnhancement of Traffic Management Systems” contributed to the achievement of results. \nComponent 2 included the reconstruction of Mile 12–Ikorodu Road to expand from a four-lane to \na six-lane highway with segregated BRT lanes running in the middle and the upgrade of 44 bus \nshelters of the BRT-lite (Mile 12–CMS). The original corridor was in poor condition and suffered \nfrom persistent road-safety and traffic issues. Some sections experienced submersion during the \nrainy season due to perennial flooding, which made travel time significantly unreliable during the \nrainy season. \n48. Figure 1 depicts the before and after photos of the corridor. \n\nTable 2. Framework to Assess Improvement in Mobility for BRT Users: \nCorridor Mile 12 to Ikorodu \nAttributes Criteria Used to Assess \nAvailability The BRT operation from Ikorodu to Mile 12 began in November 2015. The operator, Primero \nTransport Services Limited, started operating from Ikorodu to TBS, which includes the new BRT \ncorridor plus the BRT-lite section (constructed under the LUTP and upgraded under the LUTP2). \nThe operator operates a 24-hour bus service, the first of its kind in Nigeria. BRT provided an \nalternative mode in the corridor that reduced travel time along the BRT corridor, measured as the \nreduction of travel time from Ikorodu to TBS by 28%, from 120 minutes to 86 minutes (PDO \nindicator). The actual value exceeded the target (90 minutes). The average travel speed of the \nBRT buses is 23 km/h, higher than the target of 18 km/h. The main reasons for mobility efficiency \nare: (a) other commercial buses spend more time picking up and dropping off passengers, and \nthey make more stops at bus stops that are in-between; (b) off-board ticketing; and (c) BRT’s \nexclusive and dedicated right-of-way. \nThe BRT design allows improvement of efficiency and gains in mobility in the BRT corridor. All \nthe BRT stations were designed to enable the free passage of buses not using the station when the \nstation platforms are occupied. Where appropriate, the necessary cross-section for the platform \nand lay-by were obtained by reductions in the adjoining service lane width. \nThe project also improved the reliability of transport service between Ikorodu to Mile 12 due to \nenhanced response to flooding. The works improved resilience to flooding in some sections of \nthe road, which used to experience submersion and flooding during the rainy season, significant \ndelays and unreliable transport service. \nAffordability The average amount spent monthly by individuals on bus travel along the project corridor \ndecreased from NGN 4,120 to NGN 2,141 (in 2012 Naira) (PDO indicator). Tickets are sold in \nthree different categories from Ikorodu to TBS.The current fare structure is set as follows: from \nIkorodu to Mile 12, NGN 100.00; from Ikorodu to Fadeyi, NGN 200.00; and from Ikorodu to \nTBS, NGN 300.00. \nAccessibility All bus-shelter infrastructure has access through ramps. Disabled and elderly passengers are given \npriority in boarding buses and are provided reserved seats and space for wheelchairs. The BRT \nsystem’s accessibility for wheelchair users is provided by a dedicated service using low-floor \nbuses and on-board ramps for platform access. All stations have ramps to access the station and \nmobile ramps to access the bus. \nAcceptability Acceptability has also improved. As per travel surveys, 80% of public transport users rated the \nBRT service as satisfactory, compared with the initial baseline of 20% (intermediate indicator). \nThe main reasons are: \n(a) Bus drivers’ attitude. Bus drivers are well trained and work in much more favorable \nconditions than those of informal transport. In Lagos, BRT drivers are known as “pilots,” \nwhich gives them a higher status. Drivers participate in numerous training programs, \nincluding safety, customer service, human relations, and anger management. Drivers work \neight-hour shifts. \n(b) Conditions of bus stops and shelters. Clean, adequate lighting. Apart from the new shelters \nfrom Mile 12 to Ikorodu, the upgrade of 44 BRT-lite shelters (from Mile 12 to TBS) \nimproved safety and comfort for BRT users and enhanced mobility, traffic management and \nsafety for the BRT operation in the BRT-lite section. \n(c) Cleanliness and condition of vehicles. \n(d) Comfort and capacity. The operator purchased and began operating 434 high-capacity air \nconditioned buses. The buses are designed to carry 42 seated passengers, with an additional \nprovision for 20 standing passengers. The average number of passengers carried per standard \nbus per day along the BRT corridor was 458 (PDO indicator). The value is under the expected \ntarget of 800 passengers per bus per day. Nevertheless, for similar distribution of passengers \nthe result indicates buses are less crowded at peak hour and thus provide more comfort for \npassengers. \n\nFigure 1. Improvement in Mile 12–Ikorodu Corridor\n\nSource: Images on the left: RAP; Images on the right: ICR mission Note: Left: before; Right: after\n\n49. The improvement of mobility in the BRT corridor also benefited non-BRT users. This improvement did not limit benefits to BRT users. The improvement of Mile 12–Ikorodu Road from the existing four-lane (two-lane divided highway) to a six-lane highway with segregated BRT lanes running in the middle (see Figure 1) benefited private users and other public transport users (LAGBUS, danfos and okadas). Data show that on average it takes non-BRT buses about 49 minutes to go from Ikorodu to Mile 12, compared to the original 120 minutes. Based on vehicle counts and vehicle occupancy estimates, daily ridership among these modes is estimated at 284,000 combined. For the same section, car owners 7 record travel times between 18 and 20 minutes, compared to the original 100 minutes.\n\n7 It is also understood from cases in many cities that there will be a rebound effect: as the motorization rate and private vehicle use continue to increase, the benefits in travel-time savings for private vehicles will decrease in the longer term.\n\nImprovement of mobility through the development of a complementary bus system\n\n50. The LUTP2 financed strategic civil works and technical studies to build the foundations of the LSG’s plan to implement a broader bus network reform and improve mobility in Lagos. The project, under Component 2, financed the implementation of the strategic intervention of a holistic program in Lagos: the construction of the Ikeja bus terminal. The project financed the terminal, which serves as a centralized motor park from which all minibus operations in and out of Ikeja will operate. The terminal will reorganize the fragmented parking of buses in Ikeja district. The terminal was completed by the project’s closing date, and operation is expected to begin by the end of 2017. Moreover, the project financed a bus-route network study (Component 2D: Development of Complementary Bus System) to improve the operating efficiency of all bus routes in Lagos.\n\nImprovement of mobility in rehabilitated strategic road corridors\n\n51. Additional improvements in mobility for vehicles and pedestrians were achieved with the improvement of the Lagos State Metropolitan Road Network. Activities under Component 3: Improvement of Lagos State Metropolitan Road Network resulted in improvement of mobility in prioritized corridors. As a result of these activities, 17.8 km of strategic roads were rehabilitated (PDO indicator). The average travel speed along resurfaced and rehabilitated corridors reached 50 km/h, compared to the original 12 km/h. Improvement of the road enhanced the efficiency of the use of existing road space, reduced vehicle operating costs (VOCs), enhanced the operation of buses, and improved road safety for vehicles and pedestrians. It is important to note that the corridors greatly improved mobility for pedestrians and vulnerable persons. The rehabilitated corridors incorporated a walkway that is raised above the pavement with ramp access and pedestrian crossing facilities. Moreover, prior to the rehabilitation works on the road there was a notable incidence of flooding and ponding on the road, which impeded its serviceability. This defect has been adequately addressed through the rehabilitation works carried out on the road. Field surveys indicated that users attest to the improvement of mobility and reduction of travel time.\n\nPDO2: Promote a shift to more environmentally sustainable urban transport modes. \nGEO: Promote an incremental shift to more environmentally sustainable urban transport \nmodes among users with a relatively high carbon footprint \nRating: Substantial \n\n| 2B: BRT | | •Reconstruction of Mile 12–Ikorodu | •Number | | of | direct | | To promote a shift to more | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| Infrastructure | | Road, from a four-lane to expanding | beneficiaries | | | | | environmentally sustainable | |\n| Construction and | | six-lane highway | with segregated •Number | | of | women | | urban transport modes. | |\n| Supervision (Mile | | BRT lanes running in the middle. | direct beneficiaries | | | | | | |\n| 12–Ikorodu/BRT | | | •Number | | of | indirect | | | |\n| Lite Corridor | | | beneficiaries | | | | | | |\n\nTable 3. Theory of change for PDO2 and GEO. Components, Outputs and PDO/GEO Indicators Components Outputs PDO/GEO Indicators PDO/GEO Extension)\n\nComponents Outputs PDO/GEO Indicators PDO/GEO 2C: Upgrade of BRT-Lite (Mile 12–CMS)\n\n•BRT–lite shelters are rehabilitated. •Percentage of BRT users who report owning a car or two-wheeler •Reduced CO2 emissions from vehicles along BRT corridor\n\nTo promote an incremental shift to more environmentally sustainable urban transport modes among users with a relatively high carbon footprint.\n\n52. Public transport users benefited from improvements to the Mile 12–Ikorodu corridor. The improvement of Mile 12–Ikorodu Road from the existing four-lane (two-lane divided highway) to a six-lane highway with segregated BRT lanes running in the middle (see Figure 1) improved travel experience and travel time for BRT, danfo, LAGBUS and private vehicle users. Based on vehicle counts and vehicle occupancy estimates, combined daily ridership in danfos and LAGBUS is estimated at 284,000. BRT ridership by the project’s closing date was 156,000 passengers per day. Consequently, the average daily public transport ridership along the corridor improved under the project to 440,000 (PDO indicator), which is considered the number of direct beneficiaries. Car users also benefited from mobility improvement in the corridor, around 13,000 vehicles per day. The number of women direct beneficiaries using BRT daily is 73,320, or 47 percent of total BRT users (PDO indicator). Indirect beneficiaries are those given access to the Mile 12 market within 45 minutes. This threshold accessibility enhancement has been provided for an additional 283,000 people under the project (PDO indicator).\n\n53. Competition among BRT, LAGBUS and informal transport limited BRT’s full potential ridership. Public transport provision in the intervened corridor is provided mainly by BRT, LAGBUS and danfos. LAGBUS and danfos compete with lower-than-anticipated fares than those of BRT: NGN 100 for LAGBUS (formal state bus for long-distance trips, compared to NGN 300 in BRT) and NGN 50 for danfos, compared to BRT’s NGN 100/200/300 fare. A drop in oil prices enabled danfo operators and LAGBUS to charge less than originally anticipated and still be viable. Learning from the LUTP, project preparation and implementation developed proactive and extensive consultation with danfo unions and LAGBUS to manage the expectations of different actors, including high-level meetings with union executives and involvement of senior government management. Nevertheless, because of the complexity of this environment, the number of danfos and LAGBUS in the corridor exceeded expectations: the number of danfos in the corridor decreased only by 11 percent from 2013 to 2016, and LAGBUS increased the service provided in the corridor.\n\n54. The improvement in the BRT corridor led to a reduction of CO2 emissions. The CO2 emissions from vehicles along the BRT corridor decreased by six percent, from the baseline 371,000 to 349,000 tons by closing date (PDO indicator). Taking into consideration the counterfactual scenario that traffic on the corridor could have grown by nine percent between 2013 and 2016 without BRT, the weighted average reduction of CO2 emissions is 13 percent when the 2016 scenario is compared with BRT and the equivalent without BRT (see Table 4). The main emission reductions were in the categories of personal cars and danfos, both in absolute and relative terms, while the major increase in emissions came from BRT, LAGBUS, trucks and okadas. Annex 7 presents details of the GHG emission analysis.\n\nTable 4. Total CO2 Comparison for Study Corridor (Ikorodu–Mile 12) for 2016: with BRT scenario vs. without BRT scenario. Source: LUTP II GHG Emission Study. Total CO2 Emissions (ton CO2 eq)\n\n| | | | (ton CO2 | | | eq) | | | Emission (With vs | | | | Emissions (With vs | | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| | Type of Vehicle | Without | | | | With | | | Without BRT) | | | (ton | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Without BRT) (%) | | | | |\n| | | | BRT | | | BRT | | | | CO2 | eq) | | | | | | |\n\nVariation of CO2 Variation of CO2\n\nLarge Bus (BRT, LAGBUS)\n\n| | Danfo and Coaster Bus | | 14,157 | | | 9,508 | | | | -4,649 | | | | -33% | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| | Okadas and Tricycles | | 420 | | | 1,767 | | | | 1,347 | | | | 321% | | | |\n| | Cars | 333,186 | | | 272,315 | | | | | -60,871 | | | | -18% | | | |\n| | Taxi | | 10,983 | | 12,102 | | | | | 1,119 | | | | 10% | | | |\n| | Trucks | | 43,153 | | 49,564 | | | | | 6,411 | | | | 15% | | | |\n| | | Total 402,778 | | | 348,553 | | | | | -54,225 | | | | 13% | | | |\n| 55. | The introduction of BRT | | | to the | extension | | | | corridor (Ikorodu–Mile 12) promoted an | | | | | | | | |\n| incremental | shift away from private cars and danfos, which are the | | | | | | | | | | | | most | carbon-intensive | | | |\n\n879 3,297 2,418 275%\n\n55. The introduction of BRT to the extension corridor (Ikorodu–Mile 12) promoted an incremental shift away from private cars and danfos, which are the most carbon-intensive transit modes for passengers. Comparing the project corridor with a contrafactual corridor (“with” and “without” scenarios 8), the largest growth in vehicle use is observed in large-capacity buses (hundreds of new BRT buses were added to the corridor) and okadas (two-wheelers) and the largest decrease is observed in danfos and cars. This means that, by introducing BRT and rehabilitating the roads, a considerable number of passengers traveled along the corridor, who could have used cars and danfos, instead used BRT, LAGBUS or two-wheelers. There is also some increase in the use of other modes, possibly due to the improved road conditions, but in absolute number they are not comparable to the magnitude of reduced use of cars in terms of passenger vehicles. The increased use of two-wheelers may be partly a result of short trips taken to connect the last mile to the BRT bus stations, while buses are taking the market in longer trips. The rise in motorcycle use is commonly seen in the early stage of motorization as an affordable option in many developing countries. In conclusion, the modal shift from cars and danfos to more environmentally sustainable urban transport modes is justified.\n\n56. The project showed meaningful signs of behavioral change among the younger generation and higher-income group who are leading the trend of vehicle modal choice. The percentage of BRT users owning a car or two-wheeler doubled from 14 percent in 2010 to 30 percent in 2017, and exceeded the target of 21 percent (PDO indicator). This reflected the fact that, for various reasons, the higher share of BRT users who could have used their private vehicles choose to use BRT instead. According to the BRT users’ survey and household survey, these private-car or two-wheeler owners have a very good impression of BRT and confirm that they are satisfied with its services. The main motivations for them to choose using BRT rather than other modes are ranked by order: (i) comparative comfort of BRT compared to danfos, (ii) convenience, (iii) safety, (iv) time savings, and (v) accessibility. Moreover, the field survey indicates that vehicle\n\n8 See Annex 7 for the methodology and results of the GHG emission analysis.\n\nowners who use the BRT are mostly young and have a medium-high income. 9 This can be considered a meaningful sign of behavioral change among the younger generation and higher income group who are leading the trend of vehicle modal choice, especially in the context of rapid urbanization and the growing middle class.\n\n3.3 Efficiency Rating: Substantial\n\n57. Ex-post economic analysis. An ex-post cost-benefit economic analysis was conducted for investments to support the BRT infrastructure component, accounting for 70 percent of the total financing. The ex-post economic analysis indicates that project investments were economically viable, with an overall economic internal rate of return (EIRR) of 36 percent, compared with an estimated EIRR of 15 percent at appraisal. The principal contributors to the improved economic result are (a) the increase in net passenger-related benefits associated with the increased value of time, 10 (b) the consideration of benefits from private car users, which was not included in the calculation at appraisal, and (c) the GHG emission reduction. The distribution of benefits is: 88 percent due to time saving, 9 percent to VOC savings and 3 percent to GHG emissions. Based on the analysis, the net present value (NPV) of the flow of economic benefits generated by the project over 15 years is estimated to be US$486 million (2015 prices discounted at 12 percent). Annex 3 details the methodology, assumptions and results of the ex-post economic analysis.\n\n58. Cost-effectiveness. Actual capital costs of the BRT corridor from Mile 12 to Ikorodu were NGN 35.228 billion (US$226 million 11) compared to appraisal estimates of NGN 11.264 billion (US$88 million 12), i.e., an increase of 213 percent in Naira terms. The main reason for the cost escalation in the civil works was the high inflation during the life of the project, which is correlated to the increase in construction prices. 13 Construction materials for the project rose to nearly double the price of the Naira to dollar rate during the life of the project. Imports, especially the ITS equipment, were greatly affected by the devaluation of the Naira to the dollar, which moved from NGN 150 to US$1, to NGN315 to US$1 during the life of the project. The unit cost of BRT infrastructure—US$10.4 million per km—is reasonable compared to US$10–US$15 million per km in other parts of the world and taking into account that the project included the rehabilitation of eight bridges.\n\n59. Administrative efficiency. The project’s administrative efficiency is high because project activities were completed ahead of time in a cost-effective manner. The BRT line was opened in\n\n9 60 percent of vehicle owners are between the ages of 20 and 39, of whom 64 percent are employed. The income of \n68 percent of private vehicle owners is above NGN 80,000. Source: Field survey. \n10 Value of time considered at appraisal was NGN 84 per hour; in the post-economic analysis the value is NGN 231 \nper hour in public transport and NGN 299 per hour in private vehicles. LAMATA prepared a technical study to \ncalculate the value of time for the post-economic analysis. \n11 Exchange rate 1 US$=NGN 155. \n12 Exchange rate at appraisal 1 US$ = NGN 128. \n13 Based on research, a significant level of correlation was identified between inflation rate and the price of building \nmaterials in Lagos State. Source: An assessment of the impact of the inflation on construction prices in Nigeria. \nOgun Oghenekevwe, Ogunsina Olusola and Ugochukwu Stanley Chukwudi, 2014 \n\nNovember 2015. Nevertheless, changes in the FM arrangement delayed the project’s implementation. The project was closed in May 2017 with loan funds almost fully disbursed.\n\n3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Satisfactory\n\n60. Based on the ratings for relevance, efficacy and efficiency, the project’s overall outcome is rated Satisfactory.\n\n3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts\n\n61. Institutional strengthening. One of the project’s main achievements, essential for the sustainability of outcomes, is the strengthening of LAMATA’s capacity to continue providing an overall vision and a strategic planning basis for transport planning, regulation, monitoring, administration and coordination of sector-wide management. The project also consolidated LAMATA’s position as a “knowledge hub” and “center of excellence” for transport planning and management in Africa, which further benefit African counterparts in their capacity building.\n\n62. LAMATA’s training culture is one of the organization’s best practices. Component 1 of the project was specifically designed to strengthen LAMATA’s institutional capacity, coordination with local governments, and the preliminary support activities for Kano State. The project enhanced institutional capacity by providing leadership, management and technical training, as well as study tours for staff; ensuring sustainable funding for operations; and updating the transport-demand model and assumptions for future transport planning. The project also supported improvements in the implementation of a learning management system and efforts to improve more systemized knowledge capturing. Component 2 was also devoted to updating the Strategic Transport Master Plan, identifying and studying 15 additional corridors in the Mass Transit Alternative Analyses, and developing the bus-route networks and motor-park locations (“Transit Hub” interchanges) that can be presented in Geographic Information System (GIS) packages. These activities were intended to strengthen LAMATAs’ overall technical capacity in transport planning and management, and were not limited to the scope of the LUTP2. Component 4 also supported the building of capacity in project management and monitoring, including improvements in physical equipment, technical, procurement, and financial audits, as well as social and environmental impact monitoring.\n\n63. Building capacity in GHG emission analysis. As part of the institutional strengthening, the project supported the development of a tailored and complete methodology and methodological handbook for GHG emission calculation. These were implemented entirely by local consultants. This methodology has the advantage of being tailored and practical for LAMATA to manage. It is built on what is known as the ASIF identity, 14 and it could be easily replicated in other urban transport projects.\n\n64. Building capacity at local level. The creation of Transport Planning Units (TPUs) was an integral aspect of the institutional capacity-building component. The aim was to provide capacity at Lagos Island, Kosofe, and Ikorodu LGA to be responsible for effective traffic management on\n\n14 ASIF stands for the variables of a generic equation to calculate the GHG emissions of transport that reads: GHG = Activity x modal Share x energy Intensity x carbon intensity of Fuel\n\nlocal government roads, define functional road hierarchy, and prepare and implement appropriate traffic management plans for the area. The project supported the creation of six TPUs. Nevertheless, by the closing date the TPUs appeared to have inadequate staffing, funding constraints, and tensions between them and the local government.\n\n65. The project expanded its geographic reach to influence thinking and accelerate understanding of the mobility and environmental benefits of sustainable transport policies among technicians and policy makers in Kano, Nigeria’s second-largest city. The project facilitated the transfer of capacity and lessons learned from Lagos to Kano, an emerging megacity in its own right. In doing so, the project aimed to reduce the lead time toward the development of an effective BRT in Kano. This comprises three core activities: (i) support to the Kano Urban Transport Project Office (KUTPO), (ii) studies, and (iii) capacity building. Four studies were financed through the GEF grant to support this objective: (i) Consultancy Services for the Viability Study for the Proposed Kano Light Rail Transit; (ii) Conceptual Design of Pilot Scheme for Lowering Carbon Emission in Old Kano; (iii) Consultancy Services for Design of Bus Mass Transit Route System for Kano Metropolitan Area; and (iv) Consultancy Services to Facilitate Coordination and Implementation of all Kano Grant Activities. Through Kano’s engagement in the LUTP2, the project also facilitated the establishment of the Kano Area Metropolitan Transportation Authority (KAMATA) in Kano State, following the example and success of LAMATA. By the time of this ICR, a law for the creation of KAMATA had been submitted to the Kano State House of Assembly for approval. If and when approved, KUTPO would transition to KAMATA, which would assume responsibility for the planning and implementation of transport projects in Kano State.\n\n66. The construction and improvement of BRT have a positive impact on women’s inclusion in economic activities, such as access to jobs and services. As indicated in the beneficiary survey, female passengers were known to have lower incomes than their male counterparts. The increased affordability and inclusion of female passengers are likely to have a long-term impact on reducing the gender gap in income.\n\n67. The project has supported the mobilization of private-sector financing for BRT operation and maintenance (O&M) of roads, which represents a model to be followed by the rest of the region. First, the BRT operation was formalized under a franchise agreement between the Primero operator and LAMATA. The private-sector operator funded the acquisition of rolling stock and is in charge of vehicle maintenance. The operator pays a monthly franchise fee to LAMATA. Second, LAMATA has designed and executed maintenance works with the participation of the private sector by awarding contracts to local consultants and contractors.\n\n68. The project supported the development of a high-standard ITS for BRT for the first time in the country. This improved travel time, mobility quality and monitoring of BRT operation. The ITS system includes a fare-collection system (FCS), User Information Systems (UIS) and Fleet Management Systems (FMS). The FCS allows travel time to be gained and is designed to be integrated with the next phases of BRT operations. The UIS enhance passengers’ transit planning efficacy and mobility quality. The UIS are available for the public—through real time information in stations and smartphone apps—to obtain real-time data about time-of-arrival of buses, location of closest buses, and travel time between locations in the network. The FMS is in place and allows LAMATA to efficiently monitor operator performance from a control center;\n\nit also allows LAMATA to respond to real-time issues in the network (for instance, in case of accidents or delays to due to intense flooding).\n\n69. Citizen engagement materialized thanks to strong consultations, communications and media strategy funded by project implementation. Under the project, BRT consultations, communications and media strategy played a key role in the project’s success. Four consultancies addressed and supported the strategy: (i) consulting services for events and stakeholders’ management for BRT services; (ii) consulting services for advertising and perception management of the BRT extension (Mile 12–Ikorodu); (iii) consulting services for documentation of the communication strategy and participation efforts to increase familiarity with BRT on the Mile 12– CMS route; and (iv) a consultancy to conduct stakeholder engagements in other LAMATA projects. LAMATA operationalized the strategy with weekly radio and television programs and customer service through phone and social media.\n\n3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops\n\n70. In 2017, LAMATA prepared and conducted several beneficiary assessment surveys along the Mile 12–Ikorodu corridor, Wempco Road, and Akin Adesola Road. The planned sample size for the surveys was 1,720 people and the response rate was 97 percent. Beneficiaries were individually identified and disaggregated by gender, age and income. Results showed that the major drivers of BRT users are commuters who use to go to work daily or with a frequency of three to six times per week. Over 86 percent of the survey respondents expressed their preference for using BRT, mostly because the experience is more enjoyable than on minibuses (38.8 percent), more convenient (22.9 percent), and safer (15.3 percent). Among the survey respondents of BRT passengers on the Mile 12–Ikorodu extension, 60.8 percent are male and 39.2 percent are female. Among BRT users who report owning a car or two-wheeler (22.89 percent), about 89.5 percent have a good impression of BRT. Annex 5 provides further details about the beneficiary survey.\n\n4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: Moderate\n\n71. The risk of reduced government ownership, commitment and institutional support is Moderate. The political commitment to transportation at the highest levels (state and federal) and the creation of LAMATA have been key factors for the success of the LUTP and LUTP2. LAMATA was to consolidate fragmented transport powers into a single, well-trained agency in charge of coordinating and implementing the transport policies, programs and actions of all transport-related agencies in Lagos State. Political changes could reduce government ownership of LAMATA’s vision and reduce institutional support. The reduction of transfers from the Transport Fund (see next paragraph on financial sustainability) and the changes in LAMATA’s financial management independence could be understood as signs of certain changes in government priorities that need special attention for the sustainability of objectives.\n\n72. The risk of LAMATA’S financial sustainability is rated Significant. A Transport Fund 15 was set up in 2006. Since then, LAMATA has received 50 percent of the dedicated fund\n\n15 The transport fund, created in 2006, receives dedicated funds from: (a) Lagos State budget provision, (b) license fees (taxi permits, road taxes, license plate registration, and vehicle registration), (c) bus concession fees, and (d) other road-user charges (tolls).\n\neach month. This fund represented a stable source of revenue for LAMATA. Nevertheless, transfers from the Transport Fund decreased from US$12.2 million per year in 2014 to US$5.3 million in 2016. LAMATA only received transfers for the first two months of 2017. The risk of the sustainability of funding for LAMATA jeopardizes the authority’s sustainable performance of its functions.\n\n73. The financial risk of the BRT operation is Moderate. At this stage, the BRT operator covers its O&M costs and pays a franchise fee to LAMATA. Nevertheless, the system’s financial sustainability will depend on: (a) the successful implementation of a broad-based bus reform program to integrate BRT with the rest of the network and feed the mass-transport mode; (b) the limitation of cannibalization of demand by other modes in the corridor; and (c) the enforcement of exclusive use of dedicated lanes by BRT.\n\n74. The technical risk is Low. Innovative technologies and systems have been put in place to support the operation of BRT. The ITS package was piloted in 2016 and fully installed by May 2017. The risk of maintenance of the ITS infrastructure during the O&M phase is considered low because of the significant capacity of the LAMATA ITS team and the local ITS ecosystem in Lagos. Nevertheless, special attention would need to be paid to facilitate the introduction of smart cards for BRT and integration with other modes of transportation.\n\n5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance\n\n5.1 Bank Performance \n(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry \nRating: Satisfactory \n\n75. The World Bank ensured quality at entry through an adequate alignment of the project objectives with the national and state development strategies and World Bank transport strategies, combined with components designed to achieve the PDO, as well as appropriate implementation arrangements. The World Bank’s inputs and processes prior to Board approval were appropriate. The World Bank provided guidance and support to ensure that technical and environmental specifications and feasibility studies were prepared within a short time period to meet high quality standards. Building on the LUTP’s achievements, the World Bank team ensured that the experience and lessons learned in the first phase were well considered and incorporated in project preparation. Although the project scope and portfolio were expanded compared to those of the LUTP, the Results Framework remained well focused and straightforward. The economic analysis and risk assessment proved to be valid and robust during the implementation of this complex, large-scale project.\n\n(b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory\n\n76. The World Bank worked closely with the government, implementation agency and co financiers to support the timely implementation of this complex urban transport project and to provide high quality standards, in compliance with Bank safeguards and fiduciary policies. The Bank supervised the project diligently with the required expertise. Implementation Status and\n\nResults Reports (ISRs) were prepared every six months and the ratings were candid and appropriate.\n\n77. The project was restructured three times and the Bank team was proactive in addressing the needs of restructuring, particularly the challenges associated with macroeconomics and currency depreciation. The Bank has been able to make good use of the funds and reallocate them to ensure the full deployment of the ITS and the delivery of additional and meaningful outputs not envisioned earlier, such as the Ikeja bus terminal (a new component).\n\n78. The Bank team was able to pay attention to the safeguards issues that emerged since the commencement of bus operations along the Ikorodu extension, such as road safety and enforcement of the exclusivity of BRT lanes. The World Bank Safeguards Specialist advised and monitored these issues in each mission to ensure that effective measures were in place for implementation performance.\n\n79. The World Bank drew extensively on lessons learned from the LUTP and LUTP2, and incorporated them for advanced thinking and preparation under the scope of future operations in Lagos’s urban transport.\n\n(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory\n\n80. The overall World Bank performance rating is Satisfactory, based on the ratings for Bank performance in ensuring quality at entry and of supervision.\n\n5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Satisfactory\n\n81. The LSG ensured that the project was prepared and implemented in record time with good quality, and complied with loan covenants, including fiduciary and safeguards aspects. The LSG delegated responsibility and continued to provide needed resources to the implementation agency, LAMATA, which was created under the LUTP to ensure timely project implementation in order to support the Lagos transport sector strategy. The LSG also demonstrated strong ownership of the project and was active during its implementation by participating in supervision missions and wrap-up meetings to ensure that the implementation agency executed the project in accordance with the agreements reached with all financial counterparts.\n\n(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Highly Satisfactory\n\n82. The project implementation agency, LAMATA, deserves major credit for successfully implementing this massive project. LAMATA’s institutional resilience allowed it to overcome and perform highly during political transitions, Nigeria’s complex political economy and macroeconomic changes. LAMATA is considered the hub of excellence in African urban transport to ensure development outcomes. LAMATA responded efficiently on project issues, adhered to project implementation requirements, engaged with World Bank missions, and contributed to the\n\nproject’s timely completion. LAMATA provided progress and other reports on time, monitored environmental and social aspects, and suggested good practices for environmental methodologies. It managed procurement activities efficiently, monitored resettlement, processed payment of compensation to PAPs, and provided data on performance indicators as soon as the service was operational. After project closing, LAMATA made great efforts, as promised, to ensure that the remaining social issues were resolved by the closing of the ICR.\n\n(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Satisfactory\n\n83. The overall Borrower performance is rated Satisfactory based on the ratings for government performance as well as implementing agency performance.\n\n6. Lessons Learned\n\n84. A programmatic, long-term approach to the World Bank’s engagement is critical for the success of urban transport interventions. Urban mobility problems in most of the Bank’s client countries have resulted from decades of neglect in addressing the problems in a comprehensive manner. The solutions often require a balanced mix of demand and supply instruments, together with the building of institutions and regulatory and legal frameworks. A comprehensive solution to address all issues requires a long-term engagement in the country. Very often, projects are designed as “one-shot” projects, which make it difficult to sustain the immediate benefits. It is critical to build a programmatic approach in order to address urban transport issues.\n\n85. It is important to develop an incremental phased approach with a focus on early deliverability. It is also important to develop a BRT network, not just a single corridor, but it is equally critical to develop it under an incremental, phased approach to demonstrate the concept and build popular momentum. In the case of Lagos, the success of BRT-lite (LUTP), implemented within 18 months, created awareness and appreciation of the concept and made it politically and technically possible to embark on a more ambitious agenda as reflected under the LUTP2. During the first phase, the value of “low-hanging fruit” was recognized, in which the probability of success was high and it was relatively easy to demonstrate the value of the “pilot” scheme. Quick implementation and easy deliverability of an operational and visually significant transit-way within an easily obtained right-of-way were critical to achieve local ownership and pave the way for future expansion.\n\n86. The transition of the urban transport private sector is challenging, and competition for the market and integration of informal transport should be sought. The LUTP2 evidenced that LAMATA’s negotiating capacity may be limited, with the existence of a single operator in Lagos. International experience in urban areas shows that multiple competing operators have generally improved the productivity of public transport systems. The transition from a single operator to a competitive environment in Lagos may allow efficiency gains in the tendering of future BRT corridors. Efforts to eliminate informal transport from the BRT corridor were not effective in Lagos: informal transport remained an important component of overall transport services. Innovative approaches to formalize and integrate informal public transport may allow new operators to flourish and compete for the market, as well to feed the formal transport network\n\nin an integrated manner. Up-front capacity building and discussion between different stakeholders are essential in this process.\n\n87. In the creation of a unit within an institution, it is important to develop a thorough stakeholder analysis which recognizes and incorporates the system of incentives governing the institution’s behavior. The TPUs created within the LGAs regularly undermined the strategic efforts being made by the broader city administration at a state level. These issues were not simply a question of the TPUs’ low capacity; the underlying factors have a substantially structural component. The new unit’s sustainability depends on a design that recognizes and tries to incorporate the system of incentives governing the behavior of the institutions where the new unit is hosted.\n\n88. Experiences from around the world have taught that implementation of BRT is a major challenge and requires considerable up-front preparation and consensus building, with special attention to the soft side. BRT is a “system” and requires extensive project preparation discussions with all interested parties (traffic police, ministries of planning and construction, and so on) on all relevant issues, including transit-way design; service and operations planning; design of stations and terminals; design of ticketing systems, fare levels, and structures; regulation and ownership of BRT vehicles; and traffic and non-motorized transport (NMT) safety measures, traffic management strategies, and enforcement. Special attention needs to be paid to the soft side of BRT, because it is critical for the system’s sustainability, including political leadership, skillful operation and management, and financial sustainability.\n\n89. The World Bank’s contribution to urban transport should be viewed beyond physical investments. Urban transport investments provide a platform for guidance, training, technical assistance, and learning throughout the project cycle and the sharing of best practices for demonstration and replication beyond the project’s life. It is equally important to document the impacts and share them widely within the city, in the country, and in international forums.\n\n90. A strong institutional basis for coordinated planning, implementation, and operations/regulation is critical for the success of urban passenger transport. The long-term engagement in Lagos has allowed LAMATA, the implementing agency, to mature. The key test of an institution is whether it can prove its strength, relevance and longevity beyond the tenure of a single individual or leadership team. It appears that LAMATA has “earned its stripes”: the agency, created by law in 2006, has undergone two changes in political leadership (2008 and 2015) and its first large-scale management change in 2016, yet it continues to deliver efficiently and professionally.\n\n91. BRT planning and design must be very context specific, reflecting market, physical and operational conditions in the corridor and the city in question. BRT has great potential to revolutionize the image and efficacy of public transport, but it is important to show sensitivity to the city-specific context rather than adopt a “best-technology, one-size-fits-all” solution. The approach should develop a design that is consistent with local circumstances, which may not be global “best practice” or the “gold standard.”\n\n92. The ITS being deployed needed to be planned in such a way that it would be flexible enough to accommodate multiple bus-operator models, to potentially introduce smart cards\n\nfor BRT, and to facilitate integration with other modes of transport in the future. It is important to allow sufficient time for bidders to prepare high-quality proposals, consider instructions to bidders that would encourage international firms to collaborate with local partners through joint ventures, bring ITS expertise on board in the first phases of the project preparation to advise on the design and planning process, plan for a phased deployment with adequate time for testing, and strengthen the ITS capacity within LAMATA to closely monitor deployment and rollout. Furthermore, dedicated resources from the client, consultants and vendor(s) should be in place to fully test the system for trouble-free operations and secure an enforceable service agreement for an extended period of time during the O&M phase.\n\n7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies\n\nNo comments provided.\n\n(b) Cofinanciers\n\n93. Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency/ AFD). Despite the absence of a formal mutual reliance framework, the World Bank and AFD teams have displayed a good working arrangement by agreeing onto the same objectives and a same implementation process. Even in the face of the succession of team leaders on the World Bank side and on AFD side the parallel financing has proved effective and very beneficial to LAMATA and Lagos State.\n\n(c) Other partners and stakeholders\n\nNo comments provided.\n\nAnnex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in SDR and US$, millions equivalent)\n\nLagos Urban Transport Project - P112956 - IDA-47670 - SDR\n\nAppraisal \nEstimate (SDR \nmillions) \n\nActual/Latest Estimate (SDR millions)\n\nComponents\n\nPercentage of \nAppraisal \n1. Institutional Development 13.6 5.5 40.4% \n2. Public Transport and Traffic \nManagement \n\n69.8 94 134.7%\n\n11.3 15.3 135.4%\n\n3. Improvement of Lagos State Metropolitan Road Network\n\n5.7 4.4 77.2%\n\n4. Project Management & System Monitoring\n\n5. Unallocated 19.2 - -Total Project Costs 119.6 119.2 99.7% Lagos Urban Transport Project - P112956 - IDA-47670 - Equivalent USD 16\n\nPercentage of Appraisal\n\nAppraisal \nEstimate \n(US$ millions) \n\nActual/Latest Estimate (US$ millions)\n\nComponents\n\n1. Institutional Development 21.6 8.7 40.4% \n2. Public Transport and Traffic \nManagement \n\n111.0 149.5 134.7%\n\n18.0 24.3 135.4%\n\n3. Improvement of Lagos State Metropolitan Road Network\n\n9.1 7.0 77.2%\n\n4. Project Management & System Monitoring\n\n5. Unallocated 30.5 - -Total Project Costs 190.2 189.5 99.7%\n\nLagos Urban Transport Project - (GEF) - P114762 - TF-97347\n\nPercentage of Appraisal\n\nComponents\n\nAppraisal \nEstimate \n(US$ millions) \n\nActual/Latest Estimate (US$ millions)\n\n| 1. | Institutional Development | | | 1.00 | | 1.00 | | | 100% | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| 2. | Public Transport and Traffic | | | | | | | | | |\n| | Management | | | 3.50 | | 3.49 | | | 99.7% | |\n\n| 3. | Improvement of Lagos State | | | | | | | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| | | | | 0.00 | | 0.00 | | | | - |\n| | Metropolitan Road Network | | | | | | | | | |\n\n4. Project Management & System Monitoring\n\n0.00 0.00 -Total Project Costs 4.50 4.49 99.8%\n\n16 The exchange rate used is as per the original PAD: US$1 = SDR 0.6289\n\n(b) Financing Source of Funds\n\nType of Co financing\n\nAppraisal Estimate (US$ millions)\n\nActual/Latest Estimate (US$ millions)\n\nPercentage of Appraisal Borrower - 35.00 35.00 100 International Development Association (IDA)\n\nCredit\n\nSDR 119.6 million/ 190.00 US$ million\n\nSDR 119.21 million/ 175.11 US$ million\n\n99.67 (SDR)/ \n92.16 (USD) \n\nGlobal Environment Facility (GEF)\n\nGrant 4.5 4.49 99.78\n\nFrench Development Agency (AFD)\n\nCredit 100.00 100.00 100 \nTotal Funding - 329.50 314.60 95.5 \n\nAnnex 2. Summary of Components, Outputs and Outcomes\n\nTable 2.1. Components, outputs per component, intermediate and PDO/GEO indicators linked with different outputs, if any.\n\nComponents Outputs Intermediate Results Indicators PDO/GEO Indicators PDO/GEO\n\n| Component 1: Institutional Development and Capacity Building | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| 383 staff training courses, 50 1A: Training, workshops, 8 study tours, and no Twinning and Study twinning provided over the Tours LUTP2 implementation period. 1B: LAMATA Corporate Head Office n.a. (dropped) Three studies/surveys are completed, including (i) extension of strategic-transport master plan and travel-demand 1C: Transport Model model to cover the mega-region, Update (ii) value of time and transport elasticity study for the mega-city region, and (iii) freight demand study. | Percentage of activities in annual training plan achieved on target: Achieved (Baseline: 65; Target 85; Actual: 100) n.a. Updated travel demand and network models, and databases are available for use: Achieved (Baseline: No model available; Target: Travel demand database systemized; Actual: Model completed and running, being integrated into LAMATA evaluation system) | | |\n| 1D: LAMATA Operating costs covered. | n.a. | | |\n| Operating Costs TPUs in Kosofe, Ikorodu and 1E: Creation of TPUs Lagos Island are set up. • Alternative analysis study of interventions to address congestion along Muhammed Murtala Way • Study of the impact of motorcycle and three-wheeler 1F: Support to Kano growth in Africa (case study of Kano) • Prefeasibility and conceptual design of transport hub/terminal, bus stops, pedestrian facilities, traffic management, depots and parking facilities in Kano | Number of Transport Planning Units established and functioning: Achieved (Baseline: 2; Target: 5; Actual: 5) Concept for hubs and terminals program in Kano developed: Achieved (Baseline: No concept available; Target: Concept developed and actionable; Actual: Target achieved) | | |\n| Component 2: Improvement of Public Transport Infrastructure and Enhancement of Traffic Management Systems | | | |\n\n2A: BRT \nInfrastructure \nConstruction and \nSupervision (Oshodi– \nMile 2–Oblende) \n(dropped) \n\nNot implemented because the concession of roads from the FGN to LSG has not been obtained. The scope of work would be moved to the LUTP3, if it eventually comes on stream.\n\n2B: BRT \nInfrastructure \nConstruction and \nSupervision (Mile 12– \nIkorodu/BRT-Lite \nCorridor Extension) \n\nReconstruction of Mile 12-Ikorodu Road expands from four-lane to six-lane highway with segregated BRT lanes running in the middle. (a) Construction/rehabilitation of roads (7.3 m) to provide BRT lanes, based on median configuration (b) Provision of segregation curbing (two-way), road markings, (c) Traffic management, signal control, stops, ITS (d) BRT Ikorodu interchange, bridges, pedestrian facilities (e) BRT depot (f) Bus shelter and lay-bys (g) Supervision\n\nPhysical completion of works; Baseline (percentage): Achieved (Baseline: 0; Target: 100; Actual: 100.)\n\nAverage travel speed of public transport services along BRT corridor (kph): Achieved (Baseline: 10; Target: 18; Actual: 23)\n\nAverage travel time of formal public transport Mile 12-Ikorodu (minutes): Achieved (Baseline: 120 minutes; Target: 90; Actual: 51.)\n\nPercent of public transport users rating their BRT service as satisfactory: Achieved (Baseline: 20; Target: 60; Actual: 80.)\n\nPercent of two wheelers and car owners who report having a somewhat or highly favorable impression of BRT services: Achieved (Baseline: 42; Target: 65; Actual: 67.)\n\nAverage time spent by individuals on travel along project corridor per trip (minutes): Achieved (Baseline: 120; Target: 90; Actual: 87)\n\nAverage amount spent monthly by poor individuals on bus travel along project corridor (Naira): Achieved (Baseline: 4,120; Target: 3,500; Actual: 2,141)\n\nAverage number of passengers carried per standard bus per day along the BRT corridor: Not achieved (Baseline: 500; Target: 800; Actual: 458)\n\nTo improve mobility along prioritized corridors\n\nNumber of direct beneficiaries: Not \nachieved \n(Baseline:-; Target:300,000; \nActual: 156,000) \n\nNumber of women direct beneficiaries: Achieved (Baseline: -; Target: 60,000; Actual: 73,320)\n\nNumber of indirect beneficiaries: \nAchieved \n(Baseline: -; Target: 721,031; \nActual: 721,031) \n\nTo promote a shift to more environmentally sustainable urban transport modes\n\nPercent of BRT users who report \nowning a car or two-wheeler: \nAchieved \n(Baseline: 14; Target: 21; Actual: \n30) \n\nTo promote an incremental shift to more environmentally sustainable urban\n\n2C: Upgrade BRT Lite (Mile 12–CMS)\n\nBRT-lite shelters upgraded\n\n| | | | | CO2 emissions from vehicles along | among users with a |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| | | | | BRT corridors (metric ton): | relatively high carbon |\n| | | | | Achieved | footprint |\n\ntransport modes (Baseline: 371,000; Target: 359,000; Actual: 349,000)\n\n| 2D: Mass Transit | | studied in MTAS and are | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| Alternative Analyses | | consistent with bu-route network | | | |\n| Studies | | study along with the update of | | | |\n\n15 corridors are identified and STMP.\n\nBus-route network study is georeferenced and can be viewed in GIS packages with recommendations on three types of services, including mass transit routes, high capacity/tributary routes, and standard routes. 19 additional motor park locations have been identified and would form “Transit Hub” interchanges. Ikeja bus terminal is constructed.\n\nTo improve mobility along prioritized corridors\n\n2E: Development of Complementary Bus Systems\n\nPercent of public transport users rating their BRT service as satisfactory: Achieved (Baseline: 20; Target: 60; Actual: 80)\n\n2F: BRT Consultations and Media Strategy\n\nPublic awareness strategy for the BRT system as well as framework to incorporate feedback in all elements of design and operations.\n\n| 2G: Upgrade and | | ITS on Mile 12–TBS BRT | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| Rationalize System | | corridor, Mile 12–Ikorodu BRT | | | |\n| Operations | | extension corridor and BFS | | | |\n\nDesign and commissioning of ITS on Mile 12–TBS BRT corridor, Mile 12–Ikorodu BRT extension corridor and BFS corridor. Component 3: Improvement of Lagos State Metropolitan Road Network 3A: Routine Maintenance (dropped)\n\n| 3A: Routine | | Not financed under LUTP | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| Maintenance | | because the funding was to come | | | |\n| (dropped) | | from LSG. | | | |\n| 3B: Periodic | | | | | |\n| Maintenance and | | Not financed under LUTP | | | |\n| Pavement | | because the funding was to come | | | |\n| Management System | | from LSG. | | | |\n\n(dropped)\n\nWempco Road in Ogba (1.9 km) and Akin Road in Victoria Island (1.65 km) are upgraded and rehabilitated to be divided highways roads and provided with covered drainage and necessary road furniture.\n\nAverage travel speed along resurfaced and rehabilitated roads (kph): Achieved (Baseline: 12; Target: 18; Actual: 50)\n\nTo improve mobility along prioritized corridors\n\nRoad rehabilitated, non-rural (km): \nAchieved \n(Baseline: 0; Target: 17.8; Actual: \n17.8) \n\n3C: Rehabilitation (and PMS) (renamed)\n\n| Assistance, | Procurement of office | | | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| Equipment, Vehicles, | equipment, vehicles, and other | | | | | |\n| Office Equipment, and | operational support facilities in | | | | | |\n| Other Operational | the LAMATA’s new | corporate | | | | |\n| Support for | head office. | | | | | |\n\nComponent 4: Project Management and System Monitoring \n4A: Technical \nImplementation \n\n| 4B: Institutional, | | | | Financial and technical performance of project | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| Technical, | Technical Audit Report rated | | | based on audits: Achieved | | |\n| Procurement, and | project as Satisfactory. | | | (Baseline: Not applicable; | Target: | |\n| Financial Audit | | | | Satisfactory; Actual: Satisfactory.) | | |\n\nSafeguards: Four RAPs were conducted and 2,231 PAPs were provided with identification cards to qualify for compensation and/or assistance.\n\nTraffic accident rate along project corridor (number), with breakdown as follows: Achieved (Fatal: Baseline: 14; Target 11; Actual: 3; Serious: Baseline: 31; Target: 25; Actual: 15; Minor: Baseline: 94; Target: 76; Actual: 48)\n\n4C: Outcome \nMonitoring of \nTransport and Social \nImpact Indicators, \nEnvironmental Impact \nIndicators and \nCapacity Development \nIndicators \n\nTo improve mobility along prioritized corridors\n\n| | Three air-quality monitoring | | | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| 4D: Air Quality | stations were developed for | | | | | |\n| Monitoring Along | effective measuring along the | | | | | |\n| BRT Corridors | corridor. | | | | | |\n| (dropped) | Study of pollutant emissions was | | | | | |\n\nconducted.\n\nAnnex 3. Ex-Post Economic Analysis\n\nSummary The ICR team conducted an ex-post cost-benefit economic analysis of investments to support the Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) infrastructure component, accounting for 70 percent of total financing. This ex-post economic analysis follows the same basic approach as the ex-ante economic analysis, i.e., estimating road users’ surplus, but uses a slightly modified methodology to account for the changes to the project’s scope during implementation. Based on the analysis, the net present value (NPV) of the flow of economic benefits generated by the project over 15 years is estimated to be US$486 million at a 12 percent discount rate; its economic internal rate of return (EIRR) is estimated at 36 percent. The results of the economic evaluation are presented in the table below.\n\nTable 1. Economic Evaluation Mile 12–Ikorodu Corridor Discounted Cost (million USD) 235 Discounted Benefits (million USD) 721 Economic Net Present Value (million USD) 486 Benefit/Cost Ratio 3.1 EIRR 36% VOC Saving (million USD) 66 Time Saving (million USD) 637 GHG Emissions Saving (million USD) 17\n\nMethodology and Economic Analysis Assumptions\n\nMethodology. The evaluation followed the same approach as the ex-ante economic analysis in assessing road-user benefits and the cost of investments. The main benefits stemming from the Mile 12–Ikorodu corridor investments are savings from the reduction of the following transport costs: (a) VOCs, mainly the reduction in fuel consumption and vehicle wear due to smoother road conditions, and (b) reduction in travel time of passengers and freight, which is converted into monetary terms and added as economic benefits. GHG analysis is included in the economic analysis. Additional benefits, which have not been quantified in this analysis, include a reduction in the number of collisions (which will lead to a reduction of economic loss from deaths, injuries and vehicle damage); and improved driving and riding comfort.\n\nTime horizon: A 15-year time period has been chosen, as in the ex-ante economic analysis. This has been adopted because, with the provision of maintenance allowed within the costing, it is considered reasonable to expect that the infrastructure will be serviceable over this time period. The same time horizon was considered in the ex-ante economic analysis.\n\nDiscount factor: A discount factor of 12 percent (in real terms) has been used to discount future cost and revenue streams.\n\nConstruction and maintenance cost: Construction costs consider the roadway construction cost plus ancillary infrastructure (terminals, shelters, depots, footbridges and street lighting) from Mile 12 to Ikorodu. The infrastructure cost does not include the upgrading from Mile 12 to TBS because the idea is to compare the post-economic analysis with values at appraisal, which only considered the new BRT section. Because the delivery of infrastructure requirements was achieved within the existing highway boundary, no land-purchase costs have been incorporated. For guidance, the requirement for infrastructure maintenance has been included. This has been derived at 10 percent of the subtotal and is based per annum.\n\nEconomic benefits: The main economic benefits of the roadwork are: (a) VOC savings, mainly the reduction in fuel consumption; (b) reduction in travel time of passengers and private vehicle users, which is converted into monetary terms and added as economic benefits; and (c) reduction of GHG emissions. These benefits are calculated as the difference in transport costs between a with-project scenario (alternative case) and a without-project scenario (base case).\n\nGHG emissions calculation. The economic analysis considered the benefits from emission reduction in the intervened corridor. The direct GHG emissions avoided over a period of 15 years are 858,368 tons of CO2eq and the cost effectiveness of the investment is US$161/ton. The calculation is supported by the GHG analysis explained in Annex 7.\n\nResults. The result demonstrates that the Mile 12 to Ikorodu corridor works remain economically viable. The discounted benefits are US$721 million over 15 years. The project’s main benefit, time saving, is estimated at US$637 million, 71 percent of which is time saving for BRT users. The distribution of benefits is: 88 percent due to time saving, 9 percent to VOC savings, and percent to GHG emissions. The present values of the flow of net economic benefits (eNPV) generated by the project over 15 years are estimated at US$486 million at a 12 percent discount rate and its EIRR is estimated at 36 percent.\n\nAnnex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team Members Names Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty\n\nLending \nAjay Kumar Lead Transport Economist GTI05 Team Leader \nAntoine V. Lema Social Development Specialist Social Development \nSpecialist \nRoger Gorham Transport Economist Environmental Management \nAisha D.A. Kaga Program Assistant AFCW2 Assistant \nAnne Njuguna Program Assistant Assistant \nAkinrinmola Oyenuga \nAkinyele \n\nGGO25 Financial Management\n\nSr. Financial Management Specialist\n\nThomas Kwasi Siaw Anang Procurement Specialist Procurement \nJohn Kobina Richardson Sr. Transport Specialist Team Member \nAmos Abu Sr. Environmental Specialist Safeguards \nAdenike Sherifat Oyeyiola Sr. Financial Management \nSpecialist \n\nGGO24 Financial Management\n\n| Adebayo Adeniyi | | | | Sr. Procurement Specialist | | | GGO01 | | Procurement | | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| Belinda Lorraine Asaam | | | | Program Assistant | | GWASO | | | Assistant | | | | |\n| Caroline Mary Sage | | | | Sr. Social Development Specialist | | | GSU06 | | Team Member | | | | |\n| Chita Azuanuka Obinwa | | | | Sr. Program Assistant | | | GEE07 | | Assistant | | | | |\n| Deborah Adedigba O. | | | | | | | GEN07 | | Team Member | | | | |\n| Manush A. Hristov | | | | Senior Counsel | | | LEGES | | Counsel | | | | |\n| Mohammed Aliyu | | | | | | | GSU01 | | Team Member | | | | |\n| Olatunji Ahmed | | | | Transport Specialist | | | GTI07 | | Engineering | | | | |\n| Shalonda Robinson | | | | Program Assistant | | GEEDR | | | Assistant | | | | |\n| Supervision/ICR | | | | | | | | | | | | | |\n| Roger Gorham | | | | Transport Economist | | | GTI04 | | Team Leader | | | | |\n| Adebayo Adeniyi | | | | Sr. Procurement Specialist | | | GGO01 | | Procurement | | | | |\n| Anas Abba Kyari | | | | Procurement Specialist | | | GGO01 | | Procurement | | | | |\n| Bayo Awosemusi | | | | Lead Procurement Specialist | | | GGO01 | | Procurement | | | | |\n| Daniel Rikichi Kajang | | | | Sr. Procurement Specialist | | | GGO01 | | Procurement | | | | |\n| Oyewole Oluyemi Afuye | | | | Procurement Specialist | | | GGO01 | | Procurement | | | | |\n| Sunday Esene Osoba | | | | Procurement Specialist | | | GGO01 | | Procurement | | | | |\n| Akinrinmola Oyenuga | | | | Sr. Financial Management | | | GGO25 | | Financial Management | | | | |\n| Akinyele | | | | Specialist | | | | | | | | | |\n| Amos Abu | | | | Sr. Environmental Specialist | | | GEN07 | | Safeguards | | | | |\n| Evarist F. Baimu | | | | Senior Counsel | | | LEGES | | Counsel | | | | |\n| Joyce Chukwuma | | | | Program Assistant | | AFCW2 | | | Assistant | | | | |\n\nNwachukwu\n\nMichael Gboyega Ilesanmi Social Safeguards Specialist GSU01 Safeguards Olatunji Ahmed Sr. Transport Specialist GTI07 Engineering Raman V. Krishnan Sr. ICT Specialist GTI09 ITS Sarah Farnuwa Tangalu Program Assistant AFCW2 Assistant\n\nShalonda Robinson Program Assistant GEEDR Assistant Ugonne Margaret Eze Program Assistant AFCW2 Assistant\n\nNames Title Unit Responsibility/Specialty Fatima Arroyo Arroyo Urban Transport Specialist GTI07 ICR Primary Author Yin Qiu Consultant GTI04 ICR Primary Author\n\n(b) Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle Number of Staff Weeks\n\nUS$ thousands (Including Travel and Consultant Costs)\n\nLending \nFY09 4.91 35,441.11 \nFY10 11.28 83,367.81 \nImplementation/ICR \nFY11 34.25 137,209.94 \nFY12 30.84 113,298.25 \nFY13 30.25 136,145.1 \nFY14 63.84 166,275.51 \nFY15 30.78 132,459.45 \nFY16 25.11 104,053.12 \nFY17 30.36 157,369.85 \nFY18 1.73 19,274.63 \nTotal: 263.35 1,084,894.77 \n\nAnnex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results\n\nContext and Methodology\n\n1. The LUTP2 is expected to benefit users of the roads, communities and businesses surrounding the roads. The identified beneficiaries of LUTP2 interventions were: (a) households where the projects were implemented; (b) employers/employees of businesses that benefitted economically from the improved roads; and (c) users of the improved roads. Beneficiaries who were individually identifiable were disaggregated by gender, age and income. Multistage proportionate random sampling was used to select beneficiaries in the project areas.\n\n2. The selected beneficiaries were interviewed using structured questionnaires to obtain information relating to changes in travel time (pre- and post-project), changes in transport costs, creation of new business opportunities, employment opportunities, traffic situation, wage information, and so on. The survey was complemented by focus group discussions, key informant interviews, and desk reviews. This approach generated more in-depth responses on how economic activities had changed since the project was implemented. Furthermore, rapid counts of commuters and traffic were also conducted on the Ikorodu–Mile 12 corridor, Wempco Road, Akin Adesola Road, and the TBS bus terminal.\n\n3. The targeted survey population for all the respondents was 1,720. A 97 percent response rate was attained. Twelve survey instruments were adopted to understand the project’s impacts on intended beneficiaries, including surveys of households, BRT passengers (Mile 12–Ikorodu), motorists, commuters, vehicle count, terminal inventory, speed, pedestrians, NMT, social impact on gender and vulnerable groups, counterfactual road (Agege/Oshodi), and ongoing construction of the Ikeja Bus Park. Some of the key survey results are presented below.\n\nProfile of Household Survey Respondents\n\n4. The proportions of male and female respondents are 55 percent and 45 percent, respectively. Among the survey population, 41.1 percent are between the ages of 31 and 40, 47 percent are working in business, and 45 percent have graduated from a tertiary institution.\n\nTable 8.1. Profile of Household Survey Respondents\n\nTrip Purpose and Frequency\n\n5. Because a majority of commuters use BRT to get to work daily or between three and six times a week, work is the greatest driver of BRT trips. Many of these trips are made using okada as the first mode, while BRT is the main mode, and the egress mode could either be walking or okada. The survey findings show that schoolchildren are not well represented as commuters because on the days that children go to school (three to five times per week), school trips account for very low frequency figures. With regard to the travel purpose of BRT users, a sizable percentage of both male (58.15 percent) and female (37.5 percent) respondents use the service to go to work, while others use it to go to school, market, visiting, and religious services. A more direct approach to ascertain BRT’s level of benefit to respondents shows that 48.4 percent of male respondents consider the BRT service highly beneficial while another 30.6 percent consider it slightly beneficial. Of female respondents, 50 percent consider BRT highly beneficial and another 30 percent consider it slightly beneficial. In both cases, well over 75 percent of respondents stated that BRT has been favorable to them. Some of the listed benefits include reduced travel cost, better and timely access to places of work/businesses, relative safety for transporting schoolchildren, reduction in travel expenses, and reduction in travel fatigue.\n\nFigure 8.1. Trip Frequency and Purpose on BRT\n\nPreference for BRT\n\n6. The survey shows that over 86 percent of respondents stated that they prefer using the BRT service. Of this absolute percentage, further disaggregation shows the reasons for the preference (see Figure 8.2).\n\nFigure 8.2. Household Members’ Perception of BRT Services\n\nNumber of Direct Beneficiaries by Gender\n\n7. Analysis of the BRT passenger survey conducted along Mile 12–Ikorodu Road reveals that 60.8 percent of direct beneficiaries are males and a corresponding 39.2 percent are females. Although women make numerous trips, they are mostly short. Most BRT users travel far on it, thus explaining the high incidence of male travelers. Average BRT passenger ridership is 165,000 per day. This figure has been obtained from the franchisee’s data and confirmed by the ICR BRT field survey.\n\nNumber of Indirect Beneficiaries by Gender\n\n8. To determine the number of indirect beneficiaries by gender and those who are able to traverse the extended corridor in less than 45 minutes, the volumetric traffic count was used as the basis for judgment.\n\n9. The average travel times of non-BRT buses and motor cars were also the basis of the travel times used to derive those vehicles that travel under 45 minutes. The travel times were obtained by the global positioning system (GPS). For two-wheelers, a mystery traveler also recorded times by GPS. The vehicles that fit into the category are:\n\n| | • | | Motor vehicles, | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| | • | | Two-wheelers, and | |\n| | • | | Minibuses (these buses had times ranging from 42 | to 48 minutes) and thus an average |\n\nof 45 km/h.\n\n10. Minibuses were accorded an average of 11.52 people, while motor vehicles had an average of 2.63 people and two-wheelers had an average of two people. The traffic count and assignment of averages were complemented by the visual occupancy survey of vehicles. The average total volume of indirect beneficiaries per day came to 121,732 people. In a period of one year this amounts to 44,432,180, of whom 17,417,415 are women, using the 39.2 percent average obtained on the corridor in the household and traffic surveys.\n\nTraffic Data Analysis\n\n• There is strong competition between the BRT buses and other buses going to Ikorodu. The reason why the other buses still compete is the almost bus stop-to-bus stop service they render, as well as their ability to carry wares for the women who trade in Ikorodu.\n\n• The use of cars is still relatively high as a means of travel because at Ikorodu there are no existing park-and-ride facilities. Moreover, most of these car owners live far from the main road and need their cars to move in the morning or evening due to logistics and security considerations.\n\n• The low use of taxis is a function of finance. Taxis are expensive, motorists who can afford them may not be able to use them every day, and therefore there is low patronage and low-income citizens do not usually use taxis.\n\n• During the morning peak period outbound to Ikorodu, minibuses are lesser in volume compared to inbound to Mile12 for the same period. This is because most vehicles move out toward the southeast corridor for work and commercial purposes.\n\n• Minibus figures are high outbound to Ikorodu at interpeak periods due to the longer length of time and to more movement for trading activities for people departing Ketu and Mile 12 market to beat the evening rush hours.\n\n• The use of cars is high for all periods although with changes in volume for the morning period when outward traffic to Ikorodu is quite high, with more than double the number of cars entering Ikorodu from Mile 12. These are work-bound cars and traffic is largely reversed in the evening.\n\nBRT Users who Report Owning a Car or Two-Wheeler\n\n11. In the overall survey of BRT users, the percentage of users who report that they own a car or two-wheeler is 34 percent, of which 38 percent are female and 60 percent are between the ages of 20 and 39. Another 30 percent are between the ages of 40 and 59. Among BRT users, 75 percent are married and 80 percent have post-secondary school education. However, 64 percent are employed in the private sector of the economy. Figure 8.3 shows the income distribution of BRT users reporting ownership of a car or two-wheeler.\n\nFigure 8.3. Income Distribution of BRT Users Owning Vehicles\n\nBRT Users who Report Owning a Car or Two-Wheeler and Having a Favorable Impression of the BRT Service\n\n12. In the overall survey of BRT users, the percentage of users reporting that they own a car or two-wheeler is 22.89 percent. About 62 percent of this subset are males and 38 percent are females. About 80 percent of them have post-secondary education, 64 percent are privately employed, and 36 percent are public servants. This subset also has an income peculiarity: the critical mass of 68 percent earns a monthly income above NGN 80,000.\n\n13. The percentage of BRT users reported that they own a car or two-wheeler and have a very good impression of the BRT service (89.4 percent according to the survey), while 91.5 percent confirmed that they are satisfied with the BRT service. The remaining who are dissatisfied report that there is undue delay in adding buses to the fleet at Ikorodu terminal, especially during peak periods.\n\nAverage Travel Time on Mile 12–Ikorodu: 24.08 minutes\n\n14. The methodology for obtaining the travel time on the Mile 12–Ikorodu corridor was to have a mystery traveler on board, who took 12 trips (six round trips) on BRT buses. The average travel time on the Mile 12–Ikorodu corridor is 24.08 minutes. Figure 8.4 shows the individual trip times and the average. The data show an outlier result observed on the third inbound trip which recorded 34.45 minutes, compared to other trips that ranged between 20 and 25 minutes, and the delay was a result of some obstruction under the Mile 12 bridge which kept the BRT bus in one spot for about seven minutes. Because this occurs on more than a few occasions, it was reasonable not to discard the result, which is a true reflection of the vagaries of Lagos traffic.\n\nFigure 8.4. Average Time Derived from Average of GPS Recordings of Time on 12 Trips on Mile 12–Ikorodu Corridor\n\nAverage Travel Speed on Mile 12–Ikorodu: 31.3 km/h\n\n15. The travel speed recorded by GPS shows a range from 30 to 40 m/h and the average speed was 31.3 km/h.\n\nFigure 8.5. Journey Speed on 12 Trips on Mile 12–Ikorodu Corridor with Average Speed Depicted\n\nAverage Travel Time of Other Commercial Buses on Mile 12–Ikorodu: 49 minutes\n\n16. The methodology was also to have a mystery traveler record travel and stop times on several trips in other commercial buses. This would provide a real-time comparison of travel times of buses that are not on segregated BRT lanes but ply the same route. Evidences show that it takes non-BRT buses an average of 49 minutes to make the same journey that BRT makes in 24 minutes.\n\n17. Many reasons could explain the time advantage of about 25 minutes that BRT has over other commercial buses (not including LAGBUS): (a) the other commercial buses spend more time picking up and dropping off passengers, because they make more stops at bus stops that are in-between the BRT stations; (b) the buses are not in as serviceable a condition as that of BRT and as such are not able to move as fast as BRT; and (b) because the buses do not have an exclusive lane such as that of BRT, flowing along with other road users slows down all traffic to some extent. The survey shows that reduced travel times on the corridor are making the commuter experience more pleasant.\n\nTable 8.2. GPS Record of Travel Time and Speed of Other Public Commercial Buses on Mile 12–Ikorodu\n\nAverage Travel Time and Speed on Mile 12-TBS BRT-Lite Corridor: 45.50 minutes\n\n18. Records of the readings indicate that the average travel time between Mile12 and TBS is 45.50 minutes. The survey found that the average travel time between Ikorodu and Mile 12 is 24.08 minutes, and the total travel time of the corridor is around 70 minutes.\n\nTable 8.3. BRT-Lite Corridor Travel Time and Speed\n\nDirect and Indirect Impact of Road Project Investments\n\nTime Savings for BRT Users, Non-BRT Bus Users, and Car Owners\n\n19. The socioeconomic survey on the impact of the road project was conducted with commuters. In this survey, commuters confirmed that road construction has resulted in travel time savings.\n\n• About 71 percent of BRT users stated that the trip between Mile 12 and Ikorodu currently takes less than 30 minutes. Before the intervention, 94 percent of users said that the same trip used to take between 50 and 80 minutes. It is therefore clear that there has been a time saving of 20 to 50 minutes for commuters. The commuters’ judgment of time savings concurs with the survey findings that the actual travel time is 24.08 minutes compared to 49 minutes in the past; actual time saving is 25 minutes.\n\n• Non-BRT users also confirmed travel-time savings, with 73 percent of respondents stating that it takes about 25 minutes to traverse the corridor compared to the 60 to 80 minutes it used to take. Therefore, the time saving is 35 to 55 minutes.\n\n• However, car owners recorded faster travel times than those of BRT: between 18 and 20 minutes. This is reasonable because cars have few stops and waiting times.\n\n20. In conclusion, there have been time savings of at least 20 minutes for some commuters and as high as 55 minutes for others. Car owners have the most time savings after the road construction, while BRT makes the next largest savings. For commuters who use buses, BRT is the preferred means of travel because of time savings, comfort, and security off and on the bus.\n\nCost Savings: Willingness-to-pay Extra\n\n21. Passengers’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) for improving the quality levels of a transport service was examined. The WTP survey is an important tool in the evaluation of transport investments, because it allows the investor or provider to establish the rate which could be debited to the users. The survey shows that 68.3 percent of household respondents are not willing to pay more for an improved BRT service because most of them stated that the service is owned by the government and as such ought to be subsidized. For about 32.7 percent of the sample who are willing to pay more, about 44 percent are willing to pay only about a five percent increase in fares.\n\nIncome Savings\n\n22. Before the BRT extension, commuters from Mile 12 to Ikorodu spent an average of about NGN 4,120 to NGN 4,500 per month. When the extension project was completed, many commuters migrated to the BRT service and the transport cost was reduced to about NGN 4,000 monthly. However, the BRT franchisee recently increased fares on BRT to NGN 200 per round trip, with an average monthly transport expenditure of NGN 5000. The result of this increase is that commuters’ transport expenditure has increased by about 20 percent This is a result which may appear unfavorable at project end, but it is a result that must be put into context relative to non-BRT transporters’ fares. In context, BRT fares are still relatively lower than all other transport of correlated status. The survey found that National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) buses and the minibuses charge NGN 150 per trip, with a round trip on the corridor costing NGN 300, which means that a commuter who chooses not to travel on the BRT service has a monthly transport expenditure of NGN 7,500. Compared to the non-BRT transport expenditure, the commuter saves 33.3 percent on transportation.\n\n23. The household and passenger surveys show that commuters believe there is an even greater percentage gain on transportation cost through BRT because the other commercial buses competing with BRT on the corridor do not commit to a fixed price and change prices as windows of opportunities present themselves. About 95 percent of the respondents are not opposed to the fare increase, especially because BRT provides a more comfortable and faster ride.\n\nAnnex 6. Summary of Borrower’s ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR\n\n1. LAMATA implemented the LUTP2, a transport development project which was financed by the World Bank, AFD and GEF. The project was implemented between May 16, 2011 and May 31, 2017. In compliance with credit terms, LAMATA commissioned the preparation of the ICR to examine and evaluate the implementation performance of the project at its end.\n\nSummary of Lessons Learned\n\n• The RAP should be holistic, sustainable and transparent to PAPs. Security of land tenure enables sustainability. Without it, the objective of the resettlement action will be defeated and another resettlement will have to occur in the future. In the case of the Ayangbunren Market traders, PAPs were displaced from one uncertain future to another equally uncertain future. In the long run, it is doubtful whether money used to secure the resettlement brings any value.\n\n• It is important that terms of agreements are explained properly to PAPs to ensure their acceptance. An illiterate jurat (a legal clause that shows that an illiterate person signing understands what he is signing, the same having been translated into his/her local dialect) should always be inserted into agreements in which PAPs are illiterate or appear to be more capable of transacting business or relationships in languages other than English. This will show that the terms that the allottee PAP signs are actually understood.\n\n• Resettlement should not end with a mere allocation of stalls and relocation. Instead there should be an oversight role after relocation for purposes of sorting out all problems that may occur, in order to facilitate seamless and sustainable resettlement. There is a need for some sort of government supervisory role on resettled persons, the area, and the activities of PAPs and to assure their security and tenure. In this regard, the LGA’s role should be defined in such a way that supervision of PAPs does not become burdensome.\n\n• LAMATA should seek to obtain long-term leases of land on which PAPs would be resettled. Short-term lease tenure is not ideal. If the land cannot be acquired by the government under the Land Use Act and compensation cannot paid to the owner so that the land may be government (LGA) owned (security of tenure guaranteed), then the lease should be for at least 10 years with a proviso allowing the market associations to negotiate a further lease on any other conditions they may agree with the lessors.\n\n• Lessons learned regarding the TPUs are that, before setting up a special unit in any institution, it is advisable to examine if there is any department that appears to have a semblance of similarity in functions to those of the new special unit being proposed. If such a department exists, then there must be either an abrogation or scrapping of such an existing unit or a merger of the two units. Where parallel units exist, the survival of one is uncertain.\n\n• Although it is uncertain whether the Local Government Service Commission was contacted or consulted before the creation of the TPUs, it is important to stress that stakeholder analysis at the beginning of any initiative must be thorough and include even those whose only function may be decided even remotely. In this regard, the Local Government Service Commission may have been left out and the latter’s action has adversely affected a carefully thought-out and laudable project. The commission is responsible for all LGA/LCDA workers throughout the state and the transfer of staff from one LGA/LCDA to another is a normal function. Consultation with this commission will stem the frequent transfer of trained officers to LGAs/LCDAs where the TPU is non-existent.\n\n• For projects to actually endure in the LGA/LCDA, the chairmen of all the 57 LGAs/LCDAs in the state should be sensitized and engaged in a determined manner until they are fully bought into the project. Even if the TPUs have only a 10 percent penetration at the onset, the buy-in of all 57 chairmen will provide institutional acceptance of the project; the first set would feel special to have been selected while the remainder will eagerly await their turn. The LGAs/LCDAs have their special functions, especially regarding feeder roads, and there should be no reason for them to sabotage LAMATA’s efforts if they understand the project’s overall objective. LAMATA should also keep in mind the politicking that underscores LGAs/LCDAs and help to secure legitimacy for a revenue base that by law accrues to the LGAs/LCDAs. Resistance arises if people fear erosion of their revenue base. Prompt cooperation and support for the TPUs from local government executives should be enjoyed by members of the TPU and should not be seen as competition.\n\n• A sustainable plan requires a dedicated funding line; this line should be from the LGA/LCDA. LAMATA should institutionalize the TPU’s funding line within the LGA/LCDA.\n\n• The issue of lack of a concessionary transport fare for children on the BRT corridor needs to be evaluated and a system of subsidies should be considered by LAMATA. Children are grossly under-represented in bus travel, as observed during the field survey. This is because the fares remain largely unaffordable to parents. Perhaps the operator of the franchisee could be persuaded to provide free bus travel for children at peak school resumption and closing times as a corporate social responsibility, or perhaps the LSG/LAMATA could consider subsidizing travel for children. Consideration could also be given to a system that may bring in other multinationals to subsidize such travel, similar to the free transport that Cadbury PLC was providing at one time to children.\n\nRecommendations and Follow-up Actions\n\n• In the near future, the LSG will require further assistance from the World Bank for a third phase of the LUTP. The request is based on the LUTP2’s benefits and contributions to the state’s development agenda. LAMATA’S vision for the follow on assistance would involve enhancing the mobility and affordability of bus transport services and increasing the physical resilience of Lagos State’s transport network to\n\nextreme economic downturn and weather events. The proposed request could involve a number of components, including the expansion of BRT to additional corridor(s), improving feeder-bus route connectivity, implementing portions of Lagos State’s drainage master plan, facilitating bus and passenger movements along identified corridors through enhanced traffic management and ITS measures, and improving the capacity of different agencies in Lagos State to manage the transport system effectively.\n\n• Consolidation of the gains of the establishment of TPUs in the six LGAs/LCDAs by addressing a law or regulations to resolve the issues of legitimacy and sustainability, such as removing parallel staff and institutionalizing only the TPU.\n\n• Empowering the TPU to be sustainable by providing a secure and regular funding line from the LGA/LCDA. In this regard, an annual budget should be prepared in the LGA/LCDA for the TPU, and the TPU should be made a department in the Local Government Commissions with the full rights and privileges of a government agency.\n\n• Staffing of TPUs must be assigned special status, and the Local Government Commissionsshould be instructed by the LSG, through the appropriate legal channels, that specialized staff must be retained within or transferred only to the LGAs/LCDAs that can use their expertise.\n\n• Foster cooperation and support for TPUs from the local council executives by conducting inter-LGA/LCDA stakeholder workshops for dissemination of TPU activities and feedback so that best practices can be shared.\n\nConclusion\n\n2. The consultants’ overall conclusion is that the LUTP2 has achieved the PDOs and Key Performance Indicators. LAMATA’s capacity for project planning and implementation has again been affirmed. With two major projects—LUTP and LUTP2—LAMATA has definitely come of age in Nigeria as a credible institution. It is expected that LAMATA will showcase its capacity by a more visible and perhaps “loud” presence in both hard and soft media. It is expected that more funding will be assigned to the External Relations Unit to achieve this. The website could benefit from greater robustness to make more data accessible. LAMATA can graduate to being an institution of transport planning and perhaps collaborate with various universities. The capacity within LAMATA can be of immense benefit to Nigeria.\n\nAnnex 7. GHG Analysis\n\n1. The GHG emission analysis presented in this annex follow a tailored methodology developed for this project and which could be easily replicable for other urban transport projects. The project supported the development of the complete methodology and methodological handbook for GHG emission calculation. This methodology has the advantage of being tailored and practical for LAMATA to manage. It is built on what is known as the ASIF identity 17.\n\n2. In June 2013, LAMATA undertook surveys of two corridors to determine the base case for the implementation of a GHG emissions monitoring methodology for the Lagos metropolitan area, focusing primarily on the new BRT corridor funded under the LUTP2 (Mile 12–Ikorodu). Apapa– Oworonshoki Expressway, which is labeled Corridor 1, was chosen as the control corridor to determine background traffic growth not attributed to BRT. The Ikorodu Road corridor is labeled Corridor 2. The base case was intended to provide LAMATA with sufficient information to be able to estimate the amount of GHG (CO2) emissions on the Mile 12–Ikorodu corridor prior to the implementation of BRT.\n\n3. The exercise, which conducted by LAMATA in June 2013, was carried out again in 2016. The results are presented in this summary of the report that was submitted by the consultants retained for the GHG emissions study. Furthermore, a careful comparison of the 2013 and 2016 total CO2 emissions has been conducted to determine the effect of BRT implementation and to ascertain whether there has been an increase or decrease in total CO2 emissions.\n\n4. For the project, two study corridors were identified, as in the previous studies. The surveys, traffic counts and testing focused on the following roadway corridors:\n\n• Apapa–Oworonshoki Expressway (between Gbagada-Mobil and Cele bus stop), and • Ikorodu Road (between Mile 12 and Ikorodu Roundabout).\n\n17 ASIF stands for the variables of a generic equation to calculate the GHG emissions of transport that reads: GHG = Activity x modal Share x energy Intensity x carbon intensity of Fuel.\n\n5. Ikorodu Road is the “study” corridor, while the Apapa–Oworonshoki Expressway serves as the “control” corridor.\n\n6. Data collection for the project primarily involved two types of surveys, including:\n\n(a) Drive Cycle Test, and (b) Manual Classified and Vehicle Occupancy Counts.\n\n7. The Drive Cycle Test survey was designed to capture average driving conditions across the different vehicle types within the study area, and to monitor how travel conditions evolve over time following the introduction of the BRT scheme. Drive Cycle Tests were conducted within a two-week period from Saturday, May 14 to Saturday, May 28, 2016. The Manual of Classified and Vehicle Occupancy Counts survey started on Saturday, May 14, 2016, and was conducted for a total of seven days between 6 a.m. and 8 p.m., ending on Friday, May 20, 2016.\n\n8. The Drive Cycle Test and Manual of Classified and Vehicle Occupancy Counts were conducted on private cars and public passenger vehicles including okadas, tricycles, Danfo-14, Danfo-18, Danfo-22, cars, taxis, coaster buses, large buses (BRT/LAGBUS and so on) and trucks (lorry/trailer).\n\n9. Analysis and results. In 2013, the results focused on three key aspects of the analysis that guide the project’s objectives, including equivalent CO2, fuel performance, and inter-city and inter model comparison.\n\nComparison of Total Emission Obtained from 2013 and 2016 on Corridor 1\n\n10. Table 11.1 presents a comparison of 2013 total CO2 emissions with the 2016 total CO2 emissions in Corridor 1 (Apapa–Oworonshoki Expressway).\n\nTable 11.1. Total CO2 Comparison 2013 versus 2016 for Corridor 1\n\n11. Table 11.2 presents a comparison of 2013 total CO2 emissions with the 2016 total CO2 emissions in Corridor 2 (Ikorodu Route).\n\nTable 11.2. Total CO2 Comparison 2013 versus 2016 for Corridor 2\n\n12. Table 11.1 indicates that there has been a 25 percent increase of total CO2 emissions from 2013 to 2016 in the Apapa–Oworonshoki corridor. However, Table 11.2 shows that total CO2\n\nemissions decreased by a margin of six percent between 2013 and 2016 along the Ikorodu Road corridor. This reduction of total CO2 emissions in the Ikorodu Road corridor could be attributed to the introduction of a new BRT system since November 2015. This also suggests that a switch from other modes to BRT resulted in lower overall emissions.\n\nImpact of BRT on the Study Corridor\n\n13. To determine the true impact of the BRT system on the Ikorodu Road study corridor, the growth exhibited on the control corridor between 2013 and 2016 was applied to the 2013 traffic of the BRT corridor to derive passenger trips for the counterfactual scenario without BRT. The percentage of growth from the control corridor was derived by calculating the increase in the number of vehicles in each vehicle from base year 2013 to current year 2016 and then dividing that number by the 2013 volume.\n\nTable 11.3. Control Corridor Growth Based on Number of Vehicles\n\nSource: GHG emissions report\n\n14. Table 11.3 shows the average growth on the control corridor between 2013 and 2016, which has been estimated at nine percent. The growth factors were then applied to the 2013 study corridor traffic to derive the corresponding 2016 study corridor traffic called the counterfactual scenario.\n\n15. Table 11.4 presents the summary of activity and CO2 emissions per vehicle type for a growth-induced study corridor (counterfactual) scenario without BRT. The calculation indicates that a total of 403 tons of equivalent CO2 were obtained for the study corridor under the counterfactual scenario. When the 349 tons of equivalent CO2 for the study corridor are deducted from the counterfactual scenario, the resulting 54 tons of equivalent CO2 represent the impact of BRT on the study corridor. This also suggests that BRT is responsible for a 13.5 percent reduction of total CO2 emissions on the Ikorodu Road study corridor, as shown in Table 11.5.\n\nTable 11.4. Total CO2 Corridor 2 (Without BRT) Source: GHG Emissions Report\n\nSource: GHG emissions report\n\n16. Table 11.5 presents a comparison of total CO2 emissions for 2016 with BRT and the equivalent for 2016 without BRT.\n\nTable 11.5. Total CO2 Comparison 2016 versus 2016 for Corridor 2 (Without BRT) Source: GHG Emissions Study\n\nSource: GHG emissions report\n\nConclusion\n\n17. The conclusion, based on the above analysis of the impact of BRT and the comparison of the with-BRT and without-BRT scenarios for 2016, is that BRT has had an overall positive effect on total CO2 emissions in the Ikorodu Road corridor. This conclusion is further strengthened by the comparison analysis of the 2013 without-BRT scenario and the equivalent 2016 without-BRT scenario, which showed that, had the BRT system not been implemented, total CO2 emissions would have increased in the Ikorodu Road study corridor by approximately nine percent. The positive effect of BRT is thus demonstrated.\n\nAnnex 8. Allocations per component\n\nOriginal 2011 Restructuring 2012 Restructuring 2015 Restructuring\n\nTotal LSG IDA AFD GEF Total LSG IDA AFD GEF Total LSG IDA AFD GEF Total LSG IDA AFD GEF Component 1: Institutional Development and Capacity Building Total (USD) 34 10 23 0 1 40.8 16.8 23 0 1 21 10 10 0 1 21 10 10 0 1 A. Training, Twinning and Study Tours 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 B. LAMATA Corporate Head Office 13 13 19.8 6.8 13 0 0 C. Transport Model Update 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 D. LAMATA Operating Costs 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 E. Creation of TPUs 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 F. Support to Kano 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Component 2: Improvement of Public Transport Infrastructure and Enhancement of Traffic Management Systems Total (USD) 236.5 0 133 100 3.5 236.5 0 133 100 3.5 252.9 3.4 146 100 3.5 254.34 3.4 147.44 100 3.5 A. BRT Infrastructure Construction and Supervision (Oshodi–Mile 2–Obalende) (dropped)\n\n120 120 0 0 0\n\nB. BRT Infrastructure Construction and Supervision (Mile 12–Ikorodu/ BRT-Lite Corridor Extension)\n\n100 100 205.5 105.5 100 133.4 3.4 130 133.4 3.4 130\n\nC. Upgrade BRT-Lite (Mile 12–CMS) 0 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 \nD. Mass Transit Alternative Analysis Studies 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 \nE. Development of Complementary Bus \nSystem \n\n10 10 10 10 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5\n\nF. BRT Consultation and Media Strategy 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.94 0.44 1.5 G. Upgrade and Rationalize System Operation 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 1 2\n\nComponent 3 Improvement of Lagos State Metropolitan Road Network Total (USD) 50 25 25 0 0 43.2 18.2 25 0 0 46.6 21.6 25 0 0 46.6 21.6 25 0 0\n\nA. Routine Maintenance (dropped) 25 25 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.2 \nB. Periodic Maintenance and Pavement \nManagement System \n\n14 14 14 14 0 0 0 0\n\nC. Rehabilitation (and PMS) 11 11 11 11 28.4 3.4 25 28.4 3.4 25 Component 4: Project Management and System Monitoring Total (USD) 9 0 9 0 0 9 0 9 0 0 9 0 9 0 0 7.56 0 7.56 0 0\n\nTOTAL (USD) 329.5 35 190 100 4.5 329.5 35 190 100 4.5 329.5 35 190 100 4.5 329.5 35 190 100 4.5\n\n"
  },
  {
    "url": "https://www.academia.edu/43687736/Road_transport_energy_consumption_and_vehicular_emissions_in_Lagos_Nigeria_An_application_of_the_LEAP_model",
    "text": "(PDF) Road transport energy consumption and vehicular emissions in Lagos, Nigeria: An application of the LEAP model\nAcademia.edu uses cookies to personalize content, tailor ads and improve the user experience.\nBy using our site, you agree to our collection of information through the use of cookies.\nTo learn more, view our[Privacy Policy.](https://www.academia.edu/privacy)\n×\nAcademia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.\nTo browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to[upgrade your browser](https://www.academia.edu/upgrade-browser).\n[![Academia.edu](https://a.academia-assets.com/images/academia-logo-redesign-2015-A.svg)![Academia.edu](https://a.academia-assets.com/images/academia-logo-redesign-2015.svg)](https://www.academia.edu/)\n* [Log In](https://www.academia.edu/login)\n* [Sign Up](https://www.academia.edu/signup)\n* more\n* * [About](https://www.academia.edu/about)\n* [Press](https://www.academia.edu/press)\n* [Papers](https://www.academia.edu/documents)\n* [Terms](https://www.academia.edu/terms)\n* [Privacy](https://www.academia.edu/privacy)\n* [Copyright](https://www.academia.edu/copyright)\n* [We're Hiring!](https://www.academia.edu/hiring)\n* [Help Center](https://support.academia.edu/hc/en-us)\n* less\n![First page of “Road transport energy consumption and vehicular emissions in Lagos, Nigeria: An application of the LEAP model”](https://0.academia-photos.com/attachment_thumbnails/63995770/mini_magick20200722-13003-pjemk6.png?1595471939)![PDF Icon](https://a.academia-assets.com/images/single_work_splash/adobe_icon.svg)\ndownload\nDownload Free PDF\nDownload Free PDF\n# Road transport energy consumption and vehicular emissions in Lagos, Nigeria: An application of the LEAP model\n[![Profile image of Uduak Akpan](https://0.academia-photos.com/1349483/494805/5874601/s65_uduak.akpan.jpg)Uduak Akpan](https://soas.academia.edu/UduakAkpan)\n2020, Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives\n[https://doi.org/10.1016/J.TRIP.2020.100172](https://doi.org/10.1016/J.TRIP.2020.100172)\nvisibility\n…description\n9 pages\nlink\n1 file\ndescriptionSee full PDFdownloadDownload PDF\nbookmarkSave to LibraryshareShare\nclose\n![](https://a.academia-assets.com/images/academia-logo-capital-white.svg)#### Sign up for access to the world's latest research\nSign up for freearrow\\_forward\ncheckGet notified about relevant papers\ncheckSave papers to use in your research\ncheckJoin the discussion with peers\ncheckTrack your impact\n## Abstract\nThe “Avoid”, “Shift” and “Improve” (A-S-I) approach is an effective method for transforming an unsustainable transport system to a sustainable one. This study intends to examine the possible impact of the A-S-I policy measures in transforming the transportation system in Lagos - the most populous city and the commercial capital of Nigeria. The study employs the Long Range Energy Alternative Planning (LEAP) model to project future energy demand and greenhouse gas emissions to determine the most effective A-S-I option for the city. We construct a business-as-usual scenario for Lagos as well as sustainable road transport alternative policy scenarios. The results show that Lagos' biggest obstacle to achieving its emission reduction target is the presence of very old vehicles on its roads. Our analysis shows that emission reduction in the road transport sector in Lagos is sensitive to vehicle survivability rate (i.e. the fraction of vehicles of a certain age still driven). We conclude that unless the age limit of vehicles in Lagos reduces from 40 years to 22 years, vehicle growth rate from 5% to 2% and mileage by 2% per year from 2020 to 2032, Lagos may not achieve its target of 50% emission reduction by 2032.\n...Read more\n## Related papers\n[APPRAISNG THE PROSPECTS AND SCENARIO OF LOW CARBON ENERGY TRANSITION FOR ROAD TRANSPORT SECTOR IN MAIDUGURI METROPOLIS](https://www.academia.edu/120741192/APPRAISNG_THE_PROSPECTS_AND_SCENARIO_OF_LOW_CARBON_ENERGY_TRANSITION_FOR_ROAD_TRANSPORT_SECTOR_IN_MAIDUGURI_METROPOLIS)\n[Abdulhamid T Hamid](https://independent.academia.edu/AbdulhamidTahirHamid)\nBAYERO JOURNAL OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY VOL 19 NO. 1 JANUARY, 2024\nClimate change mitigation requires a transition to clean and sustainable transport system. This paper evaluates the potentials for the adoption of low carbon vehicles (LCVs) in the road transport sector in Nigeria, with Maiduguri Metropolis as the case study. Five regular LCV options were chosen, namely; Biofuel, Battery Electric, Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and Hydrogen fuel cell (HFC) vehicles. Primary data were collected through interviews with various relevant actors (government, industry, markets, etc.) in the road transport sector. The questions were structured in such a way that different possible economic conditions of LCVs existed in terms of cost, in relation to the conventional ICE Fossil Fuel Vehicles (FFVs). The LCVs' operating costs were indexed against gasoline FFV, using different cost combinations. The result shows that the lower the initial purchase costs of LCVs in relation to the FFVs, the higher the tendency for their adoption and vice versa. With the right policy in place, the likely LCV alternative to emerge is either CNG or LPG vehicles through a dealignment/re-alignment scenario.\ndownloadDownload free PDF[View PDFchevron\\_right](https://www.academia.edu/120741192/APPRAISNG_THE_PROSPECTS_AND_SCENARIO_OF_LOW_CARBON_ENERGY_TRANSITION_FOR_ROAD_TRANSPORT_SECTOR_IN_MAIDUGURI_METROPOLIS)\n[Global Warming Potential Implications and Methodological Challenges of Road Transport Emissions in Nigeria](https://www.academia.edu/35045536/Global_Warming_Potential_Implications_and_Methodological_Challenges_of_Road_Transport_Emissions_in_Nigeria)\n[Stephen Nwanya](https://independent.academia.edu/StephenNwanya)\nThe purpose of this study is to examine the repercussions vehicular road transport emissions have on global warming potential (GWP), and the need to address the issue considering methodological challenges facing road transportation in Nigeria. Specific objectives of the study includes to determine the emission level in the country, to evaluate the GWP and to develop a emission mapping network on trunk A roads in Nigeria. Accurate information on these emissions is required to strengthen the mitigation and adaptation ability of the country to tackle climate change. The study relied on direct measurement technique supported by literature as well as questionnaires administered on the organised vehicle fleet operators and road traffic management agency as data gathering methods. Also, detailed analysis of questionnaires responses was carried out. Results show that road transport account for over 14% of greenhouse gases. Survey findings indicate that excessive smoke emission offence accounts for 1-2% of the annual road traffic offences in Nigeria. Using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) software version 16, five fitted simple linear regression models were developed. With these fitted models it is possible to map the gas concentrations on the kilometre travelled. Examination of the National Vehicle Identification Scheme (NVIS) revealed a rise in the periodic plate number generation from yearly record of 788,169 in 2001 to 791,832 in 2009. Human capacity requirements, based on yearly Drivers Licence (DL) processed, increased by 55% between 2000 and 2010. Three mutual strategies namely renewed urban and rural road transport infrastructure availability, regular fleet maintenance and capacities building for improved behavioural change of road users were recommended to help control road transport emissions. These measures if inflexibly implemented will change the transport sector from being a major global warming risk factor to that of Eco-friendly sector.\ndownloadDownload free PDF[View PDFchevron\\_right](https://www.academia.edu/35045536/Global_Warming_Potential_Implications_and_Methodological_Challenges_of_Road_Transport_Emissions_in_Nigeria)\n[A Preliminary Study of Greenhouse Gases Emissions of Lagos Commercial Vehicles: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Guidelines at Work](https://www.academia.edu/79168028/A_Preliminary_Study_of_Greenhouse_Gases_Emissions_of_Lagos_Commercial_Vehicles_the_Intergovernmental_Panel_on_Climate_Change_Guidelines_at_Work)\n[Michael Ahove](https://lasunigeria.academia.edu/MichaelAhove)\nLogistics, Supply Chain, Sustainability and Global Challenges, 2021\nNigeria deployed Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) top-down approach which generalizes transport emissions, is not detailed to localize solutions based on sectors. This identified gap was filled using IPCC’s Bottom-Up approach. Quantitative research design was employed using a descriptive survey to determine fuel consumption, vehicle and drivers characteristics through the use of a 30-item instrument named GHG emission estimation instrument (GHGEEI) to estimate the quantity of GHGs from vehicular emissions of commercial road passenger transport activities within the selected routes in Iyana-ipaja, differentiate emission estimates by vehicle categories (Tricycle referred to as ‘Keke’, Shuttle,‘Danfo’14, 18 and 22-seaters) and determine the relative contribution of each commercial road passenger vehicle type according to its age, fuel type, number of engine plugs, and frequency of service. Quota sampling technique was used to identify the strata and their frequency in t...\ndownloadDownload free PDF[View PDFchevron\\_right](https://www.academia.edu/79168028/A_Preliminary_Study_of_Greenhouse_Gases_Emissions_of_Lagos_Commercial_Vehicles_the_Intergovernmental_Panel_on_Climate_Change_Guidelines_at_Work)\n[Sustainable Energy Analysis of Nigerian Road Transportation Sector: Benchmarking against Global Trends](https://www.academia.edu/113171254/Sustainable_Energy_Analysis_of_Nigerian_Road_Transportation_Sector_Benchmarking_against_Global_Trends)\n[Ismaila Badmus](https://yabatech.academia.edu/IsmailaBadmus)\nJournal of Energy Research and Reviews, 2021\nSustainability of road transportation sector fuel exergy utilisation in Nigeria between 1990 and 2019 was examined and compared with the global trends in the same sector. Parameters used were exergy efficiency, depletion number, sustainability index and improvement potential. Petrol engines had the highest mean efficiency of 13.05% and heavy duty vehicles the lowest of 8.57%. Their respective mean depletion numbers were 0.8695 and 0.9143, while their mean sustainability index values were 1.1501 and 1.0937 respectively. However, petrol engines had the highest mean improvement potential of 2.07×10 11 MJ and cars had the lowest value of 1.86×10 10 MJ. When benchmarked against global values, petrol engines still had the highest mean potential difference value of 5.93×10 10 MJ while cars had the lowest value of 6.02×10 9 MJ. Improvement potential values were largely influenced by exergy utilisation rates, the influence of which outweighed that of exergy efficiencies, of the different carriers.\ndownloadDownload free PDF[View PDFchevron\\_right](https://www.academia.edu/113171254/Sustainable_Energy_Analysis_of_Nigerian_Road_Transportation_Sector_Benchmarking_against_Global_Trends)\n[Transport and the Environment: Towards Reducing Road Traffic Emissions in Nigeria](https://www.academia.edu/128302973/Transport_and_the_Environment_Towards_Reducing_Road_Traffic_Emissions_in_Nigeria)\n[AUGUSTUS O R O W H I G O ATUBI](https://independent.academia.edu/AUGUSTUSATUBI)\nAFRREV STECH: An International Journal of Science and Technology, 2015\nIn Nigeria much attention is given on general industrial pollution and pollution in oil industries with little reference on damage of pollution caused by mobile transportation sources of air pollution. The situation of increased pollution from mobile transportation sources is on the increase in per capital vehicle ownership, thus resulting to high congestion on Nigeria city roads and increase in the concentration of pollutants in the air, consequently, increasing health risk on human population. The paper therefore examined the concept of pollution and agents of pollution. Attention was given to air pollutants with particular reference to vehicular pollution. This paper suggested that for Nigeria government to avoid negative effects of transport on urban environment should broaden and intensify environmental policies to meet the needs of the present without compromising that of the future generation.Key words: Environment; emissions; transport; reducing; Nigeria.\ndownloadDownload free PDF[View PDFchevron\\_right](https://www.academia.edu/128302973/Transport_and_the_Environment_Towards_Reducing_Road_Traffic_Emissions_in_Nigeria)\n[Sustainable-Road-Transportation-Practices-in-Nigeria-2.pdf](https://www.academia.edu/38220102/Sustainable_Road_Transportation_Practices_in_Nigeria_2_pdf)\n[Ejem A . Ejem](https://futo-ng.academia.edu/DrEjemAEjem)\nThis study focused on the Problems associated with Carbon emission level in Nigeria, the sustainable practices adopted in Nigerian Road Transport Industry to alleviate these problems, challenges it has faced and possible ways to overcome these challenges. Data was collected from secondary sources like journals, websites and Newspaper Articles. Findings revealed that despite the varying views on Global warming , the Nigerian Government have adopted practices like BRT scheme, lane and Carpooling and Organisations aspire for a future of low carbon by adopting sustainable practices in a comprehensive life cycle approach.\ndownloadDownload free PDF[View PDFchevron\\_right](https://www.academia.edu/38220102/Sustainable_Road_Transportation_Practices_in_Nigeria_2_pdf)\n[Decarbonisation of the Transport Sector in Nigeria](https://www.academia.edu/88835247/Decarbonisation_of_the_Transport_Sector_in_Nigeria)\n[Emmanuel Uzowuru](https://independent.academia.edu/EmmanuelUzowuru)\nEnvironmental Health Insights, 2022\nWe reviewed the various sub-sectors of the Nigerian transport sector with their corresponding energy consumption rates. Results show that all the sub-sectors are solely dependent on fossil fuels to meet their energy demands and requirements, thus making the transport sector the highest consumer of fossil fuels, and consequently, the highest contributor to carbon footprint. This necessitates the need for gradual decarbonisation of the sector, but not at the expense of the nation’s economy, since the transport sector contributes about 3% of the nation’s GDP. We have therefore outlined measures to decarbonise the sector. These include revitalisation of the rail and water transport; encouragement of mass transit; improving the state of security on Nigerian roads; employment of low-carbon fuels (biodiesels); and use of electric vehicles.\ndownloadDownload free PDF[View PDFchevron\\_right](https://www.academia.edu/88835247/Decarbonisation_of_the_Transport_Sector_in_Nigeria)\n[Analysis of Sustainable Energy Metrics in Douala’s Road Transportation Sector, Cameroon](https://www.academia.edu/112759712/Analysis_of_Sustainable_Energy_Metrics_in_Douala_s_Road_Transportation_Sector_Cameroon)\n[Bienvenu Gael Fouda Mbanga](https://independent.academia.edu/BienvenuGael)\n2023\nIn this study, Douala, Cameroon was used as a case study to analyze the characteristics of sustainable energy for road transport from 2010 to 2019. Douala, being the national capital and entry point to Central Africa, served as a major hub for the movement of people and goods. However, the road transport sector was plagued by a number of problems, including traffic congestion, the use of fossil fuels, air pollution, and global warming associated with road traffic. The objective of this work was to evaluate a set of indicators that would allow monitoring the evolution of trends in the interactions between the energy component and sustainable development. The DPSIR (Driving Force, Pressure, State, Impact, and Response) model was used to select a set of indicators. According to the results, the energy intensity of the fuel used for transport decreased from 9.93 to 15.9 toe/M€. This increase in energy intensity reflected the energy-intensive nature of the road industry. Additionally, from 2010 to 2019, the energy efficiency of road transport vehicles in the city of Douala fluctuated between 20 and 22%. This indicates a significant potential for improving energy efficiency. Therefore, decision-makers need to implement sustainable transport planning to address these issues.\ndownloadDownload free PDF[View PDFchevron\\_right](https://www.academia.edu/112759712/Analysis_of_Sustainable_Energy_Metrics_in_Douala_s_Road_Transportation_Sector_Cameroon)\n[Road Transportation Impact on Ghana's Future Energy and Environment (Title)](https://www.academia.edu/86546118/Road_Transportation_Impact_on_Ghanas_Future_Energy_and_Environment_Title_)\n[george faah](https://independent.academia.edu/gfaah)\n2008\nThe UN Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement aimed at addressing the issue of climate change is now in force. Countries classified under Non-Annex I (Developing countries) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (as amended at the third conference of the parties in December 1997), such as Ghana can voluntary reduce their Greenhouse Gas emissions through the market based instruments of the protocol, which allows member countries listed in Annex I to undertake emissions reduction projects to earn emissions \"credits\". The call for such initiative under the protocol will require a credible, efficient and effective emissions inventory data, which can be use as a baseline to ascertain the amount of emissions a project avoids, reduces or sequesters. Recognizing an emission inventory as a prerequisite for the market based instruments of the Kyoto Protocol and also as a tool for policy makers, the author undertook a research at the T U Bergakademie Freiberg in Germany to investigate road transport emissions and its effect on the environment in Ghana. Data on-road vehicles in Ghana, such as the vehicle fleet for different classes (Passenger cars, Light Duty vehicles, Buses, and Heavy Duty Vehicles, Motor cycles), the average annual kilometer travelled, average velocity on the three different roads (Urban, Rural, and Highway), annual fuel consumption and fuel characteristics were sampled and the total emissions then computed with the use of the computer software COPERT III. Scenarios were created and the total emissions reduction for each scenario computed. The economic potential of emissions reductions in these scenarios were then evaluated under the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism initiative. Finally, based on these scenarios recommendations were made, describing the way forward for Ghana's road transport.\ndownloadDownload free PDF[View PDFchevron\\_right](https://www.academia.edu/86546118/Road_Transportation_Impact_on_Ghanas_Future_Energy_and_Environment_Title_)\n[EFFECT OF MOTOR VEHICLE GROWTH ON ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE AND AIR POLLUTION IN NIGERIA](https://www.academia.edu/28056646/EFFECT_OF_MOTOR_VEHICLE_GROWTH_ON_ROAD_INFRASTRUCTURE_AND_AIR_POLLUTION_IN_NIGERIA)\n[IJEETE Journals](https://ijeete.academia.edu/Ijeete)\nIn this paper, automobile vehicle demand in Nigeria up to 2106was investigated using two different methods. In addition, changes to road infrastructure in terms of energy saved or loss was assessed alongside varying vehicle demands. The scenario based vehicle demand estimates indicated that vehicle demand could rise to140% by 2050. A more realistic estimate of vehicle ownership per 1000 persons in Nigeria was obtained to be in the range of 100-150 using the sigmoid-shaped functional model; as opposed to the 200 proposed for poor countries.The impact of vehicle demand growth indicated that it will require an improvement of about 10% unpaved to paved road condition ratio every ten years in order to have a significant savings in energy and CO 2 emission.\ndownloadDownload free PDF[View PDFchevron\\_right](https://www.academia.edu/28056646/EFFECT_OF_MOTOR_VEHICLE_GROWTH_ON_ROAD_INFRASTRUCTURE_AND_AIR_POLLUTION_IN_NIGERIA)\nSee full PDFdownloadDownload PDF\n![Loading...](https://a.academia-assets.com/images/loaders/paper-load.gif)\nLoading Preview\nSorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.\n## References (40)\n1. Afolabi, O.J., Hassan, A.M., Age, L.O., 2017. Behavioral pattern of commercial public trans- port passengers in Lagos metropolis. J. Sustain. Dev. 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  },
  {
    "url": "https://www.ccacoalition.org/sites/default/files/resources/2015_Soot-Free-Urban-Bus-Fleets-in-Lagos-Opportunities-and-Challenges.pdf",
    "text": "Soot-Free Urban Bus Fleets in \nLagos – Opportunities and \nChallenges\nPRESENTATION BY \nOLUKAYODE TAIWO\nLAGOS METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSPORT AUTHORITY @ ACHIEVING CLEAN BUSES FLEET: INTERNATIONAL \nSEMINAR\nECOMOBILITY SEMINAR, JOHANNESBURG\nOCTOBER 5 2015\n• Lagos is the most populous city in Africa –\nover 20 million inhabitants\n• Bigger in population than 23 countries in \nAfrica – Benin Rep., Mali, Botswana etc.\n• Hub of nation’s economic, commercial and \nindustrial activities.\n• Contributes 20% of Nigeria’s GDP\n• Larger economy than Ivory coast, Ghana, \nMadagascar etc.\n• 45% of nation’s skilled manpower reside in the \ncity.\nChronic \ntraffic \ncongestion\nUneven urban \ngrowth and \ndevelopment\nInadequate \ntransport \ninfrastructure\nInadequate \nregulatory public \ntransport \nframework Limited \nalternatives to \nvehicular \ntransportation\nLack of sufficient \nhigh capacity \nvehicles for \npublic transport\nContributes to Air & \nNoise pollution in \nLagos\nLagos, Nigeria\n Demand for trips in Lagos Metropolitan Area by all modes (including \nwalking) was ~22million per day. \n Walk trips accounted for 40% of total trips in Metropolitan Lagos.\n About 97% of all transit in Lagos are done by road.\n4\nObserved travel demand patterns \nDanfo \n(Minibus) \n72%\nCar 19%\nRegulated \nbus 2%\nBRT 2%\nMotorcycle \n2%\nWater 2%\nRail 1%\nPassengers \nCarried\nSource: LAMATA Strategic Transport \nMaster Plan\nDanfo \n(Minibus) \n24%\nCar 57%\nRegulated \nbus 2%\nBRT 1%\nMotorcycle \n16%\nRoad Space\nUsage\nRoads\n99.8%\nOthers\n0.2%\n22%\n45%\n8%\n13%\n12%\nTotal CO2 emissions \nfrom fuel combustion by sectors\nElectricity and heat production\nTransport\nManufacturing & Construction\nOther sectors\nOther energy industry own use\nNigeria\nSource: IEA \nEnvironmental Impact\n In 2011, Nigeria had the fourth highest CO2 emission from fuel \ncombustion in Africa after South Africa, Egypt and Algeria \nrespectively. \n The transport sector, with a 45% share, was the largest contributor to \na nationwide CO2 emission from fuel combustion of 52.8 million \ntonnes that year.\n5\n The Lagos Air Quality \nMonitoring Study (2007-2009) \nrevealed that vehicles \ncontribute approximately 43%\nto the total level of air pollution \nin Lagos.\n Over a quarter of the transport \nsector contribution to CO2\nemissions in Nigeria comes from \nLagos alone.\n The emission factors for many \nNigerian vehicles are close to \nthe Euro 2 Standards, which is 3 \nto 4 times greater than \nEuropean values.\n6\nLagos\nEnvironmental Impact\nEnvironmental Impact\n Below is a breakdown of emissions per vehicle category:\n7\nDaily Average CO2Emissions in Lagos\n*HD – Heavy Duty; MD – Medium Duty; LD – Light Duty; PC – Passenger Car; P&D – Petrol and Diesel*\n0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000\nMotorcycle\nPC Petrol\nPC P&D\nPC Diesel\nTaxi\nDanfo (Minibus)\nCoaster Bus\nBRT Bus\nLD Truck\nMD Truck\nHD Truck\nCO2(g/km)\nDaily Average CO2 Emissions for each Vehicle Category\nSource: LAMATA GHG Emissions \nHandbook \nEnvironmental Impact\n However, in actual terms, the emission per passenger is lower for \nvehicles with high occupancy rates (e.g – Buses)\n8\nDaily Average CO2Emissions in Lagos\n*HD – Heavy Duty; MD – Medium Duty; LD – Light Duty; PC – Passenger Car; P&D – Petrol and Diesel*\n0.00 100.00 200.00 300.00 400.00 500.00 600.00 700.00 800.00 900.00 1000.00\nMotorcycle\nPC Petrol\nPC P&D\nPC Diesel\nTaxi\nDanfo (Minibus)\nCoaster Bus\nRail\nBRT Bus\nLD Truck\nMD Truck\nHD Truck\nCO2(g/km)\nDaily Average CO2 Emissions per Passenger by Vehicle Category \n(Passenger Carbon footprint)\nSource: LAMATA GHG Emissions \nHandbook \nCO2\nEmissions in Lagos\nEnvironmental Impact\n By the year 2032, CO2 emissions by the transport sector in Lagos are \nestimated to exceed 15 Million tonnes per annum if measures are not \nput in place to curtail it.\n9 Source: LAMATA GHG Emissions \nHdbk \n0\n3\n5\n8\n10\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n2008 2012 2032 BAU\nEmissions, Million Tonnes\nPassenger, Millions\nWithout Implementing Strategic Transport Master Plan \n(STMP)\nAuto Passenger Transit Passenger\nAuto CO2 Emissions Transit CO2 Emissions\nThe Big Moves in Lagos towards a \nSustainable Urban Transport System\n Develop a fully integrated mass rapid transit system to cover activity \ncenters identified Strategic Transport Master Plan (STMP) of the mega \ncity region\n Six Rail Lines ─ One Monorail Line\n 16 BRT Routes ─ Over 20 water routes\n Key road projects\n Introduce a common ticketing system to aid integration of public \ntransport modes.\n Develop the waterways transport network to integrate with Rail and BRT.\n Develop a ring road around Metropolitan Lagos to take pressure away \nfrom the mainland.\n Use of ITS technology to optimize the transport network.\n10\nCO2 Emissions in Lagos\n0\n3\n5\n8\n10\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n2008 2012 2032 BAU\nEmissions, Million Tonnes\nPassenger, Millions\nWithout Strategic Transport Master \nPlan (STMP)\nAuto Passenger Transit Passenger\nAuto CO2 Emissions Transit CO2 Emissions\n11\n0\n3\n5\n8\n10\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\n2008 2012 2032 STMP\nEmissions, Million Tonnes\nPassenger, Millions\nWith Strategic Transport Master Plan \n(STMP)\nAuto Passenger Transit Passenger\nAuto CO2 Emissions Transit CO2 Emissions\n• Execution of projects within the STMP will result in an emission level \nless than 8 Million tonnes per annum, which represents over 50%\nreduction in emissions from the 2032BAU level.\nSource: LAMATA GHG Emissions Handbook; *BAU – Business As Usual; *STMP – Strategic Transport \nMtPl\nEnvironmental Impact\nFinancing/Working with \nManufacturers\n Lagos State government commenced discussions \nwith Nigerian Independent Petroleum Company \n(NIPCO) on conversion of some diesel buses to \nCNG\n Only about 5000 vehicles use CNG as fuel in \nNigeria since the inception of the project in 2009\n CNG buses is already in use at Benin city, Edo \nState of Nigeria\n LAMATA is proposing five CNG buses on its BRT \ncorridor for test run. Only about 500 vehicles run \non CNG in Lagos\n12\nKey barriers and \nchallenges to date\n Nigeria is a gas-rich country, usage of CNG will \nhelp reduce Governments’ dependence on the \nimportation of refined products\n However, use of CNG powered buses is still at \ninfancy in the country\n Lack of political will to support investment in the \nuse of CNG to power vehicles\n The moderate achievement in this regard is from \nfew private investors\n13\nKey barriers and \nchallenges to date\n The cost of conversion and availability of gas are \nsome of the major challenges of this scheme\n Cost of conversion to become CNG compatible \ncost between $1000 and $1,500\n14\nNext Steps\n It is believed that a policy direction from the \nCentral government could accelerate use of \nCNG to power vehicles in Nigeria.\n Advocacy from UNEP and groups such as this to \ncreate awareness that CNG powered vehicles as \neconomical, safer, flexible and eco-friendly \n15\nThank You\n16"
  },
  {
    "url": "https://nairametrics.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/BRT-Lite-Summary-Report-FINAL.pdf",
    "text": "## LAGOS BRT-LITE: AFRICA’S FIRST BUS RAPID TRANSIT SCHEME Scheme Evaluation: Summary Report\n\nABSTRACT \nAfrica’s first Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) scheme became operational on 17 th March 2008 in Lagos, \nNigeria. Termed ‘BRT-Lite’, it is a form of BRT, but is not of the highest specification such as \nTransMilenio in Bogotá or the Brisbane South East Busway both of which cost in the region of $6 \nmillion per kilometre. It is a new form of BRT, focused upon delivering a system to meet key local \nuser needs, with the aim of improving quality of life, economic efficiency and safety within a clearly \ndefined budget. The implementation programme, which saw conception to operation collapsed into a \n15 month timeframe, together with its delivery at a cost of $1.7 million per km make its development \nunique and as such its experience is relevant to the many cities throughout the world seeking to \ndevelop BRT. BRT-Lite is now carrying almost 200,000 people per day despite a capacity that does \nnot allow it to satisfy all forecast demand. After 100 days the system had carried 9.7 million \npassengers and within its first 6 months of operation had carried a total of 29 million. \nBRT Lite consists of a 22km route that is 65% physically segregated and 20% separated by road \nmarkings but its success is not purely down to its infrastructure but a holistic approach that involved \nre-organisation of the bus industry, financing of new bus purchase, creating a new institutional \nstructure and regulatory framework to support it, together with the training of personnel to drive, \nmaintain, enforce, and manage BRT. Whilst these technical and organisational challenges were \nbeing met the public were engaged and sold a system of which they had no previous knowledge to \nthe extent that take up was immediate and praise was plentiful. All this has been achieved within an \nextremely challenging environment and spanning an election for the new State Governor! \nEvaluation of BRT Lite completed during Autumn 2008 showed that users were saving journey time, \nhad less interchanges, were travelling cheaper and felt safer. Businesses within the corridor saw it as \npositive; improving accessibility and aiding their access to staff and the ability of their staff to travel \non employees business. Negative comments primarily relate to the need for more buses and more \nroutes. Problems exist and improvements can be made but the over-riding factor is that it has been \ndelivered and is having a beneficial effect upon the quality of life of a large part of the travelling \npopulation of Lagos. \nEvaluation has declared the scheme an unprecedented success defining the critical success factors \nas being; significant and consistent political commitment, the presence and abilities of a strategic \npublic transport authority in LAMATA, scheme definition that concentrates on essential user needs \nand deliverability within a budget and programme, the work undertaken to engage key stakeholders \nand ensure that those that benefit are multiple, a community engagement programme that has \nensured that BRT-Lite is seen as a community project created, owned and used by Lagosians. \n\nTRANSPORT IN LAGOS \nBRT Lite was born into challenging circumstances. The Lagos metropolitan area has a population \nvariously estimated at between 15 and 18 million, and projected (conservatively) to grow to more \nthan 25 million by 2025. This would place it as the third largest agglomeration in the world, after only \nTokyo and Mumbai. Already it has expanded well beyond the boundary of Lagos State into Ogun \nState, and this reality was formally recognised by the former President of Nigeria, HE Olusegun \nObasanjo, in launching the Lagos Mega City Project in 2006 with the respective Governors of the two \nStates. \nHowever Lagos was then the only mega-city (defined by UN \nHabitat as having a population in excess of 10 million) without any \norganised public transport system (though those in Karachi and \nDhaka had largely collapsed by the end of the last century). As \nsuch, personal mobility relied on a large fleet of approximately \n75,000 minibuses (danfo) \ntogether with much smaller \nnumbers of midi-buses (molue) \nand shared taxis (kabu-kabu). Local journeys employed motor \ncycle taxis (okada). Danfo and molue are of low quality, fares are \nvariable, journeys are slow and uncomfortable. They ply relatively \nshort distances in the interests of maximising profit rather than \nserving demand, and their drivers (and mates) have a reputation for \naggression. \nThe inadequacy of the road network (low lane length in relation to population, limited number of multi \nlane arterial roads, and generally poor maintenance condition), and the relatively high level of car \nownership for a developing country (encouraged by subsidised petrol prices and unrestricted import \nof second-hand vehicles) exacerbated the traffic congestion inherent in this form of public transport \nprovision. As a result the typical journey for commuters to Lagos Island from the main residential \nareas to the north and west of the city could take in excess of two hours, especially when vehicle \nbreakdowns, accidents, and flooding acted to block the roads. \nLAUNCHING THE LAGOS URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LUTP) \nWhen the new administrations at Federal and State levels were elected in 1999 transport was \nidentified as one of the most pressing issues in Lagos State. Accordingly the then Governor, HE Bola \nTinubu, appointed a Special Adviser on Transportation and sought development assistance from the \nWorld Bank group. \nTaking forward concepts from earlier studies, the Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP) was \nprepared on the basis of building capacity to manage the transport system, and identifying the priority \nactions, investments and enabling measures for its improvement. A multi-modal transport approach \nwas taken, recognising the potential for development of rail and inland waterway mass-transit in \nintegration with the core road passenger transport network. \n\nFrom the outset, enhanced provision of bus services was a core component of LUTP, and included \nthe development of busway priority – though primarily as a complementary measure to the mass \ntransit railway proposal. Direct financing of new buses by the Bank was also given due consideration, \nbut the main failures of the earlier Federal Mass Transit Programme (finance defaults, and short \nvehicle lives) suggested caution in this domain. \nIt was also recognised that it would be necessary to exercise regulatory control over the private \nsector bus operators, and to introduce some order in this market where demand responsiveness in \nterms of fare level and routing had been taken to extremes. Initial actions were taken to exercise \nexisting powers for the registration of route licences, effectively on demand, but a policy decision was \ntaken to introduce ‘controlled competition’ for market entry once the appropriate legislation was in \nplace. \nWhilst Phase 1 of LUTP focused on fast-return investments, such as road maintenance/ rehabilitation \nand junction improvements, it also included the preparation of technical, environmental and social \nmeasures for possible future mass transit development that might be supported in a private-public \nfinancing framework. \n\nCREATING THE LAGOS METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSPORT AUTHORITY (LAMATA) Analysis of the transport situation in Lagos highlighted the lack of any mechanism to co-ordinate the plans and actions of the various agencies at Federal, State and Local Government levels for managing, maintaining and developing the transport network in a holistic and integrated manner. Further, most of these agencies lacked a secure financial basis for their operations with their budgets at risk from fiscal pressures and higher political priorities. Accordingly the creation of an appropriate authority for this purpose was placed at the heart of LUTP, together with measures to ensure its sustainability through a lien on transport user charges. The LAMATA Law of 2002 established and empowered the authority, which was given jurisdiction over the conurbation in Lagos State and a declared network of primary and secondary roads that carried the large bulk of road traffic and powers to plan and co-ordinate public transport and make recommendations on route planning. LAMATA was staffed with highly motivated individuals with world experience in transport and management largely derived from the Nigerian Diaspora.\n\nTACKLING PUBLIC TRANSPORT \nThe implications of introducing a controlled competition regime for the core road passenger transport \nin Lagos were explored in a detailed study undertaken in late 2003. This identified inter alia that the \nstructure of the road transport industry was not then readily amenable to regulatory control, and held \nthe power to block any attempts at reform. \nFurther, the private operators were also not in a position to make the necessary investments in larger \nbuses, whose reduced numbers (in comparison with minibuses) would act both to reduce congestion \nand whose greater capacity would raise productivity and hence offer the potential of lower fares and/ \nor enable scheduled services (as opposed to traditional fill-and-run) at the same fare. \n\nAfter an extended period of consultation with, and education of, the leadership of the operator unions and associations, agreement was reached to test both the regulatory reform and the fleet investment in a pilot scheme using the private-public financing framework envisaged in the establishment of LUTP. LAMATA would provide the enabling framework, including traffic systems management measures in the corridor and the provision of passenger terminals and a depot / workshops complex for the new fleet, whereas the operators would accept the regulatory enforcement and commit to the procurement of appropriate buses.\n\nLAMATA LAUNCH BRT \nIntegrated Transport Planning Ltd (ITP) was \nappointed in August 2006 to undertake a \n“Feasibility Study for an Initial Corridor for the \nLagos Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) System”. The study \nencompassed infrastructure, operations, regulatory \nand institutional reform. The aim of this study was \nto develop a BRT system that has the following \ncharacteristics; \nefficient level of service (low cost, high \nfrequency, high speed, high occupation, high \nsafety, low emissions), \nadequate institutional framework and \nregulation, \nhigh socio-economic benefits, especially for \nlow income population, \nmaximum level of private participation \nminimum level of public expenditures and \nliability, and \nadequate mitigation of environmental and \nsocial impacts of the BRT system. \nThis challenge had to be met with an open mind \ninformed by worldwide BRT experience, and guided \nby an understanding of local transport context \n(opportunities and constraints), locally based user \nneeds and key issues surrounding deliverability. \nBRT was taken as a flexible concept, implying a \nsystem based approach to public transport \nprovision but one that is defined according to local \nuser needs, context and deliverability. \nBRT ‘users’ were considered to be the travelling public together with system providers, stakeholders \nthat were key to delivery and those that are guardians of wider policy objectives. As such each party \n\nBRT-Lite Corridor\n\nthat had either an interest in BRT and its delivery or an investment (financial or emotional) in its \nachievement had to be represented within its definition. This approach demanded that the consultant \nworked closely with LAMATA drawing upon its efforts to harness and guide the wider stakeholder \ngroups, developing their role within and understanding of BRT implementation, bring international \nexpertise in BRT approaches that might meet local aspirations and seek to understand local traveller \nissues. \nThe Needs of the Traveller \nThe needs of the traveller were determined through: \nEthnographic observation – consisting of discreet observation of travellers access to transport, \ntheir contact and relationship with the various actors involved in transport provision, their \ndemeanour and actions. \nQuantitative/qualitative surveys – to determine formal data such as fare elasticity, values of time \nbut also detail the relative importance of walk, wait and travel time, transport choice issues and \nkey obstacles to adopting the ideal use of transport. \nFocus groups – a series of focus groups were held in order to explore in detail issues related to \ntravel in Lagos by different demographic groupings together with the testing of features that may \nor may not be applied within a BRT systems \nKey traveller concerns identified were: \nSafety – the incidence of crime on vehicle and whilst waiting for a vehicle to arrive is high \nranging from theft to physical abuse. The disorder and chaos around public transport was seen \nas giving opportunity to criminals and, where crime wasn’t present, the almost constant \nintimidation and general chaos leads to undue stress for travellers. \nFare levels – public transport fare levels often vary according to demand, weather conditions and \nthe whim of the conductor. A significant proportion of the travelling public are highly fare \nsensitive with some who make daily decisions as to whether to travel based upon available \nfinance. \nLong and unreliable journey times – the practice of a vehicle not leaving until full, operating short \nservices that require interchange and the lack of penetration into residential areas, together with \nwidespread and variable congestion ranging from high to intolerable means that public transport \njourneys are both long and uncertain. \nComfort – the state of the buses in many cases are so bad, with lack of upholstery on seats and \nthe danger of rusted metal edges, that ripped clothing or injury is common. Therefore travellers \nplace value on a basic level of ‘comfort’ which will avoid these problems. \nIn satisfying traveller user needs BRT must, above all else, be seen as: \nSafe – both on vehicle and accessing the vehicle \nAffordable – with constant and easily understandable fares \nReliable – offering improved and reliable journey times \n\nDEFINING LAGOS BRT-LITE \nThe pilot BRT corridor was chosen through the feasibility study and today BRT-Lite runs along \nIkorodu Road, Western Avenue and Eko Bridge, a key radial highway that makes the 22Km \nconnection between Mile 12 and Lagos Island (the traditional Central Business District). Before \nimplementation, the highway enjoyed a wide dual carriageway varying between two and three lanes \nin each direction. For approximately 60% of its length it has service roads. It crosses over one of the \nthree bridges that connect the mainland with Lagos Island, and as such the route effectively connects \nextended suburbs, satellite centres to the traditional Central Business District of Lagos. \nThe creation of BRT-Lite emanates from an open discussion on scheme concept with the BRT \nSteering Committee, chaired by the then Commissioner for Transport Dr Muiz Banire and made up of \nkey stakeholders. The group was presented with artist’s impressions of median operation and \nbilateral operation on the chosen corridor, both equipped with physical segregation. There was a \nquick recognition that BRT was not necessarily a long term grand aspiration but something that was \nreadily deliverable, the visualisation showing immediately what benefit it would bring to bus run times \nand consequently those travelling along the corridor. From that point on, and in parallel to the \ndevelopment of ‘BRT-Classic’, a project was launched to define BRT-Lite. \n\nArtist Impression: ‘What BRT Could Look Like’ Preliminary engineering designs for the corridor recommended virtually continuous bilateral segregation. Breaks in segregation were made where merges and diverges were allowed to/from service roads, other breaks were provisionally recommended on viaducts and overpasses where\n\nconcern over structural integrity, together with width constraints, made physical segregation using \nconcrete kerbs impossible. This resulted in a BRT system that is approximately 65% physically \nsegregated from other traffic, 20% separated by bus lanes (marked in paint) and 15% mixing with \nother traffic. Whilst total segregation may have been preferable the overall need for delivery and the \nconcentration upon improved run time by concentrating infrastructure on where it had best effect with \nrespect to third party impact meant a pragmatic solution was defined. Periodic breaks in the \nsegregation, to allow for merge/diverge across the BRT way, ensured that any broken down vehicle \ncould be readily towed out and that approaching BRT vehicles were able to divert around any \npotential blockage. This level of flexibility is important in a system where demand can potentially \nexceed supply. \nLanes are typically 3.3m wide and are separated from \nother traffic by concrete kerbs that are 400mm high. \nLane widths are the minimum that could support \nunconstrained and safe operations and kerb height is \nthe minimum that would deter lateral intrusion. Gaps of \napproximately 0.2m were left in the kerbs were required \nto allow storm water to drain negating the need to \nreposition road drainage. \nStandard detail drawings, cross sections and other \nareas of relative complexity (such as merge and diverge \nlocations) were produced. Detailed design and \nconstruction contracts were let in packages with \ncontractors (working largely from preliminary \nengineering design produced by ITP) and liaison \nbetween ITP and contractor to ensure that concept was \ncarried through to construction. This approach, \nmanaged and guided by LAMATA, effectively collapsed \nthe scheme design period by removing a detailed design \nphase and achieved continuity ensuring that concept was not lost through subsequent design. \nNew shelters were provided that gave order and structure to vehicle boarding. Tickets are purchased \nupon entry to the stop and queuing is in order before entry. The shelter gives protection from the sun \nthrough an obscured glass canopy. A similar design style is used at the terminals where more \ncapacity is provided for boarding and alighting. \n\nBRT-Lite runs seven days a week, 06:00-22:00 weekdays with reduced hours of operation at weekends. Vehicles are dispatched from terminuses when available to accomodate almost constant demand. As such headways are not part of operational planning but a product of vehicle availability, and the desire to meet demand in the context of journey time variability en route. The out turn headway typically lie between 30 and 60 seconds. A new terminus was built at Mile 12 utilising the underneath of the highway flyover. The existing terminus at Tafawa Balewa Square on Lagos Island was modified. A new depot was built alongside the route to garage the 100 new vehicles and now garages and maintains over 200 vehicles. A driver training programme was instigated to retrain existing bus drivers in use of the infrastructure and customer care. Part of the incentive programme was to nominate them as ‘pilots’. The concept is widely adopted with users referring to whether they will, or will not, ‘fly’ BRT!\n\nINSTITUTIONAL AND REGULATORY CONTEXT \nThe delivery of BRT-Lite involved the co-operation of multiple agencies: \nFirstly, BRT-Lite development needed to sit within the context of land-use and spatial development in \nthe State. Ongoing master plan development was to feed from, and BRT feeds off, this plan. To \nensure that synergy was maximised, appropriate representation was made within the BRT Steering \nGroup. \nSecondly, transfer of the control of the Federal highway over which BRT-Lite operates to Lagos State \nnow involves the relevant Ministries of Transportation and of Works. Despite BRT-Lite being a Lagos \nState Government (LSG) initiative, the co-operation of these bodies could not be taken for granted. \nAs a result, for example, the decision was taken for the BRT-Lite infrastructure construction to be \ncontracted direct by LAMATA and not through the Lagos State Ministry of Works. \nPowers for the primary traffic management and enforcement in the State lies with the Lagos State \nTraffic Management Authority (LASTMA), a body that reports to the State Commissioner for \nTransport. Co-operation with LAMATA has improved markedly in recent years, and LASTMA were \nprepared to commit the significant resource to the BRT-Lite scheme needed to protect the exclusive \nuse of its infrastructure and to manage traffic conflicts in the box junctions at the various highway \nmerges and demerges. \nFinally, the support of a State initiative ‘Kick Against Indiscipline’ (KAI) could be called upon to help \nwith public management within the BRT-Lite system, particularly at the stations and terminals. This \ncovered aspects such as trading and hawking on the walkways / sidewalks, and orderly queuing at \nthe bus stops and vehicle parks (terminals). \nLAMATA as regulator and sector sponsor \nThe original powers granted to LAMATA in the domain of passenger transport had been limited to its \nplanning and co-ordination and not to its actual regulation. However the revised LAMATA Law, \npassed by the House in late 2006, defined its function inter alia to ‘plan, regulate and co-ordinate the \nsupply of adequate and effective public transport in all travel modes and supporting infrastructure \nwithin metropolitan Lagos’ and granted specific powers to make regulations (with the approval of the \n\nGovernor) with respect to its functions. This now made the role of LAMATA as the sector regulator \nunambiguous. \nThe Law also granted powers to the Authority inter alia to ‘prepare plans for the management and \ndevelopment of transportation in metropolitan Lagos’ and, in conjunction with the Ministry of Works, \nto ‘construct, re-construct, maintain and manage transport infrastructure and facilities’ necessary for \nthe discharge of its functions. This legislation thus empowered LAMATA to act as the sponsor and \npromoter of mass-transit schemes in Lagos, and hence to develop the BRT-Lite system. \nNURTW and the transport industry \nOrganisation of road passenger transport operations in Nigeria falls, by law, under either of two \nseparate bodies – the Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria (RTEAN) and the National \nUnion of Road Transport Workers (NURTW). Over time RTEAN, which represents mainly owners’ \ninterests, came to dominate the inter-urban and large-bus sectors. NURTW, with a focus on drivers \nand workers in the transport sector, dominates the urban and small-bus sectors. \nWhilst NURTW is a national body, it is organised along State lines with each having its own Council \nand related administrative functions. The operational level of the Union is managed at its Branches, \nwhich divide the network into zones based on the principal terminals (known locally as vehicle or lorry \nparks). Routes (lines) are controlled by the relevant branch(es), with vehicles paying fees for \nregistration and each terminal departure. Vehicles queue in turn for boarding, and only leave the \nterminal when full (in the direction of predominant travel, at peak times). NURTW exercises little \ncontrol over operations once vehicles have left the terminal, and most services board and alight \npassengers on demand along the line of route. \nThe large majority of the small commercial buses that dominate the transport supply are operated not \nby their owners, but rather by individual drivers who pay a daily rental fee (‘deliver’) to the owner for \nthe use of the vehicle. The driver meets all the direct operating expenses, such as hiring a conductor, \nbuying fuel, making minor repairs, and paying system access fees (including extortion by \nenforcement agencies). The owner retains responsibility for maintenance and major repairs, and \ncovers fixed costs such as finance, licensing and insurance. As such the relationship is analogous to \nan operating lease for the use of the vehicle, and is standard practice for the sector within the region. \nNURTW were in recognition of the need for change to upgrade an ailing vehicle fleet and meet the \nchallenges of increasing demand. This realisation was fostered by LAMATA through a process of \neducation as to the options for an organised collective transport system and exposure to how such \nsystems are organised and operated including tours of South American BRT systems in 2004 and \n2006. \nThe need to actively involve NURTW and RTEAN in the development of BRT-Lite was seen as \nessential. Previous attempts at formalising public transport on Ikoyi / Victoria Island had failed \nthrough the inability to effectively engage with the unions, and bus franchising path-finding activities \nelsewhere in Lagos, being implemented in parallel with BRT-Lite, aided understanding about \nrespective roles and benefits in public-private co-operation. \n\nRoad Traffic Regulations \nBoth Federal and State legislation set out standards for the use and construction of motor vehicles, \nbut these are not consistent. \nThe Federal regulations are broadly appropriate for a standard single-deck bus or coach, but height \nand length limits effectively preclude double-deck or articulated buses. The specific standards in \nrespect of omnibuses that relate to passenger access and comfort levels (height of steps, size and \nspacing of seats, etc) are well below international norms, but place no barrier to the implementation \nof a higher quality of service where desired. By contrast, the State regulations (based on a Road \nTraffic Law dating back to 1949) represent an obsolete set of standards. \nRegulation of passenger transport services \nThe current LAMATA Law not only provided for the re-establishment of the Lagos Metropolitan Area \nTransport Authority with appropriate functions and powers, as reported above, but also repealed the \nPublic Transportation (Commuter Buses) Registration and Restriction Law of 2004. That had been a \nvery poorly drafted, and wholly unenforceable, Law that had effectively rendered all operators other \nthan Lagbus Asset Management Ltd (Lagbus), a Lagos State Government initiative, as illegal. Not \nonly had the coexistence of that Law and the Bus Franchise Regulation under s.21 of the first \nLAMATA Law led to confusion, it had also been interpreted to confer regulatory powers on Lagbus \nthat would be in conflict with the establishment of LAMATA itself. Its repeal, therefore, had been an \nessential component in securing the exclusivity of operations required for the viability of the BRT-Lite \nscheme. \nBus Rapid Transit ‘Lite’ (BRT) Regulation \nThis Regulation was gazetted to coincide with the launch of BRT-Lite, but its content had been the \nsubject of a public education campaign in the period immediately beforehand. Its application covered \nthe complete Right of Way within the corridor, and so included not only the BRT-Lite running lanes \nbut also the parallel general traffic and service lanes and the walkways / sidewalks. \nThe primary provision of the regulation was the prohibition of operation of vehicles other than those \nfranchised for the BRT-Lite scheme (and certain emergency services) in the designated \ninfrastructure. However other supporting provisions were designed to facilitate the free movement of \ntraffic in the reduced roadway capacity alongside the BRT-Lite running lanes, principally the \nrestriction of other commercial buses to the service lanes only and a total prohibition on heavy \ncommercial traffic in the peak hours. \nWhilst this regulation was made under the powers granted to LAMATA in its re-establishment, it was \nalso formally approved by the Governor so as to preclude any challenge from other vested interests. \nIt thus acted as the final regulatory security to the BRT-Lite scheme. \n\nFINANCING THE OPERATING FLEET \nTwo contrasting approaches have been taken to the financing of the large buses needed for \noperation of the BRT-Lite system. On the one hand, 100 new buses were procured by the private \nsector without any direct public support. On the other hand, 120 buses were procured by a State \nowned company and then leased to the private-sector operator, (with a further 40 buses operated \ndirectly by itself). \nThe Projects Officer of the Lagos State Council of NURTW was charged in 2005 with the \nidentification of buses that would be suitable for operation under local road and climatic conditions \nwhilst still being affordable both to the owner and the end user. This process led to the selection of a \nconventional truck-derivative passenger chassis from Ashok Leyland in India, with bodywork sourced \nin the same country despite the resultant shipping costs. \nNURTW were able to prepare a credible business plan for the operation of these buses on inter-city \nroutes to the States adjoining Lagos, and so attract the potential interest both of the vehicle supplier \nand of the financial sector that would be required to finance them. However reallocation of the buses \nto the unproven BRT-Lite scheme proved more challenging, though some banks and non-bank \nfinancial institutions (NBFIs) were still prepared to engage in the development process, and risk \nmanagement measures were devised to allay their concerns. Principal amongst these was the \nsecurity of repayment to the financier, and this was addressed in two ways: \nFirstly the scheme design gave the bank the initial lien on revenues collected from services, with only \nthe balance (after the deduction of financing costs) being passed through to the operator, the bank \nalso being given the right to act as ticket distributor and security monitor. \nSecondly the scheme design required the participating operators to accept collective liability for all \nthe obligations that they had entered into. Any individual default, whether by peculation of revenues \nor through vehicle unavailability (perhaps as a result of an accident or mechanical failure), would be \nmade good by an additional charge on all the remaining members. Where the default was fraudulent, \nthe individual would also lose his deposit / collateral (though this was deliberately not set at a level \nthat provided full security so as to avoid this being deterrent to participation in the scheme). \nIt had also been intended that the collective liability would enable the participants to self-insure \nagainst own damage and routine third-party risks (retaining catastrophe cover), but this proved \nunacceptable in the pilot implementation. \nFrom the operator perspective, the two main risks to his participation in the scheme were that the \nnew buses would not carry sufficient passengers to cover the high fixed costs of the vehicle finance, \nand that they would not provide the availability and reliability required over the finance tenor for that \nto continue to be the case over time. Clearly the first of these would be addressed through \nproductivity gains arising from the segregated running ways of BRT-Lite, but the second required a \ncommitment from the vehicle supplier to local spare-parts stockholding and technical support and \ntraining from a small team of expatriate service engineers. \nDespite all of the above, still no financial institution chose to make good on its expression of interest \nin participating in the scheme. The vehicle supplier eventually resolved this matter by offering to \n\naccept deferred payment over two years, provided that a local bank underwrote the counterparty risk. \nThis arrangement was agreed to by Ecobank Nigeria plc, but it in turn then required the lodging of \ncollateral personal guarantees from senior officers of NURTW in order to mitigate that risk exposure. \nFortunately the levels set for these guarantees were proportionate to the affordability of those who \nhad to provide them, covering less than 10% of the total transaction value, and so could be put in \nplace. \nAfter all the financial arrangements had been finalised, the order was confirmed for shipment in the \nfirst half of 2007. Delivery was then made in two batches, arriving in Lagos in June and September of \nthat year. \nIn parallel with the integrated transport sector development being led by LAMATA, the Lagos State \nGovernment had sponsored a parallel initiative for Lagos Metropolitan Priority Bus Services that was \nalso intended to address the public transport deficit. Lagbus Asset Management Ltd was established \nas a wholly State owned enterprise for the purpose of procuring buses for lease to private operators, \nwith the vision that this company would then earn revenue for the State in the near term and also \ndevelop a track record for flotation once its developmental role had been fulfilled. Lagbus’ choice of \nbus led to high lease charges and consequently it was forced into the role of operator operating a \nradial service along a route that had priority through painted bus lanes. Performance was \ndisappointing and further rollout over the intended priority network was delayed at the same time as \nthe existing idle fleet at Lagbus increased further through the delivery of new vehicles. This \npresented an opportunity for Lagbus to augment the NURTW service on BRT-Lite, and it was agreed \nthat they would provide express services from the outer terminal at Mile 12 and the intermediate \nterminal at Moshalashi under their own branding. 25 buses are deployed in this service, with a further \n15 held in reserve. \nSUPPLY MANAGING DEMAND \nInitially only the 100 standard high floor buses newly \nacquired by NURTW were available to use on the \ncorridor. Demand forecasts showed that over 300 buses \nwould be required operating at 20 second headways \nwould be needed to fully satisfy demand. This \nhighlighted the clear fact that not all of demand could be \nsatisfied and to fully regulate the corridor would overload \nthe system leading to frustration and the loss of support. \nAt launch, the 100 buses were allocated as stopping \nservices and an additional 25 buses, owned and operated by Lagbus, were allocated to run express \nservices. As theses were still too few to satisfy all demand, a further 120 buses have now been \nleased from Lagbus for operation as additional stopping services. \nAn innovative approach that allowed several issues to be solved was adopted. Existing molue and \ndanfo operating along the corridor were not replaced by BRT outright but merely prevented through \nBRT regulation from operating on the main road. Their operation within the service roads ensured \nthat the traveller had freedom to choose between public transport modes. The existing \noperators/drivers that did not retrain could continue operating, all demand could be met and main \n\n“Though there are still traffic jams on Ikorodu Road, especially during the rush hours, anyone caught in such traffic snarls is in such a situation by his choice because they have the option of keeping their vehicles at home and using the BRT buses, which are clean and safe.” (A commuter)\n\nJanuary 2009 14 road traffic flow speeded up through the removal of slow vehicles that, historically, had a habit of stopping in the carriageway and disrupting other traffic. The resultant effect is market segmentation through provision that allows freedom of choice through partial corridor regulation, ensures that no travellers are left un-served and, in the medium to long term, improves the quality of service of molue and danfo as the need to compete with BRT increases. This solution to a supply problem proved a significant benefit in securing political and community support.\n\nCLEAR AND CONSISTENT POLITICAL SUPPORT \nThe LUTP was initiated during Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s time as Governor for Lagos State. His \ncommitment to an integrated transport system with bus transit as a first point of delivery gave context \nand support to the BRT feasibility study and was articulated by his then Commissioner of Transport, \nDr Muiz Banire, who chaired the BRT Steering Committee. Governor Tinubu initiated BRT-Lite, \ncommitting funding, resources and the regulatory reform required. \nGovernor Tinubu’s term as State Governor ended on May 2007 when Babatunde Raji Fashola was \nelected Governor. Governor Fashola came from the same political party and carried the same beliefs \nand commitment to the integrated transport approach advocated by Governor Tinubu. At a time of \npolitical change the commitment to supporting a movement away from a pro private car approach to \none that emphasised public transport was a key factor of the success of BRT-Lite. In particular, \nGovernor Fashola showed significant courage in his commitment to BRT-Lite in the face of the \ninevitable criticism through its construction phases. By providing unwavering support he ensured that \npolitical risk, often present in fledgling public-private partnerships, did not present a barrier to private \nsector participation. His decision to support operations by providing public finance for training, \nuniforms and welfare for drivers together with the commitment of public funds for maintenance under \nlined a commitment to public transport; a form of transport used by the many but, in the past, \ninfluenced by the few. \nCOMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT \nBRT-Lite was developed within a city with little knowledge of LAMATA or what organised public \ntransport might be like, a history of poor delivery of transport improvements, and systems that sought \nto ensure that profit was directed to the already rich. The potential for scepticism and suspicion of \nmotives and intentions was therefore rife. The objective of the community engagement strategy \nlaunched by LAMATA at project commencement therefore was aimed at developing a similar level of \nownership of BRT within the citizens of Lagos that exists within delivery orientated stakeholders. \nThere are approximately 6 million people within the catchment of BRT-Lite and within this corridor \nthree target groups were identified: \na. Those that have no vehicles and are captive to public transport who will be primary beneficiaries \nof BRT (approximately 65% of total catchment). \nb. Those that have cars but are reluctant users. Given the right set of conditions they would use \nBRT (approximately 25%) \n\nc. Super rich. They will not be BRT users but have a strong voice and are able to spread influence \nand may benefit from the decongestion effects of BRT (approximately 10%) \nContact with each of these parties in order to develop knowledge of BRT, and the benefits to users, \nwas essential. The approach was to build upon the same principles that gave birth to the BRT-Lite \nconcept, that of developing engagement from receiving and not giving information. As such each \ngroup was consulted upon and the scheme explained as a means of solving their own problems; not \nthose identified by others and not imposing alien solutions upon users. Through this approach a \nsense of local ownership was developed resulting in BRT-Lite being seen as a user project and not \none of technocrats or bureaucrats. The influence of such an approach spread to the often sceptical \npress whose reports both through and after construction, whilst sometimes pointing out problems, \nwhere not overtly negative and were quick to emphasise the positives. \nThe public relations strategy through development and construction consisted of advertising within \nthe corridor, in newspapers, radio and on TV. TV commercials included a 90 second demonstration \non how to use BRT, getting and paying for a ticket, how to wait, board and alight. Third party \nadvocacy was employed whereby those with a voice in the community (local government chairman, \nlocal chiefs and community leaders) were welcomed to discussions on BRT, how it would operate \nand how people might benefit. Road-shows were held at which handbills were distributed in a range \nof languages that explained BRT-Lite. \nCommunity meetings were endorsed by local community leaders through the prior discussions and \nwere attended by senior LAMATA officers. The intention was to ensure that LAMATA was not a \nfaceless organisation, allow access to real decision makers and show accountability. The effect was \nto raise LAMATA’s profile in general, but also as an organisation that listens and delivers. \nIn parallel, meetings continued to be held with NURTW and its members at a local level, as well as \nwith taxi drivers and haulage operators. Through the consultation process it became more clear that \nall users had the potential to benefit from BRT-Lite and that the key objective was to: \n‘Return life back to the citizens of Lagos’ \nThe approach to consultation as a means of gathering information made a genuine and meaningful \ncontribution to scheme development. The project was not just about BRT-Lite but about facilitating \nmovement within the corridor. As such works encompassed: \nSegregated BRT running way for the majority of the corridor to ensure better and more reliable \nrun times achieved largely by part removal of median between main and service roads. This \noffered significant improvements to journey time and journey time reliability of direct benefit to \ngroup (a) and gives a realistic alternative to the car for group (b). \nNarrowing of the median to ensure main carriageway widths remained, largely, unaltered. This \nensured support of group (c) together with hauliers. \nBanning of Molue and Danfo from the main carriageway. Increasing capacity of main \ncarriageway and ensuring that travellers have an option of using BRT or other forms of public \ntransport. This form of self-balancing ‘partial regulation’. Ensured that the limited capacity of \n\nBRT-Lite in early operation had a release valve but also allowed some freedom of choice for \ncaptive users, group (a). \nKey to both stakeholder engagement and wider marketing was the engagement of NURTW. Whilst \nNURTW had become convinced that it was appropriate for \nthe City to move to a more regulated form of public \ntransport provision, its many members needed reassuring \nand developing into ambassadors of the new transport \nmode. A sense of status was created for BRT personnel \nwhereby the best drivers of Molue were encouraged to \nretrain to become ‘pilots’ of BRT. The status amongst \npeers was greater and there was a feeling that they were engaged in the transport revolution that \nwas sweeping across Lagos generated from local communities and ignited by LAMATA. It was also a \ncase that there was now a need for more drivers than before and a change in working conditions; the \nprevious tense, and often violent, atmosphere in vehicle and at stop was being replaced by a more \nordered humane population of users. The relationship is synergistic in that more respectful drivers \nlead to a more compliant population leading to more respectful drivers. BRT was seen as the catalyst \nfor change. \nThe official lunch of BRT-Lite on the 17 th March 2008 was preceded with the national anthem and the \nnational pledge. The programme of events started at 10:00am and was overseen by the Executive \nand Deputy State Governors. The event was televised and a Launch booklet produced, it was \nportrayed as a major step forward in the \ndevelopment of the City. \nOpening of BRT-Lite saw almost immediate take \nup with eager customers waiting in line to buy \ntickets and board vehicles reducing the passenger \nramp-up period often observed with new public \ntransport schemes. In order to continue to foster \nscheme support, take on board and improve \nservices and increase still further knowledge of \nBRT-Lite, the following initiatives were launched to \nsupport the operations phase: \nBRT Parliament. When BRT-Lite was 100 days old the BRT parliament was established in order \nassess and debate performance and issues arising. The parliament consists of senior LAMATA \nofficers, the lending bank, State Government representatives, user representatives (including \nphysically challenged and commuters). It is moderated independently by a senior academic from \nthe University of Lagos. It is attended by approximately 1500 people and televised. \nCustomer relations management line was established whereby those with comments and/or \nquestions can ring or text 24 hours a day 7 days per week. The line is manned by two operators. \nThe nature of comment is logged and summarised in a Customer Relations Managers report and \ncomplaint tracking \nBRT Half hour TV. From May 2008 a live TV programme shown on Sunday (repeated Tuesday) \nwas established to examine BRT issues. The programme often consists of an interview with \n\nA private car owner, said, “It is the best thing that has happened in Lagos this year. From Palmgrove to Ojota, I used to spend one hour on the traffic jam, but now it takes me five minutes.”\n\nsomeone involved with BRT-Lite and/or someone who has an opinion on it, or its operation. The programme has a weekly audience of approximately 5 million. BRT and LAMATA branding was used prior to implementation and intensified post implementation with all BRT related staff, and many others, issued with BRT-Lite polo shirts and baseball caps. This has ensured that BRT and LAMATA are brands that have a high awareness throughout Lagos.\n\nPERFORMANCE \nA full evaluation of BRT-Lite was undertaken seven months after first operation to assess the \nperformance of the scheme both operationally and in the perception of users. From this evaluation, a \nseries of key performance indicators have been derived to measure the success of the scheme and \nallow benchmarking against other BRT-Lite or other transport systems worldwide. This evaluation \nwas supported by a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative data collection exercise. The \nfollowing operational characteristics provide an overview of the BRT-Lite service. \nOperating headways were observed to range from an average of 30 seconds in the morning \npeak, to around 45 seconds in the off peak, and 40 seconds (1.5 buses per minute) in the \nevening peak. \nThe average journey time from Mile 12 to Lagos Island is just under one hour, with the minimum \nand maximum journey time in this direction ranging from 40 to 70 minutes. \nAverage journey times in the northbound direction from Lagos Island can be significantly shorter, \nwith minimum recorded journey times on the express services of 20 minutes. The average \njourney time is recorded as 45 minutes, although this varies by time of day, with average \nmorning peak journey times of around 40 minutes, rising to 55 minutes in the evening peak when \nthe main traffic movement is away from Lagos Island. \nRound trip times considerably exceed the journey times because of terminal capacity problems \nand driver layovers (drivers stay with their bus at Breaks), and so operating speeds are well \nbelow commercial speeds. \nQueuing varies noticeably by stop, direction and time of day, with significant queues of 200 or \nmore people recorded in the peak periods at some stops, particularly the Mile 12 terminal. \nHowever, with the high vehicle frequencies, this relates to an average (median) queuing time of \n10 minutes. Peak queuing times are greater, approaching 15 minutes, falling in the inter-peak, \nwith no queuing then recorded at many stops. \n\n“I live in Ikorodu but work in Marina. When I closed from work by 5pm, I decided to try this BRT because people had been talking about it. I boarded the bus at CMS and there was no problem at all. But it was from Fadeyi that I began to appreciate the advantages of the BRT. When I looked out of the window, all the other vehicles were caught in the go-slow and the BRT bus was just moving smoothly. From CMS to Mile 12, it took me just about one hour. Before the BRT, I sometimes spent more than four hours in the Ikorodu Road traffic jam. I pray to God that they can sustain it.” (A commuter)\n\nIn addition to the performance indicators, evaluation has provided information to allow an \nunderstanding of the nature of the ridership and the impact that BRT-Lite has had on travel behaviour \nalong the corridor as well as Lagos as a whole. This is presented in relation to key questions below \nHow many passengers take the new system? \nPatronage of BRT-Lite has been observed through a series of boarding surveys and records the \nfollowing figures: \n195,000 passengers on an average weekday \nOver 1,150,000 passengers in a full week. Applying locally derived annualisation this means \nthat the system may carry around 60 million over a year of operation. \nThe daily volumes carried by BRT Lite already place it as one of the largest bus systems in the world \nin terms of passenger numbers. Whilst not approaching the ridership of the TransMilenio system in \nBogotá which employs dual lanes and an extensive network of local end express services across the \ncity, BRT-Lite patronage is comparable to many of the individual lines in Curitiba, Brazil, and \napproaching that of the Metrobus in Quito, Equador. \nName City Country Length \n(km) \n\n| Name | City | Country | Length (km) | Pop | Peak hour one way | Daily two- way |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| TransMilenio | Bogotá | Colombia | 84 | 7 m | 45,000 | 1,300,000 |\n| Assis Brasil Busway | Porto Alegre | Brazil | 4.9 | 3.7 m | 28,000 | 290,000 |\n| Metrobus ! El Trole | Quito | Ecuador | 16.1 | 1.8 m | | 7,000 240,000 |\n| 9 de Julho Busway | Sao Paulo | Brazil | 7 | 10 m | 35,000 | 196,000 |\n| BRT Lite | LAGOS | NIGERIA | 22 | 15 + m | 10,000 | 195,000 |\n| Sul Busway | Curitiba | Brazil | 10.1 | 2.7 m | 13,000 | 156,200 |\n| Blok M Kota Line 1 | Jakarta | Indonesia | 12.9 | 9.8 m | | 6,500 100,000 |\n| SE Busway | Brisbane | Australia | 17 | 1.7m | 18,000 | 150,000 |\n| Megabus | Pereira | Columbia | 16.7 | 0.7 m | | 45,000 |\n| Adelaide O-bahn | Adelaide | Australia | 3 | 1.1 m | | 4,000 30,000 |\n\nWhat is the mode share for BRT-Lite? \nBRT-Lite currently carries over a quarter of trips recorded along the corridor despite BRT-Lite \nvehicles representing just 4% of vehicles on the route. This represents 37% of public transport trips \nmade along this route. As a means of access to Lagos Island, the commercial heartland of Lagos \nand a main destination on the route, BRT-Lite carries nearly a tenth of all trips inbound to the Island. \nThe level of demand is currently constrained by capacity in the peak periods, so potential to tap the \ndemand currently served by other modes means that further patronage growth could be realised \nthrough capacity enhancement. \n\nSelf‐employed, 27%\n\nCivilservant, 13%\n\nStudent, 16%\n\nManagement, 8%\n\nSales manager/Rep, 6% Blue collar, 6%\n\ninformalsector \ne.g.hawkers, 4% \nProfessional/ \nSpecialist, 9% \nClerical, 4% \nPensioner/ \nRetired, 2% \n\nHousewife, 2%\n\nUnemployed, 2% Agriculture/ fishing, 1% Director, 1% Unskilled, 1%\n\nOther, 6%\n\nWho uses BRT-Lite? \nAnalysis of the occupation of BRT \nLite users demonstrates that a \nbroad range of different travellers \nuse the system. \nA large majority are self-employed, \nreflecting the local prevalence of \nentrepreneurs running their own \nbusiness. \nCivil servants and students also \nform a significant proportion of the \nBRT-Lite ridership. \nThere is evidence of ridership among the higher-ranking employment categories including \nmanagement, professionals and directors. \nWhere have the passengers been attracted from? \nThe majority of BRT-Lite passengers were existing public transport users abstracted from other \npublic transport modes. \n85% previously took danfo, the small commuter buses. \nA further 8% used the larger molue or commercial \nbuses. \n4% of passengers previously travelled by car, with a \nfurther 2% travelling by Taxi, Okada or Kabu Kabu. \nModal shift from private transport is observed to be relatively low. However, evidence that even a \nsmall proportion of previous car users have been willing to use the new system pays testimony to a \nchange in thinking in a society in which car ownership is an aspiration, seen to mark a change in \nstatus from which people would rarely move ‘backwards’. \nWhat is the main travel purpose of BRT-Lite users? \nSurvey data shows that in the morning (0600-1000) and \nevening (1600-1900) peaks the majority of travellers are \ncommuters travelling to or from their place of work. \nHowever, business users account for over a quarter of all \ntrips, with this proportion remaining fairly consistent \nthroughout the day. The majority of shopping trips occur in the inter-peak, accounting for a quarter of \nthe trips in this period, compared to under 10% in the morning peak and 13% in the evening. \n\n“I am happy for my children to use BRT to go to school. There used to be too much risk with danfo”. (A mother)\n\n“My husband drops me at TBS and I get BRT to work most days.” (A commuting lawyer)\n\nstongly disagree disagree not sure agree\n\nstrongly agree\n\n0%\n\n10%\n\n20%\n\n30%\n\n40%\n\n50%\n\n60%\n\n70%\n\n80%\n\nBRT is ... than my previous mode of travel\n\nEducation trips account for around 10% of trips across the day, with a slight bias towards morning and inter-peak periods as the main proportion of return school trips are likely to take place before the\n\nspecified PM peak period.\n\nJourney Purpose of BRT-Lite passengers by time of day\n\n52%\n\n26%\n\n9%\n\n13%\n\nMorning Peak\n\nCommute Business shopping education\n\n35%\n\n29%\n\n25%\n\n11%\n\nInterpeak\n\nCommute Business shopping education\n\n52%\n\n27%\n\n13%\n\n8%\n\nEvening Peak\n\nCommute Business shopping education\n\nWhat do BRT-Lite users think of the new system?\n\nUser opinion of the new system is shown to be strongly positive in comparison to the alternative modes of transport. A majority is recorded to strongly agree that BRT-Lite is better than other modes in all the journey attributes mentioned. In particular, respondents find BRT-Lite particularly to be faster and more comfortable than the alternatives.\n\nIn all attributes the proportion of respondents who would agree or strongly agree that BRT-Lite is better than the previous mode of travel amount to over 90% of respondents.\n\nBRT-Lite is clearly considered to be superior to other modes by the vast majority of users.\n\nHow does the BRT-Lite journey compare to alternative travel options?\n\nThe reasons for the popularity of the BRT-Lite service become clear when comparing the relative journey attributes of the system with that of the alternative modes of transport available to people. As other public transport vehicles have been regulated off the corridor into the service lanes, those that still ply the route tend to focus on the shorter journeys attracting passengers who are travelling shorter distances or from intermediate stops where BRT-Lite capacity is limited. It is therefore necessary to interchange to make an end-to-end journey from Mile 12 to CMS if travelling using the corridor on other public transport modes. An example would be a two-stage trip from Mile 12 to Ojuelegba, then on to CMS. The alternative from Mile 12 is to access the Island via 3 rd Mainland\n\nBridge, although the majority of services using this route terminate at Obalende from which a further \nshort stage is required to reach CMS. The journey attributes for the two alternative journey options \ncompared against the BRT journey are as follows: \nMile 12 to CMS Other public transport \non corridor \n\n| Mile 12 to CMS | Other public transport on corridor | Via 3rd Mainland Bridge | BRT-Lite |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| Total in-vehicle Journey time | 78 minutes | 64 minutes | 55 minutes |\n| Fare | 230N | 120N | 100N |\n| Interchange | 1 | 1 | 0 |\n| Total Wait time | 45 minutes | 10 minutes | 15 minutes |\n\nBRT-Lite Total in-vehicle Journey time 78 minutes 64 minutes 55 minutes Fare 230N 120N 100N Interchange 1 1 0 Total Wait time 45 minutes 10 minutes 15 minutes For end-to-end journeys, the advantages of travelling by BRT-Lite are clear. The journey is faster than the other route options, saving about 10 and 20 minutes in vehicle time compared to the other options. Journey time advantages are further increased compared to other on-corridor trips by avoiding the need to interchange to access the Central Business District. Despite offering a premium service in terms both of run-time and vehicle quality, fares are actually preferential to other travel options. The BRT-Lite fare is particularly preferential to competing modes along the corridor, where the requirement to interchange and high fares for shorter journeys lead to a significantly higher fare for the full journey. There is evidence of other operators attempting to profiteer form the demand which does not choose BRT-Lite, potentially due to capacity constraints of the system. So, with every aspect of the BRT-Lite journey comparing favourably against competitive modes, what do BRT-Lite users state as their most important factor behind choosing to use the system? The quicker journey time is the decisive factor for 35% of respondents One fifth state that comfort is the main reason for choosing BRT-Lite Just under one fifth use BRT-Lite because it is cheaper than alternatives 13% cite safety or the improved security of the system 5% use the system because it is more reliable Has BRT changed passengers travel patterns? Apart from providing the new mode option to travellers, the introduction of BRT-Lite has also influenced some travellers to change travel pattern. Nearly a quarter of travellers questioned said that their use of BRT-Lite had led to a change in the time that they travelled. 80% of these said that the increased speed and/or reliability of BRT-Lite allowed them to travel at the time they wanted rather than having to leave early to ensure reaching the destination in time. Just 6% changed their time of travel for negative reasons of avoiding the queues for the service. 15% of travellers stated that they changed the number of trips they made, of which four fifths made more trips using BRT-Lite for positive reasons such as the reduced journey time, cost, comfort or improved accessibility. Of the respondents who said they made fewer trips, some of these were due to the reduced requirement to interchange, which again is positive, if not strictly constituting a change in the number of trips (as opposed to trip stages).\n\n13% of travellers have changed their destination, mainly changing to destinations served by the BRT \nroute, although a couple of respondents mention that BRT allows them to travel to locations further \nout than was practical previously. This is a clear indicator of the potential of BRT-Lite to influence \nland use decisions. \nHow does BRT fit into the full journey pattern of travellers? \nAnalysis of trip making patterns has shown how BRT-Lite is placed as part of a series of travel \nmodes between origin and destination. Only around a third of travellers use BRT as the sole means \nof making the journey. \nA large proportion of BRT users take danfo for a leg of the journey whilst okada is also a popular \nmode, used as a means of access to the transport network and the BRT corridor. On average, the \nnumber of stages to make a single trip for BRT passengers is 1.96. \n\nMode taken Proportion of travellers BRT only 31% BRT, Danfo 41% BRT, Okada 17% BRT, Danfo, Okada 7% BRT, taxi 1%\n\nCONCLUSION AND CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS \nEvaluation has shown that BRT-Lite has had a significant impact upon those travelling along the \nIkorodu Road corridor in Lagos. It has defined a new interpretation of BRT that is rooted in \nestablished BRT practice but is grounded in a detailed understanding of local user needs with the key \nrequirement of effective delivery. As such it has been able to improve the quality of lives of not only \nusers of BRT but also those who travel along the corridor by other modes and those who choose to \nlocate their businesses there. It also provides a platform on which to develop a network of BRT \nroutes as part of the integrated transport network of the City. In its current form it is both proof of a \ndelivery mechanism and a pilot scheme from which improvements can be made. It is also a \ndemonstration of focussed delivery in challenging circumstances and as such is an important \nreference case for those seeking to develop BRT elsewhere. The success is evident in the wide \nspread interest in developing similar approaches in the Nigerian cities of Port Harcourt, Ibadan, \nCalabar and Kano as well as cities elsewhere in the world that have visited and reviewed BRT-Lite. \nKey challenges in implementing BRT in Lagos were: high levels of demand to be accommodated \nwithin dilapidated infrastructure of limited capacity; the absolute need to ensure that operations are \nsustainable through appropriate delivery structures; establishing appropriate regulations and \nensuring compliance; and winning the support of the people of Lagos. \n\nThis report has summarised the definition, process and performance of BRT-Lite. In doing so the \ncritical success factors are considered to be: \n1. LAMATA. A public transport authority with apropriate expertise, energy and desire to \nsucceed, that is able to plan, regulate and form relationships to ensure the delivery of \npublic transport services. \n2. Political commitment and suport with clear focus upon outcome when difficult decisions are \nrequired and opposition is felt. \n3. Ensuring that transport organisations were supportive, together with a stakeholder \nengagement programme that educates, defines roles and demonstrates the benefits and \nlinkages in cross sectroral delivery involving public and private participation. \n4. The definition of a form of BRT that meets key user needs, is apropriate to the context in \nwhich it is placed, and is affordable and deliverable in its widest sense. \n\nBeautification Empowerment Safety\n\nThis report is a summary of the Lagos BRT-Lite Evaluation Final Report, January 2009, produced by Integrated Transport Planning Ltd and IBIS Transport Consultants Ltd for LAMATA. We are extremely grateful for the assistance of Dr Dayo Mobereola, Mr O Dairo and Ms K Efunshade of LAMATA for assisting in the production of this and the final evaluation report. Contact: Gbenga Dairo odairo@lamat-ng.com, or, Colin Brader brader@itpworld.net\n\n"
  },
  {
    "url": "http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/103047/1/Harman_the_BRT_and_the_danfo_published.pdf",
    "text": "CASE STUDY\nThe BRT and the danfo: \nA case study of Lagos’ transport \nreforms from 1999-2019\nBiodun Otunola\nPlanet Projects Limited\nManaging Director of Planet \nProjects Ltd.\nOliver Harman\nInternational Growth Centre\nEconomist, Cities that Work \nInitiative\nSebastian Kriticos\nInternational Growth Centre\nEconomist, Cities that Work \nInitiative\nDIRECTED BY FUNDED BY\nBIODUN OTUNOLA\n‘Biodun Otunola is the founding Managing \nDirector of Planet Projects Limited (PPL), \na leading and fast growing Engineering, \nProcurement, Construction and Management \n(EPCM) firm, where he heads a team that \nprovides a wide range of solutions to transport \nproblems in Nigerian cities, across Bus, BRT, \nRail, Water Transport and Traffic Engineering, \nover the entire value chain of Studies, Planning, \nEngineering Designs, Construction and \nOperations & Maintenance (O&M).\n‘Biodun is an experienced engineer, transport \nplanner and projects manager who has been \ninvolved in large scale infrastructure and \npublic transport projects including the largest \nbus terminal in Africa – the Oshodi Transport \nInterchange Project (OTIP), Lekki Port Projects, \nOgun Light Rail Projects, Lagos Strategic \nTransport Master Plan, Lagos Blue Line Light \nRail Project, Lekki Junction Improvement Works, \nLagos Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) Project, among \nothers.\nHe holds a Master’s degree from Chalmers \nUniversity of Technology, Goteborg, Sweden \nand a Bachelor’s in Civil Engineering from \nObafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria. \n‘Biodun is a member of the International \nAssociation of Public Transport (UITP), and an \nAssociate member of the American Society of \nCivil Engineers (ASCE).\nE: biodun.otunola@planetprojectsltd.com\n3 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019\nIn many developing cities, transportation is characterised by disorganised and \nlargely unregulated systems where demand clearly outstrips supply. As a result, \ncitizens are often left isolated from productive jobs and other valuable amenities \nof urban life. Improving the functionality of these cities is hence often rooted in \nmaking improvements to transport networks and providing reliable, affordable, \nclean, convenient, and safe access to urban opportunities. With improved \nurban mobility, firms and workers can come together to generate scale and \nspecialisation, which in turn, fuels productivity growth. \nThe city of Lagos has grappled with transport challenges for many decades. As \nthe second largest city in Africa, and the fastest growing megacity in the world, \ngovernment authorities have had to meet consistent pressure to improve the \nquality of existing transport systems while also providing new services that can \nsupport a larger urban population.1 In response to these demands, the Lagos \nState Government has made a range of large-scale investments in infrastructure \nand public transport over the last 20 years. Most notably, Lagos opened the first \never Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system on the African continent in 2008. Today, \nthe system boasts two different lines which cover over 35.5 km of track and \ntransport over 350,000 commuters on a daily basis.2\nThe Lagos BRT and wider transport reforms have helped to transform the \nsprawling and unplanned city, characterised by fragmentation and heavy traffic, \nto a much better example of transport development for liveable and productive \ncities. Through these reforms, Lagos has been able to achieve reductions in \ntravel times of up to one-third since 2008, relieving an estimated USD$240M in \neconomic loss each year.3 The reforms and their successes were centred around \nfive key factors which we will discuss in this case study:\n— Designing organisations for differences: Lagos undertook a radical \nredesign of the organisations governing transport to foster greater \ncoordination, accountability and public participation.\n— Establishing financial viability: long-term success was backed by proactive \nplans to improve creditworthiness and financial viability of the transport \nsector.\n— Generating buy-in: contextual awareness and public communication \nproved instrumental in gaining public support for reform.\n1 Rosenthal, E. (2012) “Nigeria Tested by Rapid Rise in Population,” The New York \nTimes. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/world/africa/in-nigeria-a-preview-of-an\u0002overcrowded-planet.html. Earley, K. (2016) “A Tale of Two Megacities - How Shenzhen \nand Lagos Are Coping with Urbanisation,” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/\njulius-baer-partner-zone/2016/mar/18/a-tale-of-two-megacities-how-shenzhen-and-lagos\u0002are-coping-with-urbanisation.\n2 Mobereola, D. (2009) “Lagos Bus Rapid Transit: Africa’s First BRT Scheme.” A SSATP \nDiscussion Paper No 9 on Urban Transport Series.\n3 Ongoing transport reforms in the city of Lagos (2018) Available at \nThe Lagos BRT and \nwider transport \nreforms have helped \nto transform the \nsprawling and \nunplanned city, \ncharacterised by \nfragmentation and \nheavy traffic, to a much \nbetter example of \ntransport development \nfor liveable and \nproductive cities\n4 — CITIES THAT WORK\n— Demonstrating quick-wins through a project driven approach:\ndemonstrating positive transformations in the short-term helped secure \ninvestor and public support. With the success of each project came further \nstakeholder buy-in, a greater willingness to instigate wider reform, and \nover time, the empowerment of formal institutions.\n— Monitoring performance to meet expected standards: Lagos has shown a \nclear commitment to assessing and achieving results through the BRT and \nsubsequent reforms to improve the transport system.\nThe challenge of urban mobility in Lagos \nUp until the year 2008, Lagos was one of the only major world cities without \nany formalised mass public transit system. Shared transportation was \npredominantly provided by a fleet of 75,000 privately operated minibus services \n(danfos) together with a smaller number of midi-buses (molue), tricycles \npopularly known as keke napep, motorcycle (Okada) and shared-taxis 4. These \ninformal minibuses accounted for around 69 percent of all motorised trips back \nin 20085 and were, as they still remain, characterised by their lack of safety \nstandards, limited regulation, poor maintenance, poor security and frequent \nviolation of traffic laws6. Planted on congested streets with slow speeds and \nhighly uncertain commute times, they were not enough to truly transform the \nmobility and efficiency of the city\nû High cost, low-quality service: Almost all of the issues of the danfo and \nmolue services are exemplified through their poor-quality infrastructure: \nbadly maintained buses, uncomfortable seating arrangements, \nbreakdowns, accidents, and few considerations for customers anywhere \nacross the system. Couple this with the system’s unreliability and lack \nof regulation, and passengers are left with a low-quality, high-cost \nservice. Fares regularly vary depending on the time of day or even on \nweather conditions. For instance, passengers can pay up to nine times \nmore between the peak hours of 6:30am-8am compared to at 9am.7\nFurthermore, many of the less profitable routes are underserviced, thus \nleaving many citizens behind. Without any alternative to danfos before \n2008, traffic and transport was highly unpredictable – only serving to \nreinforce poverty. \nû Lack of safety and security: Accidents and passenger safety have \nbeen a major concern of informal transport in Lagos, often because \ndrivers engage in reckless activities such as speeding, overlapping, and \n4 World Bank. (2016) “Lagos Urban Transport Project” Project Performance Assessment \nReport No.: 103068 Document Date: JUN 30, 2016.\n5 LAMATA. (2009) Final Report—Strategic Transport Master Plan for Lagos \nMetropolitan Area (Lagos: Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority, 2009).\n6 UN-Habitat. (2012). Enhancing urban safety and security: Global report on human \nsettlements 2007. Routledge.\n7 This figure is based on an interview with Biodun Otunola who is a transport specialist in \nLagos. \nInformal minibuses \naccounted for around \n69 percent of all \nmotorised trips back \nin 2008 and were, \nas they still remain, \ncharacterised by \ntheir lack of safety \nstandards, limited \nregulation, poor \nmaintenance, poor \nsecurity and frequent \nviolation of traffic laws\nIt is estimated that \naround 2008, there \nwould be 2-3 accidents \nper week on the danfo\nsystem\n5 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019\nindiscriminate turnings. With no training and little respect for the law, \ndrivers regularly risk the safety of their passengers. It is estimated that \naround 2008, there would be 2-3 accidents per week on the danfo system. \nSecurity is also a major concern across the informal system as they have \nvery limited infrastructure in terms of laybys, shelters and designated \nstops. At the same time, there are no trained personel to monitor and \npolice activities on the buses, which means they often become havens \nfor criminality – putting passengers at the risk of robbery or harassment \nwhen they travel.\nû Congestion: The carrying capacity of the typical danfo and okada\nminibuses is around 14-18 people, while molue buses can seat 50.8 This \ncomparatively low carrying capacity of the danfo, particularly with \nreference to their high-occupany vehicle replacements, which can carry \n30-50 passengers, means their contribution to congestion is much larger. \nWhile it is not uncommon to see informal providers cramming passengers \nonto buses far beyond their advised carrying capacity, this only further \npropogates the aforementioned issues of safety and poor-quality service. \nIn 2008, commuters from the residential areas in the north and west could \nspend over 2 hours in traffic on a one-way journey to work in the city centre \neach day (distances of approximately 20km).9 At the same time, the average \nLagosian was spending around 40% of their income on transport.10 With \nlower income families often living far from the city centre, this higher but \nunavoidable cost fell disproportionately on them. It was widely recognised \nthat improvements to public transportation and traffic management could \nyield significant benefits not just to transport users, but also to the city at \nlarge. However, as with most reforms, the Lagos State Government faced a \nnumber of constraints which made the challenge of revamping the transport \n8 Agha, E (2016) Nigeria: Molue – Is Lagos’s King of the Road Going Intro Exctinction \nAvilable at \n9 Mobereola, D. (2009) “Lagos Bus Rapid Transit: Africa’s First BRT Scheme.” A SSATP \nDiscussion Paper No 9 on Urban Transport Series.\n10 Ibid. N.B. The full fare of travelling 10 kilometres to work on similar systems in many \ncities represents almost a third of incomes for the poorest 20% of low income households. \nCarruthers, R., Malise, D., and Saurkar, A. (2005) “Affordability of Public Transport in \nDeveloping Countries”. World Bank\nDanfo minibuses congest \nthe main road in Lagos. \nImage credit: Planet \nProjects Ltd.\n6 — CITIES THAT WORK\nnetwork particularly dauntingLagos needed major capital investments for the \nconstruction, maintenance and management of a new ‘BRT Lite’11 system and \nall of its requisite infrastructure such as rolling stock, bus terminals, and vehicle \ntracks. We explain the main differences between regular BRT and ‘BRT Lite’ \nin Table 1. These investments in BRT Lite would also require complementary \nchanges to regulation, setting in place standards and frameworks such as vehicle \nuse, safety and emissions. Initiating such major changes takes a substantial \namount of time and requires strong political will to keep reform moving \nforwards, coordinating not just the legal and regulatory framework but also \nencouraging behavioural changes across society at large.\nTable 1: Differences between regular BRT and ‘BRT Lite’12\nFull Systems Lite Systems\n— Specific lanes exclusively \ndesignated for BRT buses\n— Raised platforms and shelters \nwith pre-boarding fare \ncollection\n— Advanced technologies to \nmanage traffic signalling & \nprovide information\n— More efficient and effective but \nat a financial and time cost\n— Partially segregated lanes for \nBRT buses\n— Have simpler bus shelters and \nsome collection on buses\n— Less technological intensivity\n— Easier and quicker to \nimplement but at the expense \nof efficieny\nDespite a strong will for reform in government, there were a number of political \nimpediments embedded in the institutional, structural, and socioeconomic \nfoundations of the city. Notably, the Lagos State government had to take \ninto account the interests of large and powerful groups of informal transport \nproviders who stood to potentially lose out with reforms to the system. \nWeaknesses in the incumbent formal institutions for transport meant the \nreforms had to focus on establishing new teams and taskforces to carry out \nthe ambitions. This meant taking on a project-driven approach that made \nincremental and manageable changes which could offer demonstrable results in \nthe short-term, while looking to build up institutional capacity over the longer \nterm on the foundation of successful projects. In the following section, we detail \nthe process of Lagos’ transport reforms and some of their key successes. \n11 BRT Lite systems are not designed to meet the highest technical specifications of Bus \nRapid Transit schemes which would generally entail high-speed, high occupancy vehicles. \nGenerally, these systems aim to improve the efficiency of the system through improving \nreliability and frequency of the service and enhancing customer support and commercial \nawareness. This might include changes to the operating environment such as dedicated bus \nlanes, priority signals, parking controls and traffic management. Other typical changes \ninclude new fare collection and ticketing systems to enhance customer convenience and \nenhanced travel information, better marketing and overall customer care.\n12 For more information on BRT systems see Collier, P., Glaeser, E., Venables, T., \nManwaring, P., & Blake, M. (2018) Accessing opportunities: Policy decisions for \nenhancing urban mobility, Final Report, IGC online: https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/\nuploads/2018/05/Accessibility-04.05.18.pdf\n7 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019\nOvercoming Lagos’ transport challenge\nThe turn of the 21st century saw a series of landmark shifts in the Lagos State \ntransportation strategy. Governor Tinubu (12th Governor of Lagos State \n1999 – 2007) had recently been elected based on a platform of tax reform and \ninfrastructure delivery. Over the course of his term in power, he emphasised \ncapital spending on highly visible transport projects, such as roads.13 These \nearly reforms focused on making the most of the existing network, emphasising \nspending on maintenance and infrastructure upgrades. At the same time, \nthe government made clear efforts to communicate the link between quality \ninfrastructure and taxation to the public. The idea was to enhance the social \ncontract between state and society, which played an important facilitating role \nfor ensuing reforms in the transport sector, such as efforts to improve traffic \nmanagement and compliance. \nFigure 1: Four quadrants of transport reform\n• Legal\n• Institutional\n• Regulatory\nFrameworks Infrastructure\nOperations &\nMaintenance Finance\n• Bus lanes\n• Laybys\n• Bus stops\n• Depots\n• Signalling\n• Purchase\n• Hire\n• Lease\n• Maintenance\n• Subsidies\n• Buses\n• Fares\n• Training\n• Intelligent transport\nsystems\nSource: ‘Biodun Otunola’\nOver time, however, it became clear that the existing infrastructure was not \nsufficient to truly transform mobility within the city. The longer-term strategy \nhad to include the provision of a comprehensive public transport system, \nmoving away from the reliance on private motorisation and shared molue and \ndanfo buses. Achieving this meant going beyond just delivering the required \ninfrastructure and towards recognising the transportation challenge as part \nof an integrated system, in which complementary reforms across sectors and \npolicy areas were needed to truly modernise the coordination and delivery of \ntransportation. These principles are summarised in Figure 1 which has been the \n13 de Gramont, D. (2015). Governing Lagos: unlocking the politics of reform (Vol. 12). \nCarnegie Endowment for International Peace.\nThe government \nmade clear efforts \nto communicate the \nlink between quality \ninfrastructure and \ntaxation to the public\nOver time, however, it \nbecame clear that the \nexisting infrastructure \nwas not sufficient \nto truly transform \nmobility within the \ncity. The longer-term \nstrategy had to include \nthe provision of a \ncomprehensive public \ntransport system\n8 — CITIES THAT WORK\nunderpinning approach for much of Lagos’ transformation – simultaneously \nfocusing on the regulatory frameworks, infrastructure, operations and \nmaintenance, and financing of bus reforms.14 \nThe process of public transport reform\nMajor reforms often require a shift in political strategy to enable effective \nchange. For Lagos’ transport sector, this process was largely kickstarted in \n2000 with the inauguration of the Lagos State Traffic Management Authority \n(LASTMA). LASTMA was mandated by the Lagos State Government to \nimprove enforcement of traffic laws, set new standards and rulings, and \nencourage compliance among road users. Although it initially did not include \nany provisions for public transport, its establishment marked a behavioural \nshift within politics and society that collectively strived for better performance \nin urban mobility.\nBefore LASTMA was established, there had been a wide array of local, state \nand federal government agencies involved in transport provision in Lagos. Most \noperated in siloes, with little regard for the effect their policies had on other \nareas of the system, or even how the decisions of other agencies affected them.15\nFurthermore, they had a tendency to over-rely on infrastructure building, \nneglecting the importance of traffic planning and management. A number \nof studies undertaken in the 1990s – such as the Lagos Mass Transit Study \n(LMTS) – had brought these issues to light, highlighting the fragmentation of \ninstitutional responsibilities, weaknesses in traffic management, and the lack of \na cohesive strategy for the city. These studies were used as the basis to justify \nthe establishment and responsibilities of agencies like LASTMA. \nWhile LASTMA helped generate attention towards traffic management, there \nwas a clear recognition that Lagos still needed a metropolitan-wide agency \nto encompass all matters of transport policy including and beyond traffic \nmanagement. Subsequently in 2002, the Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport \nAuthority (LAMATA) was established, taking on principal authority for \ncoordinating inter-agency responsibilities, policies and programmes. The \nconcept of LAMATA had previously been proposed in the LMTS and 1996 \nDetailed Framework for Establishment of LAMATA (DFEL). Influenced by \nTransport for London (TfL), the framework detailed the role, objectives, and \nresource requirements it would need in relation to other transport agencies.16\nThe World Bank had also ardently pushed for a dedicated transport authority \nto be set-up. In fact, this was made a requirement for future funding of \nproposed transport reforms during the Lagos Urban Transport projects which \nbegan in 2000. \n14 This diagram is based on an interview with Biodun Otunola who is a transport \nspecialist in Lagos.\n15 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/758551468288333387/\npdf/418330WP0UNI0A1s0case0dp0501PUBLIC1.pdf \n16 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/758551468288333387/\npdf/418330WP0UNI0A1s0case0dp0501PUBLIC1.pdf \nWith LAMATA in \noperation, it offered the \nforesight and practical \nstrategy to move Lagos \nout of chaos on the \nroads and towards a \n21st century transport \nsystem\n9 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019\nWith LAMATA in operation, it offered the foresight and practical strategy to \nmove Lagos out of chaos on the roads and towards a 21st century transport \nsystem. Through the assistance of the World Bank, LAMATA was able to \nfinance the city’s first Strategic Transport Master Plan (STMP) in 2005, which \nhas since served as the guiding framework for all transport policies up to 2025. \nThe plan set ambitions for the city to harness multi-modal transport, predicting \nthat by 2025, 60% of travel should be by road, 20% by rail, and 20% by water. \nAt the same time, LAMATA would oversee major investments in transport \ninfrastructure including the plan’s ambitions to establish 6 BRT lines, 7 rail \nlines, and 6 water transport routes by 2025. \nTable 2: Key stages of reform\nYear Lite Systems\n2000 Lagos Transport Management \nAuthority (LASTMA) inaugurated.\nLagos Urban Transport Projects begin.\nInvest in the road network and enforce traffic laws \nand compliance.\n2002 Lagos Metropolitan Transport \nAuthority (LAMATA) inaugurated.\nPolicy learning from World Bank.\nEstablish a metropolitan agency with principal \nresponsibility to oversee and coordinate city \ntransport policy. LAMATA would be the organisation \nto improve overall functionality, comfort, reliability \nand accessibility of the transport system.\n2005 Strategic Transport Master Plan \n(STMP) developed through help of \nWorld Bank\nGuide the development of transportation policies in \nthe state until 2025 and set plans to diversify public \ntransport modes including BRT, rail, and water \ntransport routes.\n2006-\n2007\nConsultations with best-practice in \nother developing cities\nFirst BRT Lite lines operational\nState-owned company LAGBUS is \nlaunched\nPolicy learning was used to sensitise the powerful \ntransport union, showing how things could be \ndone in Lagos. This happened in parallel with the \nlaunch of the BRT and LAGBUS, which offered \na safer alternative to the informal sector and new \nemployment opportunities for workers.\n2008 BRT Lite system becomes fully \noperational\nTo ameliorate the negative consequences of the \ndisorganised, fragmented, costly, unsafe, and \nunreliable transport system.\n2008-\n2017\nComplimentary regulatory reforms \nand infrastructure investments.\nRegulations have been implemented to provide for \nseveral safety standards. New technologies have \nbeen rolled-out on the bus fleet to improve customer \nexperience, and new infrastructure such as junctions, \nbus terminals, shelters, and rail systems have helped \nimprove the overall transport system.\n2017-\n2019\nBus Reform Initiative (2017-2019) Aims to improve the capacity and customer \nexperience of the system through: replacement of \nall danfos with HOVs, increased digitatisation of \nthe network, improved transport infrastructure, and \ndriver training.\nLAMATA was able to \nfinance the city’s first \nStrategic Transport \nMaster Plan (STMP) in \n2005, which has since \nserved as the guiding \nframework for all \ntransport policies up to \n2025\n10 — CITIES THAT WORK\nIn 2007, the first BRT Lite lines became operational and within one year \nthe system was delivered in full and experiencing extremely high demand. A \nnumber of reforms have taken place since then, including the second wave of \nbus reforms ongoing since 2017. Further detail on these policies are provided in \nthe Table 2 and the sections that follow. \nThe principles that underlay the effective development of the BRT and other \npublic transport reforms focused on five key areas: \nDesigning organisations for differences\nDelivering reform required a complete redesign of the organisations governing \ntransport in Lagos. Significant political and financial backing from top officials \nplayed a critical role in establishing and maintaining the integrity of the \nongoing governance changes.17 The creation of LAMATA was undoubtedly \nan instrumental shift towards better coordination of planning, regulation and \nmanagement of transport in the city. As a state government agency, it also \nmeant that authorities were held more accountable for their performance. \nFinally, LAMATA’s active public relations strategy and community meetings \nmeant citizen engagement became a much stronger norm. \nLAMATA took responsibility for coordinating all of the major stakeholders \nin the transport sector. This helped to integrate the activities of different \nagencies, ensuring they could cooperate effectively based on common objectives. \nSupporting legislation and planning strategies enshrined the particular roles and \nresponsibilities of different agencies. It also made clear how each agency could \nleverage one another’s distinct powers to deliver the city’s plan. The following \nare three important examples where inter-agency coordination played a key role \nin the success of the BRT system:\n— Ministry of Physical Planning and Urban Development: As representatives \nof the state master plan, the Ministry of Physical Planning and Urban \nDevelopment were invited to sit on the BRT Steering Committee. This \nhelped the transport authorities access the land on which they needed to \nmake infrastructure investments. Furthermore, with proactive planning \nthey could also utilise zoning and land-use regulations to more effectively \nensure high density around the transport nodes. In turn, increased \nridership on the system would likely improve the financial viability \nof reform.18 Contrasting this with the policy experience in Bogota \n(Colombia), where the BRT was planned and built without amendments \nin the zoning laws around the corridor. As a result, Bogota has not been \nable to capture the full welfare gains from increased land values that may \nhave been possible with the construction of their BRT system.19\n17 World Bank. (2016) “Lagos Urban Transport Project” Project Performance Assessment \nReport No.: 103068 Document Date: JUN 30, 2016.\n18 Collier, P., Glaeser, E., Venables, T., Manwaring, P., & Blake, M. (2018) Accessing \nopportunities: Policy decisions for enhancing urban mobility, Final Report, IGC online: \nhttps://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Accessibility-04.05.18.pdf \n19 Tsivanidis, N. (2018). The Aggregate and Distributional Effects of Urban Transit \nInfrastructure: Evidence from Bogotá’s TransMilenio. Working Paper, University of Chicago \nBooth School of Business.\n11 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019\n— Lagos State Traffic Management Authority: It was critical that LAMATA \nhad a comprehensive role, both to support the operational systems \nnecessary to complement spatial planning and traffic regulation, as well \nas, to take the responsibility for the hard infrastructure. As such, a close \nworking relationship with the LASTMA was instrumental to ensure they \ncommitted resources to protect and improve the BRT.20 This partnership \nenabled effective enforcement of rules. It also meant that there were the \nnecessary accompanying investments such as traffic lights, signalling \nsystems, or renewal of pinch-point areas on the road network. \n— Ministry of Public Works and Housing: With the inauguration of LAMATA \nthere had to be a transfer of power and control over infrastructure in \nLagos. This happened in coordination with the Federal Ministry of \nWorks and Housing who transferred control of the federal highways – in \nwhich the BRT system would operate – over to LAMATA, as well as the \nresponsibility for financing and constructing the required infrastructure.21\nTo operate effectively, these institutions also had to improve internal capacity, \nensuring they had an adequately trained and motivated staff. The recruitment of \nexperienced international staff allowed for policy learning and the creation of \na strong authority which could move the project from conception to practical \ndelivery. Providing an adequate cadre of qualified staff as well as reorganising \nits functions and providing on-going skills training, has been key in ensuring the \nreforms were sustainable over time.\nGovernor Fashola (13th Governor of Lagos State 2007 – 2015), who succeeded \nGovernor Tinubu, also placed a strong emphasis on improving the image \nof the transport authority to make it reflective of a modern-day institution, \nworthy of more positive expectations from international investors and wider \nsociety. Fashola recognised that to operate effectively, the bus system had to \nbe staged with a strong network of trained, committed, and qualified staff \nincluding drivers, attendants, and back-office operators. Specific funds were \nearmarked for staff training, social support, and uniforms for the drivers, which \nimproved career incentives and the dignity of the profession. Tax funds were \nalso put aside for the for maintenance and operations of the BRT system which \ngenerated confidence among private investors to engage more directly in the \nsystem through public-private partnerships.22\nEstablishing financial viability\nA sustainable BRT system requires a realistic financial strategy from the outset. \nFor the early stages of reform, the World Bank had been the principal funder, \noffering financial support for the technical advisory and feasibility work which \ntook place during the Lagos Urban Transport Projects and the STMP. However, \nattracting the kind of capital needed to finance the hard infrastructure for the \n20 Mobereola, D. (2009) “Lagos Bus Rapid Transit: Africa’s First BRT Scheme.” A SSATP \nDiscussion Paper No 9 on Urban Transport Series.\n21 Ibid\n22 Ibid\nFashola recognised \nthat to operate \neffectively, the bus \nsystem had to be \nstaged with a strong \nnetwork of trained, \ncommitted, and \nqualified staff including \ndrivers, attendants, \nand back-office \noperators\n12 — CITIES THAT WORK\nwhole system over the long-term meant the Lagos State government had to \nborrow more. This required demonstrating a capability to handle and repay \nlarge sums of money to potential investors.\nTherefore, one of the initial intentions of the BRT Lite system was to focus \non delivering results within an agreed upon budget. This was particularly \nrelevant as the Lagos State Government was to finance the first line exclusively \nthemselves. It was built at an average cost of just $1.7 million per kilometre. \nThis is much lower than a similar system that has been proposed in Kampala \nat an estimated cost of USD$17million per kilometre. 23 Even in other cities like \nBogota and Brisbane, although they have more intricate infrastructure, the BRT \nsystems cost around $6 million per kilometre.24\nWith the BRT operational, Lagos State Government also acted as a financial \nguarantor for the National Union of Transport Workers (NURTW), which \nallowed the NURTW to attract commercial funds for the purchase and \noperation of 100 high capacity buses and lease of a further 120. Members of \nthe transport union would then operate these buses on the BRT lanes, where \nthey experienced higher rates of ridership, better service delivery, and ultimately \nincreased revenue. With that success, the NURTW was able to pay back their \nloans in just two years. At the same time, the Lagos State Government began to \nsee large increases in operational revenue through ticket sales and advertising, \nmaking the scheme widely considered as a financial success.25\nGiven the positive outcomes of first stages of BRT Lite implementation, \ndevelopment finance institutions were much more willing to provide finance for \nthe expansion of the BRT as part of the second phase. The principle investors \nwere the World Bank and AfDB, who together provided the state loans of \n$190million and $100million respectively.26 Over time, the full 22km BRT \nsystem in Lagos cost just USD$37.4 million to build, including the cost of \nstations, road partitions and 220 buses. Today, it remains financially sustainable \nto fund operations without subsidies from the national government.27\nEncouraging buy in\nDuring the construction of the BRT system there was intense criticism of the \nLagos State Government by certain interest groups who thought they would \nlose out from the reforms. Private vehicle users felt threatened by the likelihood \nof disrupted traffic. Incumbent minibus operators felt they would be squeezed \nby increased competition. There was even resistance from ordinary residents \nof Lagos who were worried about the possibility of sunk state capital. These \n23 Collier, P., Glaeser, E., Venables, T., Manwaring, P., & Blake, M. (2018) Accessing \nopportunities: Policy decisions for enhancing urban mobility, Final Report, IGC online: \nhttps://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Accessibility-04.05.18.pdf \n24 Ibid\n25 World Bank (2016) “Nigeria. Lagos Urban Transport Project.Project Performance \nAssessment Report.”\n26 World Bank Independent Evaluation Group. “NG - LUTP-II (FY10) (P112956)\n27 World Bank (2016) “Nigeria. Lagos Urban Transport Project.Project Performance \nAssessment Report.” \nWith that success, the \nNURTW was able to \npay back their loans in \njust two years\nGiven the positive \noutcomes of first \nstages of BRT Lite \nimplementation, \ndevelopment finance \ninstitutions were \nmuch more willing to \nprovide finance for the \nexpansion of the BRT \nas part of the second \nphase\n13 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019\nconcerns were taken seriously by the state and the success of the BRT can be \npartly attributed to systems being put in place for citizens to express their views \nand have them addressed. \nOne of the biggest challenges LAMATA faced in this regard, was \ncommunicating with the existing bus operators and convincing them to engage \nwith the new system. The Lagos State Government therefore embarked on \nextensive negotiations with the politically powerful NURTW. They used these \nnegotiations to convince union officials of the widespread benefits of a BRT \nsystem – in particular, the prospect that BRT could offer direct employment \nvia hiring, training and renumerating existing drivers as well as indirect \nemployment through enhancing Lagos’ competitiveness. One of the key \nnegotiating tools for the state, was that they sponsored visits for the union \nofficials to see BRT and other bus services in other international cities, including \nCuritiba (Brazil) and Bogota (Colombia). Seeing how such systems had been \nsuccessfully integrated with exisiting bus services elsewhere, helped to persuade \nthe NURTW to adopt and franchise the BRT concepts locally, smoothing the \nlater transition of existing operators into the formal system.\nAfter the first lines became operational, the following administration under \nGovernor Fashola made further provisions to incorporate informal operators. \nExisting operators were encouraged to retrain their staff and it became known \nthat the best minibus drivers would be offered a career path in the more \nformalised BRT system. This had the additional benefit that operators of the \nmoule and danfo systems were incentivised to improve the overall quality of \ntheir service delivery so they could compete with the BRT Lite. \nThe choice of integrating the incumbent bus services rather than attempting to \neradicate them proved instrumental in gaining political support for the system \nfrom local communities. Commuters maintained their flexibility of choice for \nshared transport systems, while some of the more isolated, non-commercial \nroutes could still be maintained. In this way, the previous network provided a \nfeeder, ‘last mile’ service to routes which the BRT did not cover.\nDemonstrating quick wins through a project-driven \napproach\nThe focus on positive incremental change was at the heart of Lagos’s approach \nto transport reform. In particular, one of the main intentions of implementing a \nBRT Lite system, as opposed to a standard BRT, was to concentrate on essential \ngaps in infrastructure that could be targeted and addressed very quickly. These \nchoices for where to focus resources were based on where considerable positive \nchange could be made through relatively modest and cost-effective investments. \nTherefore, the investments that were undertaken, prioritised the creation \nof dedicated lanes, bus stops, depots and signalling infrastructure and the \nintroduction of reliable services to customers. \nTo put some of these infrastructure gaps into perspective, Lagos did not have \neven one single formal bus stop prior to the BRT implementation in 2008. It \nnow has approximately 260. Compared to London, where the bus system serves \nroughly half the number of citizens, the city has around 19,000 stops, roughly \n70 times as many than Lagos. By targeting resources towards a clear need in \nSeeing how such \nsystems had been \nsuccessfully integrated \nwith exisiting bus \nservices elsewhere, \nhelped to persuade \nthe NURTW to adopt \nand franchise the BRT \nconcepts locally\nThe choice of \nintegrating the \nincumbent bus services \nrather than attempting \nto eradicate them \nproved instrumental \nin gaining political \nsupport for the system \nfrom local communities\n14 — CITIES THAT WORK\nthe city, Lagos could build bus stops and curb the irregular stopping patterns \nof danfos, demonstrating a quick improvement to congestion thanks to their \nreform efforts. \nThe BRT itself took just 15 months to go from the conception phase to \nhaving the first line fully operational. Within the first 100 days of operation, \nthe system had carried over 9.7 million passengers and within six months of \noperations, it was over 29 million.28 An evaluation by the World Bank in 2009 \nsuggested that within a year of the operation of the BRT system, over 200,000 \ncommuters were using it daily, with passengers enjoying a reduction of fares, \njourney time, and an overall increase in quality of service. Short term and \nregular demonstrable improvements were critical in maintaining interest in and \nbuilding support for long-term reform.\n28 Ibid\nCommuters queue to board \nthe Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) \nin 2009. Photo credit: Pius \nUtomi Ekpei/AFP/Getty \nImages.\n15 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019\nMonitoring performance to meet expected \nstandards\nApart from the visible successes felt by passengers on a daily basis, it was also \nimportant to measure the performance of the BRT against the desired objectives \nof the government, as well as the changing needs of the city. Several studies \nhave assessed the impacts of the BRT, including both its successes and areas for \nimprovement.\nSuccessful outcomes of the BRT reform\nü Reduced congestion: even though BRT buses only accounted for around \n4% of vehicles on Lagos’ roads in 2009, it has been estimated that across \nthe whole transport system, average in vehicle journey times were reduced \nby 40% and average waiting times by 35%.29\nü Affordability: The Lagos BRT system has been able to maintain affordable \nfees for customers. Following the BRT’s introduction, one off fares in \nLagos actually decreased by 30 percent, from 140 Naira to 100 Naira,30\nhelping to bring-in low-income passenger groups. In the Mile 12 to Ikorodu \nBRT corridor the average monthly spend by individuals on bus travel \nhalved.\n31\nü Financial Sustainability: Operators can deliver their service without \nrelying on financial government assistance. It is self-sustaining even with \nthe 30% reduction in fees received by the user.32\nü Safety benefits: the operation of the BRT and reduction of bad habits \namong danfo operators has contributed to a reduction in accidents from \n139 to 96 accidents per 100,000.33\nü Employment: The Lagos BRT reforms generated 2000 direct new \nemployment opportunities for drivers, bus conductors, ticket sellers and \nmechanics. Moreover, transferring over to the formal system offered \noperators on the pre-existing danfo services a more stable, formalised \ncareer path. It is estimated that a further 10,000 jobs were indirectly \n29 Mobereola, D (2009) “Africa’s First Bus Rapid Transit Scheme”. Sub-Saharan Africa \nTransport Policy Program\n30 Mobereola, D (2009) “Africa’s First Bus Rapid Transit Scheme”. Sub-Saharan Africa \nTransport Policy Program\n31 World Bank Independent Evaluation Group. “NG - LUTP-II (FY10) (P112956)”\n32 Omole, D and Ndambuki, J (2014). Sustainable Living in Africa:Case of Water, \nSanitation, Air Pollution and Energy. Sustainability 6(8), 5187 - 5202\n33 World Bank Independent Evaluation Group. “NG - LUTP-II (FY10) (P112956)”\n16 — CITIES THAT WORK\ncreated through the operation of park and ride facilities as well as food \nservices.34 Some estimates indicate that there were socio-economic benefits \nindirectly impacting as many as 500,000 individuals.35\nü Environmental benefits: the introduction of the BRT has been associated \nwith a reduction in CO2 emissions of 13% and GHG emissions by 20%36, \nbenefits that are not only felt by users of the new system, but the wider \npopulation as well. \nAreas for improvement\nû Demand estimations: the BRT system introduced in 2008, though \nlaudable, became over saturated within few months of operation and \nfaced a big issue of demand and supply mismatch. Only 100 high floor \nbuses were initially available to the NURTW, yet it became apparent \nwithin the first year of operation that another 200 buses would be \nneeded.37 Responsive policymaking allowed some of this demand gap \nto be satisfied through leasing of buses through LAGBUS. However, \nat times many commuters would be stranded because the buses could \nnot sufficiently meet the growing demand of the city, particularly at \npeak periods. The experience shows that the need for flexibility and \ncontingency in plans to either upscale or downscale in reaction to demand \nis important.\nû Enforcement: enforcing traffic rules and respect for the BRT system \namong private vehicle users has been challenging, particularly because \nthe system is only 65% physically segregated from the regular lanes. As \na result, private vehicles are still able to drive in BRT lanes, although \nthey are not supposed to. Poor policing over vehicles using the lanes has \ntherefore impaired the overall speed of the system. \nû Private car to public transport shift. In 2009, 85% of the clientele using \nthe BRT had transferred from previously using danfos, however, due to \nthe difficulty in encouraging a private to public shift, only 6% of riders \nhad transferred from private cars. Ensuring a high quality customer \nexperience has since been an important focus for improvement in order to \ncapture higher income transport users.\n34 Peltier-Thiberge, N. (2015) “Lagos’ Bus Rapid Transit System: Decongesting and \nDepolluting Mega-Cities” World Bank Group, Transport for Development Blog\n35 UNHabitat (2013) “Planning and Design for Sustainable Urban Mobility: Global \nReport on Human Settlements 2013”\n36 Peltier-Thiberge, N. (2015) “Lagos’ Bus Rapid Transit System: Decongesting and \nDepolluting Mega-Cities” World Bank Group, Transport for Development Blog\n37 Mobereola, D (2009) “Africa’s First Bus Rapid Transit Scheme”. Sub-Saharan Africa \nTransport Policy Program\n17 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019\nLatest efforts to improve the transport system: the Bus \nReform Initiative (BRI)\nIn response to these areas for improvement, the Lagos State Government \nrecently embarked on an ambitious 3-year Bus Reform Initiative (2017-2019). \nThe program is spearheaded by Governor Ambode – building on the work of \nhis predecessors Bola Tinubu and Babatunde Fashola – and broadly aiming to \nenhance the customer experience and capacity of the public transport network.\nKey elements of the reform include: \n1 Buses: The replacement of all danfos, taking them off the street and in \ntheir place providing a fleet of 5000 new European standard HOVs and \nMidi-Buses which offer increased safety, reliability and comfort. 820 \nbuses have so far been procured, 520 of which are HOVs and 300 are \nMidi-buses.\n2 Infrastructures: The provision of world-class infrastructure to support \nthe transport system. This includes: the completion of remaining BRT \ncorridors, road and junction improvement works, as well as 954 new bus \nshelters and lay-bys, 13 new terminals, and 7 depots.\n3 Operations: 60 routes will be allocated to qualified bus operating \ncompanies whose performance will be monitored against set indicators \nfor service delivery. By allowing private operators to manage parts of the \npublic transport network, the government hopes to improve the capacity \nand overall conditions of the system. \n4 Digitisation: The increased digitisation of the network – including the \ncollection and dissemination of real-time service information, smart \nticketing and ITS-based route allocation.\n5 Staff training: Better support and training for drivers and bus attendees, \nincluding mandatory practical courses to ensure staff are adequately \ncertified to operate the bus services. \nWe provide some illustrative examples below of how the BRI is has been carried \nforwards in practice. For further details, we refer the reader to the appendix, \nwhere we provide project and infrastructure specifications that have been part \nof the reform to date, as well as pictures to showcase some of these. \nInfrastructure and operational improvements as part of the \nBRI\nThe first phase of the BRI commenced in Ikeja in 2018 as critical infrastructures \nsuch as depots, terminals and dedicated stops were constructed. Such \ninfrastructures are to be developed along all of the proposed routes of the \nreform initiative, covering major transport zones including Ikeja, Lagos Island, \nOshodi and Abule Egba. See Figure 1 in the appendix for a map showing the \nfull coverage of the BRI. \nOpearations of the buses then commenced in May 2019 starting with a pilot \non two major routes between Oshodi-Talafa Balewa Square and Oshodi-Berger. \nWithin the first six weeks of operation, from May 2nd to June 23rd, these two \n18 — CITIES THAT WORK\nroutes alone recorded a ridership volume of 84,903 and 75,554 passengers \nrespectively, meaning there were roughly 3,700 overall passengers travelling \nfrom Oshodi per day. Managing this traffic was only made possible because of \nthe recent construction of the Oshodi Transport Interchange, one of several new \ninfrastructure projects that the reform iniative is putting in place. \nBefore Oshodi was constructed, passengers had excessive troubles trying to \nboard buses: waiting points were undefined and unstandardized, boarding areas \nwere typically congested, and passengers were susceptible to injuries and theft. \nIn addition, the state of boarding areas was very poor, passengers had no shelter \nagainst harsh weather and the waiting environment was typically unclean and \npoorly maintained. However, the construction of the Oshodi terminal, has made \nthe environment efficient and more comfortable for all passengers: new state\u0002of-the-art terminals have shelters where passengers sit comfortably while they \nwait for their buses and designated spaces so passengers can queue in an orderly \nmanner as they move into the bus. Moreover, the infrastructure has made a \ntransformative difference to the management of vehicular traffic within and \naround the Oshodi terminal.\nIn parallel, the government has also made efforts to improve the flow of \ntraffic across the city through the extensive removal of bottlenecks in the \nroad network. Junction improvements, merge and exit lanes, roundabout \nmodifications, and pedestrian bridges have all been key areas of focus to \ncomplement the BRI. One example is the axis connecting Lekki and Victoria \nIsland: previously with nine roundabouts between Abraham-Adesanya and the \nLekki tollgate, citizens could spend as much as three hours travelling between \nthe centre and east of the city – a distance of only 18km.38 Since the government \nremoved six roundabouts, there has been a 75 percent reduction in traffic time \nand an estimated NRN87billion (~USD$240million)39 saving through reduction \nin fuel costs, environmental costs and lost travel time.\nFinally, the government is also opening up new routes for the BRT network \nsuch as the Oshodi-Abule-Egba corridor. The Oshodi-Abule-Egba corridor is \ncurrently one of the busiest corridors in West Africa, often experiencing huge \ncongestion, particularly during peak periods, where journey time can increase \n38 Ongoing transport reforms in the city of Lagos (2018) [Multimedia Item]. London, \nInternational Growth Centre\n39 Ongoing transport reforms in the city of Lagos (2018) [Multimedia Item]. London, \nInternational Growth Centre\nAerial picture of the Oshodi \nTransport Interchange \nbefore and after new \nconstruction work. Photo \ncredit: Planet Projects Ltd.\n19 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019\nby as much as 400%. Construction of the BRT corridor remains ongoing, with \noperations planned for early 2020, at which point it is expected that the BRT \ncorridor will carry over 300,000 passengers daily across a 13km stretch.\nThese efforts intend to enhance the overall quality, efficiency and reliability of \nthe bus network, changing the public perspective and strengthening trust in the \nsystem.\nIn summary\nThe Lagos transport reforms highlight that with the right motivation, \ndedication and leadership it is possible to achieve striking results. Since the \nimplementation of the BRT, the city has seen remarkable improvements across \na number of indicators that impact upon the everyday lives of citizens. We \nsummarise a few of the key highlights in the Table 3. \nTable 3: Lagos’s pre and post reform transport performance\nPre-reform Post-reform\nTransport cost Average 140 Naira Decreased 30% - 50%\nCongestion Very high Reduction in travel times of 40%\nGreenhouse gas emissions High Decreased 13% - 20%\nSafety 139 accidents per 100,000 Decreased 30%\nComfort levels Low Wide felt improvements\nOther benefits Direct & indirect employment, security of travel.\nSeveral features of the reforms are important to consider for replication in \nother cities. Firstly, policy learning from abroad was combined with a strong \nknowledge of the city context. Solutions were tailored towards integrating \nsociety and the danfo-dominated network rather than excluding it from \nthe decision-making process. Secondly, establishing a strong institutional \nfoundation for project coordination and setting the strategic plan was critical \nto the long-term success of reform. Lastly, utilising the incremental approach \nallowed the state to make quick, cost-effective and visible wins that were \nwitnessed by everyday citizens. These characteristics proved instrumental to the \nsuccesses of the Lagos transport reforms.\n20 — CITIES THAT WORK\nAppendix\nIn the sections below, we provide details of the coverage and infrastructures in \nthe Lagos Bus Reform Initiative. This information is from Planet Projects Ltd, a \nNigerian company that has been closely involved in the strategic planning and \nimplementation of various transport improvements in Lagos including the BRI. \nCoverage of the Bus Reform Initiative\nFigure 2: Map of Lagos Bus Reforms – Phase 1A\n21 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019\nAs part of the planning and implementation of the BRI, Lagos was divided into \nfive strategic transport zones in which targeted solutions could be made based \non the specific transport challenges of each area. These zones include: \n— Zone 1A: Ikeja;\n— Zone 1B: Lagos Island;\n— Zone 2A: Oshodi;\n— Zone 2B: Oshodi-Abule-Egba; \n— Zone 3: Strategic Linkages.\nFigure 2 provides a map of Phase 1 of the bus reforms initiative, showcasing the \nroutes and locations of proposed infrastructures.\nBus specifications:\n5,000 new buses (HOVs and Midi Buses) will be deployed to the public \ntransport route to replace the danfos. These buses provide more comfort, with \namenities like charging points and free Wi-Fi, for enhanced user experience and \nincreased ridership. The bus specifications are shown in Table 4.\nTable 4: Summary of Bus Specifications (HOV and Midi-buses)\nS/No. Bus Specifications (HOV & Midi-buses)\n1. Configuration and Size 2-Axle Single Deck, \n- HOV: Length 12m – 13m, Width 2.4m – 2.55m \nMidi-bus: Length 7m – 11m, Width 2.2m – 2.4m\n2. Ground Clearance 150mm – 450mm\n3. Seating Capacity HOV 40 - 50 Passengers, \nMidi-bus: 27 – 33 Passengers\n2x2 Distribution, Vinyl Seat Covers\n4. Standing Capacity HOV 30 - 45 Passengers, \nMidi-bus: 10 – 20 Passengers\n5. Passenger Door \nNumbers\n2 Double Leaf Pneumatically Operated Doors\nDoor Release Valve For Emergency Exit\nManual Ramp For Wheelchair Access\n6. Passenger Door \nPositions\nAhead Of Front Axle\nAhead Of Rear Axle\n7. Ventilation And Climate \nControl\nFully Air Conditioned\nSliding Windows, Tinted Glasses With UV Filtering and Heat \nInsulation\nRoof Hatches with 4 opening positions and emergency exit\n8. Suspension \nConfiguration\nAir Suspension \nKneeling Suspension\n22 — CITIES THAT WORK\nS/No. Bus Specifications (HOV & Midi-buses)\n9. Steering Configuration Left Hand Drive with integrated power steering\nSteering Column with pneumatic height and titlt adjustment\n10. Braking System Self-Adjusting Braking System (Slack Adjuster, Automatic)\nDrum Brake\nExhaust Brake Control, Automatic\nRetarder\n11. Power-Plant Location Centrally And Longitudinally Rear\n12. Engine HOV: 5-Cylinder, In-Line, Direct Injection, Turbo-Charge, 250hp\nMidi-bus: 4-Cylinder, In-Line, Direct Injection, Turbo-Charged, \n150hp\n13. Power-Plant Fueling Automotive Gas Oil (Diesel)\n14. Exhaust Emission \nStandards And \nTreatments\nEuro Ill, with Diesel Particulate Filter\nExhaust Catalysts\nFuel Cooler\nCentrifugal Oil Cleaner\n15. Transmission Type Automatic 6-Speed Transmission\n16. Windscreen Front – 2piece Green Laminated Glass [ECE-R 43]\nRear – 1 Piece Green Laminated Glass\n17. Destination Signs Electronic – LED\nExterior And Interior \n18. Electrical System Alternator – 2x 100A\nBatteries – 2x225AH (HOV), 2x150AH (Midi-bus), Maintenance \nFree\n19. Fuel Tank Internally Coated\nMinimum 300 Liters Capacity with preferably 2 Filling Points\nAnti- Siphon Device Fitted\n20. Front Axle \nRear Axle\nHOV: 7 Tonnes; Midi-bus: 3 tonnes \nHOV: Minimum 12 Tonnes; Midi-bus: 6 tonnes\n21. Body And Flooring Full Body Frame Insulation With Injected Polyurethane\nOverall Anticorrosion Treatment On Body Frame\nFiberglass And Aluminum Body\nFlooring – Marine Plywood, 14mm Thickness\nFlooring Covered With Heavy Duty Synthetic Material\n23 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019\nS/No. Bus Specifications (HOV & Midi-buses)\n22. Interior Accessories 1 nos. 6kg Fire Extinguisher – Driver’s Compartment\n1 Set Of Triangular Early Warning Device\n1 Box Of First Aid Kit\n4 Pieces Of Hammers For Breaking Windows In Case Of An \nEmergency\nWindscreen Roller Blind\nPassenger Bells With Buzzer And Warning On The Driver’s \nDashboard\nPA System\nTool Box\nEntertainment System (Dvd and Radio) With Speakers On Parcel \nRack\n23. Additional \nRequirements\nDriver’s enclosure \nTropicalisation of engines minimize engine overheating issues\nSpeed limiting device\nWarranty 5-years rust free on body frame\nElectronic Ticketing Machine ready\nTurnstiles at entry and exit points\nGPS enabled\nCCTV with minimum of 4 cameras for exterior and interiors views\nHub odometers\nCustomized operator logo\nWorkshop and operation manuals\n3-years warranty or 150,000km whichever comes first\nProvision of factory and local technical training\nSetup and initial managing of central workshops\nProvision of recommended fast moving spare part list with part \nnumbers for 3 years with fixed prices\nExisting or ability to setup Bus Manufacturing Assembly Plant in \nLagos, Nigeria within specified timeframe.\nUSB charging point at all passengers’ seats and In-bus Wi-Fi \ncoverage\n24 — CITIES THAT WORK\nInfrastructure Projects Status\nTable 2 provides a description of the various infrastructures that are included in \nPhase 1 of he BRI and their delivery status.\nTable 5: Status of Phase 1 Infrastructure Delivery\nS/No. Infrastructure Completed On-going Remaining balance\n1. Buses 820 (HOV – 520, \nMidi-bus – 300)\n- 4,180\n2. Depots 2; Yaba & Oshodi 1; Anthony 4\n3. Bus Shelters 100 - 854\n4. Bus Terminals 3; TBS, Ikeja, Oshodi 6; Yaba, Ojota, Agege, \nOyingbo, NAHCO, \nAjah\n18\n5. Junction Improvement \nWorks (JIW)\n- Ongoing -\n6. Intelligent Transport \nSystem\n- Ongoing -\nLagos Bus Reforms Buses – \nHOV bus\nLagos Bus Reforms Buses – \nHOV bus\n25 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019\nThe images below provide visuals of some of the infrastructures and their \nassociated impacts.\n3D architectural plan of \nthe Oshodi Transport \nInterchange\nAerial picture of the \ncompleted Oshodi \nTransport Interchange\nAerial picture of the Oshodi \nBus Depot\n26 — CITIES THAT WORK\nYaba Bus Terminal (currently \nunder construction)\nYaba Bus Depot\nTafawa Balewa Square Bus \nShelters\nTypical Bus Station & Lay-by\n27 — THE BRT AND THE DANFO: A CASE STUDY OF LAGOS’ TRANSPORT REFORMS FROM 1999-2019\nIkeja Bus Terminal – Before \n& After\nIkeja Bus Terminal\nWaiting points (before and \nafter)\nBoarding process (before \nand after)\nPassenger comfort during \ntransit (before and after)\nEnvironmental conditions \n(before and after)\nThe International Growth Centre (IGC) aims to promote sustainable growth in \ndeveloping countries by providing demand-led policy advice based on frontier \nresearch. Cities that Work is an initiative from the IGC to facilitate evidence\u0002based policy decisions on urbanization in developing countries, by synthesizing \neconomic research with the knowledge of urban planning practitioners and \npolicymakers. It is led by Paul Collier (Oxford University), Yvonne Aki Sawyer \n(Mayor of Freetown), Edward Glaeser (Harvard University), Astrid Haas (IGC), \nNaison Mutizwa-Mangiza (Director Regional Office for Africa, UN-Habitat), \nJonathan Leape (IGC), Jennifer Musisi (Executive Director of Kampala Capital \nCity Authority) and Tony Venables (Oxford University). \nPlease contact us at citiesthatwork@theigc.org.\nPlease cite the contents of this document as follows:\nOtunola, B., Kriticos, S., and Harman, O. (2019) The BRT and the danfo: \nA case study of Lagos’ transport reforms from 1999-2019. IGC Cities that \nWork Case Study."
  },
  {
    "url": "https://www.ssatp.org/sites/default/files/publication/DP09-Lagos-BRT.pdf",
    "text": "## Lagos Bus Rapid Transit\n\n### Africa’s first BRT scheme\n\n##### Dayo Mobereola\n\nSSATP Discussion Paper No. 9 Urban Transport Series\n\n## Lagos Bus Rapid Transit\n\n### Africa’s first BRT scheme\n\n##### Dayo Mobereola\n\nSSATP Discussion Paper No. 9 Urban Transport Series\n\nAfrica’s First Bus Rapid Transit Scheme\n\nAfrica’s First Bus Rapid Transit Scheme\n\nThe Lagos BRT-Lite System\n\nDayo Mobereola\n\nSeptember 2009\n\nSub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program\n\nThe SSATP is an international partnership to facilitate policy development and related capacity building in the transport sector in Sub-Saharan Africa.\n\nSound policies lead to safe, reliable, and cost-effective transport, freeing people to lift themselves out of poverty and helping countries to compete internationally.\n\n* * * * * * *\n\nThe SSATP is a partnership of  35 SSA countries  8 Regional Economic Communities  2 African institutions: UNECA, AU/NEPAD  10 active donors: European Commission (main donor), Denmark, France, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Islamic Development Bank, African Development Bank, and World Bank (host)  Numerous public and private state and regional organizations\n\n* * * * * * *\n\nThe SSATP gratefully acknowledges the financial contributions and support of the European Commission; the governments of Denmark, France, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and United Kingdom; and the Islamic Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the World Bank.\n\n* * * * * * *\n\nMore publications on the SSATP Website: www.worldbank.org/afr/ssatp\n\nThe findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the SSATP or its partners.\n\n© 2009 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank All rights reserved.\n\nDoctor Dayo Mobereola is Managing Director of the Lagos Area Transport Authority (LAMATA).\n\n#### Contents\n\nForeword vii \nAcknowledgments ix \nAcronyms and Abbreviations xi \nOverview 1 \nTransport in Lagos 3 \nLaunching the Lagos Urban Transport Project 4 \nCreating the Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority \n(LAMATA) 5 \nTackling Public Transport 6 \nLAMATA Launches the BRT System 7 \nDefining the Lagos BRT-Lite System 10 \nInstitutional and Regulatory Context 14 \nFinancing the Operating Fleet 18 \nSupply Managing Demand 21 \nClear and Consistent Political Support 22 \nCommunity Engagement 23 \nPerformance 28 \nConclusion: Critical Success Factors 37 \n\nvii\n\nForeword\n\nAfter years of struggling with a lack of reliable public transportation system, Nigerians living in the city of Lagos finally got to experience their first organized and efficient bus transport system. Launched in March 2008, the new Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system provides Lagos commuters with a clean, affordable and reliable means of getting around in the city. The BRT is a bus-based mass transit system that de livers fast, comfortable and cost-effective service.\n\nIn a city such as Lagos, this is no small feat. As the commercial capital of Nigeria and with a population of 17 million (the sixth largest city in the world), its highways are often extremely congested, partly because of the city’s layout. There is currently no organized mass transit system in the city and public transport services are of very poor quality and delivered mostly by individual bus operators.\n\nThis BRT system is the first of its kind in sub-Saharan Africa, and is the only example of a comprehensive and integrated approach to improv ing public transport. The project draws from best practice examples of Bogota (Columbia) and Curitiba (Brazil) but adapts the concept to African context, as BRT ‘Lite’ (i.e. a high-quality bus system that is af fordable in the local context while retaining as many of the most desira ble BRT characteristics as possible).\n\nSince the start of its implementation, the new system has brought about many positive changes. The evaluation suggests that thus far, over 200,000 commuters use this bus system daily, passengers enjoy a reduc tion of 30 percent in average fares (from 140 Naira in the past to 100 Naira currently) and a reduction of 40 percent in journey time, cut av erage waiting time by 35 percent, and experience a welcomed absence of exposure to theft on public transport. This has been made possible by the introduction of discipline in operations (route franchising), the increase in average speed (from less than 15 km/hour to 25 km/hour),\n\nviii\n\nand the creation of an enabling environment (investing in infrastruc ture needs).\n\nThis project has demonstrated and confirmed the strategic role of pub lic transportation in a megacity and the critical role of commitment and leadership at the highest levels of government. The Lagos BRT-lite sys tem provides a good example for replication in other cities. If Lagosians can do it in Lagos, it can be done anywhere else, with the right motiva tion, commitment, dedication, and leadership.\n\nAjay Kumar SSATP Urban Transport Thematic Leader\n\nix\n\nAcknowledgments\n\nThis review of the first Bus Rapid Transit Scheme in SSA was underta ken by Integrated Transport Planning Ltd. under the guidance of the Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA) staff, partic ularly Gbenga Dairo, Desmond Amiegbebhor, Lanre Akintillo, and Kemi Efunshade. The evaluation instruments and the framework were developed by Colin Brader, Ian Barrett, and their team at the ITP. This work would not have been so productive and efficient without the valu able assistance of the team at LAMATA. In addition, I wish to thank the Department of Physical Planning of the Lagos State Government, the Government Monitoring Team, Lagos NURTW (the first BRT Co Operative Society Ltd.), the Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA), Ecobank Nigeria PLC, IBIS Transport Consultants Ltd., and Business Interactive Consulting. The work was undertaken in col laboration with the World Bank and a special thanks to Ajay Kumar and Samuel Zimmerman for their support.\n\nxi\n\nAcronyms and Abbreviations\n\nAU/NEPAD Africa Union/New Partnership for Africa’s \nDevelopment \nBRT bus rapid transit \nEC European Commission \nITP Integrated Transport Planning Ltd \nKAI “Kick against Indiscipline” \nLAMATA Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority \nLASTMA Lagos State Traffic Management Authority \nLSG Lagos State Government \nLUTP Lagos Urban Transport Project \nNBFI Nonbank financial institution \nNURTW National Union of Road Transport Workers \nRTEAN Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria \nSSA Sub-Saharan Africa \nSSATP Sub-Saharan African Transport Policy Program \nUNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa \n\nOverview\n\nAfrica’s first bus rapid transit (BRT) scheme began operations on March 17, 2008, in Lagos, Nigeria. Called “BRT-Lite”, it is a form of the BRT system, but it is not of the highest specification like the TransMi lenio in Bogota or the Brisbane South East Busway, both of which cost about $6 million per kilometer. This new form of the BRT scheme is aimed at delivering a transport system that will meet the needs of local users, while improving citizens’ quality of life, economic efficiency, and safety within a clearly defined budget.\n\nTwo aspects of the system—the relatively short time, 15 months, re quired to go from conception to operation and its delivery at a cost of $1.7 million per kilometer—make its development unique. This expe rience is relevant to the many cities throughout the world seeking to develop a BRT system. The BRT-Lite system in Lagos is now carrying almost 200,000 passengers a day, but its capacity will not allow it to satisfy all the demand forecast. Within its first 100 days, the system car ried 9.7 million passengers, and within its first six months of operation 29 million passengers.\n\nThe BRT-Lite system operates along a 22-kilometer route of which 65 percent is physically segregated from the regular roadway and 20 per cent is separated by road markings. However, its success stems not sole ly from its infrastructure but from a holistic approach that has included reorganizing the bus industry, financing new buses, creating a new in stitutional structure and regulatory framework to support the system, and training the personnel needed to drive, maintain, enforce, and manage it. While meeting these technical and organizational challenges, BRT officials were also engaging the public and promoting the new sys tem. In return, the public quickly adopted the new system, and the\n\npraise was plentiful. All this was achieved within an extremely challeng ing environment and during an election for the new state governor.\n\nAccording to the evaluation of the BRT-Lite system completed in the fall of 2008, its users were saving travel time, had fewer transfers, were traveling cheaper, and felt safer. Businesses along the system’s corridor were positive; the new system improved accessibility—staff found it easi er to get to work and to travel on company business. Negative com ments primarily revolved around the need for more routes and buses. Problems, then, do exist and improvements will be made, but the over riding factor is that the BRT-Lite service is having a beneficial effect on the quality of life of a large part of the traveling population of Lagos.\n\nMore broadly, the evaluation declared the scheme an unprecedented success. The critical success factors were defined as a significant and consistent political commitment, the presence and abilities of a strategic public transport authority in LAMATA (Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority), a scheme definition that concentrates on essen tial user needs and deliverability within a budget and program, the work undertaken to engage key stakeholders and ensure that they bene fit, and a community engagement program that has worked to assure Lagosians that the BRT-Lite system is a community project created, owned, and used by them.\n\nTransport in Lagos\n\nThe BRT-Lite system was born into challenging circumstances. The Lagos metropolitan area has a population estimated at between 15 and 18 million, and projected (conservatively) to grow to more than 25 mil lion by 2025. If such growth materializes, the metropolitan area would become the third largest agglomeration in the world, after Tokyo and Mumbai. Already it has expanded well beyond the boundary of Lagos State into Ogun State, and this reality was formally recognized in 2006 when Olusegun Obasanjo, the former president of Nigeria, accompa nied by the governors of the two states, launched the Lagos Mega City Project.\n\nAt that time, Lagos was the only \nmegacity (defined by UN Habitat \nas a city with a population of over \n10 million) without any organized \npublic transport system (although \nthose in Karachi and Dhaka had \nlargely collapsed by the end of the \nlast century). Lagosians relied for \ntheir mobility on a large fleet of 75,000 minibuses (danfo), together with \nsmaller numbers of midi-buses (molue) and shared taxis (kabu-kabu). \nFor local journeys, they employed \nmotor-cycle taxis (okada). Danfo \nand molue are low quality modes of \ntransport with variable fares, and \njourneys are slow and uncomforta \nble. They favor short distances to \nmaximize profit rather than to serve \ndemand, and their drivers have a \nreputation of being aggressive. \n\nIn Lagos, the inadequacy of the road network (insufficient road length relative to the population, a limited number of multilane arterial roads, and generally poor road maintenance) and the relatively high level of car ownership for a developing country (encouraged by subsidized pe troleum prices and unrestricted imports of second-hand vehicles) ex acerbated the traffic congestion inherent in this form of public trans port. As a result, the typical journey for commuters from the main resi dential areas to the north and west of the city to Lagos Island could take more two hours, especially when vehicle breakdowns, accidents, and flooding blocked the roads.\n\nLaunching the Lagos Urban Transport Project\n\nWhen new administrations were elected at the federal and state levels in 1999, transport was identified as one of the most pressing issues in La gos State. In response, the governor, Bola Tinubu, appointed a special adviser on transportation and sought development assistance from the World Bank Group.\n\nBuilding on concepts from earlier studies, the Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP) began by building the capacity to manage the transport system and identifying the priority actions, investments, and enabling measures needed for its improvement. The project adopted a multi modal transport approach, recognizing the potential for developing rail and inland waterway mass transit for integration with the core road passenger transport network.\n\nFrom the outset, enhanced bus services were a core component of LUTP, and it so included the development of a bus way—though pri marily as a measure to complement the mass transit railway proposal. Direct financing of new buses by the World Bank was also considered,\n\nbut the problems with the earlier Federal Transit Program—finance de faults and short vehicle lives—suggested caution in this area.\n\nLAMATA also recognized it would have to exercise regulatory control over the private sector bus operators and introduce some order in this market, where the response to demand in terms of fare level and routing had been taken to extremes. It began by exercising the existing powers for the registration of route licenses, effectively on demand, and opted to introduce “controlled competition” for market entry once the appropriate legislation was in place.\n\nPhase 1 of LUTP focused on fast-return investments, such as road maintenance or rehabilitation and junction improvements, but it also included the preparation of technical, environmental, and social meas ures for possible future mass transit development that might be sup ported within a private-public financing framework.\n\nCreating the Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA)\n\nAn analysis of the transport situation in Lagos revealed the lack of any mechanism to coordinate the plans and actions of the various agencies at the federal, state, and local government levels for managing, main taining, and developing the transport network in a holistic and inte grated manner. Furthermore, most of these agencies lacked a secure financial basis for their operations; their budgets were vulnerable to fiscal pressures and higher political priorities.\n\nThe creation of an appropriate coordinating authority was therefore placed at the heart of LUTP, together with measures to ensure its sus tainability through a lien on transport user charges. The LAMATA Law of 2002 established and empowered the authority. It was given jurisdic-\n\ntion over the conurbation in Lagos State and a declared network of primary and secondary roads that carried the large bulk of road traffic, as well as the power to plan and coordinate public transport and make recommendations on route planning. LAMATA was staffed with highly motivated professionals, many former residents of Nigeria, who had experience worldwide in transport and management.\n\nTackling Public Transport\n\nThe implications of introducing a controlled-competition regime for the core road passenger transport in Lagos were explored in a detailed study undertaken in late 2003. This study discovered that, among other things, the structure of the road transport industry was not readily amenable to regulatory control and held the power to block any at tempts at reform.\n\nIt also found that the private operators were not in a position to make the necessary investments in larger buses, whose fewer numbers (in comparison with minibuses) would reduce congestion and whose greater capacity would raise productivity, thereby offering the potential of lower fares or enabling scheduled services (as opposed to the tradi tional fill-and-run) at the same fare.\n\nAfter an extended period of consultation with and education of the lea dership of the operator unions and associations, agreement was reached to test both the regulatory reform and the fleet investment in a pilot scheme using the private-public financing framework envisaged in the establishment of LUTP. LAMATA would provide the enabling frame work, including traffic systems management measures in the corridor and passenger terminals and a depot and workshops complex for the new fleet; the operators would accept the regulatory enforcement and commit to procuring the appropriate buses.\n\nLAMATA Launches the BRT System\n\nIntegrated Transport Planning Ltd. (ITP) was asked in August 2006 to \nundertake a “Feasibility Study for an Initial Corridor for the Lagos Bus \nRapid Transit (BRT) System.” The study, which encompassed \ninfrastructure, operations, and regulatory and institutional reform, was \nlaunched with the goal of developing a BRT system with the following \ncharacteristics: \n Efficient service (low cost, high frequency, high speed, high oc \ncupation, high safety, low emissions) \n Adequate institutional and regulatory framework \n Significant socioeconomic benefits, especially for the low-income \npopulation \n Maximum private participation \n Minimum public expenditures and liability \n Adequate mitigation of environmental and social impacts of the \nBRT system. \nThis challenge had to be met with an open mind informed by the expe \nrience worldwide with the BRT system and guided by an understanding \nof the local transport context (opportunities and constraints), local user \nneeds, and the key issues surrounding deliverability. The BRT concept \nwas assumed to be a flexible one, implying a systems-based approach to \npublic transport, but defined by local user needs, context, and delivera \nbility. \n\nBRT ”users” were defined as the traveling public, together with the system providers—that is, the stakeholders who were key to delivery and those who were guardians of the wider policy objectives. Each party with either an interest in the BRT system and its delivery or an investment (financial or emotional) in its achievement had to be represented within the effort to define the system. This approach demanded that the consultants work closely with LAMATA, drawing on its efforts to harness and guide the wider stakeholder groups, de veloping their role in and un derstanding of BRT implemen tation, bringing in international expertise in approaches that might meet local aspirations, and seeking to understand the needs of local travelers.\n\nThe Needs of the Traveler \nThe needs of the traveler were determined using the following methods: \n Ethonographic observation. This method consisted of discreet ob \nservation of travelers’ access to transport, their contacts and rela \ntionships with the various actors involved in transport, and their \ndemeanors and actions. \n\nThe 22-km BRT-Lite route from Mile 12 to Lagos Island\n\n Qualitative/qualitative surveys. Surveys were conducted to estab lish formal data such as fare elasticity and value of time, but also to gather details on the relative importance of walk, wait, and travel times, transport choice issues, and the most important ob stacles to the ideal use of transport.  Focus groups. A series of focus groups were held to explore in de tail the issues related to travel in Lagos by different demographic groups, as well as to test the features that may or may not be ap plied within a BRT system. The following concerns were identified as very important to travelers:  Safety. The incidence of crime on vehicles and while waiting for vehicles to arrive was high. The crimes ranged from theft to physical abuse. The disorder and chaos surrounding public transport was viewed as an opportunity for criminals, and, where crime was not present, the almost constant intimidation and general chaos led to undue stress on travelers.  Fare levels. Public transport fare levels often varied according to demand, weather conditions, and the whim of the conductor. A significant proportion of the traveling public is highly fare sensi tive, with some making daily decisions about whether to travel based on available funds.  Long and unreliable journey times. The practice of vehicles not leaving until full, of short services that required transferring to another vehicle, and the lack of transport penetration into resi dential areas, together with the widespread and variable conges tion ranging from high to intolerable, meant that public trans port journeys were both long and uncertain.  Comfort. The state of many buses was very bad. Lack of uphols tery on seats and the rusted metal edges that ripped clothing or caused injury were common. Therefore, travelers placed value on a basic level of comfort that would avoid these problems.\n\nIn satisfying traveler user needs the BRT system had to, above all else, \nhave the following attributes: \n Safe, both on the vehicle and accessing it \n Affordable, with constant and easily understandable fares \n Reliable, offering improved and reliable journey times. \n\nDefining the Lagos BRT-Lite System\n\nThe pilot BRT corridor was chosen by means of the feasibility study, and today the BRT system runs along Ikorodu Road, Western Avenue, and Eko Bridge, a key 22-kilometer radial highway that connects Mile 12 and Lagos Island (the traditional central business district). Before implementation of the BRT system, the highway enjoyed a wide carria geway that ran two or three lanes in each direction; service roads run alongside about 60 percent of its length. The BRT corridor crosses over one of the three bridges that connect the mainland with Lagos Island, and so the route effectively connects extended suburbs, satellite centers, to the traditional central business district of Lagos.\n\nThe concept of a BRT system was the subject of an open discussion with the BRT Steering Committee, chaired by the commissioner for trans port, Muiz Banire, and composed of key stakeholders. The group viewed an artist’s impressions of the median and bilateral operation of cars and buses on the chosen corridor, both equipped with physical segregation of BRT buses from the rest of the vehicular traffic. Partici pants quickly recognized that the BRT system was not necessarily a long-term grand aspiration, but was instead something readily delivera ble. The visualization showed immediately what benefit the system would bring to bus run times and consequently to those traveling along the corridor. From that point on, and in parallel with the development\n\nof a “BRT-Classic” scheme, a project was launched to define a “BRT Lite” system.\n\nAn artist’s rendering of what the BRT-Lite system might look like.\n\nPreliminary engineering designs for the corridor recommended virtual ly continuous bilateral segregation, with breaks where merges and di verges were needed to and from service roads. Other breaks were provi sionally recommended for viaducts and overpasses where concerns about structural integrity, together with width constraints, made physi cal segregation using concrete curbs impossible. The final result is a BRT system in which about 65 percent is physically segregated from other traffic, 20 percent is separated by bus lanes (marked in paint), and 15 percent mixes with other traffic. Although total segregation may have been preferable, the overall need for delivery and improved run times by concentrating infrastructure on where it had the best impact meant adopting pragmatic solutions. Periodic breaks in the segregation to allow for merge or diverge across the BRT roadway ensured that any broken-down vehicles could be easily towed and that approaching BRT vehicles would be able to drive around any blockage. This level of flex ibility is important in a system in which demand could exceed supply.\n\nIn the system as implemented, lanes are typically 3.3 meters wide and are separated from other traffic by concrete curbs that are 400 millime ters high. Lanes are the minimum width that can support uncon strained, safe operations, and curb height is the minimum that will de ter lateral intrusion. Gaps of about 0.2 meters were left in the curbs to allow storm water to drain, thereby avoiding the need to reposition road drainage.\n\nStandard detailed drawings and cross-sections were produced of areas of relative complexity (such as merge and diverge locations). Detailed design and construction contracts were signed with contractors, who worked largely from the preliminary engineering design produced by ITP. ITP and the contractors worked together to ensure that the con cept was carried through to construction. This approach, managed and guided by LAMATA, reduced the scheme design period by removing a detailed design phase and achieving the continuity needed to make sure that the concept was not lost in the subsequent design.\n\nAlong the BRT-Lite corridor, new shelters were built to give order and structure to vehicle boarding. Tickets are purchased upon entering the stop, and passengers then queue before entering the bus. The shelter protects passengers from the sun by means of an opaque glass canopy. A similar design style is used at the terminals, where more space is provided for boarding and alighting.\n\nThe BRT-Lite system runs seven days a week, between 0600 and 2200 on weekdays and with reduced hours of operation on the weekends. Vehicles are dispatched from a terminus when available to accommo date the almost constant demand. As such headways (the time interval between two vehicles traveling in the same direction on the same route)\n\nare not part of operational planning but a product of vehicle availability and a desire to meet demand in the context of journey time variability en route. The out turn headway is typically between 30 and 60 seconds.\n\n BRT running lane \n Carriageway lining \n Type 2 concrete \nsegregation \n Warning signage \n Yellow box area \n Merge area \n Extension of diverge \n“nose” \nGive way marking \n\nBRT lane: typical merge/diverge arrangement\n\n| | BRT stop structure  | | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| | Entry taper and layby  | | | | |\n| | Type 2 concrete  | | | | |\n\n Pedestrian warning \nsignage \n Pedestrian crossing \npoints \nsegregation \n Stop landscaping \nfeature \n Running lane \nStop lighting \n New lighting \n\nBRT stop: typical arrangement\n\nA new terminus was built at Mile 12 utilizing the underside of the highway flyover. The existing terminus at Tafawa Balewa Square on Lagos Island was modified. A new depot was built alongside the route to park the 100 new vehicles. It now houses and maintains over 200 vehicles.\n\nA driver training program was instigated to retrain bus drivers in use of the infrastructure and customer care. An incentive for drivers to partic ipate was their new title—pilots. The concept is popular, with users refer ring to whether they will or will not “fly” BRT!\n\nInstitutional and Regulatory Context\n\nThe delivery of the BRT-Lite system involved the cooperation of mul tiple agencies for several reasons. First, development of the system had to be situated within the context of the state’s master plan for land use and spatial development To ensure that synergy was maximized be tween development of the BRT-Lite system and the master plan, repre sentatives of the state master plan sat on the BRT Steering Committee.\n\nSecond, transfer of the control of the federal highway over which the BRT-Lite system operates to Lagos State involved the Lagos State Minis tries of Transportation and of Works. Even though the BRT-Lite system is a Lagos State Government (LSG) initiative, the cooperation of these bodies could not be taken for granted. One result was that the construc tion of the BRT-Lite infrastructure was contracted directly by LAMATA and not through the Lagos State Ministry of Works.\n\nThird, oversight of primary traffic management and enforcement in the state lies with the Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA), a body that reports to the State Commissioner for Trans port. Co-operation between LASTMA and LAMATA improved mar kedly in recent years, and so LASTMA was prepared to commit to the BRT-Lite scheme the significant resources needed to protect the exclu sive use of its infrastructure and to manage traffic conflicts in the box junctions at the various highway merges and demerges.\n\nFinally, the BRT-Lite system needed the support of the state initiative “Kick against Indiscipline” (KAI) to help with management of the pub lic, particularly at the stations and terminals. This management in cluded traders and hawkers on the walkways or sidewalks and orderly queuing at the bus stops and vehicle parks (terminals).\n\nLAMATA as regulator and sector sponsor The original powers granted to LAMATA in the domain of passenger transport had been limited to the planning and coordination of such transport, not its actual regulation. However, the revised LAMATA Law passed by the House in late 2006 defined LAMATA’s function as, among other things, to “plan, regulate and co-ordinate the supply of adequate and effective public transport in all travel modes and support ing infrastructure within metropolitan Lagos”. The revised law also granted LAMATA specific powers to make regulations (with the ap proval of the governor) related to its functions. With these powers, LAMATA’s role as the sector regulator was unambiguous.\n\nThe law also granted LAMATA the power to “prepare plans for the management and development of transportation in metropolitan La gos” and, in conjunction with the Ministry of Works, to “construct, re construct, maintain and manage transport infrastructure and facilities” necessary for the discharge of its functions. This legislation thus empo wered LAMATA to act as the sponsor and promoter of mass transit schemes in Lagos and therefore to develop the BRT-Lite system.\n\nNURTW and the transport industry The organization of road passenger transport operations in Nigeria falls by law under two separate bodies: the Road Transport Employers Asso ciation of Nigeria (RTEAN) and the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW). Over time, RTEAN, which represents mainly owners’ interests, came to dominate the interurban and large-bus sec-\n\ntors. NURTW, which focuses on drivers and workers in the transport sector, dominates the urban and small-bus sectors.\n\nAlthough NURTW is a national body, it is organized along state lines with its own council and related administrative functions. The opera tional level of the union is managed by its branches, which divide the network into zones based on the principal terminals (known locally as vehicle or lorry parks). Routes (lines) are controlled by the relevant branch(es). Vehicles pay fees for registration and each terminal depar ture. They queue for boarding, and only leave the terminal when full (in the direction of predominant travel at peak hours). NURTW exercises little control over operations once vehicles have left the terminal, and most vehicles board and let off passengers on demand along the route.\n\nThe large majority of small commercial buses that dominate the trans port supply are operated not by their owners but by individual drivers who pay a daily rental fee (“deliver”) to the owner for the use of the vehicle. The driver absorbs all the direct operating expenses, such as hiring a conductor, buying fuel, making minor repairs, and paying sys tem access fees (including extortion by enforcement agencies). The owner retains responsibility for maintenance and major repairs and covers fixed costs such as finance, licensing, and insurance. The rela tionship is analogous to an operating lease for the use of the vehicle and is standard practice for the sector within the region.\n\nNURTW had recognized the need to upgrade the ailing vehicle fleet and meet the challenges of increasing demand. This recognition was fos tered by LAMATA through a process of educating the operators about the options for an organized collective transport system and how such systems are organized and operated. This educative process included tours of South American BRT systems in 2004 and 2006.\n\nThe need to actively involve NURTW and RTEAN in the development of the BRT-Lite system was viewed as essential. Previous attempts at formalizing public transport on Ikoyi/Victoria Island had failed because\n\nof the inability to effectively engage the unions. In this instance, howev er, the bus franchising activities under way elsewhere in Lagos in paral lel with development of the BRT-Lite system helped the parties to un derstand their respective roles in and the benefits of public-private co operation.\n\nRoad traffic regulations Both federal and state legislation set out standards for the use and con struction of motor vehicles, but these standards are not consistent.\n\nThe federal regulations are broadly appropriate for a standard single deck bus or coach; height and length limits effectively preclude double deck or articulated buses. The specific standards for omnibuses related to passenger access and comfort levels (height of steps, size and spacing of seats, etc.) are well below international norms, but they place no bar rier to the implementation of a higher quality of service where desired. By contrast, the state regulations, based on a Road Traffic Law dating back to 1949, are an obsolete set of standards.\n\nRegulation of passenger transport services The current LAMATA Law not only provides for the reestablishment of the Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority with the appropriate functions and powers, as just reported, but also repeals the Public Transportation (Commuter Buses) Registration and Restriction Law of 2004. That poorly drafted and wholly unenforceable law had effectively rendered all operators other than Lagbus Asset Management Ltd. (Lag bus), a Lagos State Government initiative, illegal. Not only had the coexistence of that law and the Bus Franchise Regulation under s.21 of the first LAMATA Law led to confusion, but it also had been inter preted as conferring regulatory powers on Lagbus, which would be in conflict with the establishment of LAMATA itself. Repeal of the law, therefore, had been an essential component of the effort to secure the\n\nexclusivity of operations required for the viability of the BRT-Lite scheme.\n\nThe BRT-Lite regulation \nThis regulation was published to coincide with the launch of the BRT \nLite system, but it had been the subject of a public education campaign \nin the period immediately beforehand. The regulation applied to all \nright of way within the BRT-Lite corridor, and so included not only the \nsystem’s running lanes but also the parallel general traffic and service \nlanes as well as the walkways or sidewalks. \n\nThe primary provision of the regulation prohibited the operation of vehicles other than those franchised for the BRT-Lite scheme (and cer tain emergency services) in the designated infrastructure. However, supporting provisions were designed to facilitate the free movement of traffic in the reduced-capacity roadway alongside the BRT-Lite running lanes, principally by restricting other commercial buses to the service lanes and totally prohibiting heavy commercial traffic during the peak hours.\n\nAlthough this regulation was made under the powers granted to LAMATA when it was reestablished, it was also formally approved by the governor in order to preclude any challenge from other vested in terests. It thus acted as the final regulatory security needed for the BRT Lite scheme.\n\nFinancing the Operating Fleet\n\nTwo contrasting approaches were taken to financing the large buses needed for the BRT-Lite system. In one approach, 100 new buses were procured by the private sector without any direct public support. In the\n\nsecond, 120 buses were procured by a state-owned company and then leased to the private sector operator (an additional 40 buses were oper ated directly by the state-owned company).\n\nThe projects officer of the Lagos State Council of NURTW was charged in 2005 with identifying buses that would be suitable for operation un der local road and climatic conditions and yet still affordable to the owner and the end user. This process led to the selection of a conven tional truck-derivative passenger chassis from Ashok Leyland in India, with bodywork from the same country despite the shipping costs.\n\nNURTW was able to prepare a credible business plan for its operation on intercity routes to the states adjoining Lagos, and thereby attract the interest of both the vehicle supplier and the financial sector, which would have to finance the new vehicles. However, reallocation of the buses to the unproven BRT-Lite scheme for operations within the city proved more challenging, though some banks and nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) were still prepared to engage in the development process, and risk management measures were devised to allay their con cerns. Principal among these measures was the security of repayment to the financier, which was addressed in two ways.\n\nFirst, the scheme design gave the bank the initial lien on revenues col lected from services; only the balance (after the deduction of financing costs) was passed on to the operator. The bank also was given the right to act as ticket distributor and security monitor.\n\nSecond, the scheme design required the participating operators to ac cept collective liability for all the obligations into which they enter. Any individual default, whether by embezzlement of revenues or through vehicle unavailability (perhaps as a result of an accident or mechanical failure), would be met by an additional charge on all the remaining members. When the default was fraudulent, the individual would also lose his deposit/collateral (although this provision was deliberately set\n\nat a level that would not entail loss of all a deposit/collateral so that it would not be a deterrent to participation in the scheme).\n\nThe collective liability was intended to enable participants to self-insure against their own damage and routine third-party risks (retaining catas trophe cover), this proved unacceptable in the pilot implementation.\n\nFrom the operators’ perspective, the two main risks to their participa tion in the scheme were that the new buses would not carry enough passengers to cover the high fixed costs of vehicle finance, and that the buses would not provide the reliability required from adequate main tenance over the finance tenor over time. Clearly, the first of these risks would be addressed through the productivity gains arising from the segregated roadways devoted to the BRT-Lite system, but the second required a commitment from the vehicle supplier to make available locally spare parts and technical support and training from a small team of expatriate service engineers.\n\nDespite all of these steps and measures, no financial institution chose to participate in the scheme. The vehicle supplier eventually resolved this matter by offering to accept deferred payment over two years, provided that a local bank underwrite the counterparty risk. Ecobank Nigeria agreed to this arrangement, but it, in turn, required that senior officers of NURTW lodge collateral personal guarantees in order to mitigate that risk exposure. Fortunately, the levels set for these guarantees were proportionate to the financial capacities of those who had to provide them, covering less than 10 percent of the total transaction value, and so could be put in place.\n\nOnce all the financial arrangements were finalized, the vehicle order was confirmed for shipment in the first half of 2007. Delivery was then made in two batches, arriving in Lagos in June and September of that year.\n\nWhile LAMATA was leading the development of an integrated trans port sector, the Lagos State Government was sponsoring a parallel initi ative for Lagos Metropolitan Priority Bus Services that was also in tended to address the public transport deficit. Lagbus Asset Manage ment Ltd. was established as a wholly state-owned enterprise for the purpose of procuring buses for lease to private operators. It was envi sioned that this company would then earn revenue for the state in the near term and develop a track record for flotation once its developmen tal role had been fulfilled. Meanwhile, Lagbus’s choice of bus led to high lease charges, and consequently it was forced into the role of operator, running a radial service along a route that had priority through painted bus lanes. But performance was disappointing, and further rollout over the intended priority network was delayed at the same time that the idle fleet at Lagbus was growing because of the delivery of new vehicles. This situation presented Lagbus with an opportunity to augment the NURTW service on BRT-Lite, and it was agreed that Lagbus would provide express services from the outer terminal at Mile 12 and the in termediate terminal at Moshalashi under its own branding. Twenty-five buses are deployed in this service, with a further 15 held in reserve.\n\nSupply Managing Demand\n\nInitially, only the 100 standard high-floor buses newly acquired by NURTW were available. Demand forecasts estimated that over 300 bus es, operating at 20-second headways, would be needed to fully satisfy demand. Clearly, then, not all of the demand could be satisfied, and fully regulating the corridor would overload the system, leading to fru stration and the loss of support. At launch, the 100 buses were allocated as stopping services, and an additional 25 buses, owned and operated by Lagbus, were allocated as express services. But because these buses were still too few to satisfy the demand, 120 more buses were leased from Lagbus to serve as additional stopping services.\n\nMeanwhile, an innovative \napproach that allowed the \nresolution of several issues was \nadopted. Molue and danfo \nalready operating along the \ncorridor were not replaced by \nthe BRT-Lite system outright, \nbut were merely prevented \nthrough BRT regulation from operating on the main road. With these \nvehicles operating on the service roads, travelers then had freedom to \nchoose between public transport modes. In this way, the opera \ntors/drivers who did not retrain could continue working, the demand \ncould be met, and the main road traffic flow could be speeded up \nthrough the removal of slow vehicles that, historically, had a habit of \nstopping in the carriageway and disrupting other traffic. The result was \nmarket segmentation through an approach that would allow freedom of \nchoice through partial corridor regulation, would ensure that no travel \ners were left unserved and, in the medium to long term, would improve \nthe quality of service of molue and danfo as the need to compete with \nthe BRT-Lite system increases. This solution to a supply problem \nproved to be a significant benefit in securing political and community \nsupport. \n\nClear and Consistent Political Support\n\nThe Lagos Urban Transport Project was initiated during Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s tenure as governor of Lagos State. His commitment to an integrated transport system with bus transit as a first point of deli very gave context and support to the BRT feasibility study and was arti culated by his commissioner of transport, Muiz Banire, who chaired the BRT Steering Committee. Governor Tinubu initiated the BRT-Lite sys-\n\n“Though there are still traffic jams on Ikorodu Road, especially during rush hours, anyone caught in such traffic snarls is in such a situation by his choice because they have the option of keeping their vehicles at home and using the BRT buses, which are clean and safe.” —A commuter\n\ntem, committing the funding, resources, and regulatory reform re quired.\n\nGovernor Tinubu’s term as state governor ended on May 2007 when Babatunde Raji Fashola was elected governor. Governor Fashola, who was from the same political party as Governor Tinubu, had the same beliefs about and commitment to the integrated transport approach as his predecessor. At a time of political change, the commitment to sup porting a movement away from private cars to public transport was a key factor in the success of the BRT-Lite system. In particular, Gover nor Fashola showed special courage in his commitment to the new scheme in the face of the inevitable criticism during its construction phases. By providing unwavering support, he ensured that political risk, often present in fledgling public-private partnerships, did not present a barrier to private sector participation. His decision to support opera tions by providing public financing for training, uniforms, and welfare for drivers, together with his commitment of public funds for mainten ance, underscored his commitment to public transport—a form of transport used by the many but in the past influenced by the few.\n\nCommunity Engagement\n\nThe BRT-Lite system was developed within a city with little knowledge of LAMATA or what organized public transport might be like, with a history of poor delivery of transport improvements, and with systems that sought to ensure that profit was directed to the already well-to-do. For that reason, the potential for skepticism and suspicion of motives and intentions was rife. The objective of the community engagement strategy launched by LAMATA at project commencement was therefore aimed at developing within the citizens of Lagos the same kind of own ership level for the BRT-Lite system found among delivery-oriented stakeholders.\n\nWithin the some 6 million people living in the catchment of the BRT \nLite corridor, three target groups were identified: \n Those who had no vehicles and were captive to public transport \nand who would be primary beneficiaries of the BRT-Lite system \n(approximately 65 percent of the total catchment). \n Those who had vehicles but were reluctant users, and who, under \nthe right set of conditions, would use the BRT-Lite system (ap \nproximately 25 percent). \n The super rich, who would not be BRT-Lite system users but \nwho would have a strong voice and so would be able to spread \ninfluence and might benefit from the decongestion effects of the \nnew system (approximately 10 percent). \nIt was essential to contact each of these parties in order to develop \nknowledge of the BRT-Lite system and the benefits to its users. The \napproach used was to build upon the same principles that gave birth to \nthe BRT-Lite concept—that of developing engagement based on receiv \ning rather than giving information. Thus when each group was con \nsulted, the scheme was explained as a means of solving their own prob \nlems rather than those problems identified by others; alien solutions \nwould not be imposed upon users. Through this approach, a sense of \nlocal ownership was developed, resulting in the perception of the BRT \nLite system as a user project and not a project owned by technocrats or \nbureaucrats. The benefits of this approach spread to the often skeptical \npress, whose reports both during and after construction, while some \ntimes pointing out problems, were not overly negative and were quick \nto emphasize the positives. \n\nThe public relations strategy during the development and construction stages consisted of advertising within the corridor in newspapers and on radio and television. TV commercials included a 90-second demonstra tion on how to use the BRT-Lite system: how to pay for a ticket and where and how to wait, board, and alight. Third-party advocacy was\n\nalso employed. Those with a voice in the community (local government chairmen, local chiefs, and community leaders) were welcomed to dis cussions on the BRT-Lite system, how it would operate, and how people might benefit. At the road shows held, handbills were distri buted in a range of languages that explained the new transport system.\n\nCommunity meetings were endorsed by local community leaders and were attended by senior LAMATA officers. The intention was to ensure that LAMATA was not a faceless organization, to allow access to real decision makers, and to show accountability. The effect was to raise LAMATA’s profile in general, but also portray it as an organization that would listen and deliver.\n\nIn parallel, meetings continued to be held with NURTW and its mem bers at the local level, as well as with taxi drivers and haulage operators. Through the consultation process, it became clearer that all users had the potential to benefit from the BRT-Lite system and that the key ob jective was to return life back to the citizens of Lagos.\n\nThe approach to consultation as a means of gathering information \nmade a genuine and meaningful contribution to scheme development. \nThe project was not just about the BRT-Lite system but also about faci \nlitating movement within the corridor. The project thus encompassed \nthe following: \n Constructing a segregated BRT roadway for the majority of the \ncorridor to ensure better and more reliable run times. The segre \ngated roadway was achieved largely by removing part of the me \ndian between the main and service roads. This step offered sig \nnificant improvements in the journey times and journey time re \nliability, which is of direct benefit to those who have no cars (the \nfirst target group just described) and gives a realistic alternative \nto the car for those who have cars but are reluctant to use them \n(the second target group). \n\n Narrowing of the median to ensure that the main carriageway widths remained largely unaltered. This step ensured support of the third target group, the well-to-do, together with haulers.  Banning of molue and danfo from the main carriageway, thereby increasing the capacity of the main carriageway and ensuring that travelers could choose between using the BRT-Lite system or other forms of public transport. This form of self-balancing “partial regulation” ensured that the limited capacity of the BRT Lite system during its early operation had a release valve, but it also allowed some freedom of choice for captive users of public transport, the first target group. Key to both stakeholder engagement and wider marketing was the en gagement of NURTW. Although NURTW had become convinced that it was appropriate for the city to move to a more regulated form of pub lic transport, its many members needed reassurance and had to be converted into ambassadors of the new transport mode. Meanwhile, the best drivers of the molue were en couraged to retrain to become “pi lots” of the BRT vehicles, thereby conveying to them a sense of status. The status among other operators was even greater; they believed they were part of the transport revolu tion sweeping across Lagos—a revolution generated by the local com munities and ignited by LAMATA. Moreover, more drivers were needed than ever before, and the working conditions had changed; the previously tense and often violent atmosphere in vehicles and at stops was being replaced by an environment that reflected the more ordered and civil population of users. The relationship between drivers and us ers is synergistic: more respectful drivers lead to a more compliant pop ulation, which leads to more respectful drivers. The BRT-Lite system was seen as the catalyst for change.\n\n“It is the best thing that has hap pened in Lagos this year. From Palmgrove to Ojota, I used to spend one hour in the traffic jam, but now it takes me five minutes.” —Private car owner\n\nThe official launch of the BRT \nLite system on the March 17, \n2008, was preceded by the na \ntional anthem and the national \npledge. The program of events, \nwhich were televised, began at \n1000 and was overseen by the \nexecutive and deputy state gov \nernors. In the launch booklet \nproduced, the system was portrayed as a major step forward in the de \nvelopment of the city of Lagos. \nThe opening of the BRT-Lite system was followed almost immediately \nlines of eager customers waiting to buy tickets and board vehicles, the \nreby reducing the passenger ramp-up period often observed with new \npublic transport schemes. In order to continue to foster scheme sup \nport, improve services, and spread the news about the new BRT-Lite \nsystem, the following public relations initiatives were launched to sup \nport the operations phase: \n When the BRT-Lite system was 100 days old, a BRT parliament \nwas established to assess and debate the performance of the sys \ntem and any issues arising from it. The parliament consists of se \nnior LAMATA officers, the lending bank, state government rep \nresentatives, and user representatives, including the physically \nchallenged and commuters. Moderated independently by a se \nnior academic from the University of Lagos, the parliament is at \ntended by some 1,500 people and even more watch the televised \nproceedings. \n A customer relations management line was established so that \nanyone with comments or questions can ring or text 24 hours a \nday, seven days a week. The line is manned by two operators. \nThe nature of the comments is logged and summarized in a cus \ntomer relations manager’s report and complaint tracking. \n\n In May 2008, a live TV program was launched to examine BRT issues. Shown on Sunday and repeated Tuesday, the program of ten consists of an interview with someone involved in the BRT Lite system or someone who has an opinion on it or its opera tion. The program has a weekly audience of about 5 million. BRT and LAMATA branding was used prior to implementa tion of the BRT-Lite system and was intensified after implemen tation by issuing all BRT-related staff and many others BRT-Lite polo shirts and baseball caps. This ges ture has ensured that BRT and LAMATA are highly known brands throughout Lagos.\n\nPerformance\n\nA full evaluation of the BRT-Lite system was undertaken seven months \nafter its launch to assess the performance of the scheme both operation \nally and in the eyes of its users. From this evaluation, a series of key per \nformance indicators were derived to measure the success of the scheme \nand allow benchmarking against other BRT or other transport systems \nworldwide. This evaluation was supported by a comprehensive quantit \native and qualitative data collection exercise. The following operational \ncharacteristics provide an overview of the BRT-Lite service: \n Operating headways range from an average of 30 seconds during \nthe morning peak hours, to about 45 seconds during the off-peak \nhours, to 40 seconds (1.5 buses per minute) during the evening \npeak hours. \n\n“Before the BRT, I sometimes spent more than four hours in the Ikorodu Road traffic jam. I pray to God that they can sustain it.” —A commuter\n\n The average journey time from Mile 12 to Lagos Island is just under one hour; the minimum and maximum journey times in this direction are 40 minutes and 70 minutes, respectively.  The average journey times in the northbound direction from La gos Island could be significantly shorter; the minimum recorded journey time on the express service is 20 minutes. The average journey time is 45 minutes, although this time varies by time of day: the average morning peak journey time is about 40 minutes, rising to 55 minutes during the evening peak hours, when the main traffic movement is away from Lagos Island.  Round-trip times considerably exceed the journey times because of terminal capacity problems and driver layovers (drivers stay with their buses during breaks), and so operating speeds are well below commercial speeds.  Queuing varies noticeably by stop, direction, and time of day. Significant queues of 200 or more people have been recorded during the peak periods at some stops, particularly the Mile 12 terminal. However, with the high-frequency vehicle departures, this translates into an average (median) queuing time of 10 mi nutes. The average queuing times are greater during peak hours, approaching 15 minutes, but they falling between peak hours, with no queuing recorded at many stops. In addition to the performance indicators, the evaluation gives more insight into the nature of the ridership and the impact of the BRT-Lite system on travel behavior along the corridor as well as on Lagos as a whole. This insight is described in the following sections.\n\nHow many passengers take the new system? \nUse of the BRT-Lite system has been observed through a series of \nboarding surveys, which reveal the following figures: \n The system serves 195,000 passengers on an average weekday. \n\n Over 1,150,000 passengers pass through the system in a full week. The application of locally derived annualization indicates that the system may carry about 60 million passengers over a year of operation.\n\nThe daily ridership volume of the BRT Lite system already place it as one of the largest bus systems in the world in terms of passenger num bers. Although the system does not approach the ridership of the TransMilenio system in Bogotá, Colombia, which employs dual lanes and an extensive network of local end express services across the city, the BRT-Lite patronage is comparable to that of many of the individual lines in Curitiba, Brazil, and approaches that of the Metrobus in Quito, Equador.\n\n| Comparison of 10 Urban Transport Systems in Length and Ridership | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| Name | | | | City | | | Country | | | Length | Population | | | Peak hour | | | Daily | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | | | | (km) | | (millions) | | one-way | | | two- way | | | | |\n| TransMilenio | | | | Bogotá | | | Colombia | | | | 84 | | 7 | | 45,000 | | 1,300,000 | | | | |\n| Assis Brasil Busway | | | | Porto | | | Brazil | | | 4.9 | | | 3.7 | | 28,000 | | | 290,000 | | | |\n| | | | | Alegre | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |\n| Metrobus ! El Trole | | | | Quito | | | Ecuador | | | 16.1 | | | 1.8 | | 7,000 | | | 240,000 | | | |\n| 9 de Julho Busway | | | | Sao Paulo | | | Brazil | | | | 7 | | 10 | | 35,000 | | | 196,000 | | | |\n| BRT Lite | | | | LAGOS | | | NIGERIA | | | | 22 | 15 + | | | 10,000 | | | 195,000 | | | |\n| Sul Busway | | | | Curitiba | | | Brazil | | | 10.1 | | | 2.7 | | 13,000 | | | 156,200 | | | |\n| Blok M Kota Line 1 | | | | Jakarta | | | Indonesia | | | 12.9 | | | 9.8 | | 6,500 | | | 100,000 | | | |\n| SE Busway | | | | Brisbane | | | Australia | | | | 17 | | 1.7 | | 18,000 | | | 150,000 | | | |\n| Megabus | | | | Pereira | | | Columbia | | | 16.7 | | | 0.7 | | | | | 45,000 | | | |\n| Adelaide O-bahn | | | | Adelaide | | | Australia | | | | 3 | | 1.1 | | 4,000 | | | 30,000 | | | |\n| What is the mode share for the BRT-Lite system? | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |\n| The BRT-Lite system currently carries over a quarter of all the trips | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |\n| recorded along its corridor (or 37 percent of public transport trips), | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |\n| even though BRT-Lite vehicles represent just 4 percent of vehicles on | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |\n| the route. The system carries nearly a tenth of all trips inbound to Lagos | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |\n\nIsland, the commercial heartland of Lagos and a main destination on the route.\n\nThe level of demand is currently constrained by the capacity in peak periods. Thus by increasing its capacity, the BRT-Lite system could tap the demand currently being served by other transport modes.\n\nWho uses the BRT-Lite system?\n\nAnalysis of the occupations of BRT-Lite users demonstrates that a broad range of travelers use the system. A large majority are self employed, reflecting the local prevalence of entrepreneurs running their own businesses. Civil servants and students also constitute a significant proportion of the BRT-Lite ridership. And there is evidence of ridership among the higher-ranking employment categories, including manage ment, professionals, and directors.\n\nWhat were passengers riding before the BRT-Lite system opened?\n\nThe majority of BRT-Lite passengers were using the existing public \ntransport: \n Eight-five percent were taking danfo, the small commuter buses. \n Eight percent were using the larger molue or commercial buses. \n Four percent were traveling by car, and a further 2 percent by \ntaxi, okada (motorcycle taxis), or kabu kabu (shared taxis). \nThe modal shift from pri \nvate transport appeared to \nbe relatively low. However, \nevidence that even a small \nproportion of previous car users have been willing to use the new sys \ntem is testimony to a change in thinking in a society in which car own \nership is an aspiration, marking a change in status from which people \nrarely retreat. \nWhat is the main travel purpose of BRT-Lite users? \nSurvey data show that during the morning (0600–1000) and evening \n(1600–1900) peak hours the majority of travelers are commuting to or \nfrom their places of work. Business customers account for over a quar \nter of all trips, and this proportion remains fairly consistent throughout \nthe day. The majority of shopping trips occur during the inter-peak \nhours, accounting for a quarter of the trips during this period com \npared with under 10 percent during the morning peak hour and 13 per \ncent in the evening. \n\nEducation-related trips account for about 10 percent of trips across the day, with a slight bias toward morning and interpeak “I am happy for my children to use BRT to go to school. There used to be too much risk with danfo.” —A mother\n\n“My husband drops me at TBS and I get BRT to work most days.” —A commuting lawyer periods—that is, the main portion of return school trips are likely to take place before the evening peak period.\n\nJourney Purpose of BRT-Lite Passengers by Time of Day\n\n| | | | Morning Peak | | | | Interpeak | | | Evening Peak | | |\n| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |\n| | | 13% | | | | 11% | | | | 8% | | |\n| | | 9% | | Commute Business | | | | Commute 35% Business | 13% | | | Commute Business |\n| | | | | | 25% | | | | | | | |\n| | | 26% | | shopping 52% education | | | | shopping education | 27% | | | shopping 52% education |\n| | | | | | | | 29% | | | | | |\n| | | | | | | | | | | | | |\n\nWhat do BRT-Lite users think of the new system?\n\nUser opinion of the new system is strongly positive in comparison with opinion on the alternative modes of transport. A majority strongly agreed that the BRT-Lite system is better than other modes in all the journey attributes mentioned. In particular, respondents found the\n\nBRT-Lite system to be faster and more comfortable than the alterna\n\ntives.\n\nIn all attributes, over 90 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the BRT-Lite system is better than the previous mode of travel. The system is, then, clearly considered to be superior to other\n\nmodes by the vast majority\n\n80%\n\nof users.\n\n70%\n\n60%\n\n50%\n\nHow does the BRT-Lite\n\n40%\n\n30%\n\njourney compare to alterna\n\n20%\n\nstrongly agree\n\ntive travel options?\n\nagree\n\n10% not sure\n\n0%\n\ndisagree\n\nThe reasons for the popular\n\nstongly disagree\n\nity of the BRT-Lite service became clear when respon\n\nBRT is ... than my previous mode of travel dents compared the relative\n\njourney attributes of the system with those of the alternative modes of transport. Because the other public transport vehicles are now limited to the service lanes, those that still ply the route tend to focus on the shorter journeys, thereby attracting passengers who are traveling short er distances or from intermediate stops where the BRT-Lite capacity is limited. It is therefore necessary to transfer from one transport to another to make an end-to-end journey from Mile 12 to CMS if travel ing on other public transport modes. An example would be a two-stage trip from Mile 12 to Ojuelegba, and then on to CMS. The alternative from Mile 12 is to access the island via the Third Mainland Bridge, al though the majority of services using this route terminate at Obalende from which a further short stage is required to reach CMS. The journey attributes for the two alternative journey options compared with the BRT journey are as follows:\n\nMile 12 to CMS Other public transport on corridor \nVia Third Mainland \nBridge \nBRT-Lite \nTotal in-vehicle journey time 78 minutes 64 minutes 55 minutes \nFare (Nigerian naira) 230 120 100 \nInterchange 1 1 0 \nTotal wait time 45 minutes 10 minutes 15 minutes \n\nFor end-to-end journeys, the advantages of traveling by BRT-Lite are clear. The journey is faster than that using the other route options; pas sengers save about 10–20 minutes in vehicle time. Journey time advan tages are further increased compared with other in-corridor trips by avoiding the need to change transport to access the central business district.\n\nThe BRT-Lite offers a premium service in terms of both run time and vehicle quality, but its fares are actually lower than those for other travel options. The BRT-Lite fare is particularly preferential to competing modes along the corridor, where the requirement to transfer from one vehicle to another and the high fares for shorter journeys lead to a sig nificantly higher fare for the full journey. There is evidence that other\n\noperators are attempting to profit from the demand that does not choose the BRT-Lite service, primarily because of the capacity con straints of the system.\n\nSo, with every aspect of the BRT-Lite journey comparing favorably \nagainst the competitive modes, what do BRT-Lite users point to the \nmost important factor behind their choosing to use the system? \n Quicker journey time: 35 percent of respondents \n Comfort: 20 percent of respondents \n Cheaper than alternatives: just under 20 percent of respondents \n Safety or the improved security of the system: 13 percent of res \npondents \n More reliable: 5 percent of respondents \n\nHas the BRT-Lite system changed passengers’ travel patterns? The introduction of the BRT-Lite service has influenced some travelers to change their travel patterns. Nearly a quarter of travelers questioned said that their use of the service had led to a change in the time of day that they traveled. Eighty percent of these said that the greater speed or reliability of the BRT-Lite service allowed them to travel at the time they wanted rather than having to leave early to ensure reaching their destinations in time. Just 6 percent changed their time of travel for the negative reason of avoiding the queues for the service.\n\nFifteen percent of travelers stated that they changed the number of trips they made, of which four-fifths made more trips using the BRT-Lite system for positive reasons such as the reduced journey time, cost, com fort, or improved accessibility. Of the respondents who said they made fewer trips, some of these were attributed to the reduced requirement to transfer to another vehicles, which again is positive, if not strictly con stituting a change in the number of trips (as opposed to trip stages).\n\nEighteen percent of travelers had changed their destinations, mainly to those served by the BRT-Lite route, although a couple of respondents mentioned that the BRT-Lite service allows them to travel to locations farther out than was practical previously. This is a clear indicator of the potential of the BRT-Lite service to influence land use decisions.\n\nHow does the BRT-Lite system fit into the full journey pattern of \ntravelers? \nAnalysis of trip-making patterns has shown how the BRT-Lite system \noccupies part of a series of travel modes between origin and destination. \nOnly around a third of travelers use the BRT-Lite service as the sole \nmeans of making a journey. \n\nA large proportion of BRT-Lite users take danfo for a leg of their jour neys, and okada is a popular mode as well, used as a means of access to the transport network and the BRT-Lite corridor. On average, the number of stages needed for BRT-Lite passengers to make a single trip for is 1.96.\n\nModes of Transport in the BRT-Lite Corridor\n\nMode taken Percentage of travelers \nBRT only 31 \nBRT, danfo 41 \nBRT, okada 17 \nBRT, danfo, okada 7 \nBRT, taxi 1 \n\nConclusion: Critical Success Factors\n\nAccording to the recent evaluation, the BRT-Lite service has had a sig nificant impact on those traveling along the Ikorodu Road corridor in Lagos. It has produced a new interpretation of bus rapid transit that is rooted in established BRT practice but is grounded in a detailed under standing of local user needs, the key requirement being effective deli very. In this way, the BRT-Lite service has been able to improve the quality of lives of not only its users but also those who travel along the corridor by other modes and those who choose to locate their business es there. It also provides a platform on which to develop a network of BRT routes as part of the city’s integrated transport network. In its cur rent form, the BRT-Lite service is both proof of a delivery mechanism and a pilot scheme from which improvements can be made. It is also a demonstration of focused delivery in challenging circumstances and therefore is an important reference case for those seeking to develop bus rapid transit elsewhere. The success is evident in the widespread interest in developing similar approaches in the Nigerian cities of Port Harcourt, Ibadan, Calabar, and Kano as well as cities elsewhere in the world that have visited and reviewed the BRT-Lite system.\n\nThe central challenges in implementing the BRT system in Lagos were accommodating the high levels of demand in the face of a dilapidated infrastructure of limited capacity, ensuring that operations were sus tainable by means of the appropriate delivery structures, establishing the appropriate regulations and ensuring compliance, and winning the support of the people of Lagos.\n\nThis document has summarized the definition, process, and perfor \nmance of the BRT-Lite system. The critical success factors are consi \ndered to be the following: \n LAMATA, a public transport authority that has the appropri \nate expertise, energy, and desire to succeed and that is able to \n\nplan, regulate, and form relationships to ensure the delivery of public transport services.  Political commitment and support with a clear focus on out comes when difficult decisions are required and opposition surfaces.  Supportive transport organizations, together with a stakehold er engagement program that educates, defines roles, and de monstrates the benefits and linkages in cross-sectoral delivery involving public and private participation.  The effort to define a form of bus rapid transit that meets user needs, is appropriate to the context in which it is placed, and is affordable and deliverable in the broadest sense.\n\nBeautification Empowerment Safety\n\n"
  }
]